Transitions in Namibia
Which Changes for Whom?

Edited by Henning Melber

Nordiska afrikaiNsTiTuTeT, uppsala 2007

Indexing terms:
social change
economic change
Cultural change
political development
liberation
decentralization
Gender relations
international relations
economic and social development
post-independence
Namibia

Cover photos: Henning Melber
language checking: peter Colenbrander
© The authors and Nordiska afrikainstitutet 2007
isBN 978-91-7106-582-7
printed in sweden by elanders Gotab aB, stockholm 2007

Cover:
The restored steam tractor outside the coastal town of swakop-

mund was made in Germany and brought to the country in
1896. it should replace ox wagons as a means of transport in the
further colonization of Namibias interior. The 2.8 tons heavy
machine in need of lots of water never managed it through the
sands of the Namib desert. The local colonizers named it after
the German reformer Martin luther, who in 1521 had declared:
Here i stand may God help me. i can not otherwise. Today
a national monument and put behind glass, Namibias Martin
luther remains an early symbol for the failure of grand visions.

Table of Contents

preface & && && && && && && && && && && && && && && && && && & 5

Henning Melber
Transitions in Namibia Namibia in transition
an introductory overview & && && && && && && && && && && & 7

Christopher Saunders
History and the armed struggle
from anti-colonial propaganda to patriotic history? & && 13

Phanuel Kaapama
Commercial land reforms in postcolonial Namibia
What happened to liberation struggle rhetoric? & && && && 29

Herbert Jauch
Between politics and the shop floor
Which way for Namibias labour movement? & && && && & 50

Volker Winterfeldt
liberated economy?
The case of ramatex Textiles Namibia & && && && && && & 65

Gregor Dobler
old ties or new shackles?
China in Namibia & && && && && && && && && && && && && && 94

Henning Melber
poverty, politics, power and privilege
Namibias black economic elite formation & && && && && & 110

Lalli Metsola
out of order?

The margins of Namibian ex-combatant reintegration & & 130

Mattia Fumanti
imagining post-apartheid society and culture
playfulness, officialdom and civility in a youth elite club

in northern Namibia & && && && && && && && && && && && && 153

Graham Hopwood
regional development and decentralisation & && && && && && 173

Wolfgang Zeller / Bennett Kangumu Kangumu
Caprivi under old and new indirect rule
falling off the map or a 19th century dream

come true? & && && && && && && && && && && && && && && && & 190

Dianne Hubbard
ideas about equality in namibian family law & && && && && && 209

Lucy Edwards
HiV/aids in Namibia
Gender, class and feminist theory revisited & && && && && & 230

Suzanne LaFont
decolonising sexuality & && && && && && && && && && && && && & 245

Biographical notes on the authors & && && && && && && && && & 261

preface

This volume on social realities in Namibia completes the liberation
and democracy in southern africa (lidesa) project undertaken at the
Nordic africa institute between 2001 and 2006. The chapters in it mainly
address topical socioeconomic and gender-related issues in contemporary
Namibia and complement the earlier stock-taking publication on Namibian
society that focused on aspects of the countrys socio-political culture since
independence. as before, most of the contributors are either Namibian,
based in Namibia or have undertaken extensive research in the country.
Their interest as scholars and/or civil society activists is guided by a loyalty
characterised not by rhetoric but by empathy with the people. They advo-
cate notions of human rights, social equality and related values and norms
instead of being driven by an ideologically determined party-political
affiliation. Their investigative and analytical endeavours depict a society in
transition, a society that is far from being liberated. Not surprisingly, they
explore the limits to liberation more than its advances.

i wish to thank all the authors for their collaborative commitment to
this project and for their contributions to a necessary debate, which must
take place first and foremost inside Namibia for the best of the country and
its people. Thanks also go to Jeremy silvester and Jan-Bart Gewald, who
again served as external reviewers of the draft manuscripts and added to
the value of the final texts. i am also grateful for the meticulous language
editing so reliably undertaken by peter Colenbrander, for whom this part
of the world is anything but a distant abstraction. i am indebted to Nina
klinge-Nygård, who assisted me over the years in executing my duties at
the Nordic africa institute. special thanks are due to sonja Johansson,
Boël Näslund and karim kerou, among many other supportive colleagues.
They processed the final manuscript in the shortest possible time without
compromising the quality of the product. finally, i extend my heartfelt
gratitude to lennart Wohlgemuth and karl-eric ericsson, director and
deputy director during most of my time as research director at the Nordic
africa institute. They welcomed me from Namibia as part of a team and

1. Henning Melber (ed.), Re-examining Liberation in Namibia. Political Culture since
Independence. uppsala: Nordic africa institute 2003. for other outputs of the pro-
ject, see the summary report and further bibliographical references accessible on
the institutes website (www.nai.uu.se).

offered me their loyal support and friendship throughout the days we shared
as colleagues.

last but not least, i dedicate my own contribution to this last product of
the lidesa project to my wife susan and my daughter Tulinawa, for their
love and tolerance during all the years of our family life in uppsala (which
at times suffered considerably from my professional commitments); and to
the memory of my brother rainer (195179) and my mother Gretel (1923
2007). They were reunited this very day in the local cemetery between the
atlantic ocean and the dunes of the Namib desert, exactly 56 years after
my brothers birth and 40 years after we first arrived as German emigrants
in this coastal town of then south West africa. Transitions have many faces,
dimensions and meanings.

Henning Melber
swakopmund/Namibia
9 august 2007

Transitions in Namibia Namibia in transition
an introductory overview

Henning Melber

We Africans fought against colonialism and imperialism and successfully overthrew
colonialism and white minority rule to achieve genuine social and economic eman-
cipation. sam Nujoma in his opening address to the congress of the swapo
Youth league, Windhoek, 17 august 2007.

This statement was made by one who should know better: sam Nujoma, the president
of the national liberation movement sWapo since its establishment in 1960, and
Namibias first head of state, a position he held for three terms from 1990 to 2005. at
the time of publication of this volume, he remained in control of an influential faction
within the swapo party, which, through its political office bearers, has exercised politi-
cal control over the government of the republic of Namibia since independence. after
his retirement from the highest office of the state, Nujomas personal merits earned
him the official title of the founding father of the republic of Namibia. Nonethe-
less, and with due respect to the old man who over almost half a century has clearly
demonstrated an ability to cling to power as a political leader, he has got it wrong
in claiming the above achievements. speaking as a political animal, he either lacks
the analytical grasp of social transition and transformation or (more likely) is merely
showing that a political project and its rhetoric at times display profound ignorance
of social processes (or simply seek to cover up certain class projects by means of such
misleading rhetoric).

The implications of such fabrication of a patriotic history were the main focus of
the volume that preceded this one, which concentrated mainly on the political culture
and ideology cultivated since Namibias independence and its effects on governance
issues and different sectors of society (Melber 2003). The first chapter following the
introduction to this second volume serves as a kind of link to these socio-political
and ideological dimensions of the Namibian nation-building project. it shows how
the liberators use their power of definition in a hegemonic public discourse to rein-
vent themselves within the heroic narrative that was already being constructed during
the anti-colonial struggle. But this rhetoric must be gauged against the achievements
claimed by among others the founding father, a central figure in the Namibian ver-

1. as quoted in Nujoma addresses Youth league, The Namibian, 20 august 2007.
2. for the politics of transition from the first to the second head of state in more detail, see Melber

(2006).

Henn ing Me lb e r

sion of a liberation gospel. This gospel claims that the seizure of political power and
the ideological commanding heights included a more profound transition to another
society and transformation of colonial structures into a liberated society and economy
that benefits the majority among the formerly colonised masses.

Most chapters in this volume are a kind of stock-taking exercise: they examine the
extent to which a transition is taking place and the results it has achieved during the
17 years since independence. in so doing, this volume seeks to add to the existing body
of knowledge. This new knowledge is by no means confined to the era beginning with
Namibias independence day (21 March 1990). instead, one needs to emphasize that
societies are in constant transition as they reproduce (and modify) themselves. The in-
tensity of the transition may change, and the formal end of colonial occupation and
foreign rule inasmuch as political power is transferred to a local agency are the most
obvious points of reference or departure for these new chapters. These milestones are not
necessarily complete turning points, but may induce more rapid social change through a
more dramatic shift in the organisation of political and social structures, with a result-
ant direct impact on the fabric and nature of societies.

social transitions in Namibia have been analysed on many occasions before. This in-
troductory overview cannot provide a complete analysis but it can introduce some of the
relevant literature touching on transitions in Namibian society since the 19th century.
Brigitte lau, who headed the National archives of Namibia until her untimely death,
was among those who contributed to insights on early transitions in Namibia with the
advent of colonialism (cf., lau 1987), and John kinahan, an archeologist with the local
authorities, provided an even more historically oriented perspective on social transitions
in parts of Namibia and its population (kinahan 1991). These authors greatly benefited
from their direct access to local archives or their own field studies. so did those oth-
ers who compiled relevant documentary evidence in the true sense by using existing
photographic material to document and analyse the visually obvious social changes and
power structures induced by colonialism (Hartmann 2004, Hartmann/silvester/Hayes
1998).

The colonial impact on local and regional modes of production, social reproduc-
tion and related aspects of identity has already been explored in numerous analyses,
often undertaken in pursuit of an academic degree. prominent examples of such his-
torical research by local scholars are the thesis by frieda-Nela Williams (1994) and by
Wolfgang Werner (1998), but also by Nampala and shigwedha (2006). other insights
from a local perspective into historical changes under colonial occupation include
Gewalds seminal work (1999 and 2000), which supplements Werners thesis on the
Herero communities. local analyses on social change in owambo societies under co-
lonial rule were complemented by the work of finnish scholars (siiskonen 1990, eirola
1992), thereby highlighting in an historical perspective similar to the academic work
linked to the German period of foreign rule the special relations between the northern

3. references are limited to books published in english and ignore numerous relevant journal ar-
ticles and individual book chapters as well as the additional relevant works existing in German
(testifying to the fact that Namibia had been a German settler colony, which resulted in a par-
ticular interest among German-speaking scholars that has persisted into the present).

4. local (especially historical) knowledge production is now reaching a wider audience thanks in
part to the publication efforts of the Basler afrika Bibliographien.

In t r o d u c t i on

region of Namibia and the finnish missionaries. The focus on Namibias northern re-
gion previously called owamboland has also produced scholarly work dealing with the
particular impact of Christianity on social transition and transformation (Mckittrick
2002) and the effects of environmental change on the organisation of these societies
(kreike 2004, but also erkkilä/siiskonen 1992). a good example of how a study on
owamboland-based elites in transition resulted in far-reaching political consequenc-
es for the personal future of its author is evident in the case of Gerhard Tötemeyer
(1978).

studies of social organisation and transformation among Namibian social forma-
tions other than the oshiwambo- and Herero-speaking communities are relatively few
(see, among others, kössler 2006 on the Nama). The san or Bushmen communities
represent an exception to the general tendency for most analyses to focus on the most
relevant (in the sense of most influential) social groups within a country: as the most
marginalised indigenous minority group (who are almost viewed as social outcasts),
they have achieved relative prominence in the literature (Gordon 1992, Widlok 1999,
suzman 2000, dieckmann 2007).

The focus on social transformation processes linked to sectoral and regional issues
that go beyond specific group identities has been rather limited in historically orient-
ed studies. among the noteworthy exceptions are Wallace (2002) and contributions
to the volumes edited by Bollig/Gewald (2000), Hayes/silvester/Wallace/Hartmann
(1998) and Miescher/Henrichsen (2000), while emmett (1999) provides insights into
the formative stages of modern political resistance to colonial occupation. analyses of
the subsequent politically organised liberation struggle and its internal dynamics are
provided by leys/saul (1995) and dobell (1998). a particular trade union perspective
within the anti-colonial struggle can be found in works by peltola (1995) and Bauer
(1998), while Becker (1993) explores the gendered perspective. pendelton (1994) pro-
vides a special focus on the most significant urban setting in Namibia and its changes,
while Hinz (2003) combines environmental management, ecology and the particular
role of local traditional leaders and their control over nature as a resource to present
another perspective relevant to the transition of Namibias society.

several edited volumes have meanwhile added to the picture of social challenge and
reorganisation since independence. keulder (2000) does so in a historical, state-centred
perspective; Melber (2000) looks at socioeconomic realities after a decade of sovereign-
ty; while chapters in diener/Graefe (2001) offer a wide panorama of relevant studies, as

5. This has resulted in a tradition of academic writings, especially from a social anthropology per-
spective on aspects of the owambo kingdoms.

6. He obtained access to the field on the basis of his political loyalty to the then south african
government occupying Namibia. The results of his interviews, however, originally submitted as a
phd thesis at stellenbosch, illustrated the generally anti-colonial and anti-south african orienta-
tion among the new elite. This was no welcome finding and initially dramatically circumscribed
the further career of the author drastically only to result in a politically very different second
career: after Namibian independence he left academia to enter politics and ended up as a deputy
minister before his retirement.

7. Which to some extent is also reflected in the prominent role of the German-speaking minority in
the analysis of segments of Namibian society (though admittedly mainly in the German litera-
ture).

0

Henn ing Me lb e r

do the contributions in Winterfeldt/fox/Mufune (2002). all these undertakings have a
high degree of local authorial participation.

finally, one must not omit from this brief overview another form of documenting
social transition, namely the personal testimonies of individuals involved in the pro-
cesses of social change, such as those compiled in the volumes by Becker (2005) and
leys/Brown (2005), and the various literary and poetic narratives, in which the creative
writing conveys a political message (cf., Melber 2004). New forms of recorded and pub-
lished oral history also provide access to testimonies that afford insights into processes
of social and political transition and transformation (cf., Namhila 2005).

The contributions to this volume seek to update earlier assessments and to deal with
hitherto largely unexplored aspects. They summarise and critically reflect on develop-
ments since independence. in doing so, they challenge parts of the dominant narrative
of the liberation movement now in political power and control. While swapos libera-
tion gospel suggests that the struggle for independence achieved meaningful change for
all people in most spheres of life, this volume presents a somewhat different perspective.
We must take time, urged swapos president sam Nujoma in the same speech to the
partys Youth league congress in mid-august 2007 quoted above, to consider where
we have come from as party and country, where we are today and where we would like
to be as a nation. The chapters below share this motivation and approach, even though
they may put forward perspectives or conclusions different from those of the founding
father.

references
Bauer, Gretchen (1998), Labor and Democracy in Namibia: 19711996. athens, ohio:

ohio university press
Becker, Barbara (2005), Speaking Out: Namibians Share Their Perspectives On Independence.

Windhoek: out of africa
Becker, Heike (1995), Namibian Womens Movement 1980 to 1992. From Anti-colonial

Resistance to Reconstruction. frankfurt am Main: iko
Bollig, Michael and Jan-Bart Gewald (eds), (2000), People, Cattle and Land. Transformations

of a Pastoral Society in Southwestern Africa. köln: köppe
dieckmann, ute (2007), HaiIIom in the Etosha Region. A History of Colonial Settlement,

Ethnicity and Nature Conservation. Basel: Basler afrika Bibliographien
diener, ingolf and olivier Graefe (eds), (2001), Contemporary Namibia. The first landmarks

of a post-Apartheid society. Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan and Nairobi: ifra
dobell, lauren (1998), SWAPOs Struggle for Namibia, 19601991: War by Other Means.

Basel: p. schlettwein
eirola, Martti (1992), The Owambogefahr: The Owamboland Reservation in the Making:

Political Responses of the Kingdom of Ondonga to the German Colonial Power, 1884
1910. rovaniemi: Historical association of Northern finland

emmett, Tony (1999), Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915
1966. Basel: p. schlettwein

8. as quoted in Nujoma addresses Youth league, The Namibian, 20 august 2007.

