AN OXFAM REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR POVERTY IN NAMIBIA
M
Y
First Published 1986
©Oxfam 1986
ISBN 0 85598 0761
Printed in Great Britain by Express Litho Service (Oxford)
Published by Oxfam
274 Banbury Road
Oxford 0X2 7DZ
United Kingdom
This book converted to digital file in 2010
Acknowledgements
My main thanks must go to all the Namibian people who generously gave
their time and expertise to help with the research for this book,
particularly Oxfam friends and partners.
I am also grateful to the Overseas Development Administration, the
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, the Catholic Institute for International
Relations and the Namibian Support Committee for their assistance in
providing information.
Thanks are especially due for the time and advice given by all those who
read and commented on the drafts. In particular, I am grateful to Richard
Moorsom who helped with both research and editing, and to Justin Ellis,
Julio Faundez, Peter Katjavivi, Prudence Smith, Paul Spray and Brian
Wood.
This book reflects the collective experience of Oxfam's work in Namibia
over the past twenty-two years and I have therefore relied on the active
collaboration of Oxfam staff and trustees. Sue Coxhead deserves special
thanks for her help with research and typing.
Finally, without the special help with childcare given by Mandy
Bristow, Caroline Lovick and Prudence Smith, the book would never
have seen the light of day.
Susanna Smith
March 1986
A M B I AA N G O L A
3*S^_5 Okavango
S i Swamp
.or
B O T S W A N A
AT LANTIC
OCEAN
Luderi
Oranjemu
A F R I C A
Map 1: Namibia and its neighbours
Map 2: Namibia
Scale: 100
frontiers
restricted areas
'homelands'
tar roads
«~ other roads
railways
rivers
I capital city
A main towns
A mines: 1 TSUMEB copper/lead
2 ROSSING uranium
3 ORANJEMUNO diamonds
200 miles
Adapted from The Namibians, the Minority Rights Group
report no. 19, London, 1985.
Contents
8 NAMIBIA - Basic Facts
10 CHRONOLOGY
14 INTRODUCTION
20 Chapter 1 - THE ECONOMY: Wealth based on poverty
21 PEOPLE
22 The'Homelands'
26 Repressive Legislation
28 Trade Unions
28 Poverty
32 Cost of Living
34 LAND
36 Agriculture and Food
36 Commercial Agriculture
39 Farm Labourers
39 Peasant Agriculture
41 MINING AND MINERALS
43 FISHING
46 Chapter 2 - OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPMENT
47 OXFAM'SROLE
48 EDUCATION
49 Education for an Independent Namibia
53 HEALTH
53 Poverty and Poor Health
53 Malnutrition
54 Infectious Diseases
55 Stress-related Health Problems
55 Mental Stress
57 Alcoholism
57 Organisation of Health Services
57 Orientation of Health Services
60 MILITARY OCCUPATION
64 Chapter 3 - BRITISH RESPONSIBILITIES
64 DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL LINKS
65 INTERNATIONAL LAW
65 South Africa's Illegal Occupation and International Inaction
69 Protecting Namibia's Natural Resources
70 ECONOMIC LINKS
73 BRITISH AID TO NAMIBIA
73 BRITAIN'S LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA
73 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC MEASURES
75 THE INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN COMPANIES IN NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA
78 THE VIEWS OF OXFAM'S PARTNERS IN NAMIBIA
80 SUMMARY AND KEY CONSIDERATIONS
82 Notes and References
89 Appendices
98 Abbreviations
99 Bibliography
NAMIBIA
Bask Facts
Government International law recognises the United Nations Council
for Namibia as the legal administering authority for
Namibia, and in turn the United Nations recognises the
South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) as
the "sole authentic representative" of the people.
However, Namibia is illegally occupied by South Africa.
Namibia is referred to by South Africa as 'South West
Africa/Namibia'.
Capital Windhoek.
Area 824,000 km2 - over 3 times the size of the UK, and 2/3
the size of South Africa.
Population 1.46 million. Black 94%, white 6%. 70% of the black
(1983)1 population is rural. Approximate growth rate of black
population 3%.
Language Oshivambo is the main indigenous language group, and
is spoken by half the black population. Afrikaans is the
main official language.
Land 5,000 large white-owned farms occupy 77% of all the
Ownership viable farming land. 190,000 black peasant farming
households are crowded onto fragments of inferior land
and desert on the fringe of the white-owned farming
land.2
Economy GDP per capita R 1,400 ($1,259)
(1983)3 GNP per capita R 1,200 ($1,079)
GNP is normally 25-30% below GDP. The difference is
wealth made in Namibia but sent abroad, mostly as
corporate profits.
Main exports: diamonds, uranium oxide, base metals,
beef/cattle, karakul (lamb pelts used for fur coats), fish
and fish products.
Distribution GDP per capita - whites R5.800 ($5,168)
of wealth - blacks R330 ($297)
(1983)4 - black peasants R130 ($117)
Health Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)5
- for blacks 155
- for whites 21
Education 60% of black adults are illiterate.6
- Only 1 % of black adults have completed secondary
education.7
- Schooling is compulsory for white children, but not
for black.
- Per capita, the state spends over five times more on
white children's education than on black children's.8
Chronology
1820-30s Orlams and other Khoisan groups move north from Cape Province.
1850 Jonker Afrikander (Nama leader) defeats Hereros.
1862-70 Nama-Herero Wars.
1868 British Commissioner sent from Cape Town.
1876 Boers trek to north-east of territory.
1878 Walvis Bay (today Namibia's only deep-water port) annexed by
Britain.
1884-85 German colonial period starts following Berlin Conference.
German expropriation of Namibian land begins. Walvis Bay taken
over by the Cape Colony, now part of South Africa.
1888 Maharero, Herero chief, forces Germans to withdraw from his
capital.
1889 First German troops arrive.
1890 Germany annexes territory.
1892 German troops massacre Namas.
1894 Another defeat of the Namas; Herero rebellion crushed.
1904 Ovambos defeat Portuguese expedition at Naulila.
1904-07 Namas and Hereros revolt again. German colonial administration
adopts genocide policy against Herero people; over 80,000
Namibians killed. Cattle and land confiscated for settler farmers.
1908 Discovery of diamonds leads to mineral rush and growth of
settlement.
1914 Outbreak of World War I; South Africa aligns with Britain against
Germany.
1915 South African colonial period starts
Germany surrenders Namibia to South African troops.
Military administration of Namibia by South Africa.
10
1919 Treaty of Versailles at end of World War I. Germany's colonies
confiscated and redistributed.
1920 Namibia placed under League of Nations mandate to be
administered by South Africa on behalf of the British Crown.
1922 South Africa establishes 'reserves' and starts to distribute land to
settlers.
1925 Legislative Council established with all-white electorate.
1939 Outbreak of World War II; South Africa sends troops to Namibia
to prevent pro-Hitler coup by German settlers. Many Namibian and
South African blacks serve in the South African forces, fighting
against Nazi Germany."
1946 South Africa refuses to hand over mandate for Namibia to United
Nations (UN) trusteeship on grounds that it does not recognise UN
as successor to League of Nations.
1948 Victory of Afrikaner National Party in South Africa; beginning of
modern apartheid legislation.
1949 First petition by Namibians to UN for end of South African rule.
1950 International Court of Justice unanimous decision that mandate is
still in existence (contrary to South African claim that it ceased
with the League of Nations).
Protest against 'removals' in Windhoek, twelve killed, fifty
wounded when police open fire.
1957 Ovamboland People's Congress founded, the precursor to
SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organisation), Namibia's
national liberation movement.
1960 SWAPO founded.
1961 Ethiopia and Liberia apply to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) to end South Africa's League of Nations mandate.
1964 Odendaal Commission's report outlines a blueprint for the
establishment of separate 'homelands' for Namibia's black people.
1965 Organisation of African Unity recognises SWAPO as the liberation
movement of Namibia.
1966 The UN General Assembly revokes South Africa's mandate over
Namibia, and orders South Africa to withdraw. South Africa
refuses. SWAPO starts military offensive, marking beginning of
liberation war against South Africa's forces.
1967 United Nations Council for Namibia (UNCN) established to
administer Namibia on the UN's behalf until independence. The
UNCN has been denied access to Namibia, by South Africa, ever
since.
11
1968 South Africa begins to implement 'homelands' policy in Namibia.
Thirty-eight SWAPO members, including Ja Toivo (currently
SWAPO Secretary General), put on trial in Pretoria on terrorism
charges: twenty-one sentenced to life imprisonment on Robben
Island.
1971 The ICJ gives its Advisory Opinion that South Africa occupies
Namibia illegally.
1973 SWAPO recognised by the UN as the "sole authentic
representative"of the Namibian people.
1974 The UNCN passes its Decree no. 1 for the Protection of
Namibia's Natural Resources requiring UNCN consent for any
exploitation of natural resources undertaken by foreign companies.
1975 Angola becomes independent and gives SWAPO new military
bases. South Africa starts the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference
in an attempt to promote client political groupings inside Namibia
and thus bypass SWAPO's political influence.
1977 South Africa appoints an Administrator-General for Namibia with
full legislative and executive powers. South Africa re-annexes
Walvis Bay.
The UK, USA, Canada, France and West Germany form the
Contact Group to negotiate with South Africa over Namibia's
independence.
1978 Contact Group's proposals incorporated in UN Security Council
(SO Resolution 435 for free and fair elections aimed at leading to
early independence. Resolution accepted both by SWAPO and
South Africa. But South Africa has rejected the UN programme
for implementation ever since.
Contrary to the terms of SC Resolution 435, South Africa holds
internal elections (boycotted by SWAPO) and then installs the
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) of client political groups as
the National Assembly with wide legislative powers. International
community refuses to acknowledge the new interim government
which is declared null and void by the UN Security Council.
South African commando raid kills 700 Namibian refugees in
Angola. War intensifies.
1980 Compulsory military service in the South African armed forces
extended to black Namibians.
South Africa mounts further military incursions into Angola.
1981 UN Pre-lmplementation Meeting, Geneva. South Africa says it is
premature to proceed towards ceasefire.
New US administration, under President Reagan, introduces
'linkage' policy making Namibia's independence conditional on the
withdrawal of Cuban troops stationed in Angola.
12
More South African military attacks in Angola.
Southern African 'frontline' states call for economic sanctions
against South Africa to pressurise it to accept implementation of
SC Resolution 435.
1983 DTA administration collapses and the South African-appointed
Administrator-General assumes direct rule.
France leaves Contact Group in protest at US 'linkage' policy.
South Africa invades Angola again.
1984 SWAPO and South African officials meet in Zambia and Cape
Verde. No agreement due to South Africa's insistence on 'linkage'
and South Africa's refusal to abide by terms of Resolution 435.
UN Secretary blames 'linkage' issue for stalemate, saying that
agreement had been reached on all other outstanding issues.
Military conscription of Namibian blacks extends age limit to 55.
1985 'Multi-Party Conference' (MPC) administration unilaterally
announced as 'interim government' by South Africa to replace
failed DTA. MPC is boycotted by SWAPO and condemned by
Churches in Namibia, the Non-Aligned Movement, the EEC and
unilaterally by western nations including Britain.
Mass arrests by police and army in Namibia as civilians
demonstrate against the new 'interim government'.
South African troops mount largest-ever military exercise in
Namibia called Vuiswys, Afrikaans for 'fist-showing'.
The Commonwealth Nassau Communique in October condemns
South Africa's continued illegal occupation, and agrees on limited
sanctions against South Africa on these grounds, inter alia.
1986 South African President, P.W. Botha, announces implementation
of SC Resolution 435 from August 1, provided agreement is
reached on withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. South
Africa's continued insistence on 'linkage' remains unacceptable to
SWAPO, the Angolan Government and UN. The stalemate over
Namibia's independence continues.
13
Introduction
Namibia is one of the wealthiest countries in Africa, with rich mineral
deposits, fertile coastal fishing grounds and plenty of good stock-farming
land. Yet the majority of Namibians live in extreme poverty. The facts in
this report show emphatically that their poverty is directly caused by the
economic, political and social policies and structures imposed on Namibia
by South Africa.
Successive land expropriation first by the German and then by the
South African colonial authorities has robbed Namibians of their
economic independence. Forced into reserves on land which the white
settlers did not want, black Namibians have been systematically
pauperised. However, it is their labour which has built the prosperity of
the colonial economy.
Women, unemployed men, children and the old are imprisoned by
poverty in urban slums and in the 'homelands' where they must scratch
a living as best they can. Whereas the South African-controlled
administration ensures good health care and education for the whites,
services for the black majority are grossly inadequate. In contrast to the
opulent lifestyle enjoyed by the white minority, the poverty endured by
the majority seems all the more appalling. This inequality means that a
black baby is over seven times more likely to die in infancy than a white
baby.1
Impoverished and oppressed by apartheid rule, the Namibian people
are also suffering the devastating effects of military occupation. An
estimated 100,000 members of the South African Defence Force
presently occupy Namibia as a result of the bitter war being waged in the
north with SWAPO guerillas.2 This makes Namibia one of the most
intensively occupied countries in the world.3 Some 75-80,000 Namibians
have left their country, fleeing from poverty, oppression and military
occupation.4
Oxfam has been funding small-scale development and humanitarian
projects in Namibia since 1964 and providing humanitarian assistance to
Namibian refugees. Based on this experience, Oxfam's view is that the
widespread poverty and underdevelopment which exists today is
14
preventable. However, only after independence will Namibia's people
have the power to begin to reshape their society and transform the
inequitable structures which cause and perpetuate their poverty.
After independence huge problems will of course remain. In writing this
book Oxfam's aim is to raise awareness of the suffering of the Namibian
people and to create a sense of urgency over the need for independence.
The interminable high-level UN negotiations over Namibia's
independence have made the issue seem remote and confusing. The
basic problem is, however, very simple: two decades since the UN
General Assembly ordered South Africa to withdraw, Namibia remains
the last country in Africa under white colonial rule.
In 1920 South Africa took over the administration of Namibia on behalf
of the British Crown, under a League of Nations mandate. Under its terms
South Africa was mandated to "promote to the utmost the material and
moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the
territory"^ However, in spite of its acceptance of this mandate and of "a
sacred trust for civilisation" for Namibia's people,6 successive South
African governments have imposed apartheid policies on Namibia and
drained the country of its riches.
The UN, in 1945, took over trusteeship of territories previously under
League of Nations mandates. South Africa refused to give up its
mandate, demanding the right to annex Namibia. This was rejected by the
UN General Assembly and the long and fruitless international
deliberations over Namibia began.
In 1971 the International Court of Justice declared that South Africa's
occupation of Namibia was illegal. But Namibia remains an international
pawn, its future tied up with superpower politics and foreign economic
interests. The five western countries with the biggest economic stake in
Namibia Britain, West Germany, the United States, France and
Canada set themselves up in 1977 as the 'Contact Group' to negotiate
with South Africa the terms of Namibia's independence. These
negotiations led to the UN Security Council's Resolution 435, outlining
the terms for free and fair elections and full independence. Resolution 435
is the most important internationally acceptable statement of intent,
which has governed all diplomacy concerning Namibia since its adoption
in 1978.
Although the South African Government agreed to the terms of
Resolution 435, it has prevaricated ever since over the UN implementation
programme.
South Africa's evasion of UN control on this issue lies at the heart of the
political deadlock over Namibia's independence. Other states with
substantial economic interests in South Africa have lacked sufficient
political will to enforce implementation of Resolution 435.
The deadlock was compounded in 1981 when the new US
administration introduced the concept of 'linkage' into the negotiations,
insisting that Namibia's independence should be conditional on the
15
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. (The Cuban troops had been
invited into newly-independent Angola in November 1975 to repel attacks
by UNITA forces and the South African military.7)
Although the UN and the other Contact Group states declared that
'linkage' was irrelevant to implementation of Resolution 435, the United
States has continued to promote it as a key condition of Namibian
independence.
France resigned from the Contact Group in protest at the introduction
of linkage', but Britain has taken a different view. After his visit to some
of the southern African 'frontline' states in January 1985, the UK
Oxfam's Namibia Programme
Oxfam has been funding small-scale development and humanitarian projects in
Namibia since 1964, and has been providing humanitarian assistance to Namibian
refugees.1
Inside Namibia, Oxfam has supported a range of projects. One example is a
small scheme in the south of the country where local people have organised their
own independent school . As well as providing a decent education, the school
also runs its own garden where the parents grow fruit and vegetables for the
children and for the old people in the area. In this way, the most vulnerable
sections of their community have an improved diet, and there is a little left over for
sale to raise funds for the school. Fresh garden produce is otherwise hard to come
by. In the shops, fruit and vegetables are expensive and usually far from fresh as
they are generally imported by road from South Africa.
Another example is a community creche in Katatura, the township reserved for
'blacks' outside Windhoek. Many poor women, particularly those who are
bringing up families alone, find daytime childcare for the under-sevens a problem
as there are no state nurseries to care for children while their mothers are out at
work or looking for work. As a result, pre-school children are often left all day to
fend for themselves in the streets. The creche provides a secure, daytime home
for fifteen such children. As one of the creche workers explained:
"Our aim is to help some of the poor women of Katatura. We are all so poor that
we have to rely on each other if we are to survive. Our creche has been running
for one year now, and you can see how well the children are getting on. Their
mothers are so happy to have the creche, because now they don't have the
terrible anxiety of leaving their children alone while they go to work." 2
A third example is the literacy training undertaken by the Namibian Literacy
Programme (NLP), a voluntary organisation which organises adult learners'
groups throughout the country. One NLP worker explained:
"We are working to help people overcome the enormous educational
inequalities in this country. Illiteracy is a big social handicap, and the majority of
adults are illiterate. People join our groups for all sorts of reasons. For example,
a lot of women join so that they will be able to write letters to their husbands
working away from home as migrant labourers. " 3
16
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Geoffrey
Howe, stated: "One must recognise that the best possible prospect for
settlement lies in the negotiations now led by the United States. Linkage
was no part of the Security Council's Resolution. We do not recognise it
as a precondition for settlement, but the fact that a linkage has been made
cannot be ignored if a settlement is to be reached." 8
During 1985, international opinion against South Africa hardened,
largely due to the South African Government's violent reaction to
growing black civilian resistance to apartheid. This provoked renewed
international concern and many western nations decided to impose
Oxfam Grants To Namibian Projects For The Last Four
Financial Years
1982-83 £3,918
1983-84 62,511
1984-85 84,609
1985-86 (to 30.3.86) 84,037
Children playing at an Oxfam-funded community creche in Katatura.
17
limited economic sanctions against South Africa to increase the pressure
for change.
However, notwithstanding this increased international focus on South
Africa, the stalemate over negotiations for a just settlement in Namibia
continues. The once-active Contact Group has faded into inaction and
Britain appears to be passively backing American diplomatic initiatives.
Despite President P W Botha's recently announced deadline of August
1st 1986 for beginning implementation of Resolution 435, the condition of
linkage' to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola remains a major
stumbling block.
The prospect of Namibia attaining an internationally recognised
independence is still bleak. However, if the international community were
to join together and press unconditionally for Namibia's long-denied right
to independence, South Africa would find it hard to sustain its illegal
occupation.
The challenge facing Britain is clear. There is now an urgent need to
consider new measures to secure Namibia's unconditional independence,
to relieve the poverty, distress and suffering of the Namibian people.
18
Summary of the main terms of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 4353
" Free and fair elections for the whole of Namibia as one political entity,
under the supervision and control of the UN.
" Universal adult suffrage.
" Elections to be held for a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a
Constitution for an independent Namibia. The Constitution to
determine the organisation and powers of all levels of government.
" Before the start of the electoral campaign, the Administrator-General
of Namibia to repeal all remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws,
regulations, or administrative measures which might prejudice that
objective.
" Before the start of the electoral campaign, the release of all Namibian
political prisoners or political detainees held by the South African
authorities should be arranged so that they may participate freely in the
electoral process.
