Faculty of Natural Resources and Spatial Sciences
Integrated Land Management Institute (ILMI)

Land, livelihoods and housing
Programme 2015-18
Working Paper



The Integrated Land Management Institute (ILMI) is a centre of the Faculty of Natural
Resources and Spatial Sciences (FNRSS) at the Namibia University of Science and
Technology (NUST), committed to developing reputable and multidisciplinary
research and public outreach activities in the fields of land administration, property,
architecture, and spatial planning.

The Land, Livelihoods and Housing Programme aims at deepening and expanding the
focus on these three key issues in Namibia. This thematic approach seeks to reflect
the wide-ranging skills exiting at the FNRSS, and was developed to guide ILMIs
activities during the 2014-18 period. The programme is organised in four aspects:
institutional, environmental, fiscal and spatial processes.

2015



Integrated Land Management Institute (ILMI)
13 Storch Street
Private Bag 13388
Windhoek
Namibia

T: +264 61 207 2483
F: +264 61 207 9483
E: ilmi@nust.na
W: ilmi.nust.na

Working Paper No. 1
25 YEARS OF

LAND REFORM

Wolfgang Werner
Associate Professor

Department of Land and Property Sciences
Namibia University of Science and Technology

WERNER 25 Years of Land Reform

ILMI Working Paper No. 1 Page 1

1.Introduction

25 Years after the first commercial farms were bought by the then Ministry of Lands,
ResettlementandRehabilitation, landreform inNamibiacontinues toexercise themindsof
many. Public focus continues to be on the performance of government with regard to the
redistributionoflandinthefreehold1sector,althoughasignificantcomponentofthenational
land reform programme is focused on the communal areas. Against a background of large
scalelanddispossessionsduringtheGermancolonialera(Werner,1993),itshouldnotcome
asasurprise that the first12yearsof Independencewerealmostexclusivelydominatedby
concernsaboutredistributivelandreforminthefreeholdorcommercialfarmingsector.The
overarchingaimsof thisprogrammewere to redress the injusticesof thepast ina spiritof
nationalreconciliationandtopromotesustainableeconomicdevelopment(MinistryofLands,
ResettlementandRehabilitation,1998,p.iv).

Twomaininstrumentsweredevelopedtoachievetheseobjectives.TheNationalResettlement
Programme (NRP) involves the acquisition of freehold farms by the state and their
transformation into small-scale farming units to be allocated to previously disadvantaged
Namibians. TheAffirmative Action Loan Scheme (AALS) complements this approach, albeit
targetingaverydifferentgroupofpeople.Under thisprogrammepreviouslydisadvantaged
Namibianswith the necessary asset base financial and otherwise are supported to buy
commercial farms with subsidised loans. The Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and
Agribank respectively administer these two components of land reform in the freehold
farmingsector.

Landreforminthenon-freeholdorcommunalareasofNamibiaonlystartedinearnestwith
thepassingoftheCommunalLandReformActin2002.TheobjectivesoftheActincludethe
improvementoftenuresecuritybyverifyingandregisteringcustomarylandrightstoarable
andresidential land,aswellas thedevelopmentofsmall-scalecommercial farmingthrough
the surveying of communal land into parcels of approximately 2.500 ha. The MLR with
financial support from its international partners is developing the necessary infrastructure
for farming through large-scale investments through the Programme for Communal Land
Development (PCLD). Since the inception of this programme, small groups of communal
farmershavebeenincludedintheprogramme.Inbothcases,projectbeneficiarieswillbeable
toregisterlong-termleaseagreementsoverindividualfarmsaswellasgroupfarmingareas.

This Working Paper, the first in the series to be published by ILMI, will briefly review
progressinbothlandreformsectorsandraiseafewissuesthatcontinuetoposechallengesto
theprogramme.

1 The characterisation of Namibias dual land ownership structure as communal and commercial is inaccurate insofar as
communalreferstoabroadtenuresystem,whilecommercialtoaproductionsystem.Itisthereforemoreaccuratetoreferto
freehold and non-freehold areas, as commercial production, to a greater or lesser extent, is taking place in both systems.
However,communalandnon-freeholdwillbeusedinterchangeablyinthisWorkingPaper.

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ILMI Working Paper No. 1 Page 2

2.Landreforminthefreeholdsector

Thereappearstobegeneralagreementthatthepaceoflandredistributionistooslow.Successand/or
failureoftheNRPandAALSsincetheirinceptionhavealmostexclusivelybeenmeasuredintermsof
howmuchlandwasacquiredandreallocated.However,targetsforlandredistributionundertheNRP
remain ambiguous. The Strategic Options and Action Plan for Land Reform in Namibia (PTT)
(Permanent Technical Team, 2005b, p. 21) emphasised the need to have realistic land acquisition
targetsinordertoplanappropriatepostsettlementsupportprogrammesandhavesufficientfinancial
meansavailable.Itrecommendedanincreaseofthelongtermtargetfrom9.5millionhato15million
haby2020(Ibid:22).The latter targetamounts to42%ofall freeholdagricultural land inNamibia.
CabinetdecidedthattheMLRandtherepresentativesoflandownerscouldnegotiateasolutiontothe
short-andmedium-termacquisitionof land (CabinetChambers,2006,p.1). It isnotclearwhether
this everhappened. Suffice to say therefore, thatwhileMuzyamba andHilton (2012, p. 69) in their
studyonagriculturallandpricesassumedthatthetargetforlandacquisitionby2020was15million
hectares,theMinisterofLandsandResettlementusedatargetforlandacquisitionof5millionhaby
2020,whenhepresentedatechnicalbudgetbrieftotheNationalAssemblyin2014(MinisterofLands
andResettlement,2014b,p.3).

AlthoughthetargetsassetoutbytheMinisterin2014aremuchlowerthanthoserecommendedby
thePTT, theyareveryambitiouswhen it is taken intoconsiderationthat theMLRacquiredonly2,3
million ha from 1990 to the end of 2014. This figure includes 54 farms amounting to 411,257 ha,
whichweretransferredfromtheMinistryofAgriculture,WaterandRuralDevelopmenttotheMLRin
the1990s.Table1providesasummary2.

Table 1: Redistribution of freehold land 1980-2013/14

Year Type of acquisition No. of farms Total freehold area (ha.)
Distribution % of

freehold area
Before 1990 Land belonging to black farmers 181 980 260 3

1991-2014 National Resettlement Programme 371 2 264 462 6
Farms transferred by MAWF to MLR 54 411 257 1

1992-2013 Affirmative Action Loan Scheme 649 3 412 431 9

1992-2013

Land acquired by previously
disadvantaged Namibians outside the

AALS (private purchases)

?