In t r o d u c t i on

erkkilä, antti and Harri siiskonen (1992), Forestry in Namibia 18501990. Joensuu:
university of Joensuu

Gewald, Jan-Bart (1999), Herero Heroes: A Socio-Political History of the Herero of Namibia,
18901923. oxford: James Currey and athens, ohio: ohio university press

(2000), We Thought We Would Be Free: Socio-Cultural Aspects of Herero History in
Namibia, 19151940. köln: köppe

Gordon, robert J. (1992), The Bushman Myth. The Making of a Namibian Underclass.
Boulder/san francisco/oxford: Westview press (2nd revised edition with stuart
douglas, 2000)

Hartmann, Wolfram (ed.), (2004), Hues between black and white. Historical photography
from colonial Namibia 1860s to 1915. Windhoek: out of africa

Hartmann, Wolfram, Jeremy silvester and patricia Hayes (eds), (1998), The Colonising
Camera. Photographs in the making of Namibian History. Cape Town: university of
Cape Town press, Windhoek: out of africa and athens, ohio: ohio university
press

Hayes, patricia, Jeremy silvester, Marion Wallace and Wolfram Hartmann, Wolfram (eds),
(1998), Namibia under South African Rule. Mobility and Containment 19151946.
oxford: James Currey, Windhoek: out of africa and ohio: ohio university press

Hinz, Manfred o. (2003), Without Chiefs there would be no Game. Customary Law and
Nature Conservation. Windhoek. out of africa

keulder, Christiaan (ed.), (2000), State, Society and Democracy: a Reader in Namibian
Politics. Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan

kinahan, John (1991), Pastoral Nomads of the Central Namib Desert. The People History
Forgot. Windhoek: Namibia archeological Trust and New Namibia Books

kössler, reinhart (2006), In Search of Survival and Dignity. Two traditional communities in
southern Namibia under South African rule. frankfurt am Main/london: iko and
Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan (2005)

kreike, emmanuel (2004), Re-Creating Eden: Land Use, Environment, and Society in
Southern Angola and Northern Namibia. portsmouth, NH: Heinemann

lau, Brigitte (1987), Namibia in Jonker Afrikaners Time. Windhoek: National archives of
Namibia

leys, Colin and susan Brown (2005), Histories of Namibia: Living through the liberation
struggle. Life histories told to Colin Leys and Susan Brown. london: The Merlin press

leys, Colin and John s. saul (eds), (1995), Namibias Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged
Sword. london: James Currey/athens and ohio: ohio university press

Mckittrick, Meredith (2002), To Dwell Secure. Generation, Christianity, and Colonialism in
Owamboland. portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, oxford: James Currey, Cape Town:
david philip

Melber, Henning (ed.), (2000), Namibia A Decade of Independence, 19902000, Nepru
publication No. 7. Windhoek: The Namibian economic policy research unit

(ed.), (2003), Re-examining Liberation in Namibia. Political Culture Since Independence.
uppsala: The Nordic africa institute

(ed.), (2004), It is no more a cry. Namibian Poetry in Exile and Essays on Literature in
Resistance and Nation Building. Basel: Basler afrika Bibliographien

(2006), presidential indispensability in Namibia: moving out of office but staying in
power? in roger southall and Henning Melber (eds), Legacies of power: Leadership
change and former presidents in African politics. Cape Town: HsrC press and
uppsala: The Nordic africa institute, pp. 98119

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Miescher, Giorgio and dag Henrichsen (eds), (2000), New notes on Kaoko. Basel: Basler
afrika Bibliographien

Namhila, ellen Ndeshi (2005), Kaxumba kaNdola. Man and Myth. The Biography of a
Barefoot Soldier. Basel: Basler afrika Bibliographien 2005 (live, legacies legends; 2)

Nampala, lovisa T. and Vilho shigwedha (2006), Aawambo Kingdoms, History and Cultural
Change. Perspectives from Northern Namibia. Basel: p. schlettwein

peltola, pekka (1995), The lost May Day: Namibian workers struggle for independence.
Helsinki: The finnish anthropological society in association with the Nordic africa
institute

pendelton, Wade (1994), Katutura: A Place where we stay. Life in Post-Apartheid Township in
Namibia: Katutura Before and Now. Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan (2nd revised
edition ohio 1996)

siiskonen, Harri (1990), Trade and Socioeconomic Change in Owamboland, 18501906.
Helsinki: sHs

suzman, James (2000), Things from the Bush. A Contemporary History of the Omaheke San.
Basel: p. schlettwein

Tötemeyer, Gerhard (1978), Namibia Old and New. Traditional and Modern Leaders in
Owamboland. london: C. Hurst

Wallace, Marion (2002), Health, Power and Politics in Windhoek, Namibia, 19151945.
Basel: p. schlettwein

Werner, Wolfgang (1998), No One Will Become Rich. Economy and Society in the Herero
Reserves in Namibia, 19151946. Basel: p. schlettwein

Widlok, Thomas (1999), Living on Mangetti: Bushmen Autonomy and Namibian
Independence. oxford: oxford university press

Williams, frieda-Nela (1994), Pre-Colonial Communities of Southwestern Africa: A History of
Owambo Kingdoms 16001920. Windhoek: National archives of Namibia

Winterfeldt, Volker, Tom fox and pempelani Mufune (eds.), (2002), Namibia Society
Sociology. Windhoek: university of Namibia press

History and the armed struggle
from anti-colonial propaganda to patriotic history?

Christopher Saunders

a contested historiography is a sign of a healthy and mature democracy. Views of the
past inevitably change as the past is seen from new vantage points in an ever-changing
present. While certain facts about what happened in the past are incontrovertible, once
one moves beyond the bald facts to an interpretation, there are bound to be different
views of what happened. as an eminent historian once wrote, history that is worth the
name should be an argument without end, for there are no final truths in history
and the process of reinterpretation is ongoing. Yet there are countries where this con-
stant questioning of the past has not taken place, and instead an officially sanctioned
view of the past has been imposed, a master narrative that does not admit alternative
interpretations. one of the countries that has fallen into that trap is Zimbabwe, with
which Namibia had close relations during its liberation struggle. Namibia, fortunately,
is not in that situation, and hopefully never will be, but some worrying trends can be
detected, as this chapter will illustrate

Two great episodes in Namibian history come to the fore in most contemporary
discussions of the countrys past: one is the period of colonial warfare against the Ger-
mans and the genocide of 190407, the other the liberation war of 196689. it is with
the latter that this chapter is exclusively concerned. scholars have begun to document
how the liberation war has been used for political ends and to write about how it has
been memorialised at the Heroes acre outside Windhoek and in other ways (most
recently kössler 2007). Here the focus is not on monuments or, say, the use of public
holidays and the renaming of streets, but on writing about the past. i present a survey
of such writing, conscious that there has been all too little analysis of Namibian histo-
riography in general and hardly any discussion of writing on the liberation war. Given
limitations of space, i shall inevitably have to adopt a broad-brush approach and be
selective in the examples i cite. a more detailed and comprehensive study will reveal
greater complexities and nuances between different works, but i hope that what i say
here will prompt others to explore this subject in greater depth. This is no mere intel-
lectual exercise, for it can help us understand current debates and may hold lessons for
the future.

africanist and patriotic history
from the late 1950s, as countries in tropical africa began to approach independence,
old-style eurocentric writing about the histories of those countries began to be replaced
by a new afrocentric or, as it was usually called, africanist historiography. some of

Chr i s t oph e r Saunde r s

this was scholarly and it considered, with appropriate nuance, african resistance to the
imposition of colonial rule, african responses to colonialism itself and struggles for
independence. other writing about the past was more overtly political, being clearly
designed to buttress the new nations by providing a nationalistic history that would le-
gitimate them and provide them with a necessary history. such writers tried to trace the
history of the new nations from the present back into the distant past, laying emphasis
on continuities and the unity of those who challenged the colonial system, and present-
ing a triumphalist picture of what the nationalists had achieved (cf., Temu/swai 1981).

from the 1960s, these new forms of historical writing were replicated in those coun-
tries in southern africa that remained under white minority rule. for south africa,
such writing ranged from the scholarly afrocentrism of the first volume of the new
Oxford History of South Africa (Wilson/Thompson 1969) to the more popular, largely
uncomplicated history of the african National Congress by Mary Benson entitled The
African Patriots (Benson 1966). in Zimbabwe too, a nationalist historiography emerged
long before the arrival of independence in 1980. The central figure in the development
of that was Terence ranger, who taught at the university College of rhodesia before be-
ing expelled in the 1960s. He then moved to dar es salaam, then the united states and
Britain, all the time continuing to work on Zimbabwe history himself, and encouraging
others to do so, from a standpoint broadly sympathetic to the nationalist movement. in
one of his most influential articles, he drew connections between the primary resistance
to european intrusion in the late nineteenth century and the modern mass nationalism
of his own day, and the argument for continuity was clearly to help give legitimacy to
the nationalist movement then seeking power. it resonates with recent attempts to link
Mugabes disastrous policies of the early 21st century with two previous anti-colonial
struggles (chimurengas) of 189697 and 196679. Much more recently, however, and
reflecting his disillusionment with the way the nationalist project has been hijacked by
an oppressive ruler, ranger has sought to distinguish the nationalist historiography, to
which he contributed so much from the 1960s, from what he terms patriotic history,
the unscholarly approach to the Zimbabwean past now propagated, more than a quar-
ter of a century after independence, by the robert Mugabe regime and its supporters
(ranger 2003).

What ranger calls patriotic history is really not history at all, but myth and propa-
ganda. it does not tell the truth about the past, but emphasises selected aspects of the
past to present a picture of a glorious, continuous revolutionary tradition. it rejects
academic history writing as an attempt to complicate the story of the past, and, instead,
attempts to impose a hegemonic view of the liberation struggle. This writing about the
Zimbabwean past is not concerned with the liberation struggle versus the colonial op-
pressors as one of right against wrong, for the rightfulness of the independence struggle
against white minority rule is taken for granted. it stresses, instead, another divide,
between those who led the fight and won and those who compromised and should
therefore be denounced as unpatriotic and as sell-outs. This categorisation of people into
those who were with us and those who were not, relates, of course, to present political
battles in Zimbabwe, with those in power trying to legitimise their position by iden-
tifying themselves as the true liberators of the country. others are denounced for not
having such liberation credentials or are written out of history.

Hi s t o r y a n d t h e a r m e d s t r u g g l e

That the distinction between nationalist and patriotic historical writing is not as
clear-cut as ranger suggests is seen, say, in the work of rangers own chief Zimbabwean
collaborator, the historian Ngwabi Bhebe, whose work has shifted from the scholarly to
what verges on the patriotic (Bhebe 1999, 2004), but rangers article may nevertheless
serve as a useful starting point from which to pose questions about writing on Namibias
armed liberation struggle. i am concerned here both with writing on that struggle while
it continued and with post-independence writing, for writing before independence in-
fluenced what came after. from what perspectives has the Namibian conflict been writ-
ten about? is Namibia following the Zimbabwean path to patriotic history?

The context
Though Namibias armed liberation struggle began at roughly the same time as Zim-
babwes, it continued much longer. Zimbabwe entered its brief transition to independ-
ence in late 1979, and only in april 1989 did Namibia begin to follow a somewhat
similar path. as that month began, and a ceasefire was supposed to take effect, some
of the bloodiest battles of the war took place in the war between south african forces
and those of the peoples liberation army of Namibia (plaN), the armed wing of the
south West africa peoples organisation (sWapo). Given the time disparity between
the two transitions, it is not surprising that much less has been written to date about the
Namibian struggle than about the Zimbabwean one. There are other reasons, however,
why the body of work on Namibias liberation struggle remains so small. Namibias edu-
cated elite is minute, and few in that country have had time to devote to writing about
the past, while for some Namibians the liberation struggle has remained too painful to
write about.

Here i am primarily concerned with writing by Namibians themselves rather than
by Western sympathisers, much of whose writing was ephemeral and polemic in intent,
though some of the best had lasting value (one example is Herbstein and evenson,
1989). Before i turn to work sympathetic to the Namibian struggle, however, it is im-
portant to note that both before and since independence there has been a large body of
writing from the other side, the side of the south african occupation and the forces out
to crush the nationalist movement by force. This writing sought to justify, and white-
wash, the counter-revolutionary struggle waged by the south african government, and
to present those who were engaged in it as performing a necessary task in the combat-
ing of terrorism and communism. This literature, which is very heavily focused on the
military aspects of the war against sWapo, comes mainly from south africans who
themselves either fought on the south african side, such as Willem steenkamp (1989),
or were close to those who fought, such as Helmoed-romer Heitman (1990) and peter
stiff (2004), or from far-right wing americans for whom sWapo was seen as a tool of
the soviet union (e.g., Norval 1989).

1. steenkamp fought in angola in the late 1970s. stiff was a guest of the south african police in
northern Namibia in 1989 (stiff, 2005:429, 481). Norval, an ex-us Marine, was executive direc-
tor of the selous foundation, which also published his Inside the ANC: The Evolution of a Terrorist
Organization (Washington 1990).

Chr i s t oph e r Saunde r s

This literature is mostly narrative and anecdotal and not scholarly (despite some use
of footnotes). Though these books deserve to be subjected to a detailed critique, here we
can merely note that they tend to portray plaN as weak and ineffectual and as acting
on the orders of Moscow. at the same time, and contrary to the suggestion of weak-
ness, such accounts speak of heroic acts of military daring and success by south african
and surrogate Namibian forces against a formidable enemy which, despite losing large
numbers on the battlefield, nevertheless remained a serious threat. While stiff makes a
brief attempt to look at the war from the viewpoint of two plaN combatants in his lat-
est blockbuster (stiff, 2004:3478), and while some voice is given to those in the south
african forces who saw the war as pointless, on the whole this writing is anchored in
the idea that the war that the south africans and their allies fought in northern Na-
mibia and southern angola was both justified, to prevent a revolutionary take-over in
Namibia, and effective. To date there has been no systematic attempt to critique the
arguments in such books.

early writing about the armed struggle
The first major attempt to present a different perspective from that found in such south
african history writing, and to promote the nationalist agenda, was To Be Born a Na-
tion, produced by sWapos department of information and publicity and published by
a left-wing British publishing house, Zed press, in 1981 (sWapo, 1981).2 This drew
on earlier, slighter accounts from within sWapo (especially sWapo 1978), and on
the brief history of Namibia written some years before by randolph Vigne, the lead-
ing figure in friends of Namibia and then the Namibia support Committee in Britain
(Vigne 1975).3 To Be Born a Nation for the first time brought together in book form a
detailed account of the colonisation of Namibia and the resistance to it, carrying the
story to 1979. The most significant work on Namibia to which it could be compared,
ruth firsts South West Africa, was written and published before the beginning of the
armed struggle, at a time when it was still unclear whether sWapo or the rival south
West africa National union (sWaNu) would emerge as the leading nationalist move-
ment, and her pioneering study had been, if anything, more sympathetic to sWaNu
than to sWapo (first 1963). Vignes short history had only discussed very briefly the
early years of the armed struggle. Now, for the first time, To be Born a Nation provided
not only a detailed history of Namibia before the armed struggle began , but also an ac-
count of how that struggle had developed to the late 1970s, like other nationalist works
emphasising the continuities in resistance from precolonial times to the present.

To be Born a Nation was a sWapo project and no author was identified. peter
katjavivi, who had set up the sWapo office in london in 1968 and a decade later
moved on to study at Warwick university while remaining a leading sWapo figure in

2. Zed published many key texts on Namibia in the 1980s, from H. drechslers Let Us Die Fighting
(1980) to Herbstein and evenson (1989).

3. Many articles on aspects of the struggle appeared in the various sWapo journals, especially The
Combatant, the journal of plaN.