" All Namibian refugees to be permitted to return peacefully and
participate fully in the electoral process, and the UN to ensure that
Namibians in exile are given a free and voluntary choice whether to
return.
" A binding ceasefire by all parties and the restriction of South African
and SWAPO armed forces to base. Thereafter a phased withdrawal
from Namibia of the majority of South African troops.
" All unilateral measures taken by the illegal government in Namibia in
relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of
voters or transfer of power, are null and void.
19
CHAPTER 1
THE ECONOMY:
Wealth based on poverty
Namibia is one of the wealthiest countries in Africa, with a per capita GDP
in 1983 of R 1,400 ($1,259),1 but the wealth is very unevenly distributed.
In Oxfam's experience some of the worst examples of chronic poverty
and suffering in Africa are to be found amongst Namibia's black
population, alongside the wealthy and privileged lifestyle enjoyed by the
minority white population. The average ratio of white to black incomes is
about 18:1,2 though recent moves by South Africa to promote a black
elite of salaried civil servants and political appointees has reduced this
discrepancy for some blacks.
The basis of the country's wealth is its abundant natural resources:
land, minerals, the sea and, above all, the people, who have been robbed
of their economic independence and kept grindingly poor. The basis of
the people's poverty is the unchecked exploitation and export of the
country's wealth by South African, British and other foreign interests.
Poverty for the majority is created in two main ways. Firstly, much of
Namibia's wealth is exported by foreign investors.3 Secondly, the
colonial structure of the economy means that wealth remaining inside the
country is almost entirely in white hands. Even the taxes raised by the
government are disproportionately spent on services for whites.
Moreover, foreign companies employ whites in nearly all the best-paid
and supervisory jobs. In 1983, only about 22% of GDP was left over for
the black population, who formed 94.5% of the total population. Of this
22% of GDP, about two thirds went on wages to workers, another tenth
represented the earnings of small business people and traders, leaving
only a quarter for the peasant population.4 Thus, barely 6% of GDP was
left over for the peasant population, by far the largest section of black
society.
The sheer profitability of colonialism has meant that Namibia's Gross
National Product (retained in country) has been consistently lower, by
25-30%, than its Gross Domestic Product (produced in country). The
difference is wealth created in Namibia but sent abroad, mostly as
corporate profits. The severe recession reduced the difference in 1983 to
about 15%.5
20
PEOPLE
Namibia's people have been endlessly exploited in the interests of the
prosperous colonial economy. The comprehensive nature of colonial
social engineering has affected every important aspect of daily life for
blacks. As one black worker explained:
"Politics affects everything we do. For example, we can't expect equal
pay for equal work, so we can't ever be in a position to choose freely
where we live, as the white areas in town are too expensive for us." 6
Distribution of Namibia's GDP (1983)
Gross profits* of
foreign companies (TNCs)
and colonial businesses
(mostly farms and
fisheries)
40%Salaries and
allowances
to whites
18%
Taxes to
SA administration
in Namibia
20%
'Includes reinvestment
21
Map 3: Settlement patterns before colonisation
J
\\ San .... ^ ^ f c ^
\\ m oK\\ Nama O - r * ^ Damara
Damara ..;::::::'
\\;X;: Namax:;:;:j:;x;x;:j:;:j:;:j:;;j: :;x;:;x;:j:;:x:
\\ san -mMt&m^.
\\ '':x-:-:-: Nama
Kavango
San
|
!
Ill
mi
::::*x-x-|
x:xxxj
iisij
lip
i
i
i
i
i
i
^
Masubia
'^£&>
Vlafue
fiSSSa Main areas of settlement
Source: R.H. Green, M. & K. Kiljunen, Namibia: the Last Colony, Longman, Harlow, 1981.
The 'Homelands'
The principal way in which the South African authorities have controlled
Namibia's black population is by dividing them up into 'ethnic groups',
and by instituting a 'homelands' policy corresponding to the apartheid
concept of 'ethnicity'. The 'homelands' policy consolidated previous land
appropriation, whereby blacks were forced off their land into labour
reserves.
The present-day 'homelands' policy began with the South African
Government's appointment of the Odendaal Commission which was set
22
Map 4: 'Homelands' according to the Odendaal plan
|P>-i] African 'homelands'
j Areas reserved for whites
I Game reserves and other
I government areas
1 Kaokoland
2 Ovambo
3 Kavango
4 East Caprivi
5 Damaraland
6 Bushmanland
7 Hereroland
8 Rehoboth
9 Tswanaland
10 Namaland
up in 1962 to devise an apartheid blueprint for Namibia. In 1964, the
Commission's report was completed. It proposed to divide the Namibian
people up into twelve 'population groups', each with its own 'homeland'
and associated constitutional trappings but none of the powers of
independent government. Thus the aim was to prevent blacks, as a
unified political force, from participating in national government by
sealing them off into small, internal, quasi-nation states outside which
they would have no political rights, and inside which their political rights
would be restricted.
Implementation of the Commission's plan was held back pending
23
international developments, but by 1968 South Africa judged that it could
go ahead.7 New laws in 1968 and 1969 set the framework for
constructing the 'homelands' edifice.8 The Development of Self-
Government for Native Nations in South West Africa Act (1968)
provided for the creation, for each 'homeland', of a legislative council
with nominal ordinance-making powers and an executive council with
corresponding administrative powers. However, important matters such
as control of the military, police, foreign affairs and the amendment or
repeal of the Act itself were excluded.9
Extensive amendments to the 1968 Act were made by an act passed in
1973 which enabled the 'homelands' to become 'self-governing' as a
transitional phase prior to South Africa's conception of
'independence'.10 The 1973 Act allowed for each self-governing area to
have a cabinet consisting of a chief minister and other ministers.
After further delays caused by the transformation of the Turnhalle
Constitutional Conference into a National Assembly, the Administrator-
General for Namibia (appointed in 1977 by the South African Government
as the colonial governor) introduced Proclamation AG8 in 1980. This
provided for a second tier of government (underneath the then DTA-
dominated central administration), for each of Namibia's officially
classified 'ethnic groups'. The introduction of these second-tier
governments, also called 'representative authorities', or 'ethnic
administrations', was partly intended to make the 'homelands' policy
more palatable to international opinion. The geographical emphasis of the
previous 'homelands' legal arrangements was dropped in favour of a
definition which characterised each 'representative authority' as
responsible for the governmental matters of each 'population group',
wherever resident. But this is widely held to be a merely cosmetic
distinction since the administration centre for each 'population group'
remains in the previously proclaimed 'homeland' area. In any case the
very existence of separate governmental structures for each racial group,
and for each 'population group' amongst blacks, however presented, is
clearly a mechanism to promote 'divide and rule'.
Each 'representative authority' consists of a legislative assembly and
executive committee with local control over such matters as education,
health, housing, social welfare, agriculture, taxes, land tenure, civil
defence and internal security. But vital matters of national importance
such as foreign affairs, international negotiations, overall national
planning, and command over the military remain in the hands of the
South African-controlled central administration, under the
Administrator-General who has authority to veto any decisions it takes.11
Twelve 'population groups' were originally classified by the Odendaal
Commission, and ten 'homelands' for blacks were officially designated
during the main implementation phase from 1968 to 1977.u Three of
these have been given 'self-governing' status, and the others various
forms of tribal authority such as advisory boards or councils.
24
In practice, black Namibians are not divided in the way which the
apartheid classification suggests. Many are of mixed descent from
different 'ethnic groups'. Some groups are closely related to each other,
many live closely together, and urbanisation tends to break down rural
divisions. The Namibian Churches act as a cohesive force, and the
national liberation movement, led by SWAPO, has tried to create a
national identity in its attempt to overcome the imposed divisions.
"/ am a Namibian. I have lived and worked in every part of this country. My children and
grandchildren are also Namibians. "
25
Repressive Legislation
Since the beginning of the colonial era, a wide range of laws has been
introduced to control and exploit the black labour force. Together with
the poverty created by land appropriation, these laws have ensured a
continuous supply of cheap labour. They have served both to restrict
black people's movement and their residency rights. Other punitive laws
appear designed to keep blacks in a servile position and prevent the
growing impact of the national liberation movement.
In order to serve the labour requirements of the colonial economy, two
forms of discrimination against blacks were used, related to job sector
and to supposed place of residence. The aim was to prevent a free labour
market and thus to keep down labour costs : Accordingly, each
commercial sector was allocated its own reservoir of cheap black labour
and various 'Pass Laws' were introduced, restricting different categories
of blacks as to where, how, and for how long they could work.
Three legal categories of black worker were identified. Firstly,
preference was given to workers who qualified under stringent 'influx
control' laws to live permanently on farms or in the towns, mainly to
provide labour in small colonial businesses. Secondly, migrant workers
from the reserves in southern and central Namibia usually had to take
whatever work they were given. With extreme difficulty a few could gain
the legal right to settle permanently at their place of work. This category
of worker was principally used to augment the settled labour force in the
towns and ranches. Thirdly, the worst-off category were the 'contract
workers' (so called because in order to work at all they had to sign an
indenture depriving them of all rights).
'Contract workers' were drawn from the northern labour reserves
originally to work in the mines and state utilities, but were later used for
all manner of menial work. The 'contract labour' category exploited the
extreme poverty of thousands, and provided a great reserve army of
labour. These workers were available to fill any gaps not covered by the
other two categories, and paid so little that they undercut every other
section of black labour, ensuring that all categories came cheap.
'Contract workers' were completely unable to secure residency rights in
white areas, and so they were always separated from their families when
employed.
Pass Laws, ensuring that black workers had to obtain a maze of official
permits in order to be able to live or work anywhere outside the labour
reserves, were the main instrument of control. They restricted movement
and even the freedom to look for work. The general Pass Law was the
Native Administration Proclamation no. 11 of 1922 which ordered
that, "A native found beyond the confines of a location, reserve, farm or
place of residence or employment shall exhibit on demand to the police
his pass and on neglect to produce may be arrested. "
The Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation of 1924 imposed a more
26
comprehensive and detailed set of controls on workers in the towns and
mines. Other laws provided additional restrictions in particular industries,
notably the Mines and Works Proclamation of 1917 in mining, and the
Masters and Servants Proclamation of 1920 in farming. By requiring
that all blacks outside the reserves should have state-registered jobs, the
laws ensured that blacks were only allowed to stay in the designated
white areas for as long as they served the labour needs of the employers.
All workers had to have 'service contracts', usually for 12 to 18 months at
a time, and so the migrant labour system was perpetuated. Most blacks,
forced by poverty to find work in white areas, could not settle there with
their families. Instead, they had to leave their families in the impoverished
rural reserves, returning to join them only when their service contracts ran
out and they became unemployed again.
If the majority of migrant workers were badly off, the 'contract workers'
from the north were particularly oppressed. Their only choice was
whether or not to apply to SWANLA (the South West African Native
Labour Association), the semi-official labour recruiting organisation set
up in 1926 by the big mines. SWANLA indentures meant that workers had
to sign on for periods of 12 to 18 months. They had no right to give notice,
and on completion of their contract they had to return to the labour
reserve.
Punitive measures against workers gave white employers police-like
powers over black workers. A Vagrancy Law was introduced so that
blacks could be punished for leaving their designated areas except to
work for a white, and the Masters and Servants Proclamation made
'desertion' a criminal offence.
Widespread protest against the migrant labour system led to a general
strike in 1971/72 which was started by 'contract' workers. This was
brutally repressed by the South African police and army.13 However, it
resulted in the abolition of SWANLA which was replaced by a system of
labour bureaux run by the tribal authorities in the 'homelands'.14
In 1977, the Administrator-General repealed sections of the Pass Laws
thus allowing blacks to stay in urban areas without limit and abolishing the
carrying of passes. However, the Identification of Persons Act,
introduced in 1979, partly replaces the Pass Laws by requiring all adult
Namibians to carry an identity card which enables the security forces to
check on people's movements.
Major constraints on the free movement of migrant workers are still in
operation. They are still obliged to have their work contracts registered,
and employers risk a fine if they fail to comply. Moreover, the lack of
government provision for urban social services and totally inadequate
housing in the towns are the main reasons why workers are prevented
from bringing their families to settle with them at their place of work.15
The Abolishment of Racial Discrimination (Urban Areas and
Public Amenities) Act of 1979 opened all urban residential areas and
public amenities to all races. This could have been interpreted as an
27
encouraging step, but as one black woman farmer put it, "Apartheid is
about losing your rights and being poor, not about being able to eat in the
same restaurants as whites."16
The constitutional changes introduced in 1980 under Proclamation
AG8, by allowing the white population group a 'representative authority',
ensure that health and education services remain segregated along racial
lines because each 'representative authority' is responsible for health and
education services for its own 'population group'.
Trade Unions
Labour relations in Namibia are governed by the Wages and Industrial
Conciliation Ordinance of 1952 which excludes the largest group of
black workers, those employed on farms and in domestic service. In 1978
this law was amended to permit blacks to join and form their own trade
unions. However, the new legislation contained political restrictions,
making it illegal for a registered trade union to assist or affiliate to any
political party. Also no trade union may receive funds or assistance from
a political party. It is widely held that this legislation was intended to
curtail the activities of the main union for blacks, the National Union of
Namibian Workers, which was formed in 1978 and is affiliated to
SWAPO.
At the end of 1985, the Wages and Conciliation Amendment Bill
was hastily drawn up reportedly to prevent the employees at
Consolidated Diamond Mines from affiliating with the South African
National Union of Mineworkers.17
Poverty
While the underpaid labour of black men has fuelled the colonial
economy, the unpaid labour of black women has underwritten it. The
women of migrant labourers' families struggle in the impoverished rural
'homelands' to bring up the next generation of labourers, and to care for
the old, discarded generation. Unable to earn even a subsistence in the
'homelands', rural women have to depend on the often insecure
remittances of their menfolk. Those who receive none become destitute.
Johanna, a woman of 45 living in a dusty rural settlement in central
Namibia, is typical. She is bringing up ten children, all under 12, by
herself. She does this by begging food from her neighbours, all of whom
are themselves very poor.
"My life is terribly hard. Long ago, my husband went to Windhoek to
look for work, but he is unemployed so he never sends money. I get a
relief ration from the government each month of beans, maize, jam and
fat but it only lasts us for 4 days, so I live by begging for the rest of the
month. I send the children out to beg small amounts of food from my
neighbours but tonight they came back with nothing, so they will have to
28
go to bed crying for food. If I cook the small amount of maize porridge I
have now, then there would be nothing to give them tomorrow. When we
can, we eat porridge for breakfast, but I don't give any to the school-age
children because they get a meal at school. Then we have some porridge
for lunch, but we rarely eat an evening meal because, if I have to choose,
it is better for the children to be asleep when they're hungry. There is no
work for me around here, and I cannot leave the children to look for work
as I am quite alone." 18 Johanna had wanted a small garden beside the
nearby river, but others got to the limited space first.
Johanna and some of her children. "I live by begging."
Mass poverty forces tens of thousands of black workers to leave their
homes in the rural reserves in search of work as migrant labourers.
Although the law, in a technical sense, no longer forces families apart, the
general conditions of life for blacks continue to do so. Low wages, high
unemployment, the lack of social amenities and a desperate shortage of
urban housing, keep men apart from their families. Thousands have tried
to reunite their households in the numerous shanty towns growing up
around urban centres.
Precise figures are impossible to calculate, but roughly 20% of the
black labour force is wholly unemployed and many more are under-
employed on the land or in seasonal, short-term work in the towns,
fisheries and on white farms.
Migration to the urban areas has been exacerbated by the severe
drought which has affected Namibia since 1978, and which has made
survival in the 'homelands' even more precarious.
In Windhoek, the spacious white suburbs are placed well apart from the
high-density poor townships of Katatura and Khomasdal, reserved for
29
'blacks' and 'coloureds' respectively. About 70,000 people live in Katatura
township, which is situated seven miles from the city centre. The bus
service is unreliable and expensive, so long lines of workers walking to
and from the city can be seen early each morning and late into the
evening.
A church social worker in Katatura explained:
"Malnutrition is a very great problem here. It is especially bad in the
overcrowded sections of Katatura because these are where the poorest
families live. The so-called 'single quarters' are the worst. These were
originally built by the municipal authorities for single male migrant
workers, but now they are occupied by whole families with no extra
rooms or facilities to cope with the increased numbers. Ma/nutrition is
most common amongst children whose parents are unemployed. And
much of the malnutrition is hidden from sight because many children,
who cannot be fed by their families here, are sent to stay with relatives in
the rural areas to relieve the pressure. But we know that they are no better
off there."'19
Inside the 'single quarters' of Kawtura. Mary, her husband, two children and a lodger
live in this one room. "I put up a curtain so we could have a little privacy."
Many mothers are forced to abandon their children because they just
cannot afford to feed them. A typical example is Franz, who was
abandoned at a community creche in Katatura. "We think he's about two
years old," explained one of the creche workers. "His mother left him
with us 5 weeks ago saying she would be back in half an hour. She never
came back, so now he lives here. He feels the creche is his home now,
that's why he's standing in front of the other children for your photo."20
30
Two-year-old Franz, standing in front of the other children, was abandoned by his
mother who couldn't afford to keep him.
Many other children are not so lucky. The social worker continued,
"We're living in a city where women abandon their babies in dustbins.
I've come across many cases of this. It is directly caused by poverty, not
lack of compassion."
The widespread social dislocation in Namibia caused by poverty and
migrant labour also takes its toll in the towns.
"We estimate that about 70% of the families in Katatura are one-parent
families, many of them headed by unmarried mothers. In 1983, there were
332 baptisms at our local church, and only 16 of these babies were born
to married parents."
The same social worker continued, "Alcoholism and prostitution are
also symptoms of the pressures on people here, and I am particularly
concerned about the increasing numbers of children turning to drink and
prostitution. We find that children suffer psychologically as well as
physically from their families' poverty. Young kids are often left alone all
day while their mother is out working or looking for work; they grow up
in the streets. They have to feed themselves as best they can, that's why
you often see children digging in the rubbish tips. There is no proper
control by the municipality of the many illicit drinking places in Katatura,
so children are free to buy the local home-brewed beer, Tom bo, which is
very strong. We are working with young people who are already
alcoholics by the age of 18.
"Prostitution is the only way many young girls, from the age of 8
upwards, have of surviving. The going price for a child prostitute is RIO
(£2.76), while adult prostitutes charge between R20 (£5.50) to R50
(£13.80). So you see, the men, whites and blacks alike, often take the
young girls because they are cheaper. "
31
Many of the working women in the towns are employed as domestic
servants in white households. Aline is a domestic servant in Windhoek
who earns R80 (£22) a month, slightly above the average. She explained,
"/ am the only breadwinner in my whole family and I support my five
children, my parents and my husband. Asaresult, we all live in poverty".
While Aline works in Windhoek, her family live in a poor rural settlement
in central Namibia.
Aline on a rare visit home to see her children.
"I am not allowed to have my own children with me in Windhoek while
I look after my employer's child. I miss my children all the time, and long
to see them. But the fare home costs R20 (£5.50), so if I go to see my
children, I have even less money to send home for food."21
Housing is another major problem for the urban poor: Sofia, a widow
since 1980, has five children living with her and has lost three children due
to diarrhoea and pneumonia. Her total monthly income is R81 (£22), a
widow's pension. The monthly rent she pays for one small room in an
overcrowded house is R50 (£14). "Our room is so small that three of my
children have to sleep out here in the backyard." She pointed to their
'bedroom' - an old car.22
Cost of Living
In 1983, a university research team calculated that for minimal survival a
black family of six people in Windhoek needed a household subsistence
level of R301.48 (£178.68) per month.23 According to a Windhoek social
worker, the average family income in Katatura at the time was R98
32
(£58).24 The cost of living is considerably higher in northern Namibia, due
to the inflated prices in local shops and stores.