2 200 000

6

Sub-total 1991-2012 8 077 163 22
Sub-total including 1980-1990 9 057 423 25
Total freehold area 36 164 880 25

Source: Minister of Lands and Resettlement, 2014; Republic of Namibia, 1991, p. 126, Republikein, 16.2.2015

3.Reasonsforslowpace

ThereasonmostfrequentlycitedbytheMLRtoexplaintheslowpaceoflandacquisitionisthatit is
not being offered enough land of sufficient quality, becausewhite farmers donotwant to sell their
land. That the latter is not entirely correct is borne out by the fact that white land owners sold
approximatelytwiceasmuchlandtoAALSfarmersthantotheNRPsinceIndependence.Theproblem
isthattheMLRiscompetingwithprospectiveAALSbuyersforthebestland,wherethelatterhavea
distinctadvantage.ContrarytotheAct,anunwrittenpolicydirectiveexemptsownerssellingfarmsto

2NofiguresforAALSandprivatepurchaseswereavailablefor2014.

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ILMI Working Paper No. 1 Page 3

AALSbuyersfromapplyingforawaiver.Formostsellersthisisamoreattractiveoptionthanoffering
the farm to the statewith all that this entails. Instead of having a preferent right to buy as theAct
provides for, theMinistry ends up having second choice. An analysis of where the state and AALS
farmershaveboughtcommercialfarmsshowsquiteunambiguouslythatthemajorityofAALSfarmers
have bought land in the better endowed regions of the country such Omaheke, Otjozondjupa and
Kunene.AdisproportionatenumberoffarmsacquiredbytheMLRforresettlementlieintheHardap
andKarasregions.IftheMLRwantedmorelandofacceptablequality,asimplepolicydecisioncould
givetheMLRfirstchoice,andleavewhatitdoesnotwantforotherbuyers.

Thewillingsellerwillingbuyer(WSWB)modelofacquiring landisalsocriticisedforhavingfailed
thespeedyimplementationoflandredistribution.Whilethestateislegallyempoweredtoexpropriate
landforpublicpurposes,ithasusedexpropriationonlyinveryfewcasessinceIndependence.

AcommitmenttotheWSWBprincipleimpliesthatlandacquisitioninNamibiaisnotdemanddriven,
butdependsonsupply.Thestatebuyslandifandwhenitisavailable,fundspermitting.Inasmuchas
theWSWBprinciplecontributestowardsmaintainingstabilityandcontributingtoreconciliation,this
principleprotectstheinterestsoflandowners,insofarastheyareneithercompelledtosellagainst
theirwillnor forcedtosellatapricewithwhich theyarenot fullysatisfied(Lahiff,2005,p.2).The
WSWBprinciplecreatesunequalpowerrelationshipsbetweenlandowners,thelandlessandthestate.
Despitethepowerofanationalpoliticalmandatetoacceleratelandredistribution,thestateisplaced
inaweakerpositiononaccountofthefactthatitdependsonthewillingnessoflandownerstomake
suitablelandavailableatrealisticprices.

AlargenumberoflandownersofferingtheirfarmstotheMLRforpurchasereceivewaivers.In2012,
forexample,of260 farmsoffered to theMLR,249or96%receivedwaivers (MinistryofLandsand
Resettlement,2014,p.22).Intheabsenceofmorerecentresearch,researchcarriedoutin2008will
have to suffice to shed some light on the high percentage of waivers. The nature and size of land
offered appear to be amajor hindrance. Approximately 75 per cent of all offers between 2003 and
2008 were waived because they did not satisfy the minimum farm sizes recommended for
resettlement.More specifically, 73 per cent of land offered since 2003waswaived in the northern
regions,becauseitwassmallerthan1,000ha.Thecorrespondingfigureforthesoutherndistrictswas
78percent(Werner,2008,p.12).


3.1Farmmodel

The high number of waivers can be explained to some extent by the prevailing farm model for
resettlementintermsofwhichthesuitabilityof landisassessed3.Themodelisbasedonsmall-scale
commercial farming primarilywith livestock combinedwith croppingwhere feasible, reflecting the
natureofagriculturalresourcesinthecountry.

The overriding factor that determines land uses and hence possibilities for diversification iswater.
Evenwhererainfallissufficienttomakerainfedcroppingfeasible,thehighvariabilityofrainfalland
the low moisture retention capacity of most soils make this very risky (de Pauw, Coetzee, Calitz,
Beukes,&Vits,1998,p.43).Commercialcroppingisthereforelargelyrestrictedtothemaizetriangle
and areas with sufficient water such as Hochfeld, Stampriet, Hardap and along the Swakop and
Omarururivers(Mendelsohn,2006,p.60).Asaresultofthesenaturalresourceconstraints,extensive
livestockfarmingisthedominantagriculturalproductionsysteminthefreeholdagriculturalsector.

ItfollowsfromthisthatfarmsofferedtotheMLRareassessedprimarilyintermsoftheirpotentialto
sustainlivestockfarming.ThecriteriarecommendedbytheLRACforassessingthesuitabilityofland
forresettlementarethatapieceof landmustbeabletosupportat least80 largestockunitsor500

3Thissectionisbasedon(Werner,2008,pp.1518)

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ILMI Working Paper No. 1 Page 4

small stock units, assuming also that the appropriate infrastructure is in place and in a working
condition.Thepotentialoflandtosupportcroppingisdeterminedbyitsgrowingperiod4.

The availability of and access towater is of prime importance for any farming business. Under the
current resettlementmodel, large, centrallymanaged commercial farmsare subdivided into smaller
units.Arguably,thiscontributestowardsthenumberoffarmsfoundunsuitableforresettlement,inso
farasmanyfarmshavepoorwaterinfrastructurewhichisnotcoveringtheentirefarm.Consequently,
waivers are recommended. In other instances large parts of a farm are not developed for livestock
farming,orasisthecasewithsomegamefarmsoffered,havenointernalfences.OffersintheKhomas
Regionarefrequentlyfoundtobetoomountainousforresettlement,althoughcurrentlandownersare
farming with cattle. In some instance where the MLR acquired such farms, beneficiaries have
complainedtotheMinistrythatthelandwasnotsuitableforfarming.

Thepicturethatemergesisthatunlessanofferconsistsofverygoodland,bothintermsofitsnatural
resources endowment andwell developed infrastructure, awaiver is likely tobe given.This clearly
limitstheamountoflandthatcanbeusedforredistributiontosmall-scalefarmers,asnotallfarmsfall
into this category. While it is understandable that the MLR wants to buy farms where it is not
necessary to rehabilitate and/or develop new infrastructure, the reality is that much of the
infrastructure foundon farms isoldand thatmany farmsarenotoptimallydeveloped.This implies
thatunlesscriteria fortheselectionof freehold landforacquisitionarechanged, theamountof land
thatissuitableforresettlementpurposesneedstobereassessedinordertoarriveatrealistictargets
for redistribution. At the same time, the question needs to asked whether small-scale commercial
farming under the NRP model is appropriate, given the natural resource and infrastructure
endowmentofmanyfreeholdfarms.