Hi s t o r y a n d t h e a r m e d s t r u g g l e

Britain, contributed a foreword, and elsewhere he is described as the books editor.4
The book was launched at the africa Centre in london on 26 august 1981, the 15th
anniversary of the battle of omugulu-gombashe in northern Namibia, the day that
sWapo recognises as the start of the armed struggle. The launch came a day after
south african forces had again attacked sWapo bases in southern angola, so the
literary proceedings were animated by news from the battlefront. in his speech at the
launch, katjavivi modestly admitted that the book was not a definitive account, but said
that it aimed to set the record straight by countering anti-sWapo accounts, and that
it was therefore itself part of the liberation struggle.5

as the title suggested it was taken, we are told, from a saying in the Mozambique
liberation struggle, to die a tribe and be born a nation (sWapo 1981:ii) this history
implied that sWapo, through its armed struggle, was bringing into being a new Na-
mibian nation. one of the organisations leading slogans was one Namibia, one Na-
tion, and the book presented sWapo as embodying the popular will of the Namibian
people to oust the occupiers and create an independent nation. To be Born a Nation
made clear that the armed struggle was the leading form of struggle, and that diplomacy
was at best second fiddle to it. sWapo, as the only organisation involved in the armed
struggle against south african rule, represented the Namibian people in their fight for
freedom. such ideas, as we shall see, were to survive in post-independence writing.

While To be Born a Nation was the single most important work of history on the
liberation struggle to be published before independence, it was not of course the only
one. alfred T. Moleah, a south african exile in the united states, published Namibia:
The Struggle for Liberation in 1983. in it, he suggested that any attack on sWapo lead-
ership or policies would be unpatriotic. denial of a sWapo government, he wrote,
is negation of Namibian independence (Moleah 1983:300). sWapos department of
information and publicity helped the Namibia support Committee organise the major
international conference on Namibia 1884 to 1984 held at the City university of lon-
don in september 1984, and not surprisingly the papers that were published in the 800
page volume that emerged from that conference some years later were mostly uncritical
of the liberation struggle and did not delve into any of the tensions within it or contro-
versies that dogged it (Wood 1988). and when sWapos deputy secretary-general for
education and culture collaborated with a German colleague to produce a history text
for secondary schools, the epilogue ended as follows: since it was founded in 1960,
sWapo has shaped Namibian history & The future of Namibia is bound up with the
decisions and actions of sWapo (Mbumba/Noisser 1988:291).

all this is of course understandable within the context of the struggle then be-
ing fought against south african occupation. perhaps the most balanced work by a
Namibian in this pre-independence period on the liberation struggle post-1966 came
from peter katjavivi, the activist turned scholar who, after completing a masters degree
at Warwick university, moved on to st. antonys College, oxford, for a doctorate. after

4. see his biography on the united Nations university website: http://www.unu.edu/council/mem-
bers/katjavivi.html. richard Moorsom, who was active in the Namibia support Committee and
had completed a masters thesis on Namibia at the university of sussex, is known to have been
one of the main authors.

5. There is a copy of his speech in the Michael scott papers, rhodes House library, oxford, Box
34.

Chr i s t oph e r Saunde r s

he had completed that, he wrote a brief overview for uNesCo of the history of resist-
ance in Namibia from the earliest times to the late 1970s, again emphasising continui-
ties and justifying the armed struggle, and helped edit a book on Church and Liberation
in Namibia (katjavivi 1988, 1989). To its credit, his account of resistance did not ig-
nore, as other writing did, the serious crisis that divided sWapo in the mid-1970s and
led to the detention of some of its leading officials (cf., katjavivi 1988:1067), though it
did not mention the even more serious issue that was only beginning to emerge into the
light of day as katjavivi wrote, concerning torture and other atrocities being perpetrated
on sWapos detainees in lubango, angola.

of the memoirs of individuals in the struggle to be published before independence,
among the most important were the autobiographies of two sWapo activists. Vinnia
Ndadis Breaking Contract (Mercer 1989) and John Ya ottos Battlefront Namibia (Ya
otto 1982) both told the stories of internal resistance leaders who fled into exile to join
the externally based struggle. They praise sam Nujoma as the father figure of the move-
ment, and Ya otto recalls how he scratched the sWapo slogan one Namibia, one
Nation on the wall of the cell in which he was imprisoned. These activists drew upon
their own memories to select historical detail to advance the stories they wanted to tell,
stories of great suffering and heroism. While these are striking accounts by extraordi-
nary men, they tell individual stories from the perspective of their authors and are not
balanced accounts. To that extent they are, as a literary critic has pointed out, myth-
making (Haarhoff 1991, esp. 229). so is the equally striking account that appeared
after Haarhoff wrote, Helao shitywetes Never Follow the Wolf: The Autobiography of a
Namibian Freedom Fighter, which told of his military training and what happened to
him after he returned to northern Namibia as a combatant (shityuwete 1990).

such memoirs stressed the unity of the Namibian people under the banner of
sWapo, the popular commitment of the Namibian people to oust the south african
oppressor and the heroic nature of the struggle against south african rule. Their pub-
lication was designed to help aid the struggle, not only by remembering what had hap-
pened but also by encouraging others to support it. as with most work produced in the
years of struggle, they served a clear propaganda purpose. While it was widely accepted
all over the world that the Namibian liberation struggle was a just one against racism
and colonialism, this did not, of course, make such writing good history. it was not his-
tory in any real meaning of that word, in that it did not attempt to present a rounded
picture or explore the complexities and ambiguities of the struggle. one autobiography
critical of sWapo did appear as the country moved towards independence, but it was
slight and as selective from its own perspective as the memoirs of others. it received little
attention, not least because its authors party was virtually eliminated in the founding
election of November 1989 (shipanga 1989).

perspectives after independence
if that, in brief summary, was the state of writing by Namibians about the liberation
struggle while it was taking place, what of writing that looks back on the liberation
struggle from a post-independence perspective? With the end of the struggle and the
advent of independence in March 1990, one might have thought that there would no

Hi s t o r y a n d t h e a r m e d s t r u g g l e

longer be the same concern by Namibians to show solidarity and to dismiss counter
views. it might have been expected that writers would now try to understand what had
happened with greater detachment and in fuller complexity. a body of academic litera-
ture might have emerged on the liberation struggle by scholars who had not themselves
been involved in it and could therefore see it in new perspective. But none of this has
happened.

Beyond a few seminar papers 6 and a study of the Cassinga massacre of 1978, the
largest single atrocity of the entire apartheid era, by annemarie Heywood (1996), no
scholarly historical writing on the armed struggle has emerged from within Namibia.
When more popular works are considered, it was perhaps not to be expected that those
who had committed themselves over so many years to a cause would now be any less
firm in their commitment to it, or be ready to change their views upon it. They now
looked back to the armed conflict as a heroic episode that had brought the new na-
tion into being. They were proud to have participated in that process. They had been
socialised in a time of war to be disciplined and suspicious of contrary views, and when
others began to advance such views, they were encouraged to close ranks in the face of
what they saw as new challenges. While the armed conflict was now over, the struggle,
it seemed, was continuing in new ways.

When the process leading to the first democratic election in November 1989 was
getting under way, a group of those who had been detained by sWapo in southern
angola returned to Windhoek after their release as part of the negotiated settlement
providing for the transition to independence. on their return, they told of imprison-
ment and torture in the dungeons of lubango. The sWapo leadership had grudgingly
admitted that mistakes had been made but would not agree to any enquiry into what
had happened (dobell 1996; leys/saul 2003). all sWapo did was publish a list of
those who had fallen in the struggle, with minimal information about the circum-
stances in which they had died (sWapo 1996). While this publication was generally
welcomed, the list was criticised for being so slight and incomplete, and in the book
there was no admission that anyone had died in vain, no attempt to address the pain
suffered by those who still did not know what had happened to those who had left to
fight and had never returned (cf., NsHr 1996).7 some years previously, a group of those
related to people who had disappeared had put together a brief account of a struggle
Betrayed (Thiro-Beukes 1986), but it was left to outsiders, people who had been heavily
involved in support of sWapo and its struggle in the 1980s, to write substantial works
that began to document what had happened.

Colin leys and John saul, Canadian academics who had campaigned for sWapo
for decades, now in the aftermath of independence presented Namibias liberation
struggle as having had negative as well as positive aspects: it was, the title of their book
suggested, a Two-edged sword (leys/saul 1995). Then siegfried Groth, a German
pastor who had worked closely with sWapo, published Namibia: The Wall of Silence:
The Dark Days of the Liberation Struggle. When Groths book appeared, the Namibian

6. Those given at the conference on public History, forgotten History held at the university of
Namibia, Windhoek, august 2000, have not been published.

7. There was speculation that sWapo would bring out a second, revised edition of Their Blood
Waters our Freedom, but this has not appeared.

0

Chr i s t oph e r Saunde r s

president, sam Nujoma, appeared on state television to warn the nation against Groths
false history.8 More recent accounts that are highly critical of sWapo have also been
assembled externally. They include the memoirs of keshii pelao Nathanael, who now
lives in sweden. a member of the sWapo Youth league, he had gone into exile, fought
and been detained and tortured by sWapo (Nathanael 2002). and Colin leys with
susan Brown, now based at the institute of Justice and reconciliation in Cape Town,
have published a collection of the reminiscences of 11 Namibian activists, only one of
whom did not become a critic of sWapo (leys/Brown 2005).

in the leys and Brown book, Histories of Namibia, only Ben Mulongeni, who went
into exile in 1977 and then studied in Zambia and Bulgaria, plays down the ex-detainee
issue. for him, the former plaN chief of security, subsequently known as the butcher
of lubango was just a victim of the time he was living in (ibid, 37). The others were
involved in the detainee issue in one or other way, or became critical of the way in
which sWapo sought to stifle any internal organisation that it did not control. Their
stories usefully add to our knowledge of sWapos actions and authoritarianism, and
so of the ambiguities of the struggle, even if the result is an unbalanced set of histories
from Namibia, for the collection is far from being a representative sample of those
involved. and while such accounts can constitute valuable primary sources, they need
to be read critically and sifted by scholars who can assess whether they are accurate in
what they remember, or, say, the extent to which they exaggerate to make a point. The
life histories reproduced in the leys and Brown book are not so sifted, and the word
histories in the title of the book is therefore misleading in the sense that history should
be the critical study of the past, for this is not such a study.

The same is true of writing about the past from other perspectives, whether ellen
Namhilas autobiographical memoir, The Price of Freedom, or the collection of brief ac-
counts of the experiences of Namibians in the struggle and after published under the
title Speaking Out (Becker 2005). Namhilas memoir told the fascinating story of how
she left for southern angola, was among those attacked by south african forces, and
eventually settled in finland. during the struggle she was taught that freedom would
come from the barrel of the gun alone, but in her memoir she calls for the full history
of the exile experiences of Namibians to be written (Namhila 1997:190, 195). Speaking
Out includes the story of another woman who survived the Cassinga massacre and of
the leading black Namibian journalist in the struggle period. While it is useful to have
such accounts, it must be remembered that the academic lens and personal perspec-
tives of the interviewers and editors facilitates and influences how the life story is told
(patel/Hirschsohn 2005:x). autobiographies and life stories are selective in what they
say, presenting an individuals point of view, often through the prism of a much later
context, and therefore they need to be read critically.

Writing not critical of the now ruling party continued to suggest, as pre-independ-
ence writing had, identification between the ruling party, the armed struggle and the
nation. Consider ellen Namhilas recently published life of kaxumba kaNdola, more
commonly known, from being the first accused in the pretoria terrorism trial of Na-
mibians in 1968, as eliaser Tuhadaleni, a founding member of sWapo. When the first

8. The Namibian, 7 March 1996. Nujoma went on to accuse Christo lombard, a theology professor
who had defended Groths work, as being an apostle of apartheid (ibid).

Hi s t o r y a n d t h e a r m e d s t r u g g l e

fighters returned to northern Namibia from training abroad in 1965, they reported to
him, we are told by the veteran politician Toivo ya Toivo in the foreword, because of
his self-sacrificing nature, generosity, honesty, and dedication to the liberation struggle
(Namhila 2005:vii). in writing of his support for sWapo, his long incarceration on
robben island and his eventual release from imprisonment in 1985, Namhila has cho-
sen to present the reader with huge chunks of primary material, whether from interviews
or documentary sources. she does not make it clear on what basis she selected these or
alert the reader to the dangers of relying on such sources, especially oral testimony. Her
book is a valuable attempt to reconstruct the life of man who had been virtually forgot-
ten, but it is a tribute to a hero and a legend, not a critical account.

in south africa, many key participants have now written memoirs. The accounts
by ahmed kathrada, Nelson Mandela and Mac Maharaj of how Mandela wrote what
eventually became Long Walk to Freedom on robben island, and how it was smuggled
out, differ, but access to archival documents is now able to reveal more than the writers
knew when they penned their accounts and can help resolve differences in what they
remembered (Prisoner, 2005:1723). such a process has not begun in Namibia, where
stories, whether of heroes of the struggle or of those who suffered during it, remain
unanalysed and are presented uncritically. Writing scholarly studies of the liberation
struggle will of course remain very difficult when there is so little documentary material
available. sWapos own archive, now housed in Windhoek, remains firmly closed to
scholars, and there has been no hint of whether it will be opened, and on what condi-
tions.

Nujoma and Namakalu
i turn now to two key books on Namibias armed struggle: the one by the leading figure
in that struggle, the founding president of sWapo, sam Nujoma, recently given the
title of father of the Nation by the Namibian parliament, the other the first detailed
account of plaNs operations. Though Nujoma agreed in 1990 to have his life ghost
written, the project faltered, but the publication in the mid-1990s of the books by leys
and saul and Groth, which he and others saw as an attack on sWapos record in the
struggle, must have encouraged him to bring out his own account to set the record
straight from his perspective. His book takes the story of the liberation struggle to in-
dependence in March 1990. unlike other memoirs, it not only draws upon Nujomas
own memory, but uses a considerable range of other accounts of the events it describes,
a number of them, in Nujomas eyes, by opponents in the struggle. some of the later
chapters read almost as if his main purpose was to update To Be Born a Nation by con-
tinuing the history of the armed struggle to its end.

oswin Namakulu was trained in plaN, but like Nujoma, the commander in chief,
it seems that he did not engage in actual fighting himself. after holding administrative
positions in sWapo in exile, he returned to northern Namibia and began interview-
ing plaN combatants to assemble a descriptive history of plaNs activities designed
explicitly to present what happened in the war from the perspective of those who fought
against south africa. His account ranges over the entire war, from the first armed clash
between the two sides, the battle of omugulu-gombashe on 26 august 1966, to the

Chr i s t oph e r Saunde r s

fighting in april 1989. He acknowledges that his book, and its lists of battles and at-
tacks, is far from being comprehensive. Namakalu (2005:15965) is strangely incom-
plete. only in respect of a limited number of engagements does he go into detail. He
tells us that he decided to include nothing on Cassinga because it has been written about
elsewhere (p. viii). When he deals with the key battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 198788,
he writes of the Cuban-angolan forces but does not mention that sWapo units fought
alongside them. He estimates that 75% of his information on plaNs combat missions
from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s came from interviews, sWapo documents and
plaN operational reports (p. viii). unfortunately for the scholar, he gives no clue as to
where these are to be found.

it is Where Others Wavered, however, that illustrates better than any other book
the problems with much of the recent writing (cf., saunders 2003; du pisani 2007).
its title comes from a statement Nujoma made in 1978, a key year in the Namibian
struggle, a statement that he and others often repeated afterwards: When the history
of a free and independent Namibia is written one day, sWapo will go down as having
stood firm where others have wavered: that it sacrificed for the sacred cause of liberation
where others have compromised. The title, then, clearly indicates the strong political
and polemical purpose of Nujomas book: to assert and substantiate the heroic role of
sWapo in bringing independence and freedom to Namibia, to praise those who stood
firm and to condemn those who did not. Though the sub-title on the cover is My life
in sWapo and my participation in the liberation struggle of Namibia, the book is
more about sWapo and its struggle than about Nujomas own life and involvement.
His identification with sWapo, the only effective liberation movement (Nujoma
2001:267) was, and remains, complete: everything else is subordinated to that. Those
who dissented are traitors, on the wrong side of history. His concern to condemn them
is shown by his choosing a title that emphasises the wavering of others rather than his
own steadfastness and determination.

if his memoir is to be believed, there was never any doubt in Nujomas mind about
the eventual triumph of his cause. His story is of a steady movement towards victory.
We pursued policy with vigour and determination until the final victory, he writes.
The national liberation war was increasingly effective. every year we made more
progress until 21 March 1990 when genuine freedom and independence were achieved
(Nujoma 2001:260). He remained convinced that sWapo would inevitably defeat the
south african Goliath (Nujoma 2001:151), and in the end, of course, was proved right
in the sense that south africa did withdraw and sWapo was able to come to power.
His account is hardly at all self-reflective. Much of it is about events that Nujoma was
involved in, or connected to, rather than about his own experiences. There are long de-
scriptive passages dealing with events that he was not present at and which he can have
only heard about from others. There is hardly any of the personal detail that enlivens
most autobiographies. There is no suggestion that his position as leader was ever under
serious challenge, or that there were setbacks, or that any wrong decisions were made.
There is hardly anything about the internal history of sWapo in exile, or about his
interaction with close friends or colleagues.