Another 1983 survey found that 86% of black wage earners in
Windhoek lived below the household subsistence level, while in the north
this applied to 99% of wage earners.25 The high rate of unemployment
and under-employment means that those without paid work have to
depend on wage earners already in dire poverty themselves.
Three of Sofia's children in front of the broken-down old car which is their bedroom.
Housing in one of Windhoek's white suburbs.
33
LAND
"When we lost our land, we lost our rights, our family way of life, our
independence and our culture. "26 This is how a black woman farmer in
central Namibia described the crucial issue of dispossession from the
land.
Both the colonial authorities of Germany, prior to 1915, and South
Africa wanted Namibia for minerals and for white settler farmers. Both
aims required wholesale seizure of land, thereby reducing the area
available to peasant production and stock-grazing, and forcing the
dispossessed to become wage labourers.
The German authorities began by selective dispossession of some
indigenous groups and arranged 'protection treaties' with others. In 1904,
the Herero, Damara and Nama peoples of central and southern Namibia
rose in protest against German colonial rule. The Germans responded
with a ruthless campaign of genocide, killing some 60% of the black
population of central and southern Namibia (the so-called 'Police Zone')
and nearly all their livestock.27
Thereafter, the German regime expropriated nearly all the communal
land of these groups. The people of the far north, the Ovambo- and
Kavango-speaking peoples, escaped. The Germans feared their military
strength, and considered their land as less suitable for white settlement.
The South African colonial authorities took over where the Germans
left off. Explicitly linking land and labour policies, they consolidated the
former theft of land by creating a two-tier system of labour reserves,
which were later to be incorporated into the 'homelands' system.
Blacks in the 'Police Zone' were to provide labour for the white farms
and small businesses. The large majority of the black population, in the
northern reserves, was regarded as the chief source for migrant labour. In
the 1920s the 'contract labour' system was introduced for people in the
north, principally those in Ovamboland.
Today, the historical legacy of colonial land expropriation remains
intact, with white settler farmers owning the lion's share (77%) of the
country's viable farmland.
More than a third of the country's total land surface is desert, or
waterless Kalahari sandveld (sandy soil). The majority of this barren land
has been allocated to the'homelands'. Of the viable farmland, as much as
90% is dry pasture best suited to stock-farming, and only 10% receives
sufficient rainfall to grow crops. Fully 80% of the stock-farming land and
half the arable land is occupied by about 5,000 white-owned farms, nearly
all of them large ranches. Black farmers and herders are left with
fragments of inferior land and desert on the fringes of the white
commercial farming zone. Some 40,000 black households struggle to
survive on the leftover 20% of the stock-farming zone, and 150,000
peasant households raising livestock and cultivating grain are confined to
limited areas of arable land in the far north. The concentration of the black
34
population in the northern 'homelands' means that half the total
population are confined to 5% of the viable farmland.28
Distribution of viable farmland:
average per farming household (hectares)
WHITE RANCHES 7,200 ha.
BLACK STOCK FARMS 335 ha.
BLACK CULTIVATORS 17 ha.
The creation of the 'homelands' is the most recent consolidation of
previous moves to link labour requirements with land policy. Although
some extra land was added to the existing reserves when the 'homelands'
were designated, much of the land in the 'homelands' is useless for
pastoral or agricultural production.
29
Proportion of viable farmland in the designated 'homelands'
'Homeland' Planned total land area
Ovambo
Kavango
East Caprivi
Kaokoland
3ushmanland
Hereroland
Damaraland
Tswanaland
Namaland
RehobothGebiet
i i l i l i i l i i 24 |
1117 |
52
l i l l i i l 20 |
1
iiilili7 |
iiii§ll2i |
I
i l l 18 |
mmmmmm 100
m
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6
million hectares
= viable farmland (%)
35
The best farmland is owned by white settlers who raise beef cattle for export.
Agriculture and Food
There are two forms of agriculture in Namibia: the commercial ranching
sector which is owned mainly by whites and is export-orientated, and the
black agricultural sector which produces mainly for home consumption.
Separate as these two sectors appear, they are nonetheless closely
linked by the historical process of land appropriation which has not only
reduced black agriculture to today's low levels, but has also forced
thousands of impoverished blacks to work as labourers on white farms. In
1983, 50% of the economically active population were employed in black
peasant agriculture, and 8% on the commercial farms.30
Commercial Agriculture
The white-dominated commercial agricultural sector concentrates on
producing beef cattle and karakul sheep almost entirely for export. 92%
of the cattle reared are for export to South Africa and 100% of the karakul
pelts31, which are used for manufacturing expensive, high-fashion fur
36
WO 000 black peasant families are hardly able to feed themselves on the inferior scraps
of land the white settlers didn 't want. This child is one of the countless casualties of rural
poverty.
37
coats, are exported mainly to the US, Japan and Europe through South
Africa.32
In 1983, the commercial agricultural sector accounted for 95% of
Namibia's marketed agricultural output, 4% of GDP and 12% of total
exports.33
The export orientation of the commercial agriculture sector, together
with the inequitable distribution of wealth and profits earned from the
land, raise key issues for Namibia's agricultural economy.
Because so much of the country's land is dry pasture and therefore best
suited to stock rearing, a high degree of specialisation is appropriate for
ecological reasons. However, the present commercial agricultural sector
operates in a highly exploitative manner, particularly with respect to land
ownership, employment of labour, and preferential access to government
assistance and state-controlled marketing outlets.
As most of the viable farmland is used to rear animals and animal
products for export, particularly red meat for South Africa's cities and
pelts for the international fur trade, the country is dependent on imports
to meet its basic food requirements. Under the present regime, Namibia
is a captive market for South African farmers and food marketing
companies, importing half its maize requirement and 90% of other
foodstuffs.34 With enough home-produced beef to supply the entire
national protein requirement, the majority of Namibians go hungry and
many are seriously undernourished. The local food processing industry is
so underdeveloped that the consumption of tinned meat is met
completely from imports, some of them Namibian products re-exported
from South Africa.35
For as long as Namibia remains a colony, settler farmers' demands will
always take priority over peasant farmers' needs and Namibia's
agricultural economy will continue to be geared to South African
interests. It is clear that only the attainment of independence will give
Namibians the power to begin to transform the present agricultural
system by allocating resources to peasant producers and boosting
production, as in post-independence Zimbabwe.36
As with other sectors of the economy, Namibia's commercial
agricultural sector is vulnerable. Due to the extreme dependence on
exported produce and imported machinery and goods, the effects of
recession are biting hard. In addition, the drought which has affected
Namibia since 1978 has seriously harmed commercial and peasant
agricultural production. The commercial ranches are reported to be
increasingly dependent on state subsidy.37
Many white farmers are leaving, frightened of bankruptcy and the
possibility of black majority rule. In January 1985 the Administration for
Whites doubled its subsidy to prevent white farmers from leaving their
farms.38 Clearly many white farmers would be unlikely to survive even
limited agricultural reforms, and this poses problems for the future. Since
the whole land issue is so central to the present economy and to the
38
political grievances of the majority, an incoming post-independence
government is likely to be faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, the
electorate will expect a redistribution of land and more equitable
agricultural employment. On the other, the almost exclusive
concentration of managerial and marketing skills amongst the white
farming population will mean a hiatus at least and, at worst, serious
capital flight with possible destruction of fixed assets as white farmers
leave Namibia.39
Thus the commercial agricultural sector currently brings little benefit to
the majority, and is likely to pose serious problems for the future nation.
Farm Labourers
Under the present system, black farm labourers are amongst the most
exploited of Namibia's people. The commercial farm labour force is
mostly composed of people from the southern and central parts of
Namibia. In a white farming area south east of Windhoek, there is a
church-run hostel which provides a term-time home for farm labourers'
children who live too far away to go to the local school every day. One
church worker explained:
"Most farm labourers round here live little better than slaves. They earn
about R20 (£5.50) a month plus a fixed food ration, regardless of family
size. Work as labourers on the surrounding farms is all that's available.
People can hardly survive on the low pay, and, as a result, many of the
children we look after at the hostel come to us with malnutrition. The
white farmers round here are very hard; most of them do not allow their
labourers the 'privilege' of growing a little food on their land. The children
we take care of have grown up under oppression, and they don't know
anything else but a life of poverty. They will only realise life can be
different if they travel and see other things." 40
Peasant Agriculture
Black agricultural production for household or local market consumption
contributes 3% of GDP, reflecting the poor, insufficient land and the near
total absence of government assistance available to peasant farmers.41
70% of the black population live in the rural areas, depending partly or
wholly on agriculture for their income.42 Altogether, 90% of the
population spend at least part of their lives on the land, particularly in
childhood and old age.43
Peasant farming varies in different parts of the country. In the northern
sandveld area where the majority of the black population lives, both
livestock and crops (principally sorghum and millet) are raised. In the
southern part of the country there is insufficient rain for crops so people
concentrate on small livestock (sheep and goats), and depend largely on
their meagre cash incomes for food.
39
The San people also known as 'Bushmen' who live in the north-
eastern part of the country, on the Kalahari sandveld, are perhaps the
worst off of all Namibia's dispossessed people. Successive enforced
reductions of the land available to them, and more recently the drought,
have largely destroyed their hunting/gathering subsistence. Poverty and
destitution have forced many San into the South African army in
Namibia. An estimated 5,000 San soldiers and their families are
encamped around the army base at Omega, dependent on the South
African presence for their survival. Others live in the slums around
Tsumkwe, dependent on government handouts and support from
relatives in the army.44 Many others have survived by working as
labourers on white farms (for as little as R9 (£3) a month in 198545),
especially during the dry season when traditional foods are in short
supply.
Black peasant agriculture is in a state of crisis. The over-crowding and
resultant soil degradation arising from apartheid social engineering gets
worse as time goes on. Almost no government assistance with credit,
inputs, veterinary services, and marketing is available to blacks, in
contrast to the enormous farm subsidies and state-controlled services
available to white farmers. In 1983, government drought relief totalled
R37m (£22m), of which only R6m (£3.5m) went to the 190,000 black
peasant households in the country.46
With no resources to regenerate their over-used, eroded land, rural
people see the inevitable decline of its productivity. A black woman
farmer explained:
"We really want to make a living from our land because it is our only
hope for the future. But the local government won't give us any help to
sink a borehole, and the drought means that now we can't grow anything
or water animals without one. Our land is all we have to leave to our
children, but it's becoming barren." 47 To add insult to injury, the
'representative authority' responsible for each area levies a poll tax from
local people.
Thousands of rural families, especially those without their menfolk, are
completely destitute. Paulina, a young single woman living in central
Namibia with a 3-month-old baby son explained her problems:
"/ don't have any income, my parents are dead, and the father of my
child has disappeared. I have no animals, and there is no work around
here for me. Often I don't eat from one day to the next. My baby is sick
and I'm very worried. Some days my baby just has water from the stream.
I get no help from the government." 48
Until the land tenure system and the present agricultural economy are
transformed, there can be no hope for people like Paulina. As she put it,
"When we get independence, I hope I will be able to be independent too
with a few cattle and some land for them to graze. Then I will be able to
feed my baby."
40
Paulina and her sick baby. "He is all I have. I wish I could afford to feed him properly.
MINING AND MINERALS
Most of Namibia's wealth is based on its rich deposits of diamonds,
uranium ore and base metals, principally copper, lead, lithium, pyrite, tin,
silver and zinc.
The mining sector is owned by South African and western
transnational corporations, and by combinations of South African state
corporations with western transnational.49 The three main mining
concerns in Namibia are Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM) owned
by De Beers, which is part of the South African Anglo-American group;
Rbssing Uranium Ltd, owned partly by Britain's Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ)
with other shareholdings held by French, Canadian, West German, and
South African corporations, and Tsumeb Corporation Ltd (TCL)
owned by Gold Fields of South Africa, the American firm Newmont
Mining Corporation, the British firms Selection Trust Ltd & BP Minerals,
and the South African companies O'okiep Copper Company and General
Mining Union Corporation, Ltd. (GENCOR).50
By the late 1970s, minerals accounted for nearly half of Namibia's GDP,
four times more than all agricultural products51, but the recent recession
has brought the proportion of GDP derived from minerals down to 24%
in 1983.52
Minerals make up a massive 85% of Namibia's total exports53 and
virtually 100% of mineral production leaves the country.54 However, in
41
spite of the mining industry's crucial importance to the economy, the
majority of poor Namibians derive almost no benefit from these national
riches. Mining provides relatively few jobs, giving direct employment to
3% of the economically active population.55 Moreover most of the
workforce are migrant workers, who must live separated from their
families. Of the total employed in the mining sector in 1983, some 3,200
were white, 13,000 'black' (over 90% migrants) and 800 'coloured'. In the
mining industry overall, average wage rates for 1983 were R18,000
(£10,668) for whites, R5,000 (£2,568) for 'blacks', and R9,000 (£5,334) for
'coloureds'.56
Because of the high proportion of mineral earnings which are exported,
the mining sector largely accounts for the divergence between Namibia's
GDP and its GNP.
During the 1982 to 1983 period, nearly a third of the total sales income
Breakdown of total sales income (minerals) 1982 - 83
57
42
from minerals was used to buy inputs which were mainly imported. This
expenditure did little to stimulate Namibia's undeveloped local
manufacturing base or to provide jobs for the unemployed. It is estimated
that over a third of revenue was taken as profit and taxes on profit. As
taxes are paid to the South African-controlled administration in Namibia,
black Namibians have no democratic say in how these taxes are spent. Of
total earnings from sales, as little as one tenth is estimated to have been
paid out in wages to the black workforce. Moreover the mining sector's
dependence on exports of both raw or minimally processed minerals, and
the importance of mining to the national economy makes the industry,
and therefore the whole economy, vulnerable to fluctuating world prices.
The contribution of mining to GDP has fallen dramatically since 1980,
mainly as a result of world recession. As a result, employment in the
mines fell from 21,000 in 1977 to 15,000 in 1984.58
FISHING
The sea off Namibia's coast contains a plentiful variety of marine life and
in pre-colonial times, fish provided an important source of protein for
small communities near the shallow coastal lagoons of the Namib
desert.59
From the late 18th century onwards, foreign fishing interests starting
with European and North American vessels were attracted to Namibian
waters.60 Then, early this century, a more systematic South African
exploitation of Namibia's marine resources developed, severely depleting
the rock lobster and the pilchard stocks. With the advent of factory ships
in the 1960s, foreign fishing companies could trawl the offshore species
unfettered by the South West Africa Administration's flimsy conservation
measures. This new technical capacity effectively separated inshore and
offshore fishing into today's two distinct industries.
The inshore industry contributed 10% to GDP, and accounted for 10
15% of the value of all exports during the mid-70s.61 However,
unchecked over-fishing depleted fish stocks and profits alike and by the
end of the 1970s the contribution to GDP had fallen to 2%, plus another
1 % from processing.62 After a slight recovery, the contribution to GDP in
1983 was approximately 9%.63
Most of the inshore catch is exported, mainly to South Africa, which
ensures its own preferential access to the market. The result is that most
Namibians cannot benefit from this valuable source of protein. The
inshore industry provides approximately 1% of total employment, plus
another 1% during the peak season. 64 However its collapse in the late
1970s due to over-fishing has meant that five out of the nine processing
factories have closed down, and two- thirds of the workers employed in
the mid-70s have lost their jobs.65
Inshore fishing is largely carried out by vessels owned by white
businessmen and run by black crews. Six South African companies,
43
based principally at Walvis Bay, own the inshore processing industry
(tinning, plus oil or meal extraction). During the boom of the mid-70s,
profits were high and companies could recover the entire cost of their
investments within three or four years.66 Gross company profits were
estimated to have been as high as R50m (£31.8m) with only R8m (£5.09m)
going on wages, food and rent to the 7,000 black workers.67 The profits
mostly left the country, either as dividends and soft loans to shareholders
or to be invested abroad, as the decline in pilchard stocks became
apparent.
The high rate of return on capital and the size of profits dropped as sales
plummeted, but the companies involved have not been hurt by their over-
fishing as they have diversified and have invested their profits elsewhere,
mostly in South Africa.68 Taxes to the South African-controlled
administration in Namibia have averaged 30 35% of gross profits in
recent years, a rate estimated to be low by world standards.69
The offshore, foreign-dominated industry has also over-exploited fish
stocks and absolutely no benefit accrues to Namibia from this industry.
The bulk of the offshore catch goes to the USSR and Eastern European
countries.
Without its own national government, Namibia has not been able to
secure an internationally accepted exclusive economic zone, so the
offshore factory ships are free to come and go at will. The South African-
appointed Administrator- General for Namibia proclaimed a 370km fishery
zone to be in force in April 1981. But due to the illegality in international
law of South Africa's occupation of Namibia, this zone has been regarded
as null and void by the long-distance factory trawlers. The United Nations
Council for Namibia (UNCN) has signed the Law of the Sea Convention
on Namibia's behalf, but has not yet proclaimed a 370km zone.70
A voluntary body acting as a regional fishery convention for Namibia,
the International Commission for the South-East Atlantic Fisheries
(ICSEAF), was formed in 1969 by most of the states who fish these
waters, principally the USSR, Eastern European countries, Spain and
South Africa. Its main functions are to provide a forum for the member
governments to agree regulatory measures and to organise back-up,
monitoring and information services.71
The UNCN has no representative on the ICSEAF, and although the
South African-controlled administration is represented, South African
fishing companies are less concerned with conserving Namibia's wealth
for the future than they are with their own profits. Thus the ICSEAF has
been called "not so much a regional convention as an open-ended club of
foreign states whose trawlers exploit Namibia's offshore waters"12
Without a strong national government to safeguard its interests, it is
likely that Namibian waters will continue to be over-fished by foreign
companies and Eastern European state fleets, and profits and catches will
continue to be exported. The future nation will be left with a needlessly
run-down inshore industry, dependent on South African finance and
44
expatriate managerial skill, and an export-dominated offshore sector of
little benefit to the Namibian economy.73 The whole industry could
continue to by-pass local nutritional and employment needs. In the
meantime a precious national asset has been so severely depleted that
some species may never recover.
Given that Namibia's economy is overwhelmingly geared towards the
interests of settlers and foreign investors, without regard for the needs of
the black majority, it is not surprising that in Oxfam's experience
development work with poor communities meets with considerable
obstacles.
There is an urgent need to transform the structures which cause and
perpetuate poverty for the majority. But these structural changes can
only begin after independence.
45
CHAPTER 2
OBSTACLES TO
DEVELOPMENT
The obstacles to development work and to the development of the poor
majority are immense. Courageous attempts to promote community-
based projects in the vital fields of education and training, health, child
care, agriculture, water supply and legal aid are however under way.
Oxfam, together with other international voluntary agencies, is
supporting these initiatives, more because of the present difficulties than
in spite of them. As one Namibian development worker put it:
"During the '70s, we used to think that development was something
we'd all turn our minds to after independence. Now we realise that we've
got to get on with it, so that when independence comes we'll have laid the
foundations of our new society. If we just sit and wait, our fear is that
when independence finally comes, it will just be independence in a
formal, political sense with no real social and economic dimensions. " 1 In
Oxfam's experience, after 22 years of working in Namibia, the difficulties
frustrating community development have clear economic and political
causes.
Economically, the majority of Namibians are prevented from climbing
out of the pit of poverty and destitution. In general, people do not have
adequate land to produce enough for themselves, let alone a surplus with
which to generate income. There is no economic base on which to
overcome the poverty of the majority, and therefore little chance for
community development schemes based on income from agricultural
production. In some areas of the country, it may be possible to develop
more intensive forms of agricultural production, with the use of irrigation
for example. But in general, the pressing need is for more extensive
access to land as well as to water resources, agricultural credit and inputs.
Only extensive land reforms and state provision for the peasant
agricultural sector after independence will begin to resolve this major
obstacle to development.
Politically, black Namibians have been marginalised in all areas of life.
They cannot exercise basic democratic rights in the shaping of their
society. Harsh legislation, the sweeping powers of the security forces, the
poor education system available to blacks, and the divisive 'homelands'
46
policy have repressed the emergence of community organisations
through which development work should take place.