A number of people have argued that the state should buy freehold farms with inadequate
infrastructure and assist beneficiaries in upgrading it. This approach, it is argued, would not only
provideaccesstoagriculturallandbutwould,indoingso,increasetheagriculturalproductivityinthe
country.ToalimitedextenttheMLRispursuingthisapproach,inthatitprovidesfinancialsupportto
rehabilitate water infrastructure in particular. During the 2013/2014 Financial Year, the MLR
developed and/or rehabilitated 43 resettlement farms in //Karas, Omaheke, Oshikoto, Kunene and
Otjozondjupa.Pumptestingandrehabilitationof38boreholeswascompletedin3regions(Ministerof
LandsandResettlement,2014a,p.9).

Iftheamountofwaiversistobereduced,currentassessmentcriterianeedtobereviewedtobroaden
therangeoflandthatcanbeconsideredforacquisition.Assessmentsshouldstatewhetheraparticular
farmneedscapitalinvestmentstoenablesmall-scalefarmerstofarm,andifso,whattheextentofsuch
investmentsislikelytobe.Naturally,thestateofdevelopmentonafarmwillhaveadirectbearingon
the value of the land. However, the acquisition of undeveloped land or land that has poor
infrastructure can only be justified if a financial support system in the form of infrastructure
developmentgrantsisinplacetoenablebeneficiariestomakethenecessaryinvestmentsrequiredfor
small-scalefarming.

4.Economicsustainability

Theacquisitionof2.05millionhectaresoffreeholdlandfrom1990uptotheendof2014costthestate
N$829million.Thisfigureexcludesadditionalcostsforvaluationetc.Thetotalnumberofpeoplewho
benefitedfromthisprogrammewas5,006in2014(MinisterofLandsandResettlement,2014a,p.4).
The average land allocation per beneficiary was thus 410 ha at an average cost per beneficiary
householdofN$165,601.The24yearaveragecostoflandacquisitionwasN$403perha.

4 Growing period is defined as the period during which the precipitation, i.e. rainfall, exceeds half of the potential
evapotranspiration(Huesken,Africa,&Kapiye,1994,p.4).

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ILMI Working Paper No. 1 Page 5

Thiscostsharplyescalatedduringthe2013/2014FinancialYear,whentheMLRbought18farmswith
atotalareaof101,253haforN$142million.Atotalof73familiesbenefited.Therespectiveaverages
wereN$1,402perhaorN$1,945,201perbeneficiaryhousehold,withanaverageallocationof1,387
ha.

The overall average allocation of land ismisleading, however.While large numbers of beneficiaries
receivedallocationsmatchingandevenexceedingtherecommendedminimumsizesof1,000hainthe
northern and 3,000 ha in the Hardap and Karas regions respectively, many farms are completely
overpopulated. Research data from Omaheke has shown that in 2008 only 20 per cent of the
approximately531officialbeneficiaries in the regionhadaccess tomore than1,000ha.The lowest
averageallocationwas50haforthe84beneficiariesonthefarmVasdraai.Thiswasfollowedbythe
allocationof4,102haor91haperbeneficiaryon the farmDuPlessis,where45beneficiarieswere
settled temporarily since 1999. On the farms Gemsbokfontein, Kalahari Pragt and Blouberg, the
averageallocationswere121ha,162haand188harespectivelyperbeneficiary(Werner&Odendaal,
2010,p.55).

That this trend of allocating land parcels that are too small has not disappeared entirely is evident
fromanadvertisementplacedbytheMLRin2014announcingsuccessfulapplicantsforresettlement.
Table 2 below shows that with the exception of one farm, none of the 66 beneficiaries in Kunene
Regionreceivedevenhalfoftherecommendedminimumallocation.Theoverallaverageof512hais
wellbelowthisminimumsize.

Table 2: Average allocations, 2014

Farm name No Region Size (ha) No of beneficiaries

Average size
of allocation

(ha)
Kleinhuis 174 Kunene 5 205 16 325
Michael 347 Kunene 3 997 7 571
Elf 361 Kunene 5 556 15 370
Dwight Oos 368 Kunene 1 933 5 387
Rem Dwight 368 Kunene 1 933 4 483
Tsumis 360 Kunene 5 562 14 397
Nimitz 353 Kunene 2 139 5 428
Veelsgeluk 297 Karas 5 149 2 2 575
Stahlpan 291 Karas 3 869 1 3 869
Total 35 343 69 512

Source: Die Republikein 13.5.2014

Thelowaverageallocationsoflandraisequestionsofeconomicsustainabilityandwhetheraccessto
suchsmalllandparcelswillsignificantlyimprovethelivelihoodsofbeneficiaries5.Indicationsarethat
evenwithoptimumnumbersoflivestockandaccesstoatleasttheminimumlandparcels,theabilityof
beneficiaries togenerateenoughrevenue fromtheir land tosustain themselvesaswellascover the
costsofassetdepreciationandreplacementdiffersdramatically,dependingonwhetherbeneficiaries
arefarmingwithcattlesellingweanersorsmallstock,sellinglambs.

5ThefollowingmaterialisbasedonWerner&Odendaal,2010,pp.3435

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ILMI Working Paper No. 1 Page 6

Schuhetal(2006)haveprovideddetailedfinancialandeconomiccalculationswhichshowthatunder
optimalmanagementandpastureconditions,small-scaleresettlementfarmerscangenerateincomes
on their allocated units. A rough calculation of gross farm incomes based on theMaximum Income
Derivation formulaprovided in theDraftResettlementManual (MinisterofLandsandResettlement,
2008)notonlysupportsthisviewbutalsoshowsthatgrossfarmincomesfora3,000haunit inthe
southaremuchhigherthanfora1,000haunitinthecentralandeasternregions.

TheassumptionsmadeintheDraftResettlementManualhavebeenslightlychanged.