Though Nujoma has maintained since independence that the struggle continues in
new forms, one might have expected that he would now view the armed struggle with
a certain distance. He still, however, demonises the Boers (racist whites) and cannot

Hi s t o r y a n d t h e a r m e d s t r u g g l e

bring himself to admit, say, that militarily sWapo was less effective in penetrating Na-
mibia in the mid-1980s than it had been a few years before, or that there were ever any
serious differences of views within sWapo as to the most appropriate strategy to fol-
low. While there is no doubt that the activities of plaN were more extensive than the
south africans admitted, Nujoma exaggerates plaNs military successes. it may have
always had a presence in northern Namibia, but it did not have a mechanised brigade
there, and plaN combatants were not effective and permanently fighting in all the
regions inside Namibia at all times (Nujoma 2001:271, 389).

Namakalu is more critical of mistakes made by plaN. He admits that one of the
early fighting units in northern Namibia was equipped only with axes and hunting
knives and that others had no arms at all, that there was an acute shortages of medi-
cines and food as well as weapons, and that though sWapos secretary of defence was
ordered to open a second front in angola at the Tanga conference, this was not done
effectively (Namakalu 2005:12, 35, 456). He also mentions a number of friendly-fire
incidents in which members of plaN were killed and refers to the problems and suspi-
cions caused by the koevoet practice of posing as plaN combatants, wearing plaN
uniforms and using the same methods and approaches as genuine plaN fighters
(Namakalu 2005:47, 108, 158). But despite such admissions, his book presents the war
as a heroic one, and as we will see decisive in bringing about independence.

one of the weakest sections of Nujomas book relates to the crisis of april 1989,
when over 300 sWapo fighters lost their lives in northern Namibia. Whereas by 1979
the forces of the Zimbabwean liberation armies had established a significant presence in
the rural areas of Zimbabwe, plaN had not been able to achieve anything comparable.
Visiting Mugabe in Harare, Nujoma was, it seems, advised to tell his forces to insist
that they should be placed in bases during the transitional period, as the Zimbabwean
guerrilla forces were in 1979, despite the fact that there had been no agreement on
sWapo bases in Namibia in the transitional period. None of this is clarified in Nu-
jomas account, which blames the tragedy on the West and the south african foreign
minister, pik Botha. Nujoma believes that Botha persuaded the reagan administration
to reduce the size of the united Nations Transitional assistance Group (uNTaG) force
in Namibia, as a result of which there were no uN troops in the north on the day the
Western plan was at last implemented. Nujoma implies that there was a conspiracy to
provide a setting in which the plaN fighters in northern Namibia could be massacred
(Nujoma 2001:286, 395ff.) No-one who has made a detailed study of these events will
be convinced by such an interpretation, which at a minimum fails to explain why the
sWapo leadership did not anticipate what might happen if there were no uN forces in
place in the north when the armed plaN fighters emerged.

When writing of the 1960s, Nujoma emphasises how important it was for him to
assert the claims of south West africa/Namibia to independence at a time when many
lumped sWapo with the african National Congress of south africa and did not dis-
tinguish their separate freedom struggles against the same rulers. again and again,
he stresses the need in the 1970s and 1980s to reject any idea of a Bantustan solution
for Namibia (e.g., Nujoma 2001:157) and to insist on genuine independence, which
meant, in his eyes, the total removal of south africa from Namibia and sWapo taking
power. Very reluctantly, he and sWapo had to accept in mid-1978 that Walvis Bay

Chr i s t oph e r Saunde r s

would not be included in the new Namibia and that its future would need to be negoti-
ated after independence.

That sWapo was the only Namibian party to engage in an armed struggle, and
so in effect constituted the liberation movement, is one of the key ways in which the
Namibian struggle differs from the Zimbabwean and other southern african libera-
tion struggles. from the mid-1960s, having decided not to launch an armed struggle,
sWaNu never posed any effective challenge, and yet sWapo pressed to be recognised
as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, and won such recogni-
tion, first from the organisation of african unity and then from the uN General as-
sembly (Nujoma 2001:157). unlike leaders of other liberation movements in southern
africa, Nujoma did not have to worry about being outflanked from the left or being
overtaken by another organisation. He did not need to bargain with others and define
positions to differentiate sWapo from a rival. But in sWapo there was never much
space for democratic debate. The sole and authentic doctrine caused many problems
in the negotiations over the future of Namibia, for it seemed to suggest that sWapo
did not believe in the multiparty democracy it claimed it wanted to see installed in
Namibia, and it buttressed the authoritarian tendencies seen in the ruling party after
independence.

in perhaps his greatest distortion, Nujoma dismisses as of little account the detainee
scandal of the early 1980s that did so much damage to sWapo. He writes of sWapo
advancing from strength to strength in the late 1980s. all he says about the detainees
is that their detention was legitimate, because they gave information to the south afri-
can defence force and so were in some sense responsible for the massacres at shatotwa
and Cassinga. He fails to deal with the allegation that the sWapo leadership itself
knew in advance of these raids but did not warn those in the camps. He merely says that
if we are accused of ill-treating detainees, this was very little compared to the killing,
cruel torture and brutal treatment the apartheid south african regime inflicted on our
people over so many years, and adds we prefer to leave that sad history behind us and
concentrate on national reconciliation ... (Nujoma, 2001:357). No wonder, then, that
in 2006, when war veterans protested in Windhoek that they had been forgotten, he
was reported to have said that he would shoot any veterans who continued to demand
more from the state (Legalbrief, 4 september 2006).

The centrality of the armed struggle in the years of exile meant that sWapo be-
came dominated by a military culture, strongly hierarchical, authoritarian and closed.
This was aided by the almost constant rumours of spies at work and by evidence of
actual spies. Nujoma devotes considerable space to the various traitors and spies who, he
claims, infiltrated the movement over the decades. The deputy chief of sWapos mili-
tary wing at the beginning of the armed struggle not only turned out to be an agent of
the south african security forces but even more astonishingly was allowed to remain
in sWapo even after he had been exposed. it seems that he betrayed Toivo ya Toivo
and others, who were to spend decades in jail, and was able to tip off the south africans
that the commander of sWapos military wing was crossing the Zambesi by boat,
which led to his death in May 1967 (Nujoma 2001:163; Namakalu 2005:esp. 7, 13).

a decade later, shipanga is the prime traitor and quisling, who worked hand in
hand with apartheid south africa. all Nujoma says to substantiate this is to claim that
shipanga attempted to get West German support in a bid to take over the leadership

Hi s t o r y a n d t h e a r m e d s t r u g g l e

(Nujoma 2001:246). Nujoma allows no recognition of the possibility that shipanga
was also, to cite the title of his memoir, In Search of Freedom, nor does he acknowledge
the damage done to the movement then and later by this episode, which, as leys and
saul have shown in detail, arose from the disaffection of the Youth league leaders and
the disillusionment of many of the fighters in the camps with the sWapo leadership
(leys/saul 1994). of shipanga and other reactionaries, Nujoma merely says we sim-
ply asked them to leave (Nujoma 2001:247). He makes no mention of their detention
first in Zambia and then in Tanzania. He seems to justify what was done to them by
saying that their numbers were very small. fewer than a hundred were involved. He
merely continues: There was really no uproar at all ... the armed liberation struggle
continued with intensity (Nujoma 2001:247). so Nujoma fails to tackle the charges
made against him and his organisation, but brushes them aside and provides a bland
and highly distorted account that fits with sWapos refusal to deal with such issues
since independence. Nujoma has added his authorial voice to the wall of silence that
sWapo erected (cf., leys/saul 1994; dobell 1996).

sensitive to the charge that sWapo was not democratic in its practices in exile,
Nujoma makes the astonishing claim that in the exile years there were democratic elec-
tions every 5 years for the leadership of the party (Nujoma 2001:246). But only two
consultative conferences took place in the decades of exile, and none at all in the 1980s,
the years of the spy drama. suggesting that sWapo was democratic in its practices in
exile is an example of reading back into history what he wants to find there. as sWapo
has never encouraged open discussion within its ranks, it is not surprising to find no
sense of debate in his book, of alternatives weighed, of difficult decisions taken. Critics
are not only dismissed as waverers and traitors: he writes of the elimination of some
puppets like Chief elifas (Nujoma 2001:251) as if assassination was fully justified.

The armed struggle was decisive and victorious
Though Nujoma gives much space in his memoir to the intricacies of the diplomatic
activity in which sWapo engaged, for both him and Namakalu the armed struggle is
presented as being decisive in winning the goal of independence. as the war was fought
to free Namibia from south african occupation, and that goal was achieved in March
1990, it is easy to say that the war was victorious and to see those who fought it as re-
sponsible for that victory. But for all the symbolic significance of the armed struggle,
was it the war itself that brought independence? Might it not even be that the way the
war was fought contributed to the long delay before that goal was reached?

There is certainly much myth in the way Nujoma portrays the war. omugulu-gom-
bashe was not, as he portrays it, a military victory for the liberation forces (cf., Namhila
2005, especially 67), for the south african police attacked and routed the sWapo
guerrilla fighters. in august 1990, on the first occasion on which he and others could
gather at the site of the battle after independence, he said: Now it is a fact of history
that the armed struggle initiated at this place became the decisive factor in bringing
about freedom and independence. in his book he writes: it was the armed liberation
struggle that more than anything else motivated the Namibian people to support the
struggle waged by sWapo (Nujoma 2001:268). like Nujoma, Namakalu claims that,

Chr i s t oph e r Saunde r s

despite occasional setbacks, plaN grew ever stronger and more effective and won victo-
ry after victory. His last page sums up the central problem with his book and Nujomas.
The whole page is devoted to this single sentence: Glory to the Heroes and Heroines of
the Namibian National liberation struggle (Namakalu 2005:188).

Though south africa would never have been persuaded to leave Namibia without
the armed struggle, that struggle was not nearly as significant in bringing about in-
dependence as the works by Nujoma and Namakalu suggest. only very recently has
Nujoma begun to acknowledge that Namibians within the country who did not have
guns also made a major contribution to the outcome (see kössler 2007:382). and what
he says in his autobiography of his almost ceaseless diplomatic activity while in exile is
itself testimony to the significance of the role played by the international community
and those in the outside world who gave sWapo support.

Conclusion
such works give partial, highly selective versions of the past, designed to help legitimise
the present order. in not revealing more about the inner history of the struggle, they re-
flect the dominant culture of sWapo, which is open only within circumscribed limits
and is dismissive of critics. Namibias armed struggle had its heroic aspects, but deserves
to be written about dispassionately. Writing that suggests those who did not agree with
the sWapo leadership can be written out of history is propaganda, not history.

i have tried to show that much of the writing on the Namibian liberation struggle
since independence has been as flawed as the polemical writing designed to further the
struggle when it was still being waged. There is clearly the danger that in Namibia, as
has happened in Zimbabwe, this kind of history will become hegemonic and that a
dogmatic line will be laid down concerning what happened in the past, allowing no
alternative and critical voices. fortunately, in the Namibian case, such voices, if muted,
continue to be heard and there is still some tolerance of alternative perspectives. Two
archival/digital projects now under way may help promote scholarly writing on the lib-
eration struggle from within the country.9 unfortunately for the writing of such history,
the history department at the university of Namibia, always short-staffed, has never
been headed by a professorial Namibian specialist. peter katjavivi became the universi-
tys first vice-chancellor, then followed dr Zed Ngavirue, another oxford graduate, in
taking up a diplomatic post.10 Namibia has had no Terence ranger-like figure to help
galvanise scholarship within the country from outside. one of the consequences is that
much of the history of the liberation struggle, and especially how it impacted ordinary
people in the various regions of Namibia, remains to be told. Will the future bring a
flowering of academic and critical work on the Namibian liberation struggle? or will
Namibia follow the Zimbabwean road, with those in power seeking to replace anything

9. The aluka digital project (www.aluka.org and isaacman et al, 2005) and the archives of anti-
colonial resistance and the liberation struggle project (archives: 2005).

10. i do not mention Zedekia Ngavirues 1972 thesis, not published until 1997, because Political
Parties and Interest Groups in South West Africa (Namibia) did not concern the post-1966 armed
struggle.

Hi s t o r y a n d t h e a r m e d s t r u g g l e

worthy of the name of history by the kind of propaganda that ranger generously calls
patriotic history? Time will tell.

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Commercial land reforms in postcolonial Namibia
What happened to liberation struggle rhetoric?

Phanuel Kaapama

Namibia has a total geographical area in excess of 800 000 square kilometres and a
population estimated in 2007 at two million people. although the country has a very
low population density, most of this land mass comprises semi-arid rangeland, with
low rates of rainfall and infertile soils, making it unsuitable for large-scale agricultural
production. This has created a condition of land scarcity that has over the years re-
mained a source of social tension and indirectly a potential source of violent political
conflict. access to and control of agricultural land ownership have equally remained
a key feature in the Namibian processes of social differentiation and state formation
from precolonial times through the era of colonial rule. Moreover, some scholars and
practitioners share the perspective that given the structural sociopolitical and eco-
nomic legacies from the past, land remains at the heart of the postcolonial processes
of state consolidation, in particular the realisation of the objectives of the policies of
national reconciliation and nation-state building.

These views are predicated upon a number of factors, such as the fact that the
land use and ownership patterns bequeathed to the postcolonial state continue to be
manifestations of the legacy of colonial injustice perpetuated against the indigenous
populations by successive colonial administrations since the 1880s. These injustices
resulted from the fact that the policies and programmes of these governments were
geared to ensuring that the patterns of agricultural land use and ownership during
this historical episode reflected a number of socioeconomic distortions. for instance,
a large part of the countrys best agricultural land, comprising ranches and farms,
was exclusively owned by white commercial farmers. a 1976 study cited in a uNiN
(1985:312) report made the following two observations in this regard. first, that 48%
of these commercial farms were owned by absentee landlords who visited periodically
and left day-to-day operations and management in the hands of white local supervi-
sors. second, the report alluded to the over-concentrated agricultural land owner-
ship structure, in terms of which it was estimated that in the early 1970s close to 40%
of the commercial farms in the eastern cattle-rearing district of Gobabis were owned
by 16% of that areas farmers.

another factor contributing to the heightened status of the postcolonial land re-
form agenda was the fact that mass mobilisation and public galvanisation campaigns
of the forces of liberation were premised not only on ending colonialism as a system
of foreign domination, but also strongly pledged the creation of an environment that
would enable the disenfranchised people of Namibia to engage in socially just proc-
esses of national development. such environment was largely sketched in terms of pri-

0

Phanue l Kaapama

oritising measures to redress the inequalities created by Namibias colonial past, such as
the skewed distribution of commercial agricultural land ownership.