However, the national liberation movement and the church structures
have continued to operate in spite of state repression. Oxfam's principal
partners in Namibia are the Anglican, Catholic and Lutheran churches as
well as the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN). With membership
made up from the major churches in Namibia, except the Dutch
Reformed Church, the CCN's various departments provide a major focus
for national, non-governmental organisation development activity. The
CCN runs schemes in education and training (including a scholarship
programme for Namibians to study overseas), welfare, health,
agriculture, water supply, and legal aid. The CCN is also a tireless critic of
South Africa's occupation. In January 1986, its offices were seriously
damaged by an arson attack.2
OXFAM'S ROLE
In the light of the underlying obstacles to development, Oxfam has
identified the following objectives for its work inside Namibia:
" to support community-based projects, run by members of those
communities, in order to strengthen local confidence in self-help
initiatives;
" in a society ravaged by divisive policies, to give special support to
cooperative initiatives which aim to overcome these divisions at a local
level;
" to give special attention to independent, non-governmental work in
education and health. This includes support to:
projects which give children access to a balanced school
curriculum;
projects for popular education which help to strengthen people's
organisational skills and their ability to form local community
development organisations;
projects which promote community health awareness and better
health;
" to provide humanitarian assistance, through the churches, to people in
special need.
However, the role of an agency like Oxfam is always limited compared
with the overall needs of a given country, and in comparison to the impact
of national development policies. Oxfam's experience is that, in
Namibia's case, the net effect of the state provision for blacks has been
to create serious obstacles to development. Furthermore, South Africa's
military occupation of northern Namibia has had devastating
consequences for development work, for the provision of vital services,
and for the everyday lives of ordinary people.
47
EDUCATION
Despite the relaxation of some 'petty apartheid' laws, the education
service is firmly segregated along racial lines. The resulting unequal
allocation of resources together with the style and content of the
curriculum available to blacks are major obstacles to development. The
poor state of black education is a direct result of colonial policies to keep
black Namibians as second-class citizens. A school teacher in northern
Namibia explained:
"We have so many frustrated young people in secondary school. They
are clever and able but the poor educational facilities provided for blacks
mean they cannot achieve their potential, and their employment
prospects under the apartheid system fall far short of their ability. I know
that this is why so many young people cross the border in search of a
brighter future"3
Today, illiteracy amongst black adults runs at 60% and only two-thirds
of black primary school leavers are literate.4 Education for black children
is not compulsory, as it is for white children.
Lack of adequate state funding to blacks-only schools means these children have no
classroom.
More than five times as much is spent per head on white children's
schooling as on black children's.5 Furthermore, education for white and
'coloured' children is free, whereas 'blacks' have always had to pay for
theirs.6 Although, in comparison to other black workers, black school
teachers are well paid, they are poorly trained in comparison to white
teachers.
48
There is a notable lack of state provision for vocational training for
blacks, as there is for further education of any sort. Indeed, only 1% of
black adult Namibians have completed secondary education.7 The 'Cape
syllabus' adopted for use in state schools is heavily biased towards official
white South African history, culture and political perspectives.8
The main implications of the education system for blacks are listed
below. They all create obstacles to development now and have major
implications for educational reform in the future.
" The education services for blacks are not only racially separated from
services for whites and 'coloureds', but they are also divided according to
the 'homelands' system. Thus, each 'representative authority' is
nominally responsible for administering the education service in its
respective 'homeland'. This underlines the 'divide and rule' policy on
which South Africa's political control of Namibia's black population rests.
The entire 'homelands' policy, and the political premise on which it is
based, is fundamentally incompatible with independence and democratic
social development. In the words of one Namibian educationalist,
"Education in the fullest sense, in the sense of broadening the mind and
realising a child's potential, cannot possibly be achieved under the
present system"9
" The choice of language in schools is an important issue for Namibians.
After Afrikaans, English and German also rank as official languages in
Namibia, but Afrikaans is the main teaching medium used in primary and
secondary schools. Although Afrikaans is the mother tongue of some
black Namibians, it is seen by most as the language of their oppressors.
Afrikaans thus has cultural and political connotations which offend the
black majority, and because it has no international currency it also,
according to the United Nations Institute for Namibia, "serves as an
instrument of isolation and insularity"/10 Consequently, an important
plank of SWAPO's post-independence educational policy is to promote
English as the main official language, while also appreciating the
importance of indigenous languages including Afrikaans. At present
English is poorly taught in black schools.
" State education services for blacks are designed to equip children with
only the minimum skills necessary for the existing economy and political
structures. As a result, only 22% of black children go on to higher primary
school (according to 1980 figures), and only 1 % of black adults complete
secondary education.11 Mathematics and science teaching are
inadequate, and non- existent in many secondary schools.
Education for an independent Namibia
It is generally assumed that many of the skilled, white people in Namibia
will choose to leave when full independence under a majority government
becomes a reality. Namibia's economy and civil service are heavily
dependent on white and expatriate people at managerial and technical
49
levels. Many whites are already leaving, taking their skills and assets with
them.
To differing extents, this process has taken place in other African
countries, many of which are still suffering the long-term effects of
attaining independence without the necessary stock of skills and
experience to change and run their systems of government and economic
life. In Oxfam's experience in Mozambique for instance this is one
of the harshest colonial legacies.
In Namibia's case, the independent government will need to fill
thousands of high and middle level posts left empty by whites.
Altogether, on independence an estimated total of over 16,000 middle
and high level posts in managerial, professional and skilled categories will
need to be filled for effective management of government services and
commerce.12 At the moment, almost 90% of the labour force, and a
higher proportion of the total population, have less than complete primary
education. Virtually all the 10,000 holders of university, teaching or
equivalent in-service qualifications are white.13
Add to this the educational demands which Namibian people will feel it
their right to make for compulsory schooling, a balanced syllabus,
adult literacy training, the introduction of English as the official national
language, decent opportunities for vocational and further education
and the magnitude of the problem is clear. A complete transformation of
the present services will be necessary.
Several vitally important non-governmental programmes designed to
promote a new kind of education for black Namibians are already under
way inside Namibia and amongst Namibia's refugee population. But it
should be emphasised that these initiatives remain limited in comparison
to the sheer scale of the overall problem.
Inside Namibia, there are a handful of 'independent' schools run by
churches to provide "an education fora free Namibia"as one headmaster
put it.14 English, mathematics and science subjects are prominent in the
independent schools' curriculum. Instead of the 'Cape syllabus' taught in
the government schools, they have chosen to use the Lesotho syllabus
which has been specially prepared for use in the independent Southern
African States. As one teacher in school said, "The Cape syllabus gives
students an unbalanced view of the world. Take the Cape history books
for instance. They do not reflect the whole truth about our country's
history instead they concentrate only on the white man's history".15
Another teacher explained the difficulties faced by students who have
been through the state school system when they apply for higher
education church scholarships abroad:
"Our children in state secondary schools are taught Afrikaans, a little
English, their mother tongue, history and bible studies. With that sort of
educational background, you don't qualify for further studies anywhere
outside. This means that many secondary school leavers train here as
teachers, and therefore the next generation of students suffer because
50
their teachers don't know science, maths and English. Most pupils aren 't
even advised in school that they need science and maths in order to take
up further studies. I work on a church scholarships committee, and I have
files full of applications from secondary school leavers who don't qualify.
I've seen so many of them crying when they find their examination
certificates are no use. They feel cheated and despondent, so many of
them cross the border to become refugees in search of a brighter future.
The independent schools are providing a vital service we must have
scientists, engineers, doctors and accountants for our future nation. We
must break our dependence on the ski/Is and know-how of the whites; we
can't be properly independent otherwise. " 16
The Namibia Literacy Programme (NLP) is a non-governmental
organisation which has a country-wide network of literacy promoters
who work with locally formed classes of adult learners. The NLP produces
its own functional literacy materials in all the main Namibian languages.
One NLP staff member described the problems they are up against:
"Illiteracy is a serious and widespread problem and that is why we are
running this organisation. In a properly independent Namibia, there
would be no need for a private organisation to be running a national
literacy programme, effectively single-handed; it would be one of the
Government's primary responsibilities. " 17
Several important educational schemes for Namibians are also being
implemented outside Namibia. In the SWAPO refugee settlements in
Angola and Zambia, the education of children and adults alike is high on
SWAPO looks after thousands of preschool children at this refugee settlement in
Angola.
51
the list of priorities. In contrast to the official education system inside
Namibia, every effort is made to prepare school children for life in post-
independence Namibia. In SWAPO's refugee settlement in Zambia, for
example, a library and a good stock of science equipment are available for
the students' use. Science subjects and maths are part of the curriculum,
together with Namibian and African history. Pupils are required to go
from primary to secondary levels, and as many as possible go on for
further training or higher education. English is the teaching medium, and
the teachers are black Namibians, most of whom have graduated from
the school themselves. Most importantly, school education is compulsory
for all the children, and seen as a right.18
For the adults at the settlement, literacy classes are held daily both in
English and the Namibian languages. Only about 25% of adult refugees
are literate in English on arrival in the settlements.19
In addition to the education and training activities organised by
SWAPO in the settlements, Namibian refugees are also assisted by the
United Nations Nationhood Programme set up, "To provide assistance to
Namibians who have suffered from persecution and to finance a
comprehensive educational and training programme with particular
regard to their future administrative responsibilities"'.20 The United
Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN) in Zambia's capital, Lusaka, was
established in 1976 as part of the UN Nationhood Programme, to train
Namibians, "To form the core of public service managers and
administrators for independent Namibia". The other major role played by
UNIN is to develop and analyse data and strategy which will serve future
policy makers and planners in post-independent Namibia.21
UNIN relies for its existence on the support of international aid donors,
including the British Overseas Development Administration which covers
the costs of three English language teachers. The international
community also provides educational opportunities for Namibians
abroad. British official aid contributes 50 training awards a year,
concentrating on training English language teachers and public
administrators.22
Important as these external services for Namibians are, South Africa's
continued illegal occupation means that, for the most part, Namibians
must leave their country if they are to benefit from the educational
opportunities offered by SWAPO, the UN and bilateral aid donors.
52
HEALTH
Poverty and poor health
Widespread poor health is perhaps the most debilitating consequence of
poverty in Namibia. According to UN figures, the mortality rate for black
infants23 in Namibia is well above average for Africa. In contrast, the
mortality rate for white infants is directly comparable to the world's most
developed nations. A black baby is over seven times more likely to die in
infancy than a white baby.24
The main health problems related to poverty and poor living conditions
in Namibia are malnutrition, infectious diseases - especially
gastroenteritis and tuberculosis and stress-related health problems.
Malnutrition
Nobody knows how many thousands of black children suffer from malnutrition in
Namibia. This little boy is one of the lucky few receiving special feeding in hospital.
Reliable statistics on malnutrition levels have been scant, mainly because
virtually no outreach nutritional assessment and surveillance work is done
in Namibia. However, experienced health workers suggest that
malnutrition is a very serious problem, particularly among young children.
Many of Oxfam's partners confirm this. For example, according to a
53
nursing sister on the paediatric ward at a mission hospital in Ovamboland:
"Babies and young children suffering from malnutrition and diarrhoea
are our main problem. We try to keep those who reach the hospital alive
with therapeutic feeding, but we know that many more are suffering from
hunger out in the villages."25
A health worker in Katatura (Windhoek's black township) explained:
"Child malnutrition is a very serious problem here in town, as well as in
the rural areas. Food prices are higher in the 'black' and 'coloured'
townships than in Windhoek city centre. The traders take advantage of us
because Katatura is so far from the city centre. We are trying to help by
promoting back-yard gardening through our community health
committee, but basically the hunger is caused by poverty and it won't go
away unless people see a big rise in their standard of living.
"A lot of mothers nowadays do not breastfeed because they are out
working or looking for work. So they turn to powdered milk which is very
expensive at R4 (£1.10) for two days' supply. To eke it out, mothers tend
to over-dilute the powder and so the babies become underfed. Many
babies are given sugar water or black tea in their bottles instead of milk.''26
Infectious diseases
Because malnutrition particularly affects young children and their ability
to fight infection, the incidence of preventable diseases is alarmingly high
amongst under-fives. Poor living conditions, particularly overcrowded
housing and inadequate sanitation, serve to increase the risk of infection.
According to Windhoek statistics, 'black' infants are 40 times more at
risk of dying from meningitis, gastroenteritis or tuberculosis than white
infants.27 'Coloured' infants are in between, about 26 times more at risk
than white infants. Gastroenteritis alone accounts for the same number of
deaths among 'coloured' infants per 1,000 live births as are accounted for
by all causes of death among white infants. Among 'black' infants, twice
this number die from gastroenteritis alone.28 The national incidence of
gastroenteritis is unknown since community health surveys are not
routinely undertaken, and only the most severely affected black children
within reach of a hospital are taken there, with only the worst cases
actually admitted. Among white babies, the situation is entirely different,
with the first signs of diarrhoea leading to rapid referral and early
admission to hospital.29
While diarrhoea is by far the most common illness affecting black
children, tuberculosis is the most common amongst black adults.30
Tuberculosis is a useful indicator of 'development' as it is mainly a disease
of poverty and overcrowding. Whereas its incidence has declined in
Europe and the USA as a result of improved living standards, in Namibia
TB is rampant particularly amongst black migrant workers. It is more
common among rural than urban people, much more prevalent among
blacks than whites, and more common among migrant workers than
settled residents.31
54
TUBERCULOSIS
" In the USA the estimated incidence* of the disease was 1.39 per
10,000 people in 1977.
" In England the incidence was 1.64 per 10,000 people in 1978-79.
" In South Africa, a conservative estimate was 25 per 10,000 people in
1980 with an incidence amongst blacks 15 times that amongst whites.
" In Namibia, estimates of incidence vary between 40 and 500 per 10,000
people, with blacks being up to 50 times more at risk than whites.32
" Incidence = number of new cases each year
Sleeping sickness, malaria, tick fever, bilharzia, typhoid, diphtheria,
tetanus, whooping cough, polio, hepatitis, leprosy, VD, eye infections
and scabies are among the other infectious diseases which particularly
affect blacks because they relate to poverty and poor health services.
Stress-related health problems
The stress of being poor in a violent and divided society has serious
effects on people's health and well-being.
Mental health
Health services for blacks are so underdeveloped that there are no official
statistics on the incidence of mental illness amongst blacks, only a
handful of psychiatric beds in the general wards of Katatura and Caprivi
hospitals, and no black psychiatrists or psychiatric nurses.33 However, it
is clear from Oxfam's contacts with social workers that mental problems
related to stress are significant.
A widow in Katatura with five children explained: " / have so many
problems trying to feed my children and keep a roof over our heads that
often I just sit and cry. I feel like running away from everything".^
A Namibian social worker focusing on women's problems in Katatura
reports:
"When talking of Katatura, one is inevitably talking about women
along certain ethnic/tribal lines because of the apartheid layout of the
township itself, and this segregation imposes serious limitations on
normal contact between people. People live in separate worlds as far as
their life experiences are concerned, even though they are subjected to
the same constraints, such as overcrowding, lack of privacy, not to
mention callous treatment at the municipal rental offices and the Katatura
hospital. As a result of this divided, harsh way of life I have often noticed
that women in Katatura suffer stress-related complaints, such as heart
palpitations, headaches, faintness and anxiety . . . Many women are
constantly moving from reserve to reserve, from reserve to townships,
and even in the townships they shift from house to house staying with
different relatives, their lives are restless and anxious . . . Many women
turn towards the 'healing churches', and one church prophetess told me,
55
'Her children are hungry, they want clothing but the woman has no
money. She thinks and thinks and worries about this all the time, until she
becomes mentally unbalanced. By the time she comes to our church, she
needs help'. " 3 5
Katatura, the township for blacks outside Windhoek, is divided up into 'tribal' sections to
prevent unity amongst blacks. This woman's front door is stamped with an V to denote
that she lives in the 'Ovambo' section.
56
Alcoholism
"People turn to drink because they are anxious and there is nothing for
them to hope for", said a Katatura social worker. "Tombo houses are
open from dawn until late at night serving strong, home-brewed beer. It
only costs JO cents (3p) for a half litre so it's one of the few things the poor
can afford." 36
According to reports given at an international seminar in 1983 on health
in Namibia, alcoholism has reached very serious proportions, with some
50% of adults in Katatura, and 80% of adults in Khomasdal (the 'black'
and 'coloured' townships outside Windhoek) reported to be alcoholics.37
An independent researcher studying urbanisation in Namibia reports:
"Although not officially admitted or documented, alcoholism has rapidly
reached epidemic proportions, directly or indirectly affecting roughly
50% of Katatura and Khomasdal adults. Shebeens are ubiquitous, and
expenditure on alcohol is high. A one-month survey of patients . . . by a
doctor practising in Katatura and Khomasdal substantiated these
claims." 38
Poor health will continue to be a major obstacle to development in
Namibia for as long as its causes the economic, social and political
structures which marginalise the black majority exist. Until Namibian
society is transformed, health services as such will not significantly
reduce the existing health problems. It is nonetheless worth examining
the existing health services in Namibia because, in their present form,
they compound the problems of inequality in health, and present a
pressing case for a new national health policy for an independent
Namibia.
Organisation of health services
As is the case with the state education services, apartheid is apparent at
two levels in the provision of health services. Firstly, they are racially
segregated, and secondly the administration of health services for blacks
in the rural areas has been given over to the separate, second-tier,
'representative authorities'.
An entirely disproportionate amount of health resources are allocated
to whites, as the following state expenditure figures show:
Per Capita Spending on Health Services (1981)
'Representative Authority' Total Spending per Person
Rehoboth R 4.70
Damara R 15.02
Ovambo R 24.85
Caprivi R 37.06
Kavango R 56.84
Whites R233.70
57
The town of Okahandja, north of Windhoek, illustrates the unequal
access to health care. In 1981 it had a population of 13,320 blacks and
1,800 whites. For the whites there was a twelve-bed hospital with facilities
for general surgery, maternity, and chronic and infectious diseases. There
were also X-ray facilities and the hospital was run by a medical
superintendent. For blacks there was no hospital, only a four-bed clinic
run by a nursing sister. This gives a ratio of one bed for 150 whites,
compared with one bed for 3,330 blacks.40
While whites receive the benefits of expensive medical technology,
blacks do not. A new clinical block of the Windhoek State Hospital,
opened in 1982, boasts some of the most modern equipment in Africa. In
contrast, at a state-aided mission hospital for blacks in Ovamboland, an
Oxfam visitor noted that the baby clinic had run out of weight cards, and
the dispensary was very short of several essential drugs.41
The wide disparity in expenditure between white and black hospital
facilities was highlighted by a report in the Windhoek Observer in April
1985 claiming that Namibia had built the most expensive hospital in the
world, at a cost of R1m (£413,000) per bed. The paper reported that the
Keetmanshoop State Hospital for whites had never had more than 23
patients, so small is the white population it caters for. By contrast,
Onandjukwe hospital for blacks in Ovamboland is desperately
overcrowded with 250 beds officially but, according to one staff member,
"always a minimum of 400 in-patients". 42 A new paediatric block has
recently been built but there are no funds to open it.
In the 'homelands' as a whole, the most optimistic doctor to population
This desperately needed paediatric block at a blacks-only hospital cannot be opened for
lack of state funds.
58
ratio in 1980 was about 1:12,000,43 compared to the ratio in Zambia that
year of 1:7,67c44 There are almost no black doctors, and no medical
training facilities. The health service is very dependent on the skills of
white personnel, many of whom are expected to leave if a black majority
government comes to power.45
Orientation of the health services
In its health work worldwide, Oxfam gives special emphasis to the
Primary Health Care approach of which the essential features are that:
" the promotion of health depends fundamentally on improving socio-
economic conditions and on the elimination of poverty and under-
development;
" the mass of people should participate as well as benefit from this
process;
" the delivery of basic curative and preventive health care should be at
community level, and should respond to local people's overall needs.