Withregardtocattlefarming,themaximumnumberoflargestockabeneficiarycankeepona1,000
haallocationinanareawitha1:15stockingratehasbeenadjusteddownwardtoamaximumof68or
the small stock equivalent. The second assumption thatwas changed related to running costs. The
Draft ResettlementManual assumes these to be 60 per cent of turnover. In view of the fact that
resettlementbeneficiariesareplacedondeveloped farmunitsand that theseunitswillbemanaged
primarilybyutilizingfamilylabour,thesecostshavebeenreviseddownwardsto40percent.Basedon
theseassumptions,andusingtheformulausedbytheMLR,thefollowingpictureemergesregarding
farmturnoverandgrossfarmincomeforlargestockandsmallstockfarmingunitsrespectively:

Table 3: Gross farm income using MLR Maximum Income Derivation formula, 2015

LSU
Females
(60 per
cent)

Calves (75 per
cent calving

rate)

Replacement
calves

(15 per cent)

Calves
for sale

Price
per
calf

Turnover
Expenditure

(40 per cent of
turnover)

Gross
income per

annum

67 40 30 5 25 3,289 82,235 32,894 49,341

SSU
Females
(80 per
cent)

Lambs (90 per
cent weaning

rate)

Replacement
lambs

(15 per cent)

Lambs
for sale

Price
per

lamb
Turnover

Expenditure
(40 per cent of

turnover)

Gross
income

per annum

600 480 432 65 367 719 263,868 105,547 158,321

Note: Prices are based on average auction prices for the months January-May 2015. Average weight of lamb assumed
at 35kg. These tables are intended to illustrate approximate incomes and do not purport to be exact financial
calculations. Source: Mr. J. Hanekom, NAU, 8.6.2015. His assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

Theseroughcalculations assume most favourable agricultural conditions, not only in termsof
rainfall,but in termsof farmingskillsandsufficientassets to farmoptimally.Theyalsoassume that
beneficiaries utilise their allocated land parcels fully, implying that there is no spare grazing for
drought years. The figures suggest that beneficiaries farming in predominantly cattle farming areas
arenotlikelytoimprovetheirlivelihoodssignificantly,whilehavingsufficientsparecapitaltoinvest
and/orreplaceexistinginfrastructure.

Theimplicationofthisbriefdiscussionisthatthecurrentsmall-scaleresettlementmodelisonlylikely
toyieldmoderate levelsofsuccess ifbeneficiariescansatisfy the followingrequirements(GFAterra
systems,2003,p.14ascitedinWerner&Odendaal,2010,p.35):

" Beneficiariesmusteitherownenoughlivestockorhavethefinancialmeanstoacquiresometo
usetheirlandfully;

" Unlessbeneficiarieshavesufficientlylargeherdstoutilisetheunitfully,theymusthaveaccess
tooff-farm incomeorothercapital to finance theircashneedsbefore theproductionsystem
startstoproduceasurplus;

" Beneficiaries shouldhaveexperienceorat least thepotentialability tomanagemediumsize
enterprises(suchasa1,000hafarm).

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ILMI Working Paper No. 1 Page 7

5.Lackofupwardmobility

TheNationalResettlementProgramme in itscurrent formrestrictsupwardmobilityof resettlement
beneficiaries.Theceilingonallocatedlandparcelsmakesitimpossibleforsuccessfulbeneficiariesto
accumulate enough livestock to move into large scale commercial farming. Put differently, the
recommended minimum farm sizes lock beneficiaries into small- scale farming with little room to
grow their production, as themodel places ceilings on howmuch livestock they can keep on their
allocations. Sub-leasingof resettlement landandby implication, the leasingof additional land is
prohibitedintermsoftheconditionsofleaselaiddownbygovernment,sothatbeneficiarieshavefew
options to enlarge the land they use. The potential dilemma this poses for livestock farmers is that
there exists a big gap between the maximum number livestock beneficiaries can graze on their
allocations and the minimum required to qualify for an AALS loan. It was stated above that at a
carrying capacity of 15 ha/ large stock unit (LSU), a 1,000ha parcel can support approximately 70
largestockunits(ortheirsmallstockequivalent).TheAffirmativeActionLoanSchemeonlysupports
farmerswhoowninexcessof150largestockunitsortheequivalentinsmallstock.

Thishastwomajorimplications.Firstly,resettlementbeneficiariesarenotabletoeverreach150LSU
since they are limited to 1 farming unit. Secondly, communal farmerswith herds ranging between
roughly70and150LSUdonotqualify foreitherresettlementortheAALS.This factcontradictsthe
modernisationdiscourse,which informsmuchof the thinkingabout resettlement.Briefly, it regards
accesstoresettlementfarmsasastepupfromfarmingincommunalareastowardsproperlarge-scale
commercialfarming.

Althoughthisanticipatedprogressionfromcommunalfarmingtofreeholdfarmingisnotcontainedin
anypolicies,itisfirmlyrootedinthethinkingofmanyseniorpoliticians.In2002,forexample,thethen
Minister of Lands, Resettlement andRehabilitation stated that resettlement land should serve as a
placewheresomefuturepotentialcommercial farmersshouldgraduate fromandbeabletoacquire
theirownagriculturalland(MinisterofLands,ResettlementandRehabilitation,2002,p.3).Thisview
wasreiteratedmorerecentlybyaformerCabinetMinister,whoarguedthatthebeginnerorweaker
farmers should first start in the communal area, establish themselves there, and then qualify for
resettlement. According to this view,middle-class or aspirant farmerswere stuckbetweenweaker
communal farmers and those who qualified for an AALS loan. They did not want to farm in the
communalareasanddidnothavethemeanstobuyafarm.Therefore,aresettlementfarmshouldbe
a place of empowerment, where somebody is put, not for 99 years but for a number of years, to
establishhimselfandthenbecomecommercial(InterviewinvonWietersheim,2008,p.166).

This modernisation discourse suggests that for many decision makers and others, access to
resettlement land should support aspirant commercial farmers to develop, rather than supporting
poor people, who have no access to land, livestock and employment. Against this background,
resettlement is a programme that seeks to bolster a growingmiddle class of farmerswithmassive
financialsupportfromthestate.


6.Povertyreduction

Theassumptionthataccesstoresettlementlandwillultimatelyleadtofull-scalecommercialfarming
mayexplainwhy the role that landredistribution isexpected toplay inpoverty reduction ispoorly
integratedintonationalpoliciesandprogrammesaimedatpovertyreductionandruraldevelopment.
Asober lookatexperiencesover the last25yearssuggests thataccess to landmaynotbe themost
efficientwaytoreducepoverty.Farmingrequiresaminimumassetbasethatnormallyexceedswhat
poorpeoplehave.Theromanticnotionthatvirtuallyanyonewithanylevelofeducation,background
andfinancialresourcescanbecomeasuccessfulcommercialfarmer(Sherbourne,2014,p.412)does
notseemtohaveyieldedtheresultshopedfor.