The purpose of this chapter is to revisit the thrust of the liberation struggles
political and economic ideological outlooks with a view to contrasting these critically
against the policies and programmes being pursued by the postcolonial Namibian gov-
ernment. in this process, the chapter will reflect critically on the dominant political
and economic discourses and their respective influences on the content of commercial
agricultural land reform.

articulation of the land question in the context of
the nationalist struggle for liberation
The south West africa peoples organisation (sWapo), founded on 29 april 1960,
became the leading movement in the nationalist struggle for the liberation of Namibia.
sWapo emerged out of the owamboland peoples organisation (opo), which was
founded in 1957 to protest against the deplorable working conditions in the contract
labour system that was enforced by the south african colonial government in Namibia.
sWapo waged its nationalist struggle on three fronts. first, there was the political front
based on the political mass mobilisation of the Namibian people in support of its cause
for the liberation of Namibia. second, there was the diplomatic front that culminated
in sWapos recognition by the uN in 1972 as the sole and authentic representative of
the Namibian peoples aspirations for independence and statehood. Third, there was the
military front, launched on 26 august 1966.

sWapo adopted a number of ideological blueprints to provide political guidance
to the struggle, as well as to guide the articulation of its vision of the postcolonial proc-
esses of economic reconstruction and national development. among these, the most
instructive was the 1976 sWapo political programme, which was akin to the main
body of contemporary socialist thought. it explicitly stated that one of the goals of
the movement was to unite all Namibian people, particularly the working class, the
peasantry and progressive intelligentsia into a vanguard party capable of safeguard-
ing national independence, as well as of building a classless and non-exploitative soci-
ety based on the ideals and principles of scientific socialism (kiljunen 1981:185, 189).
in this context, classlessness was explained as a social arrangement that requires the
fundamental change of thought, custom and approach to the ownership of the means
of production and decisions as to the distribution of the collective output of society
(uNiN 1985:23).

sWapo predicated its embrace of the socialist ideological outlook upon its percep-
tion that the colonial practices and values in the territory were based on the degrading
principles of racial discrimination and remorseless economic exploitation of the black
working class and peasantry, practices entrenched through the mechanism of apartheid
capitalism. These colonial socioeconomic practices ensured the perpetuation of a vicious

. ThetextisanextractfrommyPhDprojectwiththeUniversityofWitwatersrandinJohannes-
burg/SouthAfrica,whichisjointlyfundedbytheUniversityofNamibiaandtheVolkswagen
FoundationsFundingInitiativeforCollaborativeResearchinSub-SaharanAfrica.

C om m e r c i a l l a n d r e f o r m s i n p o s t c o l on i a l Na m ib i a

circle of poverty and deplorable living conditions for the black majority, who were seen
merely as tools for the maximisation of profit for the colonial economy, and could be
discarded when they were deemed no longer useful for that purpose. in view of these
negative images, sWapo argued that the free market system was particularly unsuited
to the postcolonial process of national reconstruction. Hence, in the quest to reverse
the above socioeconomic patterns of colonial exploitation it was deemed imperative for
the government of an independent Namibia to pursue development strategies capable
of securing the full well-being and all-round development of all the Namibian people
(uNiN 1985:1, 24).

angula (1990:34) observed that the peasantry constituted the real force capable of
resisting the forces of colonialism, given their relatively independent means of livelihood
(in comparison with urban workers). Thus the former constituted the decisive force in the
progress and subsequent outcome of the struggle for national liberation. Consequently,
it comes as no surprise that sWapos economic development blueprint gave extensive
prominence to the transformations required to stimulate the development of rural areas.
for instance, the uNiN (1985:36) report stressed that the systems of agricultural land
ownership and organisational structure in independent Namibia would be influenced
primarily by a political ideology oriented towards ending the colonial structure and
modes of production based on the exploitation of indigenous african peasants and farm
labourers by white settler farmers. in this regard, the report proclaimed that under the
sWapo-led government of an independent Namibia the state would become the abso-
lute owner of all agricultural land, although there was to be relative accommodation of
a number of other forms of ownership of the means of agricultural production.

The stated long-term goal of the postcolonial sWapo-led government was the estab-
lishment of fully fledged state farms based on the model of large-scale socialist farming
enterprises, in which the means of production and the resultant output would be owned
by the state. This form of ownership was deemed particularly suitable for a number
of reasons: first, in the context of specialised activities such as plant and/or animal
breeding, as well as seed, horticultural and nursery production; second, state ownership
would be in the best interests of the country by ensuring the quality of agricultural
export commodities and the cost-effectiveness of their production; and third, reshaping
the agricultural system would achieve greater social equity. The report was cognisant of
the widespread failure of state farming in other african countries: hence it advocated
safeguarding against potential pitfalls by providing for the necessary management skills
and the political mobilisation of the peasantry (uNiN, 1985:601).

The second set of agricultural land use and ownership patterns proposed in the
sWapo blueprint were cooperatives based on the combination of private ownership
of land with emphasis on joint cultivation and/or sharing of farm support services, as
well as collectives and communes. it was argued that these forms of ownership would
serve as the nucleus for integrated social and economic development, since they were
deemed to embody higher forms of political and economic organisation in which the
means of production and patterns of distribution of outputs were designed in ways
that enabled realisation of benefits for the whole community. Moreover, these forms of
collective ownership were described as more favourable to the reversal of the colonial
socioeconomic relations based on exploitation, as well as for provision of large resource
bases for accumulation from below. However, the document was also cautious about the

Phanue l Kaapama

prospects for success of production and distribution cooperation based on traditional
communalism. it pointed out, in this regard, that in some transitional societies the
means of ownership readily fell under the control of emerging political and economic
elites, who might be inclined to manipulate the transitional system for their parochial
self-aggrandisement at the expense of the welfare of the general society. Moreover, the
document placed particular emphasis on the need to balance the spirit of group solidar-
ity with the concept of individual responsibility. Consequently, it advocated raising the
sociopolitical consciousness of the community as a whole through educational, political
and organisational self-reliance mechanisms (uNiN 1985:624).

The third form of agricultural land ownership proposed in the uNiN (1985:64)
economic development blueprint for an independent Namibia was individual family
farms on land units leased from local communities. in this regard, rights of ownership
were to vest in individuals and could be passed on from one heir to another. The report
gave cognisance to both the advantages and drawbacks of such a smallholder sector, by
citing its most significant strength as the ability to provide higher yields, as well as to
generate significant employment in comparison with the capital intensive large-scale
agricultural production. on the negative side, it was noted that this form of ownership
tends to be incapable of ensuring an optimal combination of resources adequate credit
and long-term capital, and tends to experience managerial and entrepreneurial weak-
ness. The report, however, rightly noted that some of these weaknesses are attributable
to the lack of appropriate technical packages, partly because of inadequate adaptive
research on this form of agricultural land ownership and use.

The sWapo blueprint, however, also alluded to a number of potential constraints
on the realisation of the radical economic transformation programme envisaged by the
liberation movement. These included the fact that the postcolonial government was
bound to inherit an entrenched and sophisticated capitalist system, with an ingrained
racist character and in all likelihood underpinned by diametrically opposed forces di-
rected from inside and outside the country. it therefore noted that although the broad
political framework would immediately change at independence, inherited institutional
arrangements, with their goals, structures, methodologies, rules and personnel might
persist in the reinforcement of existing socioeconomic disparities (uNiN, 1985:245).

in view of these potential constraints, the documents proposed structuring the post-
independence efforts for national reconstruction in three phases. in the immediate post-
independence period (the first year of independence), the attention of the postcolonial
government would be primarily on instituting appropriate contingency measures to
mitigate the impact of possible impediments and obstructions from the retreating pro-
colonial forces. for instance, in the context of land, the report hinted at the possible
mass exodus of white farmers. Consequently, a two-pronged strategy was envisaged.
first, measures would be instituted for the immediate reversion of abandoned land to
the state, to be administered either as state farms, cooperatives and collectives and/or a
combination of these options. second, the new government would engage in dialogue
with the departing white farmers to ensure the smooth transfer of ownership. such
dialogue could entail offering incentives and compensation packages to farmers who
handed over their ranges intact to the incoming administration. However, the report
noted that sWapo was fully aware that this strategy might create room for the white
farmer community to advance unreasonable demands that might subvert progress to-

C om m e r c i a l l a n d r e f o r m s i n p o s t c o l on i a l Na m ib i a

wards a non-racial and non-exploitative society. Moreover, it cautioned that these short-
term measures might lead to delay in formulating and implementing parallel long-term
strategies to realise a desirable state of socioeconomic affairs. Nevertheless, the report
gave an assurance that a sWapo government was unlikely to accede to any demand
that compromises its social policy (uNiN, 1985:267, 55, 56, 59).

it was expected that the second phase, covering the medium-term timeframe (the
first five years of independence), would see governments attention shift towards the
introduction of measures to realise social justice in the context of a broad-based non-
exploitative agricultural development strategy. in this regard, the report noted that:

& since the colonial structure and mode of production were based on the exploitation of
the africans by the white settler farmers & any continuation of extreme inequalities with
minor reforms would & manifestly fail to meet popular expectations forged over decades of
suffering and anti-colonial struggle.

Therefore the key objective of sWapos economic development was the total transfor-
mation of the undesirable historical, structural, ideological and political parameters that
had, over the years, led to the perpetuation of conditions of socioeconomic underde-
velopment. it envisaged that the necessary structural changes would be undertaken in
the context of a comprehensive rural development strategy with a view to restoring the
land to the tillers. it was also envisaged that these undertakings would effect a series of
positive changes in the living standards of the low-income rural masses. furthermore,
the report cautioned against the emergence of a privileged bureaucratic class and advo-
cated deliberate measures to safeguard against the situation elsewhere in postcolonial
africa where prominent politicians, public servants and urban-based economic elites
manipulating the system to appropriate large areas of the best farming land to them-
selves (uNiN, 1985:278, 56).

The third phase (covering the timeframe beyond the first five years of independence)
was to be devoted to achieving long-term growth, as well as the full realisation of the
objectives of social and distributive justice. This was to be done on the basis of a series
of systematic schemes to adjust incentives, land tenure systems, agricultural production
patterns and farm inputs, as well as by organising the peasantry into associations, coop-
eratives and other economic group activities.

The nature of the independence transition and its implications
for land reforms
after the successful implementation of uN security Council resolution 435 in 1989,
which paved the way for the independence of Namibia (eventually attained on 21 March
1990), sWapo, having won the highest number of votes in the 1989 transitional na-
tional elections, established the first postcolonial Namibian government.

However, as the uNiN (1985:25) report had correctly anticipated, the manner in
which independence was attained had major implications for the implementation of
the transformation-oriented socioeconomic development agenda envisaged by the lib-
eration movement. in particular, the report noted that the direction and progress of
the postcolonial rural development initiatives would hinge on the extent to which the

Phanue l Kaapama

incoming government had the wherewithal to implement its declared political commit-
ments to eradicate injustices, inequality and exploitation (uNiN, 1985:55).

in this regard, the nature of the independence transitional process placed a number
of constraints on the pursuit of postcolonial transformation in the domain of com-
mercial agricultural land as envisaged in the sWapo economic and social blueprint.
for one thing, the strategies outlined in sWapos economic development blueprint
were overly premised on the anticipated mass exodus of the white population and the
subsequent abandonment of land. However, because of the nature of the dynamics that
unfolded during the transition to independence and its immediate aftermath, only a
handful of white farmers left the country.

second, another key factor in the transition to independence that reputedly precluded
pursuance of the radical socioeconomic transformation envisaged by sWapo was the
security Councils imposition of the 1982 constitutional principles. These represented a
number of constitutional preconditions for an independent Namibia that would have to
be met if the country was to be admitted into the community of independent nations.
Thus, article 16 (1) of the constitution of the republic of Namibia states that:

all persons shall have the right in any part of Namibia to acquire, own and dispose of all
forms of immovable or movable property individually or in association with others and to
bequeath their property to their heirs or legatees: provided that parliament may by legislation
prohibit or regulate as it deems expedient the right to acquire property by persons who are
not Namibian citizens.

However, article 16(2) further states that: The state or a competent body or organ au-
thorized by law may expropriate property in the public interest subject to the payment
of just compensation, in accordance with requirements and procedures to be deter-
mined by act of parliament.

Thus, as cautioned in the uNiN report (1985:55), the post-independence govern-
ment would only be able to institute its anticipated transformatory agenda if the post-
independence constitutional framework was exclusively formulated and adopted by
the representatives of the Namibian people, acting freely, without preconditions that
entrenched the rights of private ownership of the principal means of production. There-
fore, in the eyes of the descendants of the victims of settler colonialism the interna-
tional communitys imposition of the 1982 constitutional principles is seen as an alibi
to safeguard vested socioeconomic interests that were established through colonial theft
and plunder and as providing an inappropriate basis for pursuing meaningful national
reconciliation based on principles of restorative justice and for promoting equitable and
sustainable national development processes. proponents of this view draw on the ob-
servation by Moyo and Hall (2004:2) that while some countries with historic problems
over land were supported by their former colonial masters to resolve these disputes,
reparation and restitution for colonial losses in africa have not been adequately ad-
dressed either academically or in the aid packages that are extended to these countries.
The key players in the Western Contact Group that sponsored the 1982 principles have
come under a barrage of criticism for having acted in bad faith by clandestinely prioritis-
ing the protection of the vested interests of their economically privileged land-owning
kith and kin.

C om m e r c i a l l a n d r e f o r m s i n p o s t c o l on i a l Na m ib i a

it is equally important to acknowledge that the Namibian transition to independ-
ence coincided with the ascendance of the neoliberal governance model. Not only was
this model seen as a viable idiom for state design and reconstruction, but also its adop-
tion became a prerequisite for the accommodation of emerging and/or reformed states
within the context of the international politics of development aid, aid that was instan-
taneously needed to kick-start their reconstruction and development processes (okoth-
ogendo, 2000:467). Thus, the need to embrace the principle of economic neo-liberal-
ism is said to have arisen from these geopolitical shifts at the global level.

perhaps in anticipation of these constraints, the central message of the sWapo
political programme was significantly watered down. The sWapo election manifesto
(1989:12) for the crucial 1989 transitional elections embraced the ideals of solidarity,
freedom and justice as the beacons to guide the movement towards the future and con-
stituted the thrust of sWapos philosophy of government. The document elaborated
on these ideals as follows. solidarity: in view of the fact that the struggle was not only to
liberate the black majority from colonial domination but also to emancipate the whites
from the narrow and dehumanising confines of class and race privilege, the sWapo
government pledged to institute concrete actions to promote fraternal and human so-
cial relations, in particular to address the essential needs of all Namibian people who
find themselves in a difficult social and economic plight. freedom: sWapo pledged
that a sWapo-led government would uphold the wide array of democratic rights and
freedoms, including the right to property, and went on further to state that in a liber-
ated Namibia under a sWapo led government, freedom will mean an opportunity for
all Namibian people to realise their potential & and [will direct] the development of
our society in a way that creates the necessary material requirements and achieves higher
forms of social consciousness. Justice: The manifesto was highly critical of the policies
and social practices perpetuated by the colonial ruling class, which it accused of being
responsible for the division of the Namibian society into two distinct social groups:
the landless and property-less black majority, on the one hand, and the propertied and
privileged white minority, on the other. on this basis, it committed a sWapo-led
government to the task of ensuring that social justice and equality for all would be the
fundamental principle governing the decision-making process in an independent Na-
mibia. The manifesto further stated that in order to bring about social justice and heal
the wounds of colonial oppression, the sWapo led government will not only restore
the Namibian peoples lost political and legal rights, but will also effect a fundamental
social, industrial and economic change.

With regard to land reform, the 1989 manifesto reaffirmed the movements com-
mitment to redressing the imbalances created by colonial policies of land allocation
on a racial basis, but also made provision for private land ownership in addition to the
three forms of land ownership stipulated in the uNiN economic blueprint cited earlier
(sWapo 1989:910).