The structure and orientation of existing health services in Namibia,
(state, mission and private), are quite at odds with this model. The
Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN) is organising a health programme
which aims to provide a new approach. Health committees, made up of
local people, have been organised in various poor communities.
Committee meetings are held regularly, and participants have the chance
to discuss health and development issues from their own perspective.
After full, participatory discussions it is envisaged that community health
activities will be agreed and organised by local people. This programme is
embryonic, but represents a very small ray of hope in a system that is
otherwise biased towards curative, secondary, urban facilities.
Curative services receive the lion's share of health resources. Less than
2% of overall health expenditure is spent on preventive services.46
Furthermore, most recent health expenditure has been on new buildings
for curative medicine. This means that an increasing proportion of health
expenditure in the future will have to be spent on their maintenance and
staffing. The health service after independence will thus be heavily
mortgaged against preventive services.
For white people, most of whom live in or near towns, access to health
services is not a problem. But scattered black rural populations are often
far away from health services. A survey among Namibian refugees
revealed that about 70% of schools were more than 10km away from a
health, centre, while 5% of schools were more than 100km away from
health facilities. In many cases, people's homes were even further away,
since hospitals and schools tend to be sited together, particularly on
mission stations.47 Although well over half of the black population lives in
the 'homelands', less than 20% of doctors work there. Moreover less than
20% of health resources are spent in the 'homelands', reflecting the
white, urban bias of the health services.48
59
The government of independent Namibia will be faced with the
enormous task of eliminating these racial inequalities in the provision of
health care, and in making the orientation of health services appropriate
to the needs of the majority. But its major task will be to eradicate the
poverty which is the principal cause of the appallingly poor health in
Namibia.
MILITARY OCCUPATION
The war between SWAPO and the South African Defence Force (SADF)
has been going on for twenty years. It started in 1966, in the same year
that the UN General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate.
An estimated 100,000 SADF troops occupy Namibia; approximately
one soldier to every 15 civilians.49 This makes Namibia one of the most
intensively occupied countries in the world.50 The effects have been
devastating. The everyday lives of the peasant communities in the north
have been seriously disrupted, as have basic services such as health and
education. Community development efforts in the war zone have been
almost totally destroyed. A school teacher in the militarised zone
describes the effects of military occupation: "The war makes our people
even poorer. All the local farmers round here live in fear. They are
frequently questioned at gunpoint and sometimes beaten up. Every day
there is something. The soldiers often drive their heavy vehicles over
people's crops, just for the sake of it. What can we do?"51
One of the principal strategies of the occupying forces is to prevent
civilian assistance to SWAPO guerrillas by using harsh 'counter
insurgency' measures. For the local people, this usually means
intimidation and harassment, but many cases of torture, murder, rape
and the destruction of crops and homes have also been reported and
documented over the years.52
Thus, the occupying army's 'front line' is, effectively, the small wood
and thatch villages dotted throughout the northern countryside and their
targets include the local peasant population. There is a dawn to dusk
curfew and anyone breaking it risks being shot on sight.
It is widely held that there will be no military solution to the war, and
that only a political settlement can bring an end to the death, suffering
and destruction it brings. The war itself exacerbates poverty and
frustrates development, as indicated by reports from Oxfam's partners in
the war zone, all underlining the need for an early settlement.
At Onekwaya, a small settlement in Ovamboland, there is an
independent mission school which has been seriously affected by the war
over the years. In the first place the school was forced to move from its
former buildings at Odiibo right on the Angolan border where much of the
fighting takes place, because of the security risks to the children and staff.
A teacher at the school said, "But even after the move we continue to be
troubled. The South African soldiers disrupt our work and make us afraid
60
for the safety of our children. For example, they often just burst into the
classrooms, without asking any of us in charge, and they question the
children roughly. They harass the girls. They shoot into the air to frighten
us. Our lives and work are made very difficult, and the children are
scared." 53
The Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Kavango Church in Namibia
(ELOC), carries out a variety of development projects which have been
badly disrupted by the war. Their printing press at Oniipa has twice been
destroyed by bombs, and on a third occasion the shell failed to explode.
The ELOC printing press after it had been destroyed by South African bombing.
An ELOC worker said, "We used the press for printing a church magazine
for the local community, school text books, children's weight charts for
the local hospital, and hymn books. " M
An independent ELOC secondary school in Oshigambo, near the
Angolan border, has also been badly hit. A staff member explained: "Two
of our children have recently been shot and injured by the army. They said
it was 'by accident' but they are reckless when they harass us. Our
children live in constant fear because the local army base is very close and
every week soldiers saunter through the school premises with their guns.
It's been like this since 1977."55
In January 1986, a bomb blast destroyed the school's electricity
generators. There were no casualties but the damage was estimated at
R30.000 (£9,724). An official ELOC statement blames the South African
Defence Force.56
An ELOC development worker explained the enormous problems he
61
encounters when trying to promote village-level development projects:
"Take for example a village well which Oxfam funded. The local people
have very serious problems with their water supply. The soil is so sandy
that it is necessary to line wells with concrete, otherwise people must rely
on dirty drinking holes frequented by animals. The local authorities
refused to help the village make a well because they said the village would
give water to the guerillas. So when I started meeting with this village to
discuss what they would like to do about their water problems, where
they would like to site the well and how they would organise the labour,
they were very suspicious of me, and at first they didn't want to talk. You
see, the army divides villages by bribing some people to be informers and
harassing others. As a result nobody really knows who is on which side,
and there is little trust between people. Without trust there can be no
development in a community."57
The 'representative authority' for Ovamboland refused to help these villagers sink a well,
so they must continue to draw their drinking water from this dirty pond.
The vital mobile health work which used to be carried out from ELOC's
Onandjukwe hospital in the war zone was forced to stop in 1982. A
hospital staff member explained: "We had to stop because two of our
ambulances were blown up by land mines, the two drivers were killed and
the nurses and patients in the ambulance were injured. Our mobile health
nurses were constantly being harassed by South African soldiers who are
suspicious of anyone who travels about in the rural areas. " 58
The mobile team's work was vital. They carried out regular
immunisation of children under five, regular weighing and health checks
of babies, and ante-natal screening for thousands of expectant mothers.
The staff member continued, "We will only be able to start up our mobile
work again once the war is ended. We're seeing the results of no mobile
services now more and more children who have not been immunised
come to the hospital with preventable diseases like whooping cough, and
more come to the cemetery."
62
The Namibian Literacy Programme is a voluntary organisation
promoting adult literacy. A staff member said: "Our work is particularly
badly affected by the war in the north. You see, many of the people who
join our classes there have to walk six or seven kilometres each way. They
are afraid of army harassment, land mines or failing to get home before
the curfew. Our students and staff are often picked up and interrogated,
as the South African army is suspicious of anyone who moves about. One
of our instructors, for example, was recently picked up after he 'd finished
his class. He was detained for two days without his family knowing where
he was. It's very hard for our staff to work in these conditions, and our
programme suffers as a result." 59 (NB. In January 1985, the Windhoek
office of the Namibian Literacy Programme was damaged by vandals. It
has been reported that the attack was politically motivated.60)
Harassment of civilians by SADF troops, '7s so common it's not even
notable", said one development worker. "The army regularly drive their
armoured trucks over people's crops, that's why so many people have
moved from their original homes so thatthey can grow food in peace. "61
The Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN) runs a legal aid scheme to
help the victims of South African army harassment and physical abuse.
The doctor responsible for examining plaintiffs of the CCN scheme said,
"People are now coming forward more and more with their complaints,
even though it is a long and difficult business for ordinary peasants to take
the army to court. But they are doing it, they've had enough. " 62
in the war zone, the numerous South African army bases have become part of the
scenery. An army gun turret overlooks a graveyard in Ovambo/and.
63
CHAPTER 3
BRITISH
RESPONSBUTIES
For over a century, Britain has been closely connected with Namibia, both
directly and through its deep-rooted connections with South Africa. The
strength of these links with Namibia and South Africa places a particularly
heavy responsibility on the British Government to press for change.
DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL LINKS
As both a Contact Group member and a permanent member of the United
Nations Security-Council, Britain is particularly well placed to help break
the present stalemate.
The Contact Group has failed in its objective to secure Namibia's
independence through implementation of SC Resolution 435. Indeed,
latterly, Britain has been seen to be taking a soft line in its attitude towards
the US policy of 'linkage' to the issue of the Cuban military presence in
Angola. Having voted, (in October 1983) for Resolution 539, rejecting
'linkage', the British Government's position appears to have shifted.
Current policy is not to reject 'linkage' unequivocally, but rather to
accommodate the South African Government's insistence on it as a
guiding factor in determining British policy. In view of this
accommodation of South Africa's position, a recent Government policy
paper states: "We therefore consider that, in practice, US- led
negotiations on Cuban withdrawal offer a prospect of progress towards
implementation of Security Council Resolution 435")
Britain's role in the UN Security Council is vital, along with that of two
other Contact Group states, the United States and France, who are also
permanent members of the Security Council.2 In blocking numerous
Security Council resolutions on Namibia calling for economic sanctions
against South Africa, British economic interests in both countries are
protected.
The voting record of successive British Governments at the UN
Security Council demonstrates a clear division between adherence to the
principle of Namibia's independence, and evasion of any international
action to press for the achievement of that independence which might
64
harm British financial interests in Namibia and South Africa. (See
Appendix 1 for list of UN Security Council Resolutions on Namibia and
Britain's voting pattern.)
INTERNATIONAL LAW
South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and
international inaction
In spite of the overwhelming consensus that South Africa's occupation of
Namibia is illegal, expressed by the International Court of Justice in 1971
and since then by innumerable UN resolutions, the decision to take action
against South Africa has been consistently evaded by the major world
powers most closely involved in Namibia.
The UK, the USA and France have all used their power of veto in the
Security Council to prevent the UN from taking effective action.
A brief outline of the international legal debate over Namibia shows that
Britain, along with other permanent members of the Security Council,
needs to generate a new political will if the UN is to be able to discharge
its responsibility for Namibia effectively.
When the UN was established in 1945, following the collapse of the
League of Nations, all countries administering League of Nations
mandates agreed to enter into trusteeship agreements with the UN
with the exception of South Africa. These agreements were intended to
lead to the granting of full independence to the mandated territories.
South Africa refused to enter into a trusteeship agreement over Namibia
with the UN, arguing that after the collapse of the League of Nations, the
mandate for Namibia had ended. Since the General Assembly was unable
to influence South Africa's position, it decided to ask the International
Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion. In 1950, the Court found that
the mandate for Namibia was still in force and that the UN General
Assembly was entitled to supervise South Africa's administration.
However, the Court also held that South Africa did not have a legal duty
to accept the trusteeship regime.
South Africa did not accept the Court's Advisory Opinion and refused
not only to enter into a trusteeship agreement with the UN, but also to
accept supervision over the administration of the mandate. Throughout
the '50s the General Assembly tried by every possible means to persuade
South Africa to change its position. But South Africa, with the support of
other colonial countries, refused to comply.
Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice are
authoritative statements of the law, but they are not binding; only its
judgements are binding. For this reason, in 1960 two UN members
(Ethiopia and Liberia), which had also been members of the League of
Nations, brought an action against South Africa. In 1962, the /comd. p.68
65
BRITAIN AND NAMIBIA - MAIN HISTORICAL MILESTONES
1795 Britain takes over administration of the Cape Colony
from the Dutch. Namibia, as yet, uncolonised.
1866 Cape Colony, still under British control, annexes islands
off Namibia's southern coast.
1878 Britain annexes Walvis Bay (Namibia's only deep water
port).
1884 85 Berlin Conference - Africa is carved up and distributed
amongst the European powers. Germany's right to
occupy Namibia is confirmed by the Conference states,
including Britain.
1915 Following the outbreak of the First World War, Britain
requests South Africa to invade Namibia and recover the
territory from German rule.
1920 The League of Nations puts Namibia under a trusteeship
mandate "conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be
exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union
of South Africa".
1960 The UN General Assembly passes its seminal
"Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples" (UNGA Resolution
1514 (XV), which declares that, "Colonisation is a denial
of fundamental human rights, contrary to the Charter of
the United Nations and an impediment to the promotion
of world peace; that all peoples have a right to self
determination and by virtue of that right they should
freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development; that
inadequacy of political, economic, social and
educational preparedness should never serve as a
pretext for delaying independence and that all armed
action and other repressive measures taken against
dependent peoples shall cease; that any attempt aimed
at disruption of national unity and territorial integrity is
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the
UN". Britain abstained in the voting.
1966 The UN General Assembly terminates South Africa's
mandate ordering South Africa to withdraw from
Namibia (UNGA Resolution 2145 (XXI)). Britain
abstained in the voting.
1967 The UN General Assembly establishes the United
Nations Council for Namibia (UNCN) to administer
Namibia on the UN's behalf until independence (UNGA
66
Resolution 2248). Britain abstained in the voting,
and does not recognise the UNCN as the legal
administering authority for Namibia.
1971 International Court of Justice gives Advisory Opinion
that South Africa occupies Namibia illegally; that the
1966 UNGA Resolution has validly terminated South
Africa's mandate; that UN member states have an
obligation to recognise the illegality of South Africa's
occupation and are to refrain from any dealings with
South Africa which imply recognition of its presence in
Namibia; that member states are obliged to comply with
Security Council (SC) decisions even if they have voted
against them; and that South Africa remains
accountable for any violations of the rights of the
Namibian people Britain took the view that in this
case it was not bound by relevant SC resolutions,
and while acknowledging the illegality of South
Africa's occupation, it was nonetheless free to
accept that de facto South Africa was the
administering authority, and therefore free to permit
continued economic activities of British companies in
Namibia.
1974 The UNCN establishes Decree no. 1 for the Protection of
Namibia's Natural Resources. Britain refuses to
acknowledge it as binding and therefore under
British domestic law, British companies may act in
defiance of it. (NB Britain abstained in the voting in
1967 when the UNGA established the UNCN).
1977 The Contact Group forms to negotiate terms for an
independence settlement with South Africa, Britain is a
member.
1978 As a Contact Group member, Britain is instrumental in
formulating the important SC Resolution 435 outlining
terms for a full and early independence.
1978 The Contact Group's efforts fail to secure Namibia's
onwards independence due to South African intransigence,
which is later compounded by the United States'
'linkage' policy. Britain takes a passive role in the
Contact Group, allowing US policies to dominate.
Britain consistently refuses to accept calls for mandatory
economic sanctions against South Africa, and then
agrees to very limited sanctions as part of the October
1985 Commonwealth Accord. The Contact Group fades
to inaction, leaving international negotiations in disarray.
67
International Court of Justice decided that it had jurisdiction to hear the
case. But in 1966, in a surprising judgement, the Court reopened the
question of jurisdiction and decided that Ethiopia and Liberia did not have
standing to sue.
The UN General Assembly reacted by terminating South Africa's
mandate (UNGA Res. 2145 (XXI)). It ordered South Africa to withdraw
from Namibia, and stated that Namibia was now under the direct
responsibility of the UN (Britain abstained in the voting). South Africa,
with British support, argued that the UN had no right to terminate the
mandate and continued to impose apartheid policies in Namibia.
In 1971, the International Court of Justice responded to the UN
Security Council's request for clarification of the implication for member
states of South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia. The Court
gave an Advisory Opinion that the General Assembly had validly
terminated South Africa's mandate and that South Africa's continued
occupation was therefore illegal. Furthermore, the Court held that UN
member states had an obligation to recognise the illegality of South
Africa's occupation and must refrain from any dealings with South Africa
implying recognition of a legal South African presence in Namibia.
The Court also held that member states are obliged to comply with
Security Council decisions, including those they had voted against; and
that South Africa remains accountable for any violations of the rights of
Namibians. However, because Advisory Opinions are not binding, South
Africa and other states with economic interests in Namibia rejected the
Court's opinion.
South Africa and some permanent members of the Security Council
(notably Britain) take the view that Security Council resolutions on
Namibia are not binding. According to them, only resolutions adopted
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in the case of a breach of peace are
binding on member states. The rest are mere recommendations.
The UK position on the 1971 Advisory Opinion is contained in a 'further
statement' made in December 1974 by James Callaghan, the then
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Of the Court's
findings, he said: "In October 1971, the Government of the day informed
Parliament and the Security Council that it did not accept these
conclusions . . . .
". . . The Government believes that the course of events in the
Security Council and the consultations amongst its members do not
support the conclusions of fact asserted in the Court's Opinion. And, as
a matter of law, they remain of the view that the Security Council cannot
take decisions generally binding on member states unless there has been
a determination under Article 39 of the existence of a threat to the peace,
a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. Consequently, they are
unable to accept this part of the Advisory Opinion.
"However, for the reasons explained above, the Government takes the
view that South Africa is in occupation without title of a territory which
68
has international status. This occupation is unlawful and South Africa
should withdraw. Meanwhile, South Africa remains the de facto
Administering Authority. However, in the circumstances, there is an
obligation on states not to recognise any right of South Africa to continue
to administer the Territory. But there is no obligation, in the absence of
appropriate decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter, to take measures
which are in the nature of sanctions. It follows that we do not accept an
obligation to take active measures of pressure to limit or stop commercial
or industrial relations of our nationals with the South African
administration of Namibia." 3
According to the restrictive interpretation of the powers of the Security
Council followed by the British Government and other permanent
members of the Security Council, member states are under no obligation
to break economic links with Namibia unless a sanctions resolution is
adopted. Since, according to the UN Charter, such a resolution can only
be adopted if all permanent members of the Security Council agree, the
possibility of taking action against South Africa can be blocked by any
one of the five permanent members. That is, the UK, the USA, France,
the USSR and China can each paralyse the Security Council by vetoing
draft resolutions which call for sanctions against South Africa.
Thus there is an enormous gap between the well-established
international legal consensus on Namibia and reality. The consensus is
that South Africa's presence in Namibia is illegal. Furthermore, it is
agreed that the struggle of Namibia's people against the occupying power
is a legitimate exercise of the right of self-determination, and the UN is
acknowledged to have direct responsibility for the administration of the
territory.
But the voting record shows that permanent member states of the
Security Council, Britain among them, have used an array of technical
arguments to justify their failure to act in accordance with United Nations
decisions. A new statement of international political will, followed by
appropriate action, is now vital to bring about an early realisation of the
Namibian people's rights to self-determination and independence.4
Protecting Namibia's natural resources
In 1967 the General Assembly established the United Nations Council for
Namibia (UNCN); Britain abstained. The UNCN's role is to administer
Namibia on the UN's behalf until independence. The first full-time UN
Commissioner for Namibia was appointed in early 1974 to work through
the UNCN with the goal of asserting the Council's administrative mandate
over Namibia. In October 1974, the UNCN established its Decree for the
Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia - Decree no. 1 -
(see Appendix 2 for full text). It was a bid to discourage the economic
exploitation of Namibia's natural resources by South Africa and its main
western trading partners, notably the UK.
Under the terms of Decree no. 1 the UN became entitled to seize any
exports leaving Namibia without the written permission of the UNCN, and
any "person, entity or corporation" contravening the Decree may be held
liable for damages by the future government of an independent Namibia.