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ILMI Working Paper No. 1 Page 8

A critical analysis of political statements onpoverty reduction and the implementation land reform
revealsacuriousdisjuncturebetweenthetwo.Whilepovertyreductionostensiblyisoneofthemajor
aimsoflandredistribution,accesstolandhasnotbeenintegratedintothePovertyReductionStrategy
forNamibiawhichwasapprovedbyCabinetin1998,norintotheNationalPovertyReductionAction
Programme2001-2005whichsoughttooperationalisethePovertyReductionStrategy(SeeWerner&
Odendaal,2010,pp.11-12).Thelatterstrategydidnotaccordredistributivelandreformalong-term
role in poverty alleviation. Instead, it observed that the agricultural base is too weak to offer a
sustainablebasisforprosperity,andforeseesthatinaquartercenturyfromnow,thelargemajority
of the countrys inhabitants& are likely to have moved into urban centres& Moreover, while the
PovertyReductionStrategysawsignificantpotentialforalleviatingpovertythroughthedevelopment
of the livestock sector, it regarded further opportunities for the development of cultivation in the
freeholdorcommercialfarmingsectoraslimited.Itarguedthatatbest,landreformandanassociated
shifttointensivecultivationcouldyieldaone-timegainforpovertyreductioninthosefewareasthat
are well watered but presently farmed by extensive commercial methods (Cited in Werner &
Odendaal,2010,p.11).

Land redistribution in relation to poverty reduction also does not feature in the National Rural
Development Policy of Namibia (Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural
Development, 2012) or the National Rural Development Strategy 2013/14-2017/18 (Ministry of
Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural Development, 2013). Instead, secure long-term
land tenure in rural areas is regarded as an important intervention area in order to encourage
economicinvestmentanddevelopment.

TheMLRitselfbecamemorecriticalabouttargetingassetpoorpeoplefortheNRP.In1998itreferred
to a paradigm shift in its search for an integrated and sustainable resettlement process.
Acknowledgingtheimportanceofbringingassetsintoresettlement,thefocusofselectingbeneficiaries
shifted towards people who can mak(e) a contribution to the maintenance of allotments and pay
monthlyleaseamountstogovernment(CitedinWerner&Odendaal,2010,pp.1213).Thesecritical
reflections on the successes and challenges of resettlement culminated in the drafting of new
resettlementselectioncriteriain2008.Itobservedthatitisnotsustainabletoresettlepersonswith
little or no resources and expect them tomaintain or improve the level of economic production on
resettledunits. Itwent to say that farming is a capital intensive activity requiring large inputs up
front. Using land as a tool for social welfare provision was not considered to be economically
sustainableordesirable(MinisterofLandsandResettlement,2008,p.15).

Therevisedcriteriaemphasisedtheneedtofarmproductively.Thecriteriaintroducedthelivestock
ratio,whichsoughttoensurethatbeneficiarieswouldbeabletoutiliseallthelandallocatedtothem.
Applicantswithaprovenabilitytofarmandlivestocknumbersthatmatchedthecarryingcapacityof
thelandparcelappliedfor,stoodthebestchancesofsuccess.Tocontextualise:atacarryingcapacity
of1:15,a1,000haparcelcansupportabout69LSU.Applicantswhocanmatchtheoptimumnumber
of livestock for a given farming unit score the highest points. But an asset base of this magnitude
hardlymeets thedefinitionofpovertysuggestedbytheNamibiaStatisticsAgency.Thedraftcriteria
alsoproposedtocapnon-farmincomeofapplicantsforresettlementatN$135,000peryearinorder
forresettlementtobemeaningfultoruralpovertyreduction(Ibid,p.67).However,aworkshopwith
regional governors on the draft criteria for resettlement in February 2011 decided that the
requirementofanannualcombinedincomeofN$135,000bedropped.Thiswasdone,implyingthat
allpreviouslydisadvantagedNamibians,irrespectiveoftheincometheyearn,qualifyforresettlement
(TheNamibian,11.3.2011).

Theabsenceof a caponannual income levels resulted inanemployedeliteofpeople capturingbig
benefitsthroughresettlement.ThePermanentTechnicalTeamonLandReform(PTT)foundin2004
that of all interviewed beneficiary households, 45% were wage earners and of those 74% were
governmentemployeesbasedmainlyinWindhoek(PermanentTechnicalTeam,2005a,p.49).While
thereisnorecentdatatojudgewhetherthesituationhaschangedornot,anecdotalevidencesuggests

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ILMI Working Paper No. 1 Page 9

thatelitecaptureofresettlementbenefits iscontinuing.Regionalgovernors,permanentsecretaries-
including the formerPermanentSecretary in theMLR-businesspeopleandotheremployedpeople
areknowntohavebeenallocatedaparcelofland.Alittletricklegitimisedthesepractices:povertywas
convenientlyequatedwithlandlessness.Thepracticalimplicationofthisisthatregardlessofwhether
applicantsearnedahighsalaryornot,iftheyarelandlesstheyqualifyforresettlement.

The conclusion of this brief discussion is that the implementation of the National Resettlement
ProgrammeisnotaimedatthepoorasdefinedbytheNamibiaStatisticsAgency.Anybodywhowants
touse the landproductivelyneedsmoreassets thanarenormally associatedwithpoorpeople.The
corollaryisthatthereisnomeaningfulplaceforthepoorinalandreformprogrammethatisaimingto
increaseagriculturalproduction.Toaccommodatethepoor,theDraftResettlementManual(Minister
ofLandsandResettlement,2008,pp.16-17)proposedasocialwelfaremodel,whichshouldfocuson
theneedsofdestituteandmarginalisedpeopleandthosewhocurrentlypossessneithercapitalnor
any other assets. Such a model would complement the current resettlement group schemes and
shouldbeimplementedbylineministriesfocusingonsocialwelfareprogrammes.Thefunctionhere
oftheMLRshouldbetomakelandavailabletoandnottomanagesocialwelfareprogrammes.

6.1V2030

TheNRPessentiallytransformslarge-scalecommercialfarmsintoseveralsmall-scalefarmingunitsin
order to provide asmany previously disadvantaged Namibianswith access to freehold agricultural
landaspossible.Thisraisesthequestionwhetherextensivesmall-scalelivestockfarmingisviablein
thelongterm.Sherbourne(2014,p.412)drawsattentiontothefactthatthequestionofwhatkindof
commercial farming ismost likely to be successful inNamibia in the long term is not debated.He
points out that much of Namibias traditional farming has givenway tomore imaginativeways of
making money, including tourism and game farming. Diversifying out of traditional agricultural
productionintotourismandgamefarmingisamanifestationofdecliningprofitsinextensivelivestock
farming.Tosomeextentthisisduetoincreasinginternationalcompetitioninthemeatsectorfromlow
costproducers.Financialexpertsareoftheopinionthatagainstthisbackgroundsmall-scalefarmingis
doomed in the long run.Mega farms,where increased output volumes compensate for lower profit
marginsaretheonlywaytosustaincommercialmeatproduction. Internationally, thetrend is forto
buylandfromsmall-scalefarmersinordertocreatelargerfarmingunits(Rademeyer,2014,p.3).