The implications of these ideological changes were explained by the then sWapo
secretary of information and publicity and later minister of information and broad-
casting, Hidipo Hamutenya, in an address to the Windhoek regional conference of
the Namibia National students organisation (NaNso) two months before independ-
ence (January 1990). He affirmed sWapos conviction that socialism was seen and
embraced by the victims of oppression and exploitation as the only saviour which can

Phanue l Kaapama

deliver them from the hardships imposed by colonialism. He noted, however, that the
prospects for socialist transformation in africa and in particular Namibia did not ap-
pear that bright at that time. He predicated these doubts on the fact that the goal of
socialist transformation and the application of socialist concepts to african situations
had suffered from both theoretical inadequacies and practical drawbacks. These had led
to the adoption of notions such as african socialism which are used to cover up the
contradiction between the politicians public espousal of socialism and the lack of it
with regard to the economic policies of african countries, which call themselves social-
ist. However, he insisted that there were prospects for and the promise of successfully
pursuing the desired socioeconomic transformation, provided the right foundations
were laid. in particular, he strongly refuted claims that socialism and democracy were
inherently irreconcilable by insisting that the latter needed to be an essential part of
the former. Hence, he argued, the democratisation of Namibian society was necessary
before the process of socialist transformation could commence.

postcolonial commercial agricultural land reforms:
prospects and challenges
The 1991 national conference on the land question
immediately after the attainment of independence, the new Namibian government con-
vened the landmark 1991 National Conference on the land Question. it was attended
by 500 delegates representing the broad spectrum of sociopolitical, economic and cul-
tural interests from all corners of the country. The purpose of the conference was to
provide a consultative platform for fostering national consensus on the volatile issue of
postcolonial land reforms. This was done with a view to providing, based on broader
public input, a solid basis for the formulation of policy on land reform and the prepara-
tion of a programme of action.

The conference adopted 24 recommendations in the form of consensus resolutions
that have since served as fundamental guiding principles for government policy. it was
noted by Harring and odendaal (2002:31) that although these recommendations were
not legally binding on the Namibian government, they nevertheless have remained
highly influential in the shaping of all subsequent major land reform principles, policies
and programmes.

The consensus resolutions included a statement acknowledging that there was in-
justice concerning the acquisition of land in the past and something practicable must
be done to rectify the situation. other consensus resolutions included the adoption of
the principle of Willing-seller Willing-Buyer (WsWB), which according to Moyo et al.
(2004:1) implies that those holding land ownership rights retain full discretion in de-
ciding when and how to make their land available for sale, while prospective buyers (be
they individuals or the government acting on behalf of the state) can only contemplate
acquiring commercial agricultural land when it is offered for sale. Hence, under the
WsWB regime of agricultural land reform, the rights and interests of existing landown-

. SocialismCanWork:ButWeFirstNeedtoDemocratizeOurSociety,The Namibian, Janu-
ary0.

C om m e r c i a l l a n d r e f o r m s i n p o s t c o l on i a l Na m ib i a

ers are fully protected, as they are neither compelled to sell against their will nor at a
price with which they are not fully satisfied.

However, it was noted by latiff (2005:1) that the WsWB principles are a value-
laden concept referring to an imaginary ideal rather than actual practice. The meaning
of the concept will be influenced by the context within which it is applied. as a result,
the application of WsWB principle can often become an ideological battleground by
assuming the status of a non-negotiable issue among landowning classes and becoming
an object of contempt for the landless and their sympathisers.

some commentators have noted that in the Namibian context the decision of the
land conference regarding the adoption of WsWB derived from article 16 of the Na-
mibian constitution. This would account for its subsequent infusion into the agricul-
tural (Commercial) land act (act No. 6 of 1995), which structures the legal proc-
esses for the redistribution of commercial land in Namibia. However, the act reserved
governments preferential rights to purchase land that comes on to the market at the
expense of other bidders who may be willing to pay a higher price or be the sellers buyer
of choice. However, this provision was not fully adhered to, as it was circumvented by
some land owners who opted to convert their farms into business entities (e.g., closed
corporations) and later traded them as a corporate concession to preferred buyers, in-
cluding foreign nationals. The loophole was addressed in the second Commercial agri-
cultural land reform amendment act.

The provision that accords preferential rights of purchase to the state has come in
for criticism especially from propertied interest groups and neoliberal economists, who
construe it as hindering free trade in agricultural land and blame it for preventing the
realisation of the real monetary value of the land by sale or by bonding at the bank. pro-
ponents of this view argue that if one takes all farms in Namibia, about 5,000 at 5,000
hectares each at a price of N$ 500 per hectare in the year 2006, their combined value
would be about N$ 12.5 bn. However, if ownership of this land could be traded freely
without with land reform constraints between any willing-seller and any willing-buyer
from anywhere, the same land would be valued at N$ 50 bn. it is further argued that the
negative impacts of these constraints are also manifested in the reluctance of potential
investors to put their money in eco-tourism and other land-based business ventures, for
fear that they will not be allowed to sell the land and all its added fixed assets for the
highest price possible. as a result, agricultural land reform stands accused of having
created a situation whereby the largest amount of capital available for the countrys
prosperity remains locked away in untradable land.

The suitability of the WsWB principle has come under increasing scrutiny from
those sympathising with landless groups, who blame it for resulting in procrastination
in the land reform process in view of the apparent reluctance of landowners to dispose of
their land to the state for the resettlement of landless peasants and farm workers. Those
sharing this concern reiterate the view that their apprehensions concerning the WsWB
principle cannot be taken lightly, since the same principle has failed spectacularly in
Zimbabwe, where it operated for close to two decades after independence. The southern
african regional poverty Network (sarpN) (2003:89) attributed this failure to the

. MultimillionaireDreamsofTurningNamibiaintoaGamePark,The Namibian,September
00.

Phanue l Kaapama

fact that although the willing-buyer side of the equation was there most of the time,
progress was hampered by the absence of the willing-seller side of the bargain.

in this regard, kaumbi (2004:93) took issue with the argument that the WsWB
principle derived from the Namibian constitution by pointing out that the relevant arti-
cle expressed itself on the issue of the payment of fair and just compensation where pri-
vate property is expropriated by the state, and therefore does not mention the WsWB
principle. He further reasoned that the mere fact that the Namibian constitution makes
provision for the state to expropriate private property where such action is deemed to
be in the public interest in itself signifies a departure from the WsWB principles de-
fined above. He thus concludes that the attribution of WsWB to the constitution, one
of the foremost reasons for the lack of timely implementation of necessary structural
changes to the landownership pattern, could be construed as a blatant misinterpreta-
tion of the constitution. Harring et al. (2002:11) share this view by noting that article
16 of the constitution does not require WsWB, for it clearly sanctions expropriation of
land without regard to the willingness of individual sellers. furthermore, they hint that
article 16 must also be read in the context of the constitutional obligation to affirmative
action, as stated in article 23(2):

Nothing contained in article 10 hereof shall prevent parliament from enacting legislation
providing directly or indirectly for the advancement of persons within Namibia who are so-
cially, economically or educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or practices,
or for implementation of policies and programmes aimed at redressing social, economic or
educational imbalances in the Namibian society arising out of discriminatory laws or prac-
tices &

This apparent discrepancy is a probable reflection of the delicate political ground the
government was treading in the process leading to the passage of the Commercial agri-
cultural land reform act, in particular its need to keep the confidence in the economy
of commercial farmers and potential investors.

The uNiN (1985:556) report gave the assurance that sWapo was not only aware
of, but also prepared to deal with the transitional pitfalls that could result in the ma-
nipulation of the system by those yielding economic power with a view to retaining
control over the means of production. a sWapo government, it pledged, was unlikely
to accede to any demand that compromises its social policy. The opposite, however,
seems to be the case. although the WsWB principle has been hailed by some powerful
international institutions and their local proxies, it has remained a thorn in the flesh of
those whose ancestors lost land to the settler colonialism pursued by successive colonial
administrations and of all those who engaged in and/or supported the nationalist strug-
gle for the liberation of Namibia. rather than helping to resolve conflicting claims and
interests in the agricultural land reform process, the application of WsWB principles
seems to have solidified social tensions between those benefiting from the status quo
and those who sees themselves as victims of the perpetuation and sanctioning of colo-
nial land theft.

C om m e r c i a l l a n d r e f o r m s i n p o s t c o l on i a l Na m ib i a

The land resettlement programme
at independence, the Namibian government initiated the land resettlement programme
under the auspices of the Ministry of lands, resettlement and rehabilitation (Mlrr).
This was the agency entrusted with acquiring land on behalf of the state for the reset-
tlement of landless small-scale farmers on a leasehold basis. The operational procedure
of this scheme is rather simple, in that upon the states acquisition of commercial ag-
ricultural farmland the deed of ownership is registered in the name of Mlrr, which
assumes responsibility for regulating the property rights in respect of the land in ques-
tion. The programme seems to be primarily informed by a welfarist slant on social
reforms, in the sense that it is undertaken mainly with the view to providing previously
disadvantaged persons with the indirect means for acquiring agricultural land. The pri-
mary rationale of this programme is to facilitate upliftment of the beneficiaries so they
can achieve acceptable levels of social and economic development in order to support
themselves (Harring et al., 2002:99). Thus,in view of its underlying principles, it may be
concluded that of the two postcolonial commercial agricultural land reform initiatives,
the land resettlement programme seems to come closest to the three forms of agricul-
tural land ownership envisaged in the sWapo economic blueprint for an independent
Namibia.

in order to illustrate the complexities underpinning the implementation of the re-
settlement policy, Harring et al. (2002:96) outlined the three processes involved. first
there was the process to earmark resources for acquiring sufficient land for resettlement.
second, there is the selection of beneficiaries, a process that can become politicised and
is fraught with possibilities for fraud and which therefore requires utmost transparency
in order to preserve the integrity of the land reform programme. Third, there is the in-
stitutionalisation of effective and efficient support mechanisms for the resettled farmers
in order sustain the productivity of the land as well as the viability of the resettlement
programme.

Nevertheless, the implementation of the land resettlement programme seems to be
riddled with numerous challenges that have greatly contributed to procrastination and
delays in its implementation. downgrading of the ability of this programme and of
government initiatives for integrated rural development and poverty reduction to have
the desired positive impact on the targeted populations. for instance, Mlrr has been
unable to attain its anticipated target for the redistribution of 9.5 million hectares of
land (approximately 25% of the total commercial agricultural land) within the five-year
period (200005) of the second National development plan (Ndp 2). in this regard,
Harring et al. note (2005:96) that only 90 farms were acquired in the first ten years of
independence. at this pace, government would acquire only 900 farms in 100 years, or
less than 20% of the total number of commercial farms in Namibia.

Harring et al. (2002:97) further note that Mlrr acquires isolated farms as they
are offered for sale, charging that this piecemeal approach to land reform is unlikely to
be effective. instead, they advocate the adoption of alternative broad and transparent
approaches consistent with a similarly broad programme of agricultural development,
which would entail the proactive identification of major regions within which to acquire
blocks of farms for resettlement purposes.

0

Phanue l Kaapama

Moreover, it is alleged that the process of allocating farmland through the resettle-
ment programme has become highly politicised and is therefore wanting in transpar-
ency (sarpN 2003:21). as a result, it is alleged that the economics of affection have
found expression in the ties of political patronage, which are being exploited by some
political office bearers and bureaucrats as elaborate avenues for preferential treatment
of party stalwarts, as well as of friends and relatives of the ruling elite. in this regard,
Horsthemke (2004:88) has alluded to the absence of sound criteria for the selection
of the beneficiaries of resettlement programmes, resulting in few checks and balances
against rent seeking and free-riding behaviour. Van den Brink has cautioned against
excessive centralisation in the planning and administration of the processes for selecting
beneficiaries, resettling them and providing them with infrastructure and other support
services, as this may spawn costly and paternalistic bureaucratisation (Van den Brink,
2002:18).

Testimony of this are the controversies ignited by allegations of maladministration
of the resettlement process in the omaheke, such as fact that poor farm workers and
their families faced with threats of eviction were brushed aside, while Mlrr opted to
allocate land to high ranking civil servants and political office bearers, despite their high
salaries, which meant they could easily afford to acquire farms through the affirmative
action loan scheme (aals). These glitches resulted from a number of policy oversights,
such as the absence of a framework for dealing with the farm workers on farms acquired
by the state for redistribution, or even with regard to farm workers already on farms
that are reallocated to new owners under the governments land resettlement scheme.
Moreover, although the national resettlement policy of 1997 originally identified five
main target groups for resettlement, including evicted farm workers, in the 2001 white
paper on the national resettlement policy, farm workers and other landless peasants
were moved down a few notches on the priority list of targeted beneficiaries in the sense
that the new criteria included all Namibian citizens who were socially, economically or
educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws and practices, irrespective of
their present socioeconomic status (Werner 2004:20).

in another instance, an Mlrr official in the omaheke region himself became a
beneficiary of the scheme for whose administration he was responsible when he was allo-
cated a resettlement farm. To make matters worse, he opted to lease his newly acquired
farm to the previous white owner of the farm, as well as to two other persons who later
accused the official of having misled them into believing that they were jointly resettled
on this farm.

These malpractices occurred despite the fact that the sWapo economic blueprint
advocated safeguards against the possible disproportionate influence of the privileged
bureaucratic and economic classes that could lead to abuse by prominent politicians,
public servants and urban-based economic elites in their efforts to appropriate large
areas of the best farming land for themselves (uNiN 1985:56). Mlrr is empowered to
allocate user rights to targeted beneficiaries on a leasehold basis, with a view to provid-

. GovernmentOfficialThreatentoBootFarmworkerandNothingWrongWithLandforthe
Privileged,The Namibian, 0andNovember00.

. ResettlementStorySparksPanicinOmahekeandLandAbuseExposed,New Era, and
March00.

C om m e r c i a l l a n d r e f o r m s i n p o s t c o l on i a l Na m ib i a

ing the recipient with relatively secure property rights. for instance, the beneficiaries
can use, bequeath, mortgage and modify the property, although these user rights are
supposed to be closely regulated by the state.

according to the Mlrr, resettlement beneficiaries are entitled to 99-year leasehold
agreement, which is supposed to be registered with the deeds office upon its formal cer-
tification. The importance of clearly stipulated and understood legal rights with regard
to land derives from the fact that land confers on the beneficiaries the sense of owner-
ship, as well as the social status that accompanies land ownership. However, it was noted
by Harring et al. (2002:1001) that while the Mlrr may have attempted to meet its
legal obligations, most of the resettlement beneficiaries who interacted with their study
team were not fully aware of their legal rights to the land they occupied. for instance,
were the legal rights conveyed to beneficiaries through these 99 year leases renewable?
Would the families of the direct beneficiaries inherit these properties as a matter of
right or would the Mlrr have a role in approving such transfers? these leases be sold or
traded? if used as collateral for loans, could these leases be foreclosed by banks and other
financial institutions? Could beneficiaries be ejected from their leases for bad behaviour,
etc? in this regard, the informants hinted that although in theory land leases given to
beneficiaries could be used as collateral, in reality it has proven difficult for them to ac-
cess loans from both commercial and developmentally oriented financial institutions by
using their allocated land as collateral.

The problem of legally defined land rights needs to be looked at as part of a bigger
problem that has faced many landless Namibians since the pre-independence era, in
particular the socially disenfranchised poor segments. it has been noted by Harring
et al. (2002:101) that the legal status of most landless Namibians is less than the legal
status of their economically privileged counterparts, who generally own their land in
freehold. Thus, most landless Namibians often hold a legally undefined usufructuary
interest in communal areas, or undefined squatters rights in the hundreds of informal
peri-urban settlements scattered across the country.