The British Government does not recognise Decree no. 1 on the
grounds that the UN General Assembly acted beyond its competence in
establishing the UNCN. The British Government does not recognise the
UNCN as the legal administering authority for Namibia and therefore does
not accept UNCN decisions as binding.5
Consequently, the Decree has had little impact on Britain's trading links
with Namibia. As the Chairman of one the main British companies
operating in Namibia, the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation,6 stated: "As a
company we are subject to the laws of the countries in which we operate,
and particularly as a British company to those of the UK. United Nations
resolutions do not apply to a company unless they are made part of the
laws of a jurisdiction to which the company is subject. This has not
happened in the UK so far as the relevant United Nations resolutions are
concerned. Successive British administrations have refused to accept
their validity, and in detailing their reasons for this in a number of
ministerial statements over the years, have made it clear that our activities
in relation to Rossing are not illegal."1
ECONOMIC LINKS
British economic links with Namibia are considerable. In 1985 forty-five
British companies operated there, in a variety of sectors including mining,
banking, petroleum and insurance (see Appendix 3 for list of UK
companies). Other Contact Group states have far fewer companies
operating in Namibia. According to a United Nations report the USA has
24 companies, West Germany has 4, Canada has 4, and France has 3.8
Accurate figures for overall foreign investment in Namibia are difficult
to ascertain. Namibia belongs to the Rand Monetary Area (South Africa,
Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia) and as such is an integral part of South
Africa for the purpose of tariffs, trade and exchange control regulations.
This means that separate trade and investment flow figures for Namibia
are not normally published.
Amongst the largest British companies operating in Namibia are Rio
Tinto Zinc (RTZ) and Barclays Bank (through its South African associate
Barclays National). RTZ has a major holding in Rossing Uranium Ltd,
which operates an open-pit mine and processing plant producing uranium
oxide near Swakopmund in western Namibia. Rossing Uranium Ltd
provided RTZ with £7.3 million net attributable profit in 1984 and £14.6
million in 1983 (the large difference being due mainly to the fact that the
South African administration allowed Rossing to defer tax payments until
it had recovered its capital costs, and also due to the weakened rand
when translated into sterling).9
70
Barclays National is the largest commercial bank operating in Namibia
with an estimated 50% of the R714 million (£423 million) of total bank
deposits in Namibia at the end of 1983.10
The economic involvement of British companies in Namibia adds to
Britain's responsibility for the existing situation. British companies in
Namibia pay taxes to the South African-controlled administration in
The economic involvement of British companies in Namibia adds to Britain's
responsibilities for the existing situation.
71
Windhoek and must be licensed by either the South African Government
or the South African administration in Namibia. Thus they tacitly support
South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and their tax payments
directly contribute to equipping, deploying and maintaining the SWATF,
the South African-controlled military forces in Namibia. In the year 1981
- 82, Barclays National is reported to have paid R750,000 (£425,000) to
the Windhoek administration in tax on its profits made in Namibia.
Rossing Uranium Ltd. is estimated to have paid R30 million (£17.78
million) in tax on its operations in 1983, and a similar amount in 1984.11
Those British companies operating in Namibia which are involved in
exploiting and depleting its natural resources do so in defiance of the
UNCN's Decree no. 1 which aims to protect these resources for the
benefit of Namibia's people. In contrast to independent resource-rich
countries which have either nationalised the extractive industries, or
imposed taxes and other measures to obtain a fair share of the benefits
derived, in Namibia's case the bulk of profits earned by transnational
companies are regularly exported.
British companies operating in Namibia also benefit from low taxation.
Since the majority of Namibians have no say in how taxes are fixed or
spent, they suffer the effects of desperately inadequate public health,
education and other services. Foreign economic interests are contributing
to economic growth at the expense of national development based on
meeting the needs of the poor majority.
There is no obligation on British (or other foreign) companies operating
in Namibia to create educational and training opportunities for black
Namibians over and above the training necessary for the companies" own
operations. Enlightened self-interest has, for example, led RTZ to fund
the Rossing Foundation's training programme for blacks in Namibia. But
schemes of this kind are not enough, given the enormous inequalities in
educational opportunity and the overriding need to tackle the causes of
this inequality.
Such labour legislation as exists has been enacted more in the interests
of the colonial economy than of the labour force. Working conditions and
the type of provision made for housing are effectively left to the discretion
of individual companies. Even the voluntary EEC Code of Conduct,
established to promote minimum conditions for workers employed by
European companies operating in South Africa, could not legitimately
extend into Namibia because of the illegal status of South Africa's
occupation. In any event, it would be no substitute for enlightened labour
legislation enacted by a democratically elected national government.
Poverty, the high rate of unemployment, the near total lack of black
Trade Unions and the repressive labour legislation all militate against the
bargaining power of blacks in the labour market. Moreover, British
companies in Namibia are not accountable to any authority either in
Namibia itself or here in Europe which represents the interests of black
workers.
72
BRITISH AID TO NAMIBIA
Britain's bilateral aid programme to Namibia began in 1978, the year when
SC Resolution 435 was negotiated by the Contact Group. Unlike other
bilateral aid commitments it is not administered on a government to
government basis. In 1984/85, British aid to Namibia totalled £474,000 -
just over a fifteenth of RTZ's net attributable profits from Rossing
Uranium for the same year.12 Britain's aid to Namibia 1985/86 is
estimated to be £700,000.13
The British aid programme includes the costs of three long-term
English language teaching appointments to the United Nations Institute
for Namibia in Lusaka, one teaching post at the Namibian Extension Unit
in Lusaka and 50 awards for Namibian students, mainly in English
language teaching and public administration. It also covers a Books
Presentation Programme for educational work inside Namibia, as well as
for Namibian refugees in Angola and Zambia and a discretionary fund for
supporting non-governmental development and welfare projects inside
Namibia, administered by the British Embassy in Pretoria.14
In addition to bilateral aid, awards are made under Britain's multilateral
aid programme to the United Nations Educational Training Programme
for Southern Africa (UNETPSA) which was awarded £500,000 in 1983.
Some Namibians are among the beneficiaries of UNETPSA's work.15
In Oxfam's view, it is important that Britain and other aid donors
continue their policy of not giving aid to the illegal administration in
Namibia and that no aid is used indirectly to support South African-
controlled structures and institutions. Thus the need for international
assistance to Namibia's people is a compelling argument for full and early
independence.
The irony of the present situation is that British companies are free to
profit from Namibian resources, whilst the British Government is not free
to assist Namibia's people.
BRITAIN'S LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA
It is not the purpose of this book to trace the complex web of historical,
social, economic, political, and strategic relationships which Britain has
with South Africa. However, it is important to note that Britain has
extensive connections with South Africa, and that successive British
governments have been primarily protecting British interests in South
Africa in evading action under international law to bring independence to
Namibia.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC MEASURES
As international pressure to institute economic sanctions against South
Africa mounts, it is important to identify the key issues relating to Namibia
73
as these are often confused with the parallel debate concerning sanctions
as a means to abolish apartheid in South Africa.
Firstly, there is the question of sanctions against South Africa on the
grounds that these would speed up its withdrawal from Namibia,
preparing the way for implementation of Resolution 435. And secondly,
there is the question of the legality of foreign companies operating in
Namibia.
On the question of sanctions against South Africa, as far as the role of
the UN is concerned, Britain holds the view that Security Council
Resolutions are not binding on member states, and that only resolutions
adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are binding. This view runs
counter to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice.
Moreover Britain, as a permanent member of the Security Council, is in a
position to veto the adoption of any resolution calling for sanctions
against South Africa under Chapter VII. Thus according to its restrictive
interpretation of the powers of the Security Council, Britain is not bound
to break economic links with South Africa because of its illegal
occupation of Namibia.
However, in other international fora, Britain is less able to deflect
pressure for sanctions. For example, Britain's hitherto anti-sanctions
position has been slightly modified by pressure from other
Commonwealth states. The Commonwealth communique issued in
October 1985 was specifically critical of South Africa's illegal occupation.
It stated: Heads of Government were gravely concerned that Namibia's
independence had been further delayed . . . (and) recalled that in New
Delhi they had agreed that if South Africa continued to obstruct the
implementation of Resolution 435, the adoption of appropriate measures
under the Charter of the United Nations would have to be considered. "16
The communique also stated that the goal of "ensuring South Africa's
compliance with the wishes of the international community on the
question of Namibia" was an important reason for the Commonwealth
agreement to impose limited sanctions against South Africa, with the
possibility of imposing more stringent sanctions later.
On the second question of the legality in international law of foreign
economic interests in Namibia, the principal statement is the International
Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion of 1971. This stated that: "The
restraints which are implicit in the non-recognition of South Africa's
presence in Namibia . . . impose upon member states the obligation to
abstain from entering into economic and other forms of relationship or
dealings with South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia which may
entrench its authority over the Territory. "
Since all foreign companies operating in Namibia do so with some form
of permission, concession or licence either from the South African
Government or from the South African-controlled administration in
Namibia, they are clearly acting contrary to the spirit of the ICJ Advisory
Opinion.
74
However, successive British governments have refused to accept the
Court's findings unless the UN adopts a resolution calling for sanctions
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.17 The irony of the situation is that
Britain can use its veto in the Security Council to block such a resolution,
whilst in theory remaining in favour of UN efforts to achieve Namibian
independence. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office recently
stated: "In keeping with the spirit of various United Nations resolutions,
we give no promotional support to any form of trade with Namibia . . .
However, there are no mandatory resolutions prohibiting trade with the
territory and it is, therefore, our view that this is a matter for commercial
decision only."18
Further, on the grounds that the UN General Assembly acted beyond
its competence in establishing the United Nations Council for Namibia
(UNCN), successive British governments have not recognised the
UNCN's Decree no. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of
Namibia. Thus, the provisions of Decree no. 1 have not been incorporated
into British domestic law to prevent British nationals and companies from
operating in or trading with Namibia. While this remains the case, British
companies continue to operate in Namibia in defiance of international
law, maintaining they are doing nothing illegal.
Having identified the two principal issues concerning international
economic measures with respect to Namibia, a brief summary is
necessary of the main arguments for and against sanctions as a legitimate
form of pressure in order to outline the framework in which Oxfam's
Namibian partners make their statements.
THE INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN COMPANIES
IN NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA
Different viewpoints exist on the role of foreign economic interests in
Namibia and South Africa, and consequently on action that should be
taken regarding foreign investments as part of the international effort to
secure Namibia's independence. The different views can be broadly
categorised as follows: firstly, there are those who believe that the role of
companies and investments is simply to generate profits for their
shareholders. According to this argument, companies do not have a
political role to play and should be free to operate in all political
environments, Namibia and South Africa included.
The second broad category of opinion is that foreign companies,
through their economic activities, can be a force for evolutionary political
change, particularly if they adopt 'enlightened' employment and other
social policies and also if they form relationships with the governments of
the countries in which they operate, with a view to promoting internal
political reforms. Barclays PLC, for example, states: "Barclays National
Bank operates on a commercial basis and the successful growth of our
75
associate, together with its long-standing liberalising policies, is a force
for justice in helping to improve the lot of the underprivileged people in
South Africa and Namibia". 19
The third viewpoint holds that foreign companies, by virtue of their
economic involvement in Namibia and South Africa, necessarily buttress
the political interests of the host government and their presence is
therefore an integral part of the prevailing political system for as long as
they remain in the country. This argument maintains that only by
terminating, or at least severely limiting, their activities would pressure for
change be effected.
The economic dimension of the first two approaches is that the
activities of foreign companies eventually benefit the black majority in
South Africa and Namibia, by creating wealth, jobs and skills and thus
effectively a gradual 'trickledown' improvement in living standards. The
argument goes that because they contribute to the creation of wealth in
the country, it therefore follows that their withdrawal would hurt the
economy and, in turn, the living standards and employment opportunities
of black Namibians and South Africans.
The economic dimensions of the arguments from those who oppose
foreign investment are that foreign companies operating in Namibia and
South Africa do so in an environment where the extreme inequalities of
wealth between whites and blacks are morally indefensible. They hold
that the majority of Namibian and South African blacks, those who live in
the 'homelands', are among the poorest people in Africa and that the
'trickledown' argument is therefore meaningless. They also argue that
foreign companies operating in South Africa and Namibia, regardless of
whether they offer improved working conditions or fund social welfare
projects, have nonetheless to operate within the unjust legal framework
of the host country. Moreover the debilitating social consequences of
South Africa's illegal occupation, such as divided families, inadequate
schooling and health care, loss of dignity, deprivation of citizenship and
the right to vote, are not addressed by the economic arguments put
forward in favour of foreign investment.
The political dimensions of the views put forward in favour of
continued foreign investment are that economic sanctions would only
serve to harden the South African Government's line. It is argued that
sanctions have been shown not to work. In the case of Rhodesia, for
example, it is held that international economic sanctions, far from
crippling the economy, made it more robust by promoting self-
sufficiency. The view is expressed that for as long as foreign companies
remain in Namibia and South Africa they can promote constructive
political change by being critical of government at the same time as giving
practical examples of improved living and working conditions if they
withdrew they would be powerless to exert this pressure.
There is also the view that because the South African economy
provides jobs for thousands of migrant workers from neighbouring
76
African countries, disinvestment and sanctions would harm the interests
of other countries which derive benefit from those workers' remittances.
This, it is argued, should be set against the possible benefits of sanctions.
The political dimensions of opposition to foreign investment are that
since all efforts on the part of foreign investors have so far failed to secure
either Namibia's independence or the abolition of apartheid, it is time to
apply different, stronger measures such as economic sanctions.
On this point, a statement issued by the Commonwealth Conference in
October 1985, held that, "We are united in the belief that reliance on the
range of pressures adopted so far has not resulted in the fundamental
changes we have sought over many years . . . We consider that the
situation calls for urgent practical steps." 20
It is maintained that international sanctions would be an effective tool
to achieve change in Namibia and South Africa because the two
economies are so strongly integrated with foreign interests. Economic
sanctions are also widely seen as a means of applying peaceful pressure
for change. It is argued that the majority of black Namibians and South
Africans would rather undergo the economic hardships caused by
sanctions now than continue to endure escalating violence and the
economic, political and social deprivations they suffer at present.
With regard to the argument that workers from neighbouring African
states would be hurt by sanctions, the case is put that for as long as
apartheid rule continues in South Africa, neighbouring African countries
will continue to suffer from South Africa's regional policy of economic,
political and military destabilisation and that the removal of apartheid will
be in the long-term interests of these countries. It is also pointed out that
the Southern African 'Frontline States' have themselves repeatedly called
for sanctions against South Africa. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia,
for example, at a joint meeting of foreign ministers of the Frontline States
and the EEC in February 1986 stated: "We have been informed that the
European Communities stand for peaceful change. That is also our stand.
It is for this reason that we have advocated economic sanctions against
South Africa because we believe that these measures are a peaceful
means of bringing about the desired change in that country.
"We are quite aware of the effects such measures will have on both the
black people in South Africa and on the economies of the Frontline
States. There is no denying the fact that the majority of Frontline States
are dependent on South Africa for the survival of their economies. In spite
of this, we are prepared to suffer a little now rather than much more later
when the racial volcano in South Africa eventually erupts. Its lava will
spread to all corners of this region, killing and maiming many people in its
trail; for there is no way in which this tragedy can be avoided if South
Africa does not take the measures we have advocated and continue to
advocate."21
77
THE VIEWS OF OXFAM'S PARTNERS IN
NAMIBIA
The interminable delays over independence, and the century-long
struggle against poverty and oppression have combined to produce a
mounting frustration amongst black Namibians, many of whom feel that
decisive action from the international community is urgently needed.
Mass rally in June 1985 protesting against the official inauguration of the South African-
controlled interim government.
The views of Oxfam's major partners in Namibia are admirably summed
up in the following statement by the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-
Kavango Church (ELOC):
"The dispute over Namibia has gone on for almost twenty years. Those
twenty years, added to the eighty-two years ofcoionisation, makes it over
one hundred years during which many lives of innocent citizens have
been lost, and much of the wealth of the land plundered.
"This situation is still continuing . . . The Church is thus forced to
declare its position on the issue of sanctions against the South African
Government. And in this . . . the Church is a spokesman for the people
of this country.
"The Church does not take its position with a blind eye, without
anticipating any new suffering which may accompany the
implementation of sanctions. New suffering may befall both the whites
and blacks. But the Church is convinced that those suffering are the only
alternative to avoid the shedding of blood.
78
"The voice emanating from the muzzle of the gun is not favoured by
the Church. The peaceful negotiations that were undertaken in the past
were ineffective. Now, only one avenue remains open: to isolate South
Africa by all means.
"It is clear that the Church is not advocating isolation of South Africa
out of hatred. . . The Church is doing it in good faith, so that all those
who have a say in the affairs of this country, through negotiations, will
give the whole nation the right to choose its desired and true leaders."22
As one old man in an impoverished southern 'homeland' said,
"/ am tired of all the talking about Namibian independence. The only
thing that I see is that the western powers must take sides. If they support
South Africa, they must say so. If they are on our side, then they must
take action against South Africa. Someone who hasn't suffered
oppression cannot know what it is western countries don't understand
how we feel. " 24
79
SUMMARY AND
KEY CONSIDERATIONS
"As mothers, we are really concerned about our children's future. We
want to send a message straight to the British Government: he should use
his power and pressure so that we can get back our country." (Woman
farmer, southern Namibia.1)
South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia means that the
majority of Namibia's people live in conditions of great poverty and
deprivation, in spite of the fact that Namibia is among Africa's wealthiest
countries. It also means that black Namibians have no basic rights, and
are subject to a wide range of repressive legislation.
The South African-controlled economy is geared towards the interests
of foreign investors and settlers and keeps the black majority in poverty.
Namibian resources are exploited by foreign interests in defiance of
international law, and precious natural resources are being depleted with
minimal benefit to the poor majority.
Social development for the black majority is severely hindered by the
present colonial structures. Basic services for blacks are disgracefully
inadequate and the lack of decent educational facilities has resulted in an
acute shortage of skilled black Namibians. The war causes widespread
misery, death and destruction. Only a just political settlement will bring it
to an end, although even after independence huge obstacles to tackling
poverty and underdevelopment will remain.
International efforts to help Namibia achieve independence under
majority rule have foundered over the conflicting interests of powerful
states. Meanwhile, Namibia's people continue to suffer under South
African occupation, denied the right to govern their country and to shape
their own society.
Historically, politically and economically, Britain has been closely
connected with Namibia for well over a century, and consequently carries
a heavy responsibility to help it achieve independence.
The following key considerations are based on Oxfam's experience of
more than 20 years' work in Namibia.
80
1: A fresh initiative for unconditional independence
The overwhelming need to achieve full and early independence for
Namibia, according to the United Nations Security Council Resolution
435, is more urgent than ever before.
The extreme poverty and denial of basic human needs are Oxfam's
particular concerns. Until Namibians can run their own country under an
elected government, they cannot begin to address these pressing
problems.
Britain should recognise its important historical role and take a fresh
and urgent initiative to press for Namibia's unconditional independence in
accordance with SC Resolution 435, and should avoid the 'linkage'
precondition in current US-led negotiations.
2: Recognition of Decree no. 1
Meanwhile, the British Government should take steps to ensure that
British-based companies operating in Namibia do not take advantage of
the Namibian people's powerlessness to control their country's economy
and natural resources.
Until Namibia is independent, the activities of British-based companies
operating in Namibia are contrary to the spirit of international law, and are
morally highly questionable in the light of the extreme poverty
perpetuated by present economic and political structures.
The British Government should formally recognise the United Nations
Council for Namibia's Decree no. 1 for the Protection of the Natural
Resources of Namibia and act on its provisions.
3: The views of Oxfam's partners in Namibia
The British Government should give careful consideration to the views
expressed by Oxfam's partners in Namibia on the question of econo'mic
sanctions against South Africa as a means to speed up implementation of
Security Council Resolution 435.
4: Aid
On independence, British and EEC official aid to Namibia should be
generous in scale and fully in accordance with the needs of the majority.
In the meantime the British Government should ensure that sufficient
bilateral and multilateral humanitarian aid is allocated to Namibian
refugees.
81
Notes and References
General Notes
Racial terminology. The South African Government uses the general term 'blacks' or
'Africans' to denote all the indigenous 'population groups' (as classified by the South
African authorities) except for 'coloureds' which is a South African term denoting people of
mixed race ancestry. In this book, 'blacks' is used as a common term for all non-white
Namibians except where, in order to explain apartheid in action, we have used single
inverted commas to distinguish between 'blacks' and 'coloureds' in the South African
sense.