AdiscussionofthisquestionisparticularlyrelevantinthecontextofVision2030(V2030).Anearlier
draft of the Rural Development Policy drew attention to some relevant sections of V2030 to
contextualise the new Policy (Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural
Development,2010,p.11). It referred to sections inV2030,which link ruraleconomicwelfarewith
demographic trends, and recognise the limited potential for growth in Namibias rural economy.
(V2030)emphasisestheneedforplannedurbandevelopmentbasedonindustrialisationtostimulate
rural-urbanmigration.

V2030 anticipates that by 2030, 75% of Namibias population will be living in proclaimed urban
centres. This, it is envisioned,will be the result ofNamibia being a prosperous and industrialised
country. The emphasis on becoming an industrialised nation in the next 15 years must lead to a
criticalassessmentofwhetherthetransformationof large-scalecommercial farmingintosmall-scale
farmingunitswillcontributetowardsthisVision.

Whichever way Namibia wants to go long-term, for agriculture to increase its productivity,
contribution to thenational economy aswell as improve thewelfare and social equity,will require
proper support services. Farmers in both the communal and freehold areas need an effective
extension service, access to input and output markets, access to financial infrastructure and
appropriate technology. Tailoring such services particularly to small-scale farmers requires an
agrarianreformthatwillincludethedevelopmentofanintegratedprogrammeaimedatreorganising
andtransformingtheinstitutionalframeworkofagriculturetofacilitateprogress.

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ILMI Working Paper No. 1 Page 10

7.Thepoliticsoflandreform

The politics of land reform since Independence cannot be understood without reference to class
formationandspecificclassinterestsandthepolicyofnationalreconciliation.Thisprocessunfolded
against the differential impact land dispossession had on Namibias indigenous communities.
PastoralistcommunitiesinwhatwasreferredtoasthePoliceZonewhichbroadlycoincideswiththe
currentfreeholdfarmingsectorborethebruntofcoloniallanddispossession,losingalmostalltheir
land and livestock during the war of anti-colonial resistance 1902-1904. The vast majority of
householdslivingoutsidethePoliceZoneandpractisingcultivationandanimalhusbandry,wereonly
marginallyaffected(Werner,2001,p.260).Inaveryfundamentalsense,thelossoflandsymbolised
thelossofpowerinthiscountrybyAfricans(RepublicofNamibia,1994a,p.11).WhileIndependence
resulted in sovereignty and political freedom, the land ownership structures created through
dispossessioncontinue torepresent apartofcolonialismwhichneeds tobeconfronted inorder to
bringaboutrealsovereignty inwhatsomecallasecondliberationstruggle.Thefocusofthissecond
liberationstruggle todatehasnotbeenonchangingcapitalistpropertystructures thatcreatedhigh
poverty levels and a very skeweddistribution of income andwealth, but on restructuring property
rightsinfreeholdland.AsThran(2014,p.181)hasargued,themainissueisthesettlementofwhite
farmersonmuchofthefreeholdland.AformerMinisterputthisverybluntlywhenhearguedinthe
National Assembly that we feel that as long as land remains with the white people we are not
independent(RepublicofNamibia,1994b,p.33).

What this second liberation struggle for sovereignty implies is that without owning land that is
currently owned by predominantlywhite farmers, Namibia is not fully independent. Redistributing
land fromprimarilywhite owners to previously disadvantagedNamibians provides themoral and
politicaljustificationforlandreform.


7.1Restitution

The restructuring of property rights to facilitate full Independence as referred to above, must of
necessity raise the question of restoring ancestral land rights. Despite the importance attached to
redressinghistorical injusticeswithregard toaccess toagricultural land, therestitutionofancestral
landrightshasbeenruledoutinNamibia.TheLandConferencein1991passedaconsensusresolution
thatancestral landrightscouldnotberestoredinfull.Thisconsensuswasrelativelyeasytoachieve
given the overlapping claims to ancestral landmade by different communities. The practicalities of
disentanglingsuchclaimswouldindeedhavebeennearlyimpossible.Itcouldbeargued,though,that
in lieu of restoring ancestral land rights, the dispossessed should have featured as a priority group
amongstbeneficiaries.This,asiswellknown,isnotthecase.

Apossiblereasonfornotexploringalternativestoaddresstheconcernsofthedispossessedmustbe
sought in the policy of national reconciliation and the building of a Namibian nation out of a
populationthatwasdividedspatiallyandpoliticallyintoethnichomelands.Accedingtoparticularistic
demands for restoration by dispossessed minorities would have run the risk of perpetuating past
divisions.Fortheprocessofunification,orbuildingoneNamibiannation,tosucceed,historicalfacts
andcontradictionswhichmighthavestoodinthewayofbuildingonenation,hadtobereinterpreted
to allow the integration ofmultitudes of communities, eachwith their ownhistories. The historical
specificities of the land question and struggles to resist colonial intrusion and dispossession in the
early20thcenturyhadtoberepackagedasstrugglesthataffectedallcolonisedcommunitiesequally.It
isagainstthisbackgroundthatThran(2014,p.126)hasarguedthattheconsensusresolutionsofthe
LandConferencedidnotrepresentconsensusonourcommonhistory,butratherareinterpretationof
historywhichexpressedanationalinterestandabroadagreementwherewewantedtogoasanew
nation.

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ILMI Working Paper No. 1 Page 11

Thatnationalconsensusonassensitiveanissueaslanddispossessionandhowtodealwithitwasnot
realistic,wasborneoutbyseveraltraditionalleaders.BarelyamonthaftertheConference,theHerero
Royal Leadership issued a declaration describing the National Conference on Land Reform and the
LandQuestionasanabortion,callingongovernmenttorestoreancestrallandrightsandholyplacesof
the Herero (Republikein, 27.8.1991). With local avenues for restoration having been closed, the
Hereroleadershipturnedtointernationalcourts,hopingtobecompensatedfortheirlosses.

ButtheOtjihererospeakingcommunitywasnottheonlycommunitytopourscornovertheconsensus
resolution. In 1992 a group of drought stricken farmers from Soris Soris, Otjimbingwe, Tubuses,
Okombahe and Khorixas moved to the entrance of the then Daan Viljoen wildlife park west of
Windhoek, demanding the restoration of ancestral land rights to the park and large parts of the
KhomasHochland.TheywereevictedfromthethennativereserveAukeixasin1956inorderforthe
landtobedeclaredapark(TheNamibian,9.11.1992).Totheseclaimscouldbeaddedthecontinuing
claimsoftheHai//omtohavetheirancestralrightstopartsofEtosharestored(Seee.g.TheNamibian,
8.11.1993;NewEra21-27.7.1994),aswellastheMafwe,whochallengedGovernmentsproclamation
ofagameparkinWestCaprivi,astheyclaimedthistobetheirancestralland(NewEra3-9.11.1994).
And finally, the Baster community of Rehoboth explored several avenues both locally and
internationallytohavewhattheyperceivedtobetheirancestrallandrightsrestored.