Moreover, the process of resettlement brings together groups of settlers from differ-
ent communities and different parts of the country, often speaking different languages
and possessing varying human and socioeconomic capabilities. according to Harring et
al. (2002:96), immense social effort is required to organise these diverse individuals into
functioning new communities. Clearly defined, understood and enforced land rights are
a necessary ingredient in the social stabilisation of these newly forged communities.

another expressed concern relating to land resettlement is the economic viability of
the programme. such concerns mainly arise from the fact that the price of commercial
agricultural land in Namibia has continued to increase in relation to the profit that can
be made from commercial farming activities. sherbourne (2004:8) urged government
to resolve the economic dilemma by deciding either to continue subsidising the unprof-
itable land reform programme or, alternatively, to simply allow those who can afford
to farm to reap the benefits of the agricultural land reform process. However, it has
been noted by Harring et al. (2002:301) that the colonial dispossession of land from
indigenous african communities from which the postcolonial structure of land tenure
in Namibian derives was not a market-driven exercise, but was also a heavily subsidised
government enterprise. Thus, one must balance the argument that land reform is expen-
sive with the cost of seizure borne by the original owners of the land, as well as the cost

Phanue l Kaapama

of converting the land into the commercial farms that they are today. However, the duo
of scholars expressed their doubts as to whether land reform is the most socially or eco-
nomically efficient way to advance affirmative action and/or welfare schemes designed
to uplift and improve the living conditions of the masses of poor people in Namibia.

kaumbi, by contrast (2004:93), argues that during both the anti-colonial resistance
and the subsequent nationalist liberation struggle local indigenous people paid for the
land with their blood. He therefore insists that although postcolonial land reform may
be costly, this brutal reality dictates that this cost must be incurred sooner or later in
order to avoid repetition of this cruel fate.

some critics hint at the potential danger arising from the policy to convert large eco-
nomically viable agricultural units into smaller re-demarcated and partitioned farming
units for the purpose of resettling landless households. for instance, its was noted by
Harring et al. (2002:98) that given the countrys aridity, most available agricultural land
has a low carrying capacity for livestock production, while the small plots intended for
crop cultivation are equally unlikely to provide meaningful employment for the reset-
tled farmers. it is also feared that the small size of the resettlement allotments present
the threat of overgrazing that could ultimately lead to land degradation and the subse-
quent reduction of the productivity of the land

some commentators have, however, noted that the greatest impediments to the pro-
ductivity of small landholding units under the resettlement programmes arise from the
inadequacy of the support being extended to resettled farmers. as a result, resettled
peasants, farm workers and pensioners with limited sources of income are unable to
productively utilise their newly acquired land. This is despite the fact that sWapos
pre-independence economic development blueprint acknowledged a number of poten-
tial weaknesses that could undermine the viability of smallholding units, such as the
inability to combine resources and to attract adequate credit and long-term capital, as
well as managerial and entrepreneurial weaknesses. These challenges were, however,
attributed to the lack of adequate research on agricultural production based on small
landholdings. Moreover, the Mlrrs 1997 draft white paper on resettlement limited
support to beneficiaries of the resettlement programmes to the first five years of resettle-
ment. This assumed that over this period they would acquire the necessary experience
and self-confidence to sustain themselves. However, this provision was reformulated in
the 2001 white paper, which stated that the duration of support would be determined
progressively in accordance with the types of resettlement and the categories of benefi-
ciaries. Moreover, Harring et al. (2002:13) noted that moneys made available through
annual budget appropriations are primarily earmarked for land acquisition, with little
provision being made for infrastructural and training needs and other related empower-
ment programmes for resettlement beneficiaries. The second Commercial agricultural
land reform amendment act was enacted in May 2001 to ease the constraints im-
posed by these allocational discrepancies.

in this regard, Harring et al. (2002:989) refer to the skoonheid resettlement
project. started in 1993, it had no elaborate scheduled development plans for achieving
sustainability, with the result that seven years after its commencement the beneficiaries
remained heavily dependent on monthly food handouts from government. Consequent-
ly, Harring et al. cautioned against beneficiaries developing dependency syndromes and
emphasised the view that sustainability was only achievable through systematic schemes

C om m e r c i a l l a n d r e f o r m s i n p o s t c o l on i a l Na m ib i a

to provide resettled farmers with the necessary human, technical and infrastructural
operating capital. in their view, such schemes could be implemented over a longer pe-
riod of ten to 15 years, provided they were subjected to independent monitoring and
evaluation processes and provided Mlrr was willing to intervene and restructure fail-
ing projects.

However, looking at some of the challenges that have bedevilled the land reset-
tlement programme since its inception, it seems that government has been unable to
institute a fully integrated and effective package of intervention that combines the al-
location of land with the corresponding agricultural and other support services. This
implies that the current difficulties being experienced by resettled farmers cannot be
seen as reflecting any inherent inferiority in small landholding agricultural production.
This misconception is attested to by Harring et al. (2002:98), who note that although
the perception that resettlement beneficiaries are loafers is echoed by parliamentarians,
in their own field study of ten resettlement projects they came across people desirous of
making a living but frustrated by the lack of adequate support. They warn against the
danger of some resettlement projects becoming rural slums and dumping grounds for
poor people.

The alleged abuses and inefficiencies cited above cannot be looked upon lightly, since
they may lead to the substitution of hope and enthusiasm by frustration and disillusion-
ment and ultimately foment class and ethnic conflicts.

The Affirmative Action Loan Scheme (AALS)
The patterns of commercial agricultural land tenure inherited from the colonial dispen-
sation had been structured by government subsidised-loans for commercial agricultural
land acquisition and development (Harring et al., 2002:17). Thus, in its quest to redress
the racially skewed commercial agricultural land ownership patterns, the Namibian
government amended the pre-independence land Bank act (No. 13 of 1944) through
agricultural Bank amendment act 27 of 1991. section 46 (1) (a) of the latter em-
powered the minister responsible for the agricultural and rural development sectors to
provide funds

& for the purpose of enabling any person who undertakes to carry on farming or other
agricultural operations to acquire with a view to such persons advancement contemplated in
article 23 (2) of the Namibian Constitution or otherwise, agricultural land or enabling any
such person to carry on farming or other operations on any agricultural land occupied by
him/her, whether or not such land is the property of such a person.

subsequently, in 1992 cabinet introduced the aals under the auspices of the agricul-
tural land Bank of Namibia to promote several land and agrarian reform objectives.
first, it was to promote private agricultural land ownership for previously disadvan-
taged Namibians to enable them to become fully fledged commercial farmers, capable
of penetrating the lucrative agricultural commodities export markets. second, it was
to encourage the relocation of farmers with many livestock from communal areas to
commercial farmland, thereby freeing up land for those with fewer livestock, as well as
relieving the pressing problems of overgrazing and desertification on communal agricul-
tural land (sherbourne 2004:1415).

Phanue l Kaapama

in this regard, aals was designed to encourage agrarian capitalist change by dis-
persing capital on favourable terms to previously disadvantaged emerging farmers to
enable them to acquire land through market-based mechanisms. Hence, contrary to its
redistributive-inclined liberation struggle ideology, the sWapo-led government opted
for top-down accumulative agricultural land reform. The presupposition here was the
parallel development of medium- and large-scale black autarkic farming units capable
of penetrating the lucrative commercial agricultural sector, previously the exclusive pre-
serve of a handful of white commercial farmers.

Concerns abound regarding the apparent inclination of the emerging black elite not
only to amass more than one farm but also to choose farmland closest to markets and
with good soil and water. The poor landless peasants and workers, meanwhile, are left to
languish as a result of artificial scarcities of land. This is the situation described by Moyo
et al. (2004:5, 11) as a generalised but locationally narrow form of land concentration
from below, based on internal processes of local agrarian and power differentiation.

Moreover, discontent is also being expressed about aalss possible role in raising
the price of commercial agricultural land, and its consequent indirect contribution to
the current snails pace of the resettlement programme. sherbourne (2004:14, 16), based
on his review of commercial farmland transaction data at the office of the registrar of
deeds, noted that the average prices paid by aals farmers have been much higher than
for other buyers. as a result, he has expressed the need for a critical examination the
ways in which the current scheme has supported the subsidisation of land acquisition by
the emerging economic elite, as this may be contributing towards the upward spiral of
commercial agricultural land prices to the detriment of broader-based land reforms.

He (2004:17) has also expressed the fear that the strategy of encouraging previously
disadvantaged persons to venture into commercial agricultural farming on the assump-
tion that such ventures are inherently profitable could prove to be unsustainable in the
long run, and may amount to what he terms setting them up for failure. He explains
this concern through a hypothetical illustration of a formerly disadvantaged beneficiary
of the aals who takes out an investment loan of N$ 2.5 m for land and livestock, as
well as infrastructural improvement and equipment. The potential annual income of
such a farmer is estimated to be N$ 280,000, whereas his/her annual loan repayment is
estimated at N$ 313,000. sherbourne concludes that the profitability of such a typical
farming venture would remain but a distant dream (sherbourne 2004:910). Given the
high cost of land, he goes on to argue that profitability in the commercial agricultural
sector will only be possible where the prospective farmer does not have to purchase the
land but acquires it as an inheritance or gift. His conclusion is that the current forms
of land reform in general, and aals in particular, could end up being the exclusive
preserve of the rich urbanised black elite with the wherewithal to subsidise their newly
acquired farms from their other, principal sources of income.

some of the above conclusions seem to be seriously flawed and contradictory in a
number of respects. for instance, the hypothetical illustration totally overlooks the fact
that some aals beneficiaries are drawn from the ranks of already established and suc-
cessful farmers in the communal areas, who had, over the years, been able to accumu-
late productive capital in the form of livestock, equipment, savings etc. Consequently,
they may not find themselves in the financial predicament envisaged by sherbourne.
secondly, sherbourne (2004:14) notes elsewhere in his paper that full-time farmers ac-

C om m e r c i a l l a n d r e f o r m s i n p o s t c o l on i a l Na m ib i a

counted for 41% of the aals beneficiaries by october 2003. furthermore, this group
enjoys favourable terms, such as a three year grace period, after which the interest pay-
ments on their loans gradually rise over six years before reaching the agriBanks normal
lending rate. one is therefore flabbergasted as to how he arrived at some of his conclu-
sions. Thirdly, elsewhere in his paper sherbourne (2004:14) also notes that a casual
drive through Namibias commercial agricultural farmlands suggests a trend towards
diversification in land use, including tourism, trophy hunting, game lodges, wildlife
photography and adventure sports. This suggests that traditional commercial farming
is no longer seen as the optimum form of land use. since nothing prevents previously
disadvantaged farmers from also diversifying land use patterns on their newly acquired
farms, one is therefore left to wonder why sherbourne believes that the emerging com-
mercial black farmers are being set up for failure.

The Commercial Agricultural Land Tax Act
as pointed out by atwood (lund 2000:14), different people acquire and/or hold on to
farmland for different reasons, some of which can lead to poor utilisation of land and
hence culminate in the reduction of national economic output, as well as the role of
land in the social reproduction of society. for instance, the primary interest of prospec-
tive and current landowners in their land may be as an investment portfolio with high
potential for appreciation, or as a hedge against inflation, a tax shelter, or as a means for
accessing subsidised credit. The taxation regime in place in Namibia is being blamed for
encouraging people to purchase and/or hold on to agricultural land for reasons other
than its productive potential, since they are allowed to offset farming losses against the
profits from their other business ventures. Therefore, it is argued that some people buy
farms to reduce their tax liability. as Moyo et al. note (2004:12), such loopholes can be
exploited to conceal land underutilisation.

for instance, Harring et al. (2002:7) estimated that as much as 6080% of Na-
mibian commercial farms are not profitable and are very heavily in debt and only about
30% of all farmers are essentially debt free. They attribute this to the heavy subsidisa-
tion of the Namibian commercial agricultural sector during the era of colonial rule, as
well as the fact that commercial agricultural land was not taxed prior to 2005. These
circumstances contributed to the tendency of individual farmers to continue to manage
unprofitable farms. They note that any effort to tax agricultural land would likely force
most commercial farms out of business and put these farms in government hands

in addition, sherbourne (2004:14) has observed that some of Namibias economic
elite tend to acquire farms merely as places to visit occasionally with a view to enjoying
a rural lifestyle in contrast to the urban lives that they have become accustomed to.

These tendencies are also blamed not only for the exorbitant escalation of prices
of farmland, but also for the misallocation of resources, and hence the reduction of
societys aggregate welfare through the disproportionate redistribution of wealth and in-
come in favour of a small economic and political elite at the expense of the economically
disenfranchised majority. for instance, Moyo et al. (2004:7) point to the trend whereby
large tracts of farms are concessioned and sold to private investment companies, as
well as the consolidation and conversion of farmland into large-scale conservancies for
exclusive wildlife use and other nature-based economic activities. although these land

Phanue l Kaapama

use patterns are justified by those involved as promoting the sustainable use of natural
resources in fragile areas, critics point to the fact that in some cases they perpetuate
the exclusion of landless segments of society from what is at times their only available
source of livelihood. a classic example of this situation is the much publicised dream
of the south african-based property developer and owner of the 65,000 hectare erindi
Game lodge near omaruru, Gert Joubert. on the pretext of a promise to attract 2 to
3 million tourists to the country every year, he proposed turning the whole of Namibia
into a vast game park across which animals could migrate freely, while the only internal
fences would be those around towns and villages.

as Moyo et al. (2004:7) observe, such schemes could undermine integrated rural
development strategies, since farmland ends up being directed away from locally ar-
ticulated development goals more relevant and beneficial to the specific interests of the
inhabitants of rural areas, particularly the poor.

in view of the challenges regarding the availability and acquisition of agricultural
land by the state for resettlement purposes alluded to above, the Technical Committee
on Commercial farmland (TCCf), instituted by government in November 1991 in line
with the consensus resolutions of the national land conference, advocated the principle
of horizontal equity by recommending the gradual phasing-out of tax concessions fa-
vouring the commercial agricultural sector, including the land tax exemption for com-
mercial farms (Harring et al. 2002:324). This recommendation was embodied in the
land Valuation and Taxation regulations of 2001, which in turn were adopted in terms
of the 1995 Commercial agricultural land reform act. This act empowers the minis-
ter responsible for lands to impose a land tax to be paid by owners of agricultural land
and prescribe the rate, methods of calculation and the time and manner of payment or
collection of such tax and penalties for any failure to pay such tax or to comply with any
provision of such regulation. The primary objective of the regulations is to provide for
the taxation of commercial agricultural land in proportion to its estimated value, and
they are intended to increase the cost of holding on to unused or underused agricultural
land. in particular, they are intended to discourage the tendency of some current and
prospective landowners from of holding on to land for egotistical reasons. in addition,
it is anticipated that agricultural land taxation will raise funds for the land acquisition
and development fund, as proposed in both the first and second agricultural (Com-
mercial) land act, acts 6 of 2000 and 2 of 2001 respectively (Harring et al. 2002:13).

However, such land taxation policies, as a form of property tax, have generally been
criticised in neoliberal economic literature. for instance, Barzel (1993:29) argued that
property taxes tend to promote inefficient resource allocation, since the value of the
property subjected to these types of tax diminishes compared to what it should be in
the absence of the tax. from this perspective, property taxes stand accused of distort-
ing the allocation of resources, leading to their inefficient utilisation, in the sense that
expansion of production would produce a net gain, whereas the tax levy creates a wedge
that prevents the realisation of that gain, because the marginal units will be valued at
more than cost.

. MultimillionaireDreamsofTurningNamibiaintoaGamePark,The Namibian, September
00.

C om m e r c i a l l a n d r e f o r m s i n p o s t c o l on i a l Na m ib i a

Conclusion
This paper has highlighted not only the pre-independence national development out-
look of sWapo as a liberation movement, but has also shed light on a number of fac-
tors that may have necessitated compromise on the initial commitments to realise social
equity within the context of land reforms initiatives. Moreover, the paper has attempted
to demonstrate how the principles underpinning commercial agricultural land reforms,
and the policies and programmes they helped nurture, has tended to perpetuate the
concentration of land in the hands of both white and black economic elites.

in this regard, there seems to be ample evidence to substantiate the observation by
Moyo et al (2004:3) that agricultural land reform processes in several southern african
countries, including Namibia, are largely modelled on neoliberal economic principles,
even though those principles do not offer coherent articulation of the purpose of land
reforms in the local, national and regional socioeconomic development context. By
implication, therefore, the ideological underpinnings of postcolonial Namibias com-
mercial agricultural land reform processes reinforce the pre-independence extroverted
model of economic accumulation from above.

as a result, it is becoming increasingly evident that the socioeconomic trends gener-
ated by these reforms are gradually fostering socioeconomic conditions capable not only
of hardening social differentiation within the previously disadvantaged community, but
also of promoting social polarisation between those benefiting from the perpetuation of
the socioeconomic status quo and those enduring continued economic disenfranchise-
ment and social marginalisation.

in this regard, the postcolonial process of national reconciliation is also fiercely criti-
cised for being more effective at fostering mutually beneficial ties between economic
and political elites across the racial divide. for instance, kossler and Melber (2001:149)
lament the fact that the policy of national reconciliation seems to have laid and still
lays the main onus of forgiveness and concessions on the shoulder of the black masses,
while preserving the spoils of the postcolonial political and economic dispensation for
a handful of previously disadvantaged individuals who have graduated into to the eche-
lons of state power from the ranks of the liberation struggle and have thereby been most
fortunate in gaining admission to the exclusive socioeconomic club of the privileged
minority white group.

as noted by Mudge (2004:101), although Namibia has made some inroads with its
various land reform initiatives, these have thus far not significantly benefited the poor
and the needy. This predicament warrants the unyielding pleas for a socially equitable
settlement of the land question as a prerequisite for sustained peace and political stabil-
ity in Namibia. as a result of the persistent land hunger being endured by the landless
masses, farring et al. (2002:31) noted that there are strong feelings of resentment and
betrayal about the fulfilment of the liberation struggle promises. This underscores the
need for critical introspection by and between the various stakeholders involved and/or
affected by the agricultural land reform processes, with a view to precluding the radical-
isation of the rural poor, such as peasants and farm workers. in this regard, Horsthemke
(2004:87) noted that failure to take advantage of postcolonial political stability may
create room for politically opportunistic behaviour: the frustrations of the peasants and
farm workers, as well as of the descendants of colonial genocide and of war veterans,

Phanue l Kaapama

could be manipulated by competing political interests to threaten the very foundations
of peace and political stability in the country.