Currency Conversions. The South African rand is the unit of currency used in Namibia.
All figures expressed in rand have been converted into sterling, except for GDP and GNP
figures which are given in $US. Where a year-average figure is used, we have followed the
IMF (International Monetary Fund) year-average conversion rates. Otherwise, the prevailing
Financial Times conversion rates are used.
In order to protect the Namibians who have been quoted throughout the book, we have
either used no names at all or have used first names only.
Namibia - Basic Facts
1 Includes Walvis Bay and Namibian refugees, exludes non-local military personnel.
Projections based on Green R.H., Kiljunen M., Kiljunen K., Namibia the Last Colony,
1981, p. 260; and SWA/Namibia Directorate of Development Co-ordination, National
Atlas of South West Africa, 1983.
2 Estimates based on Moorsom R., Transforming a Wasted Land, A Future for Namibia
series, No. 2, CIIR, 1982, p. 99; and Green R.K., Kiljunen M. & K., op. cit., p. 262.
3 Estimates based on SWA/Namibia , Dept. of Finance, Statistical/Economic Review,
SWA/Namibia Information Services, 1984; and SWA/Namibia, Directorate of
Development Co-ordination, op. cit.
4 Gross income for whites includes salaries and local business profits but excludes
corporate surpluses; for blacks includes wages, profits and subsistence output.
(Sources as in footnote 3 above, and projections based on Green R.H., Kiljunen M.
& K., op. cit.)
5 UNIN, Health Sector Policy Options for Independent Namibia, 1984, p. 19.
6 Ellis J . , Education, Repression and Liberation: Namibia, A Future for Namibia series,
No. 4, CIIR, 1984, p. 70.
7 CIIR, Profile Namibia, 1985
8 Ellis J., op. cit., p. 41.
82
Chronology
1 Sources: IDOC International, Namibia: The Strength of the Powerless, 1980, pp.
v xix.
SWAPO Department of Information & Publicity, To Be Born a Nation;
the Liberation Struggle for Namibia, 1981, pp. 301 - 310.
CIIR, Profile on Namibia, 1985.
Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa: South Africa and Namibia,
UNESCO Press, Paris, 1974.
The Guardian, 5.3.1986.
Introduction
1 UNIN, op. cit., p. 19.
2 UNCN, The Military Situation in and Relating to Namibia, Report of Standing
Committee II of the UNCN, 1984, p. 3.
SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organisation) was founded in 1960 and leads
the national liberation movement of Namibia. It is not banned inside Namibia, but
operates under constant harassment and repression by the security forces. SWAPO
organises large refugee settlements in Angola and Zambia.
3 Ibid.
4 Fraenkel P., Murray R., The Namibians, Minority Rights Group, 1985, p. 5.
5 Text, Mandate for South West Africa, Article 2.
6 SWAPO Department of Information and Publicity, To Be Born a Nation: the
Liberation Struggle for Namibia, 1981, p. 123.
7 Hanlon, J., Beggar Your Neighbour: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, CIIR and
James Currie, 1986.
8 Hansard, 23.1.85.
Oxfam's Namibia Programme
1 Grants to Namibian Refugees: May 1985 - Feb. 1986
World University Service Training for Kindergarten teachers £ 1,301
Books for refugee camp workers 26
Namibia Support Committee Medical Kits, Angola 14,896
- Journals for SWAPO medical staff 449
Namibia Extension Unit, Lusaka Coordinator's salary 2,830
2 Personal interview with author, Katatura, September, 1985.
3 Personal interview with author, Windhoek, October, 1985.
Chapter 1
1 Estimates based on SWA/Namibia Dept. of Finance, Statistical/Economic Review
1984, SWA/Namibia Information Service, Windhoek; and SWA/Namibia Directorate
of Development Coordination, National Atlas of South West Africa, 1983; and
projections based on Green R. H., Kiljunen M., Kiljunen K., Namibia The Last
Colony, 1981.
2 Ibid.
3 An estimated 50-55% (1983) of GDP is exported. Estimate based on SWA/Namibia
Dept. of Finance, op. cit.
83
4 1983 figures give the following GDP distribution figures; gross profits for
transnational corporations and local businesses R820m (40% of GDP), taxes R410m
(20%), salaries to whites R370m (18%), income left over for all blacks R450m (22%),
income to black workers R300m (14%), to black traders and business people R45m
(2%), to black peasant farmers R105m (6%).
See note (1) above for sources.
5 Estimate based on SWA/Namibia, Dept. of Finance, op. cit.
6 Personal interview with author, Katatura, Sept. 1985.
7 Following the International Court of Justice's 1966 Judgement which held that
Ethiopia and Liberia did not have standing to bring an action against South Africa
(see section on International Law, Chapter 3).
8 The Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa Act of
1968 (No. 54) implemented the 'native affairs' part of the 'homelands' programme,
and the South West African Affairs Act of 1969 (No. 25) transferred administrative
functions from the then white Legislative Assembly in Namibia to the South African
Parliament and State President so that South Africa had direct control of the
'homelands' programme.
9 IDAF, Namibia the Facts, 1980, p. 15.
10 The Development of Self-Government for Native Nations Amendment Act of 1978
(No. 20), IDAF, 1980, op. cit., p. 15 & 16.
11 Ibid, p. 64.
12 Ibid, p. 17.
13 Ibid, pp. 27 8 28.
14 Ibid, p. 28.
15 IDAF, Focus no. 2, July 1981.
16 Personal Interview with author, central Namibia, Sept. 1985.
17 IDAF, Focus No. 63, March/April 1986.
18 Personal interview with author, central Namibia, Sept. 1985.
19 Personal interview with author, Katatura, Sept. 1985.
20 Personal interview with author, Katatura, Sept 1985.
21 Personal interview with author, central Namibia, Sept. 1985.
22 Personal interview with author, Katatura, Sept. 1985.
23 Potgieter J.F., The Household Subsistence Level of the Major Urban Centres of the
Republic of South Africa, University of Port Elizabeth Institute for Planning Research,
Sept. 1983.
24 Personal communication with author, Windhoek, September, 1985.
25 Abrahams 0., "Namibia Today: The Internal Situation", article published in The
Namibia Review, no. 28, April June 1983.
26 Personal interview with author, central Namibia, Sept. 1985.
27 Moorsom R., Transforming a Wasted Land, A Future for Namibia Series, No.2, CMR,
1982, p. 21.
28 Derived from Moorsom, 1982, op. cit, p. 99. Also Green R. H. & Kiljunen M. & K.
op. cit, p. 262.
29 Adapted from SWAPO Dept. of Information and Publicity, To Be Born a Nation -
The Liberation Struggle for Namibia, 1983, p. 62.
30 In 1983, 290,000 people (50% of the economically active population, using this
category to mean people over 12 years not in school available for employment, rather
than those in employment) relied for their main subsistence on peasant agriculture;
45,000 people (8%) were employed on white-owned farms including domestic
servants and proprietors. Estimates based on Green R. H., Kiljunen M. & K., op. cit,
p. 264.
31 Moorsom R., op. cit, p. 37.
32 UNCN, Activities of Foreign Economic Interests Operating in Namibia, Report of
Standing Committee II of the UNCN, 1984, p. 16.
33 Ibid, p. 2. Estimate of % GDP based on SWA/Namibia, Dept. of Finance op. cit, and
projection based on Green R. H. & Kiljunen M. & K., op. cit, pp. 276 & 285. This
figure is lower than in previous years because of the drought. According to Green et
84
al, in 1979 the commercial agricultural sector accounted for 9.8% of GDP. % of
exports based on SWA/Namibia Dept. of Finance, op. cit.
34 Green R. H., Kiljunen M. & K., op. cit. p. 38.
35 Moorsom R., The Plunder Continues, Action on Namibia bulletin, NSC, 1982.
36 Park, P. and Jackson, T., Lands of Plenty, Lands of Scarcity: Agricultural Policy and
Peasant Farmers in Zimbabwe and Tanzania, Oxfam, 1985, pp. 3-10.
37 One recent estimate gives R35.000 per ranch per year over the drought period as the
average subsidy. Source CNR report, 1985, p. 5.
38 Ibid, p. 5.
39 In practice many white farm owners leave the day-to-day management of their farms
to black employees, often for long periods at a time. There is, therefore, some
considerable management expertise amongst blacks {although few are given
adequate recognition for the responsibility they carry), which will be indispensable for
post-independence manpower requirements.
40 Personal interview with author, central Namibia, Sept. 1985.
41 Based on Moorsom R., Transforming a Wasted Land, A Future for Namibia series,
No. 2, CNR, 1982, p. 96.
42 It is important, in general, to avoid use of the term 'subsistence' when referring to
black agricultural production as the resource base available to peasant farming
households is inadequate to support them at subsistence level.
43 Moorsom R., op. cit, p. 9.
44 Fraenkel P., Murray R., The Namibians, Minority Rights Group report no. 19, 1985,
p. 20.
45 Oxfam internal memorandum, Jan. 1986.
46 Fraenkel P., Murray R., op. cit, p. 26.
47 Personal interview with author, central Namibia, Sept. 1985.
48 Personal interview with author, central Namibia, Sept. 1985.
49 The transnational corporations from the Contact Group states, which operate or
invest in Namibia, either directly or through associate companies, include: UK Rio
Tinto Zinc Corporation PLC (RTZ), Consolidated Goldfields PLC, Selection Trust
Ltd.; USA Newport Mining Corporation; Canada Rio Algom Ltd.; France
Total-Compagnie Miniere et Nucleaire; West Germany Urangesellschaft, mbH.
Transnationals are also involved either directly or through associate companies in
uranium prospecting operations in Namibia. These are reported to include: UK
RTZ (through Rossing Uranium Ltd.); USA - Union Carbide Corporation, Newport
Mining Corporation; France Societe Nationale Elf Aquitaine ISNEA), Pechiney-
Ugine Kuhlmann, Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP), Entreprise de Recherche
et d'Activites Petrolieres (ERAP).
Source: UNCN, op. cit, pp. 6, 9, 11, 14.
50 Ibid, pp. 8, 9, 11.
51 CIIR, Mines and Independence, A Future for Namibia Series, No. 3, 1983, p. 29.
52 Estimate based on SWA/Namibia, Dept. of Finance, op. cit.
53 CIIR, op. cit, p. 29.
54 Green R. H., Kiljunen M. & K., op. cit,, p. 37.
55 Based on Green R. H., Kiljunen M. & K., op. cit.
56 Fraenkel P., Murray R., op. cit, p. 25.
57 Estimates based on SWA/Namibia, Dept. of Finance, op. cit, and CIIR, op. cit, p.
145.
58 CIIR report, 1985, p. 2.
59 Moorsom R., Exploiting the Sea, A Future for Namibia series, No. 5, 1984, p. 16.
60 Ibid, p. 16.
61 UNCN, op. cit, p. 17.
62 Green R. H. Kiljunen M. & K., op. cit, p. 40.
63 Estimate based on Moorsom R., op. cit, pp. 19, 29, 104.
64 Estimate based on Green R. H., Kiljunen M. & K. op cit p. 40; and Moorsom R., op.
cit.
65 CIIR report, 1985, p. 6.
85
66 In 1974 R22m (£13.8m) and 1975 R20m (£12.6m) post tax profits from the inshore
industry (including the South African fisheries run by the companies operating
Namibia's inshore industry).
Source: Moorsom R., op. cit, p. 111.
67 Ibid p. 57.
68 Ibid, pp. 57, 58.
69 Ibid, p. 58.
70 Ibid, p. 35. Exclusive Economic Zones determine that a coastal state is entitled to
extend its control of marine and seabed resources to a distance of 379 km.
71 Ibid, p. 36.
72 Ibid, p. 36.
73 According to Moorsom (Ibid pp. 70-94) however, a state-planned revival of the
inshore industry, after independence, would unfortunately involve a reduction in the
numbers employed in the short term.
Chapter 2
1 Personal interview with author, Windhoek, October 1985.
2 The Namibian, 24.1.86.
3 Personal interview with author, Central Namibia, September 1985.
4 Ellis, J. Education, Repression and Liberation: Namibia, A Future for Namibia series,
No. 4, CMR, 1984, pp. 36 & 70.
5 In 1981, an average of R1.210 (£707) was spent on each white pupil, as compared to
R232 (£135) for each 'black' pupil, and R300 (£175) for each 'coloured' pupil.
Ibid, p. 41.
6 A survey conducted by the United Nations Institute for Namibia in 1979 revealed that
'blacks' had to contribute R20 to R50 (£11 to £27) towards state schooling per child
and R80 to R105 (£44 to £58) towards mission schooling.
7 C11R, Profile Namibia, 1982.
8 See Ellis J., op. cit, for a full discussion on the Cape syllabus.
9 Personal interview with author, Oxford, January 1986.
10 UNIN, Towards a Language Policy for Namibia, 1981, p. 7.
11 Ellis J., op. cit, p. 36.
12 According to UNIN's 1985 revised estimates, the commercial agricultural sector will
need to fill 1,750 new posts at independence; 3,000 new posts in education will need
to be filled; 850 in health; 3,750 in general government; 1,750 in mining; 1,550 in
transport and communications; and 300 in fisheries.
13 UNIN, Manpower Estimates and Development Implications for Namibia, 1978, p. 12.
14 Personal interview with author, central Namibia, September 1985.
15 Personal interview with author, Ovamboland, October 1985.
16 Personal interview with author, Ovamboland, October 1985.
17 Personal interview with author, Windhoek, October 1985. A pilot government literacy
programme is reported to be in progress, but NLP officials say that it is presently very
limited in scope, and that it is using Afrikaans in preference to indigenous languages
or English.
18 Oxfam internal memorandum, January 1984.
19 Namibia Refugee Project, Dossier on Literacy in the Namibian Refugee Settlements,
1985, p. 34.
20 UNGA Resolution 2679 (XXL).
21 UNIN, Manpower Estimates and Development Implications for Namibia, 1978 p. v.
22 ODA, Information Brief on Namibia, 1985.
23 The technical use of the term 'infant' means babies under 1 year, and is thus used
throughout this section.
24 Infant mortality rate (IMR) statistics are expressed as a given number per 1,000 live
births. UNIN estimates the IMR for blacks in Namibia to be 155 using official figures
86
for 1977-78 (UNIN, Health Sector Policy Options for Independent Namibia, 1984, p.
19). IPPF World Population Data Sheet, 1982 gives average IMR for Africa as 121
(based on 1979-80 statistics). It should be noted that average IMR statistics (whether
expressed for a national population or, as in this case, for a racial sub-category) mask
internal inequalities in health and wealth.
25 Personal interview with author, Ovamboland, October 1985.
26 Personal interview with author, Katatura, September 1985.
27 UNIN, Health Sector Policy Options for Independent Namibia, 1984, p. 21.
28 Ibid, p. 20.
29 Ibid, p. 20.
30 NSC Health Collective, Namibia: Reclaiming the People's Health, 1984, p. 11.
31 UNIN, op. cit, p. 23.
32 Ibid, p. 25.
33 Ibid, p. 60.
34 Personal interview with author, Katatura, September 1985.
35 Maundjua P. E, My Impressions of the Life of Women in Katatura, 1985.
36 Personal interview with author, Katatura, September 1985.
37 NSC Health Collective, op. cit, p. 99.
38 Simon D., "The Crisis in Namibian Health Services", published in the Namibian
Review, no. 28, April/June 1983, p. 19.
39 NSC Health Collective, op. cit, p. 13.
40 UNIN, op. cit, p. 49.
41 Oxfam internal memorandum, October 1985.
42 Personal interview with author, Ovamboland, October 1985.
43 UNIN, op. cit, p. 52.
44 World Bank, World Development Report, 1985.
45 UNIN, op. cit. p. 52.
46 Ibid, p. 55.
47 Ibid, p. 55.
48 Ibid, pp. 47 8 50.
49 UNCN, Report on Standing Committee 11, The Military Situation in and Relating to
Namibia, 1984, p. 3.
50 IDAF, Apartheid's Army in Namibia: South Africa's Illegal Military Occupation, 1982,
p. 9.
51 Personal interview with author, Ovamboland, October 1985.
52 Reports on Human Rights abuses have been issued by, among others, Amnesty
International, CCN, Namibia Communications Centre, IDAF, NSC, The South African
Catholic Bishops' Conference, the British Council of Churches, and the British
organisation Namibia Christian Exchange.
53 Personal interview with author, Ovamboland, October 1985.
54 Personal interview with author, Ovamboland, October 1985.
55 Personal interview with author, Ovamboland, October 1985.
56 The Namibian, 24.1.86.
57 Personal interview with author, Ovamboland, October 1985.
58 Personal interview with author, Ovamboland, October 1985.
59 Personal interview, Windhoek, October 1985.
60 The Namibian, 24.1.86.
61 Personal interview with author, Ovamboland, October 1985.
62 Personal interview with author, Windhoek, October 1985.
87
Chapter 3
1 FCO. United Kingdom Policy on Namibia, January 1986.
2 In 1983, France pulled out of the Contact Group in protest at the US policy of
'linkage'. France's voting pattern on the Security Council also appears to have
changed since its withdrawal from the Contact Group.
3 Hansard, 4.12.74.
4 For fuller discussion of this theme, see Julio Faundez, "Is There Still a Role for
International Law?", paper presented to the UNCN Regional Symposium on the
International Effort to Implement Decree no. 1, Geneva 1984.
5 See Lord Trefgarne's speech in the House of Lords on the question of uranium
imports from Namibia, Hansard, 23.4.1980.
6 Rio Tinto Zinc PLC owns 46.5% of Rossing Uranium Ltd's equity shares, but only
26.5% of the voting rights (CNR, Mines and Independence, 1983, p. 37).
7 Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation PLC, Annual Report and Accounts, 1983, p. 7.
8 UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, Public Hearing on the Activities of TNCs
in South Africa and Namibia, conference paper entitled, "TNCs with Interests in
South Africa and Namibia", September 1985, pp. 34 36.
9 RTZ Corporation PLC, Annual Report and Accounts, 1984, p. 19.
10 Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review, Annual Supplement on
Namibia, 1985, p. 21.
11 UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Transnational Corporations, Public
Hearings on the activities of TNCs in South Africa and Namibia, Conference paper
entitled, "Activities and Operations of TNCs in Namibia with Particular Emphasis on
their Exploitation of Namibian Resources and their Contribution to and Support of
South Africa's Illegal Occupation of Namibia", Report of Secretary General,
September 1985, p. 19.
12 ODA Information Brief, September 1985.
13 Personal communication from ODA, November 1985.
14 Ibid., also ODA Information Brief, September 1985.
15 HMG Statistical Service, British Aid Statistics 1979 - 1983, 1984 edition.
16 Commonwealth Conference communiques, October 1985.
17 Hansard, 4.12.74.
18 Letter from FCO to Oxfam 4.2.86.
19 Letter from Barclays Bank PLC to Oxfam 6.2.86.
20 Commonwealth Conference Communique, October 1985.
21 Text of address by His Excellency the President, Dr Kenneth David Kaunda, to the
Joint Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Frontline States and of the European
Communities, held in Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka on Monday, 3rd February 1986.
22 ELOC commands wide support in Namibia. !t is the largest single church in the
country with some 400,000 members, nearly a third of the population. (Personal
communication from the Namibia Communications Centre, November 1985.)
23 Extract from an article published in Omakwetu, ELOC's twice monthly magazine,
October 1985, reproduced by the Namibia Communications Centre, 19.11.1985.
24 Personal interview with author, southern Namibia, Sept. 1985.
Summary and Key Considerations
1 Personal interview with author, southern Namibia, September 1985.
Appendices
APPENDIX I
Britain's voting record on Namibia at the UN Security Council
Date
1969
March
No.
264
August
1970
July
July
269
276
283
July
1971
October
284
301
Description UK Vote
Recognises UN General Assembly's Resolution 2145 Abstained
of 1966 describing South Africa's continued
presence as illegal and calling for immediate
withdrawal.