A further intervention to blunt the political sensitivities around the land question, was the
appointmentof theTechnicalCommitteeonCommercialFarmland in1991,asperLandConference
resolution. Inasmuch as a sober technical appraisal of the situation in the predominantly white
freehold sector was important to enhance the environmental and economic sustainability of
commercial farming, theappointmentof theTCCFcouldalsobe interpretedasanattempt tonegate
any particularistic interests in and demands for restitution by elevating the land question to a
scientific level.Ascientificapproach to landreform leftnoroomforethnicandclassdifferences in
addressingtheissue.

Fornationalreconciliationtoworkitwasnotenoughtofocusonwhitelandownershipwithaviewto
increase access to this land by previously disadvantaged Namibians. Previously disadvantaged
Namibians themselves were not a homogenous community. Historical differences shaped by
differentiallanddispossessionaswellasclassdivisionsamongstpreviouslydisadvantagedNamibians
hadtobeaddressed.TheNationalAssemblyservedasanimportantplatformtoadvancetheargument
thatallpreviouslydisadvantagedNamibianspursuedthesameinterests.Thiswasarguedbyaformer
Minister,whenhestatedthattheneedtochangeownershipfromwhitestoblacks

isasentimentthroughoutthiscountryforaslongasyouareblack.YoucanseeitinthisHouse,
fromthetimethatthisdebatestartedtheunanimityonthisissue,notonlyinprinciple,butin
anticipatedreality.Amongusblacks,thereisnodifference,nodifferencewhatsoever(Republic
ofNamibia,1994b,pp.3334).

Tapscott (2001, pp. 314315) analysed class formation and differentiation. He argued that at
Independence,anewelitecomprisingmuchoftheexistingelitebutswelledbyaneworganisational
eliteofsenioradministrators,politiciansandbusinesspeopleemergedinNamibia.Theinterestsofthe
incoming elite coalesced to a large extentwith the interests of the old and largelywhite elites. The
process of developing a broader class identity which transcended colour, was facilitated to some
extentbypre-Independencereformprocesseswhichledtoalimiteddegreeofracialintegration.Elite
formation,therefore,wasnotstrictlyalongethniclines.Thiswasborneoutbyseniorappointmentsto
thecivilserviceandparastatalorganisations(Tapscott,1995,p.163).

TheextenttowhichtheinterestsofthewhiteandblackelitescoalescedwasexpressedintheNational
Assembly in 2000. A senior SWAPO member and former Minister of Trade and Industry and
InformationandBroadcasting reportedlyarguedagainst thehistorical approach to landbypointing
outthathehadboughtacommercialfarmintheOtavidistrict.Hewasreportedassayingthatitwould

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behighlyunsatisfactory if somebodywouldarriveoneday toclaimhis/herancestral rights to the
landhehadbought.HepleadedforsupporttothewaytheMLRRwasaddressingthelandissueinthe
interestofapeacefulresolution(Republikein17.5.2000).

More recently, an academic from theUniversity ofNamibia questionedwhether the land issuewas
simplyablackandwhiteissue,orwhetherthequestionismoreaboutclass.Henotedthat

The languageofmany landpolicies talks about previously disadvantaged, but there are two
classesofpreviouslydisadvantaged.Therearetheadvantaged,previouslydisadvantaged,and
thestilldisadvantaged,previouslydisadvantaged.Thesearesomeofthehardcontradictions
thatwehavetodebate(F.KaapamainBankie&Ithete,2014,p.31).

AgainstthisbriefdiscussionofclassformationitisnotsurprisingthatTapscott(1995,pp.165166)
argued that themost vocal and articulate claims for land redistribution camenot from the landless
poor, but from wealthier black farmers seeking to increase their own access to land. Tapscott
concluded that for these people itwas not the inequitable distribution of land in itselfwhichwas
unsatisfactory,butrathertheirshareofit.Thisargumentislentcredencebythefactthatlargetracts
oflandincommunalareaswerefencedoffforprivateusebybusinesspeople,politiciansandpeople
well connected to the new elite. A former Secretary-General of theNamibian FarmWorkersUnion,
which is aligned to SWAPO,went so far as to allege that everyMinister has already got his farm,
althoughthishasnotbeenverified(Hunter,2004,p.116).

Itfollowsthatspecificclassandpoliticalinterestsshapedtheselectioncriteriaofbeneficiaries.These
hadtobewideenoughtoincludeallpreviouslydisadvantagedNamibians.Assetsaswellasincome
andeducationallevelsdidnotmatterintheselectionofbeneficiariesforresettlement.Inreality,tobe
definedaspreviouslydisadvantagedwastheonlycriteriathatcounted.Thismadeitpossibleforwell-
off elites to capture some of the benefits of resettlement as the number of Permanent Secretaries,
Governorsandmanyotherwell-heeledpeopleattestto.Thedispossesseddonotfeatureexplicitlyasa
targetgroupandarecompetingwithotherNamibiansforland.


8.Communallandreform

Whilegeneralconsensusabouttheneedforlandredistributioninthefreeholdfarmingsectorexisted,
land reform in the non-freehold or communal areas was highly contested. The first draft of the
Communal Land ReformActwasmodelled on land policy in Botswana,where communal landwas
taken out of the jurisdiction of traditional leaders and vested in Land Boards. At a consultative
workshopin1996,amajorityoftraditionalleadersfromacrossthecountryrejectedtheseproposals,
which would have resulted in stripping them of all powers over communal land. This forced the
MinistryofLands,ResettlementandRehabilitation to review theBill.Theresultwas theCommunal
LandReformAct (CLRA),whichbecame law in2002.TheActacknowledgedthecontinuedrole that
traditionalleadersshouldplayintheallocationandcancellationofcustomarylandrightsanddefined
theirpowers,inparticularvisavisCommunalLandBoards.Thelatterwereestablishedintermsofthe
Acttoregistercustomarylandrightsandoverseetheactivitiesoftraditionalauthorities.

Landreforminthecommunalareaspursuesthreebroadobjectives:theverificationandregistrationof
customary land rights, the introduction of long term leases over communal land and the economic
development of communal land through the surveying of individual farming units and generous
infrastructuredevelopmentsupport.