Condemns South Africa's refusal to comply with Abstained
SC Res.264 (above) by continuing to occupy
Namibia; thus violating territorial integrity. Sets
deadline for South Africa to withdraw by October
1969. Calls on all states to refrain from dealings with
South Africa.
Asserts that South Africa's defiant attitude towards Abstained
Security Council resolutions undermines UN's
authority, calls on all member states especially those
with economic and other interests in Namibia to
refrain from any dealings with South Africa, decides
to establish sub-committee to study ways of
implementing SC resolutions.
All UN member states to refrain from relations with Abstained
South Africa over Namibia and cease investment
activities including concessions in Namibia. United
Nations Council for Namibia (UNCN) to make
proposals regarding passports and visas for
Namibians to travel abroad, and regarding the
discouragement of tourism and emigration to
Namibia. Recommends General Assembly to set up
UN Fund for Namibia.
Decides to submit to International Court of Justice Abstained
question of legal consequences for UN member
states of South Africa's continued presence in
Namibia.
Condemns 'homelands' policy and South Africa's Abstained
continued illegal presence, agrees with ICJ Advisory
Opinion calling on all states to abstain from dealings
with South Africa over Namibia, declares that
foreign economic activities in Namibia are not
subject to protection against claims of a future,
lawful government of Namibia.
89
1972 309
February
310
August
December
1973
December
319
323
342
1974 366
December
1975 SC draft
June resolution
No. S/11713
1976 385
January
October SC draft
resolution
No. S/12211
1978
May
428
(On
Angola)
July
July
431
432
September 435
90
Requests UN Secretary General to initiate contacts For
with all concerned to effectNamibia's independence.
Condemns South Africa's refusal to comply with UN Abstained
over Namibia, calls upon South African Government
to abolish any labour system within Namibia which
contravenes Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and calls upon all member States to ensure these
basic provisions are adhered to by foreign
companies, considers that South Africa's continued
occupation of Namibia is detrimental to maintenance
of peace and security in the region and that South
Africa should withdraw immediately, and that SC
should meet to decide effective measures under UN
Charter to secure implementation of this resolution.
Invites the Secretary General to continue contacts For
with all concerned to effect Namibia's
independence.
Notes that majority of Namibians consulted by UN For
are opposed to 'homelands' policy, and in favour of
South Africa's withdrawal.
Notes Secretary General's report, and decides to For
discontinue further efforts on the basis of SC Res.
309.
Calls on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia, For
set deadline of 30 May 1975 for withdrawal, and calls
for transfer of power to the people of Namibia with
the assistance of the UN.
Determining that the illegal occupation of Namibia Veto
by South Africa constitutes a threat to international
peace and security, demanding that South Africa
proceed with necessary steps to withdraw from
Namibia.
Draft resolution fails due to UK, US and French veto.
Demands South Africa withdraw and transfer power For
to the people of Namibia, calls for the holding of 'free
and fair' elections under UN supervision and control.
Determines that the illegal occupation of Namibia Veto
and the war there constitutes a threat to international
peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, and that all states should prevent any form
of military collaboration with South Africa including
sales of military equipment.
Draft resolution fails due to UK, US and French veto.
Condemns South Africa's aggression against For
Angola, demands immediate withdrawal of all South
African forces from Angola, demands South Africa
end its illegal occupation of Namibia.
UN Secretary General to appoint Special For
Representative for Namibia to submit report with
recommendations for implementation of SC Res.
385 for free and fair elections under UN supervision.
Notes that Walvis Bay is an integral part of Namibia, For
and South Africa must not use it in any manner
prejudicial to the independence of Namibia, or to
Namibia's economy.
Calls for free and fair elections for the whole of For
Namibia as one political entity under the control and
supervision of the UN; universal adult suffrage; after
national elections, a national Constitution for an
independent Namibia; before start of electoral
campaign, Namibia's Administrator-General to
repeal all remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws,
regulations and administrative measures. Before
start of electoral campaign. South Africa to release
all Namibian political prisoners and detainees; all
Namibian refugees to be allowed to return peacefully
and participate fully in electoral process, the UN to
ensure that Namibians in exile are given free and
voluntary choice to return; a binding ceasefire by all
partners and the restriction of South Africa and
SWAPO armed forces to base, thereafter a phased
withdrawal from Namibia of the majority of South
African troops; all unilateral measures taken by the
South African Government in Namibia in relation to
the electoral process null and void.
December 439 Condemns South Africa's decision to proceed Abstained
unilaterally with the internal 'elections' for the
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, and demands that
South Africa cooperate with Security Council in
implementation of SC Res. 435.
1979 447 Calls for South Africa to cease armed invasion of Abstained
March Angola, and calls for member states to extend
Passistance to Angola.
November 454 Calls upon South Africa to cease all acts of Abstained
(On aggression against Angola, demands that South
Angola) Africa desist from using Namibia to launch acts of
aggression against Angola or other neighbouring
states.
1980 475 Demands South Africa withdraw armed forces from Abstained
June Angola, calls on all states to impose arms embargo
against South Africa, calls for payment of
compensation to Angola by South Africa for damage
to life and property resulting from acts of military
aggression.
Condemns South Africa for its continued illegal Veto
occupation of Namibia, decides to adopt effective
measures including economic and political
sanctions, oil and arms embargoes against South
Africa.
Draft resolution fails due to UK, US, and French veto.
April Revised Reiterates that Namibia is the legal responsibility Veto
SC draft of the UN until self-determination is achieved, and
resolution that all member states should sever diplomatic,
No. S/14460 consular and trade relations with South Africa.
Rev.1 Draft resolution fails due to UK, US and French veto.
April SC draft Decides to impose a mandatory embargo on the Veto
resolution direct and indirect supply of products to South Africa
No. S/14461 and occupied Namibia.
Draft resolution fails due to US, UK and French veto.
April SC draft Decides that all member states shall cease any Veto
resolution provision to South Africa of arms and related
No. S/14462 materials of all types.
Draft resolution fails due to UK, US and French veto.
1981 SC draft
April resolution
No. S/14459
91
August
1983
May
Revised
SC draft
resolution
No. S/14664
Rev.2
(On Angola)
532
October 539
December
1984
January
545
(On
Angola)
546
(On
Angola)
December 558
1985
June
566
July
92
569
(On
South
Africa)
Demands immediate withdrawal of all South African Abstained
troops from Angola, urges all member states to
extend material assistance to Angola, decides to
send a Commission of Investigation to Angola.
Draft resolution fails due to US veto.
UN Secretary General mandated to consult all parties For
concerned on a timetable for implementation of Res.
435, and on proposed ceasefire. Secretary General to
report to Security Council by 31st August 1983.
Extends UN Secretary General's mandate (see Res. For
532 above) to 31 December 1983; condemns South
Africa for obstructing implementation of SC Res.
435; reiterates SC Res. 435; and rejects South Africa
linking independence of Namibia to irrelevant and
extraneous issues incompatible with SC Res. 435
(referring to the United States' 'linkage' policy. The
US abstained in the voting).
Condemns South Africa's continued military For
occupation of parts of southern Angola, demands
that South Africa should withdraw all its forces, and
considers that Angola is entitled to redress for
material damage suffered.
Condemns renewed South African military Abstained
agression in Angola, condemns South Africa for
using Namibian territory as a springboard for
perpetuating armed attacks and for sustaining its
occupation of parts of Angola. Demands South
Africa cease all bombing and acts of aggression in
Angola, and the withdrawal of all South African
military forces from Angola. Calls for all member
states to implement arms embargo imposed against
South Africa in SC Res. 418 of 1977, calls for
compensation to Angola.
Reaffirms SC Res. 418 of 1977 (deciding on For
mandatory arms embargo against South Africa) and
SC Res. 421 (committee established to make arms
embargo against South Africa more effective),
requests member states to refrain from exporting
arms, ammunition, and military vehicles to South
Africa.
Condemns South Africa's continued illegal Abstained
occupation of Namibia in defiance of UN; condemns
South Africa for installing interim Multi Party
Conference (MPC) government in Namibia, declares
installation of MPC to be null and void, declares that
no UN member state shall recognise it, and demands
that South Africa rescind; warns South Africa that
continued failure to cooperate on implementation of
SC Res. 435 would compel Security Council to
consider adoption of sanctions; urges UN member
states to undertake specified economic sanctions.
Strongly condemns establishment of 'State of Abstained
Emergency' in various districts of South Africa, as
well as the mass arrests, detention and murders in
South Africa; calls for unconditional release of all
political prisoners in South Africa; urges UN member
November SC draft
resolution
S/17633
states to suspend all new investments, prohibit the
sale of krugerrands, restrict sporting and cultural
relations, suspend guaranteed export loans, prohibit
new contracts in the nuclear field, and prohibit all
sales of computer equipment which may be used by
the South African army and police.
Proposed a decision to impose mandatory selective
sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter (see section on International Law)
listing: oil embargo, arms embargo, prohibition of all
new investments in South Africa and Namibia,
prohibition of all new government bank loans and
credit guarantees to South African Government and
MPC interim government in Namibia, termination of
all export credit guarantees for exports to South
Africa and Namibia, prohibition of importation or
enrichment of uranium from Namibia and South
Africa, prohibition of supply of technology,
equipment and licences for nuclear plants in South
Africa, prohibition of visits to and from South Africa
and Namibia by military, security, intelligence, and
other defence personnel, prohibition of sale and
export of computers capable of being used by South
African army, police, and security forces, cessation
of funding for trade missions, termination of double
taxation agreements with South Africa, prohibition
of krugerrand sales.
Draft resolution fails due to US and UK veto.
Veto
NB. Except where indicated otherwise, all the above SC Resolutions are on Namibia
only.
93
APPENDIX 2
UNITED NATIONS
NAMIBIA GAZETTE No.l
DECREE No. 1
FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF NAMIBIA
Conscious of its responsibility to protect the natural resources of the people of
Namibia and of ensuring that these natural resources are not exploited to [he detriment of
Namibia, its people or environmemal assets, she United Nations Council for Namibia
enacts the following decree:
DECREE
The United Nations Council for Namibia.
Recognizing that, in the terms of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27
October 1966 the Territory of Namibia (formerly South West Africa) is the direct responsi-
bility of the United Nations,
Accepting that this responsibility includes the obligation to support the right of the
people of Namibia to achieve self-government and independence in accordance with
General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,
Reaffirming that the Government of the Republic of South Africa is in illegal pos-
session of the Territory of Namibia,
Furthering the decision of the General Assembly in resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14
December 1962 which declared the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty
over their natural wealth and resources.
Noting that the Government of the Republic of South Africa has usurped and inter-
fered with these rights,
Desirous of securing for the people of Namibia adequate protection of the natural
wealth and resources of the Territory which is rightfully theirs.
Recalling the advisory opinion of the Internationa) Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,'
Acting in terms of the powers conferred on it by General Assembly resolution 2248
(S-V) of 19 May 1967 and all other relevant resolutions and decisions regarding Namibia,
'Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia t South
West Africa} notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1971. p. 16.
94
Decrees that
1. No person or entily, whether a body corporate or unincorporated, may search for.
prospect for, explore for, take, extract, mine, process, refine, use, sell, export, or distribute
any natural resource, whether animal or mineral, situated or found 10 be situated within
the territorial limits of Namibia without the consent and permission of the United Nations
Council for Namibia or any person authorized to act on its behalf for the purpose of giving
such permission or such consent;
2. Any permission, concession or licence for all or any of the purposes specified in
paragraph I above whensoever granted by any person or entity, including any body pur-
porting to act under the authority of the Government of the Republic of South Africa or
the "Administration of South West Africa" or their predecessors, is null, void and of no
force or effect;
3. No animal resource, mineral, or other natural resource produced in or emanating
from the Territory of Namibia may be taken from the said Territory by any means whatso-
ever to any place whatsoever outside the territorial limits of Namibia by any person or
body, whether corporate or unincorporated, without the consent and permission of the
United Nations Council for Namibia or of any person authorized to act on behalf of the
said Council;
4. Any animal, mineral or other natural resource produced in or emanating from the
Territory of Namibia which shall be taken from the said Territory without the consent and
written authority of the United Nations Council for Namibia or of any person authorized
to act on behalf of the said Council may be seized and shall be forfeited to the benefit of
the said Council and held in trust by them for the benefit of the people of Namibia;
5. Any vehicle, ship or container found to be carrying animal, mineral or other natural
resources produced in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia shall also be subject to
seizure and forfeiture by or on behalf of the United Nations Council for Namibia or of
any person authorized to act on behalf of the said Council and shall be forfeited to the
benefit of the said Council and held in trust by them for the benefit of the people of Namibia;
6. Any person, entily or corporation which contravenes the present decree in respect
of Namibia may be held liable in damages by the future Govemmeni of an independent
Namibia;
7. For the purposes of the preceding paragraphs 1. 2. 3. 4 and 5 and in order to give
effect to this decree, the United Nations Council for Namibia hereby authorizes the
United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, in accordance with resolution 2248 (S-V). to
take the necessary steps after consultations with the President.
The foregoing is the text of the Decree adopted by the United Nations Council for Namibia al
ils 209th meeting on 27 September 1974 and approved by the Genera! Assembly of the United
Nations at its 29th Session on 13 December 1974. For additional copies and information, please
communicate with the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia. Room DC-328, United Nations,
New York. N.Y. 10017 or at the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia. Bos
33SSO, Lusaka, Zambia.
95
APPENDIX 3
Transnational corporations based in the UK and Northern Ireland with
interests in companies in Namibia
600 GROUP LTD.
ACROW LTD.
AEPLC
BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL PLC
BARCLAYS BANK PLC
B.A.T. INDUSTRIES GROUP
BEECHAM GROUP PLC
BERGER, JENSON 8 NICHOLSON
BESTOBELLPLC
BICC LTD.
BLACKWOOD HODGE PLC1
BLUE CIRCLE INDUSTRIES PLC
BLPLC
THE BOC GROUP PLC
BRITISH PETROLEUM CO. PLC2
THE BRITISH PETROLEUM COMPANY LTD.3
BRITISH PRINTING & COMMUNICATION CORPORATION PLC
BRITISH STEEL CORPORATION2
BUSH BOAKE ALLEN
CHARTER CONSOLIDATED PLC
COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE CO. PLC
CONSOLIDATED GOLD FIELDS PLC
C.T. BOWRING & CO. LTD.4
DELTA GROUP PLC
THE DISTILLERS CO. PLC
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PLC
GRAND METROPOLITAN PLC
GUARDIAN ROYAL EXCHANGE ASSURANCE PLC
JOHN DAVIS 8 SON (DERBY) LTD.
LONRHO LTD.
MINET HOLDINGS LTD.
MITCHELL COTTS GROUP PLC
NORTHERN ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES PLC
NORWICH UNION & GENERAL ASSURANCE
RIO TINTO ZINC CORPORATION PLC
ROYAL DOULTON TABLEWARE (HOLDINGS)
ROYAL INSURANCE PLC
STC INTERNATIONAL COMPUTERS LTD. PLC
SEDGWICK GROUP PLC
THE SHELL TRANSPORT & TRADING CO.5
SMITH INDUSTRIES LTD.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK PLC
SUN ALLIANCE 6 LONDON INSURANCE
WITTINGDON INVESTMENTS LTD.
YARROW & CO. LTD.
96
Footnotes
1 Wholly owned by Blackwood Hodge South Africa Ltd. which in turn is wholly owned
by the British parent.
2 Controlled by the UK Government.
3 The British Petroleum Co. Ltd. is the parent of Standard Oil Co. (Sohio), United
States of America, through British Petroleum (Overseas) BV, Netherlands.
4 A subsidiary of Marsh and McLennan Companies, Inc., United States of America.
5 The Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, Netherlands, together with The Shell
Transport and Trading Company, United Kingdom, form the Royal Dutch/Shell
group of companies. The Shell Transport and Trading Company owns 40% of the
equity and the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company owns the remaining 60% of the
equity in the Royal Dutch/Shell group. These two companies own these proportions
of the equity in all of the subsidiaries and affiliates of the group, including its
Namibian operations. The subsidiaries are held through the holding companies, The
Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd., United Kingdom, and Shell Petroleum NV, Netherlands.
Source: UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, Public Hearings on the
Activities of Transnational Corporations in South Africa, and Namibia,
conference paper 'TNCs with Interests in South Africa and Namibia',
September 1985, pp. 34 - 36.
97
Abbreviations
AG Administrator-General
CCN Namibia Council of Churches
CDM Consolidated Diamond Mines
CIIR Catholic Institute for International Relations
DTA Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
EEC European Economic Community
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
ELOC The Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo Kavango Church of Namibia
FCO Foreign & Commonwealth Office
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GENCOR General Mining Union Corporation Ltd.
GNP Gross National Product
ICI Imperial Chemical Industries PLC
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICSEAF International Commission for the Southeast Atlantic Fisheries
IDAF International Defence and Aid Fund
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMR Infant Mortality Rate (0-1 years)
MPC Multi-Party Conference
MPLA Popular Liberation Movement of Angola
MRG Minority Rights Group
NLP Namibia Literacy Programme
NSC Namibia Support Committee
OAU Organisation of African Unity
ODA Overseas Development Administration
PHC Primary Health Care
R Rand
RTZ Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation PLC
SA South Africa
SACC South African Council of Churches
SADF South African Defence Force
SWA South West Africa
SWAN LA South West Africa Native Labour Association
SWAPO South West Africa People's Organisation
SWATF South West African Territorial Force
TCL Tsumeb Corporation Ltd.
TNC Transnational Corporation
UN United Nations
UNCN United Nations Council for Namibia
UNETPSA United Nations Educational Training Programme for Southern Africa
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNIN United Nations Institute for Namibia
UNSC United Nations Security Council
98
Bibliography
A Future for Namibia series. Catholic Institute for International Relations,
London.
1. Namibia in the 1980s, CIIR/British Council of Churches, 1981.
2. Richard Moorsom, Agriculture: Transforming a Wasted Land, 1982.
3. Mining: Mines and Independence, 1983.
4. Justin Ellis, Education, Repression and Liberation, CIIR/World University Service,
1984.
5. Richard Moorsom, Fishing and Exploiting the Sea, 1984.
6. J. Hanlon, Beggar your Neighbour, Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, CIIR and
James Currey, 1986 (forthcoming).
United Nations Publications
Trust Betrayed: Namibia, 1974.
Namibia: a Unique UN Responsibility, 1983
Social Conditions in Namibia: Report of the UN Council for Namibia, 1983 .
Contacts between UN Member States and South Africa: Report of Standing
Committee II of the UN Council for Namibia, 1984.
Plunder of Namibian Uranium: Major Findings of the Hearings on Namibian Uranium
held by the Council for Namibia in July 1980, 1982. UN Council for Namibia, Annual
Reports
International Defence and Aid Fund Publications
Namibia: the facts, 1980.
Fact papers:
9. Remember Kassinga, 1981.
10. Apartheid's Army in Namibia, 1982.
13. A Nation in Peril: Health in Apartheid Namibia, 1985.
Focus, bimonthly news digest of political repression in Namibia and South Africa
1 Other Publications
Alun Roberts, The Rossing File: The Inside Story of Britain's Secret Contract for
Namibian Uranium, Namibia Support Committee, The Campaign against the
Namibian Uranium Contract (CANUC), London, 1980.
Tim Lobstein/NSC Health Collective (eds), Namibia: Reclaiming the People's Health,
Action on Namibia Publications, London, 1984.
Department of Information and Publicity SWAPO, To Be Born a Nation: The
Liberation Struggle for Namibia, Zed Press, London, 1981.
Tore Linne Eriksen with Richard Moorsom, The Political Economy of Namibia: An
Annotated Critical Bibliography, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala,
1985.
R.H. Green, K. Kiljunen & M-L Kiljunen (eds), Namibia: the Last Colony, Longman,
Harlow, 1981.
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