Theregistrationofcustomarylandrightsaimstoimprovetenuresecurityincommunalareas, inthe
hopenotonlytoreducelanddisputes,butalsotoencourageeconomicdevelopmentthroughincreased
investmentsontheland.In2003,theMinistryofLandsandResettlementstartedtoverifyandregister
anestimated295,000customarylandrightsinthecommunalareas.Currently,80,352customaryland

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ILMI Working Paper No. 1 Page 13

rights have been registered and the process is ongoing. The jury is still out on whether such an
expensive programmewill yield the anticipated economic results or not. Evidence from theAfrican
continent suggests that security of tenure is a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic
development, where security of tenure should not be equated with registered rights. Customary
systems across the continent provide sufficient long-term security to facilitate investments and
economicdevelopment.What ismissing inmanycountries includingNamibia, isaccessto inputand
outputmarkets,financialinstitutions,agriculturaltechnologyandappropriateextensionservices(See
Moyo& Chambati, 2012). If a recent advertisement for a consultant to identify and harnesswider
potential benefits of communal land rights is anything to go by, the benefits of registering the
communal land rights have not, as yet, been tangible for many communal land holders and the
uptakeonthepotentialuseofregisteredlandrightsbythepublicandprivatesectorratherlow(The
Namibian,14.11.2014).

TheCLRA2002alsoprovidesfortheconversionofcommunal landintoprivatelyownedfarms.This
approachtodevelopmentwasfirstdevelopedbytheOdendaalCommissionintheearly1960s.Inthe
wakeofitsrecommendations,atotalof200farmsweresurveyedoncommunallandandallocatedto
individualownersbeforeIndependence.ThesesurveyedfarmsareintheMangettiareasofKavango
WestandOshikotoregionsandOkamatapatiinOtjozondjuparegion.
TheCLRAprovides thatonce traditionalauthoritieshaveagreed to theestablishmentof small-scale
farms in their areas of jurisdiction, the state designates such land for agricultural development and
causesittobeproperlysurveyedandregisteredintheDeedsRegistry.Atotalof621parcelsoflandin
Zambezi,KavangoEastandWestandOhangwenaRegionshavebeensurveyedandgazetted.Rightsto
such land in Kavango East and West were allocated by the Land and Farming Committees of
traditional authorities in the early 1990s. In 2012 the MLR, with financial assistance from its
internationalpartners,launchedtheProgrammeforCommunalLandDevelopment(PCLD)todevelop
infrastructure in select areas to enable beneficiaries to farm commercially. Apart from providing
support for infrastructure development, the PCLD will also provide beneficiaries with appropriate
extensionandmentoringservices.ThePCLDrepresentsachangeoffocusfromsupportingindividual
small-scalecommercialfarmstoincludesmallgroupsofcommunalfarmerswhoagreedtohavetheir
common land fenced off in the interest of increased commercial farming. In both scenarios,
beneficiaries will be able to register long term lease agreements over their land. Groups of
beneficiariesarerequiredtoformalegalentityinwhosenametheleasewillberegistered.

What continues tobea cause for concern is that rights to commonages in communal areashaveno
legalprotection. Inpractice thismeansthatvillagerswithcustomaryrights tograzingoncommunal
grazingareas arevulnerable tooutsiders asserting claims to their grazingareas.Themost frequent
manifestationof this inNamibia is the enclosureof communalpastures for individualuse (SeeCox,
Kerven,Werner,&Behnke,1998).LessfrequentinNamibiabutprominentinotherAfricancountries
isthegrabbingoflargetractsoflandforagriculturalpurposeswithouttheconsentofpeoplewhohold
rightsoversuchland.

Littleprogresshasbeenmadeonhowtodealwithenclosuresofcommunal landthathaveoccurred
since the1980sandwhicharecommonlyreferredtoas illegal fencing.Manyof these farms,which
were fenced with or without authorisation before the CLRA of 2002 prohibited new fences, were
developed by individual owners without any state financial support. This frequently involved
considerable investments into infrastructure development, a process similar to the Programme for
CommunalLandDevelopmentcurrentlyunderway.It is imperativethattheMinistryofLandReform
devisesmethodstoregularisetheseso-calledillegalfences.LegaltoolsexistintheCLRAtoadjudicate
thelegalityofclaimsmadetosuchland.Byregularisingclaimstofencedfarmsoncommunalland,the
MLR will be able to integrate all farmers with large to medium sized farming units, regardless of
whether they have fenced them off before the PCLD started or not, into one policy and support
framework.

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ILMI Working Paper No. 1 Page 14

In what appears to be a contradictory approach to communal land development, the MLR has
improvedaccess to farming land for somecommunal farmersbyadding freehold land tocommunal
areas.ThisoptionforlandreformwaselaboratedfordiscussionattheLandConferencein1991,but
wasneveradoptedformally,despitethefactthatitwasrankedhighintermsofequityimpactrelative
toinvestmentcosts.Morerecently,however,theMLRacquiredfarmsadjacenttocommunalareasin
the south and west and handed them over to traditional authorities for allocation. It is not clear
whetherthisispartofarevisedstrategy,orhappenedsimplyasaresultofpoliticalexpediency.


9.Conclusion

During the first 25 years of Independencewitnessed the introduction of a land reformprogramme.
Duringthefirsthalfofthisperiodthefocuswasonredistributingfreeholdagriculturalland,primarily
owned bywhites. In 2002 land reform in the communal areas started in all earnest. No systematic
assessment has been carried out to determine the impact that land redistribution had on the
livelihoodsofbeneficiaries.Availableevidencesuggeststhatthecurrentresettlementmodelmaynot
be economically sustainable for beneficiary households and the country. That access to agricultural
landwill reducepoverty remainsa statementof faithuntil reliabledata showwhat the situation is.
Whilemanysignspointtothefactthatlandredistributionisapoliticalratherthananeconomicissue,
thequestion still remainswhereNamibiawants to gowith extensive commercial livestock farming.
Thisshouldultimatelydeterminewhetherthefutureliesinsmall-scaleorlarge-scalefarming.

Whatever the decision will be, it is clear that any kind of farming in an environment that is
fundamentally risky requires assets such as skills and capital. Selecting people without sufficient
assetsislikelytosetthemupforfailure.

Progress is being made in improving tenure security in the non-freehold or communal areas by
validating and registering private customary land rights. Undivided shares in commonages remain
unprotected, and rights holders remain vulnerable. The impact of the gradual privatisation of
communal land through the PCLD remains to be seen. It is a concern that no attempt is made to
regularisecommunallandenclosuresthatwerecarriedoutbyindividualswiththeirowncapitalbut
areofquestionablelegality.

Many old land issues remain unresolved and new ones have arisen as the land reform programme
developed.Theregistrationofcustomarylandrightsandgrantingoflong-termleasesovercommunal
land may generate many new and unintended problems. Simply fusing the existing Agricultural
(Commercial)LandReformActof1996andtheCommunalLandReformActof2002asisproposed,
will not be sufficient to address the problems currently experienced. In order to do so in a more
informedwayrequiresathoroughpolicyreview.Anotherlandconferenceisnotlikelytoproducethe
desiredresults.

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ILMI Working Paper No. 1 Page 15

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