Wole sonyika (Hunter 2004:4) rightly cautioned that the persistence of socioeco-
nomic injustice constitutes an enduring threat that one day could rock the founda-
tions of what may initially have seemed like a remarkable process of reconciliation.
Thus the time may come when Namibia will be forced to rethink its handling of the
socioeconomic challenges that are being generated by the present neoliberal economic
agricultural land reform model. The socioeconomic and political realities around the
land question in Namibia are far from being sustainable. This situation calls for serious
policy-oriented research that arises from and speaks to the contexts, needs, aspirations
and insights of prevailing local realities, and seeks workable solutions that transcend the
parochial and elitist factional interests served by the present agricultural land reform
policies and programmes.

references
angula H.k. (1990), The Two Thousand Days of Haimbodi ya Haufiku. Windhoek:

Gamsberg Macmillan
Barzel Y. (1993), Economic Analysis of Property Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge university

press
farring s.l. and W. odendaal (2002), One Day We Will All Be Equal &: A Socio Legal

Perspective on the Namibian Land Reform and Resettlement Process. Windhoek: legal
assistance Centre

Horsthemke o. (2004), land reform in Namibia: opportunities and opportunism, in
J. Hunter (ed.), Who Should Own the Land? Analysis and Views on Land Reform and
the Land Question in Namibia and Southern Africa. Windhoek: konrad adenauer
stiftung/Namibia institute for democracy, pp. 8791

Hunter J. (2004), Who should own the land? introduction, in J. Hunter (ed.), Who
Should Own the Land? Analysis and Views on Land Reform and the Land Question
in Namibia and Southern Africa. Windhoek: konrad adenauer stiftung/Namibia
institute for democracy, pp. 17

kaumbi u. (2004), The land is ours, in J. Hunter (ed.), Who Should Own the Land?
Analysis and Views on Land Reform and the Land Question in Namibia and Southern
Africa. Windhoek: konrad adenauer stiftung/Namibia institute for democracy,
pp. 9294

kiljunen k. (1981), The ideology of National liberation, in r. Green, M.l. kiljunen and
k. kiljunen (eds), Namibia the Last Colony. essex: longman

kössler r. and H. Melber (2001), political Culture and Civil society: on the state of the
Namibian state, in i. diener and o. Graefe (eds), Contemporary Namibia: The First
Landmark of a Post Apartheid Society. Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan

latiff, e. (2005), from Willing seller, Willing Buyer To a people-driven land reform,
Programme For Land and Agrarian Studies, policy Brief No. 17, september

lund, C. (2000), african land Tenure: Questioning Basic assumptions, international
institute for environment and development (iied), Drylands Issues Paper 100

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Moyo s. and r. Hall (2004), Conflict and Land Reform in Southern Africa, paper delivered
at Centre for Conflict resolution (CCr) policy seminar on the political economy
of post-apartheid south africa and its Conflict Management and economic role in
africa, Cape Town, 30 July1 august 2004

Mudge d. (2004), land reform in perspective, in J. Hunter (ed.), Who Should Own
the Land? Analysis and Views on Land Reform and the Land Question in Namibia
and Southern Africa. Windhoek: konrad adenauer stiftung/Namibia institute for
democracy, pp. 10003

okoth-ogendo, H.W.o. (2000), The Quest for Constitutional Government, in G.
Hyden, d. olowu and H.W.o. okoth-ogendo, African Perspective on Governance.
Trenton NJ: africa World press, pp. 3360

sherbourne r. (2004), a rich Mans Hobby, in J. Hunter (ed.), Who Should Own the
Land? Analysis and Views on Land Reform and the Land Question in Namibia and
Southern Africa. Windhoek: konrad adenauer stiftung/Namibia institute for
democracy, pp. 810

southern african regional poverty Network (sarpN) (2003), Seeking Ways Out of the
Impasse of Land Reform in Southern Africa: Notes from an informal Think Tank
Meeting, pretoria, south africa, 12 March 2003 http://www.sarpn.org.za/
documents/10000287/p294_final_impasse_land.pdf downloaded 8 september
2003

swapo of Namibia (1989), Swapo Election Manifesto. Windhoek: sWapo
united Nations institute for Namibia (uNiN) (1985), economic development strategies

for independent Namibia, in N.k. duggal (ed.), Namibia Studies Series No. 9,
lusaka: uNiN

Van den Brink, r. (2002), Land Policy and Land Reforms in Sub Saharan Africa:
Consensus, Confusion and Controversies, a presentation to the symposium on land
redistribution in southern africa, Burgers park Hotel, pretoria, south africa,
November 2002

Werner, W. (2004), promoting development among farm Workers: some options for
Namibia, in J. Hunter (ed.), Who Should Own the Land? Analysis and Views on Land
Reform and The Land Question in Namibia and Southern Africa. Windhoek: konrad
adenauer stiftung/Namibia institute for democracy, pp. 1945

Between politics and the shop floor
Which way for Namibias labour movement?

Herbert Jauch

despite the prominent role played by Namibian trade unions in the countrys libera-
tion struggle, and regardless of the fact that the labour movement is still the strong-
est organised force among Namibias civil society organisations, trade unions seem
to have lost much of their popularity and political influence in recent years. due to
Namibias large rural population and the underdeveloped manufacturing sector, trade
unions might seem to represent only a minority of the population. However, as pointed
out by Mbuende (1986:1779), there are close links between the Namibian peasantry
and the industrial working class as a result of the contract labour system, whose legacy
is still visible today. Workers wages contribute significantly to the survival of family
members in the rural areas and Namibias industrial workers bear a substantial burden
caused by the widespread unemployment, about 37% nationwide (Ministry of labour
2005:3). over the past two decades a permanent urban working class has emerged, but
most workers in formal-sector employment share their income by way of remittances to
members of their extended families in urban and rural areas. The labour force surveys
of 1997, 2000 and 2004 revealed that almost half of Namibias national household in-
comes are derived from wages and salaries (Ministry of labour 2001, 2002 and 2006).

despite its small population of less than 2 million people, Namibia has about 30
trade unions grouped into two federations and several unaffiliated unions. The largest
trade union federation is the National union of Namibian Workers (NuNW), which
represents 60,00070,000 workers. The NuNW played a key role during Namibias
liberation struggle and continues to be affiliated to the ruling sWapo party. The
second trade union federation is the Trade union Congress of Namibia (TuCNa),
which was formed in 2002 by unions that rejected NuNWs party-political link (Jauch
2004:3847)

This article sketches some of the challenges faced by the Namibian labour movement
17 years after independence, with particular emphasis on the question of trade unions
and politics. it is argued that Namibias trade unions are at a crossroads today and that
the choices made now will have a lasting impact on the future and the relevance of the
labour movement in the years to come.

. Thisarticledrawsextensivelyontheauthorsearlierpublicationsin00and00.

0

B e t w e e n p o l i t i c s a n d t h e s h op f l o o r

The socioeconomic environment
seventeen years after independence, Namibia is still characterised by huge socioeco-
nomic inequalities that are largely a reflection of its colonial apartheid history, but also
of the class stratification that has taken place since independence. Namibia has relative-
ly limited financial resources in both the government and the private sector to conduct
frequent surveys on social-economic developments. However, the Central Bureau of
statistics (CBs) under the National planning Commission (NpC), the Bank of Na-
mibia and the ministry of labour all conducted several national surveys on which this
paper draws.

Namibias population of about 1.8 million people is relatively young. More than half
the population is less than 25 years of age and more than 40% is less than 15 years old.
in 2004, only 37% of the population lived in urban areas compared to a rural popula-
tion of 63%. These figures are changing steadily due to the increasing urbanisation that
has taken place since independence. in 2000, the average Namibian household had 5
members with an average size of 5.6 members in rural areas and 4.2 members in urban
areas (Ministry of labour 2002:26).

Economically active population
in 2004, 888,348 Namibians were 15 years or older and the labour force survey clas-
sified 493,448 (56%) of them as economically active. The bulk of those classified as
economically inactive were students (41%), followed by home-makers (25.3%), retired
and old people (25.9%) and those affected by illness and disability (6.9%). There was a
gender discrepancy, as males are dominant among economically active Namibians ac-
counting for 63.7%, while most of the economically inactive Namibians (51.7%) were
women (Ministry of labour and social Welfare 2006:3, 38).

although the number of jobs in the agricultural sector has declined steadily over the
years, it is still the largest sector in terms of employment in Namibia, accounting for
102,636 (or 26.6%) jobs in 2004 (see Table 1). it is, however, important to point out
that this figure included about 36,000 communal/subsistence farmers, 490 commer-
cial agricultural employers and 5,765 own account self-employed agricultural workers.
There were 42,620 farm workers on private farms and 2,034 workers on public farms
(ibid:53).

other important employment sectors were the public sector (19.6%) and especially
the service sectors, which accounted for about 35% of all formal sector jobs. on the
other hand, manufacturing has remained severely underdeveloped in Namibia and ac-
counted for only 6% of employment (see Table 1).

overall, there were 86,161 employees in the public sector (including parastatals) and
194,516 in the private sector. The total number of employees thus stood at 280,677 in
2004, while there were 12,209 employers outside the agricultural sector and 37,441 own
account self-employed workers (Ministry of labour and social Welfare 2006:53).

Herbe r t Jau ch

TaBle 1: eMploYMeNT BY seCTor (19882004)

Industry 1988 1997 2004

No. % No. % No. %

agriculture 34,398 18.6 146,899 36.6 102,636 26.6
(commercial (commercial

farms) & communal
farms only)

fishing 1,673 0.9 6,771 1.7 12,720 3.3
Mining & quarrying 10,062 5.4 6,592 1.6 7,563 2.0
Manufacturing 9,442 5.1 25,983 6.5 23,755 6.2
electricity, gas & water supply 1,273 0.7 4,576 1.1 6,151 1.6
Construction 12,657 6.9 19,801 4.9 19,605 5.1
Wholesale & retail trade,
repair of motor vehicles, hotels
and restaurants 29,394 15.9 36,803 9.1 67,027 17.4
Transport, storage
& communication 7,880 4.3 13,480 3.4 15,861 4.1
finance, real estate
and business services 4,325 2.3 28,061 6.8 16,956 4.4
Government service including
administration, defence,
education, health, social work
and social security 38,098 20.6 56,974 14.2 75,863 19.6
other community, social
& personal services (including
domestic work) 35,589 20.6 53,065 13.1 36,713 9.5
other 2,135 0.6 479 0.1

ToTal 184,791 100 401,203 100 385,329 100

sources: department of economic affairs 1988; Ministry of labour 2001 and 2006.

Table 1 shows significant changes in employment patterns between 1988 and 2004.
overall, there was a shift away from the primary sector (such as agriculture and mining)
towards the tertiary sector. The manufacturing industries remained fairly stagnant and
insignificant in terms of employment, despite various government attempts to boost
this sector. This presents the classical picture of a neocolonial economy, characterised
by a jump from the primary sector to tertiary industries without the foundation of a
significant manufacturing sector as a basis for industrial development.

The importance of wages and salaries
about half of all Namibian households (47%) relied on wages and salaries as their
main source of income. in urban areas, this figure was as high as 74%. These figures in-
dicate the critical importance that wages and salaries have for the survival of Namibian
households. This is further emphasised by the fact that 68% of households in the coun-
try (82% in urban areas) lack a secondary source of income (Ministry of labour and
social Welfare 2006:367).

B e t w e e n p o l i t i c s a n d t h e s h op f l o o r

Employment and unemployment
The Namibian governments unemployment definition is based on three criteria, name-
ly:

being without work,
being available for work, and
seeking work.

The strict definition of unemployment excludes from the ranks of the unemployed
those individuals (1565 years old) who are without jobs and available for work, but
who are not actively seeking work. The broad definition of unemployment on the other
hand regards every person who is 1565 years of age and without work but available for
work as being unemployed, whether he/she is looking for work or not. The labour force
survey of 2004 presented unemployment figures for both definitions as follows.

unemployment in Namibia according to the broad definition stood at 36.7%,
whilst the strict definition resulted in an unemployment rate of 21.9%. using the strict
definition of unemployment in the context of the Namibian labour market is problem-
atic. The criterion actively seeking work for classifying the unemployed may not be
accurate, as many unemployed people may have stopped looking for work, not because
they do not want to work, but simply because they may be demoralised and have given
up hope of finding a job. others may not bother to seek work as they witness the fruit-
less efforts of their friends and relatives. Thus, the criterion not seeking work may not
be relevant in labour markets that are characterised by mass unemployment.

TaBle 2: uNeMploYMeNT Broad defiNiTioN (2004)

Overall Percentage Percentage
percentage among women among men

Nationally 36.7 43.4 30.3
urban areas 29.0 33.8 24.4
rural areas 44.7 53.0 36.5
Caprivi region 51.1 58.6 44.0
erongo region 34.3 41.7 28.9
Hardap region 28.0 39.2 17.9
karas region 26.8 36.3 20.2
kavango region 44.4 47.4 41.3
khomas region 24.2 26.7 21.9
kunene region 40.1 56.8 25.9
ohangwena region 64.2 66.7 60.7
omaheke region 18.9 29.3 13.0
omusati region 64.6 64.6 64.7
oshikoto region 35.0 39.4 30.7
oshana region 31.2 34.0 27.5
otjozondujupa region 28.8 45.8 16.4

source: Ministry of labour and social Welfare 2006

Herbe r t Jau ch

Namibias unemployment has regional, gender and age dimensions. in 2004, the rural
unemployment rate (44.7%) was significantly higher than the rate in urban areas (29%).
unemployment also had a gender dimension, as significantly more women (43.4%)
than men (30.3%) were unemployed. Young people were especially hard hit, as 65% of
those between the ages of 15 and 19 and 57% of those aged 20 to 24 years were unem-
ployed. on the other hand, the unemployment rate was significantly lower (1621%)
among those between 45 and 59 years of age (ibid:3, 66 and 68).

unemployment in Namibia is of a long-term nature, as 56% of the unemployed have
been jobless for two years or more. another 17% have been unemployed for 12 years
while only 5.3% of the unemployed population has been without a job for less than
three months. There was no significant difference between men and women regarding
the duration of unemployment. However, there was a difference between urban and
rural areas as the unemployed in the rural areas tended to be out of jobs for longer than
those in the urban areas. long-term unemployment (two years or more) in rural areas
affected 60.5% of the unemployed compared to 49.9% in urban areas (ibid:69).

Unionisation rates
accurate statistics on trade union membership rates are difficult to find as only a few
unions have computerised membership database systems. Most unions rely on their
files and on membership-fee deduction records of employers to count their members. a
trade union survey carried out by the labour resource and research institute (larri)
in 199899 revealed a unionisation rate of about 50% among employees in formal sec-
tor employment (larri 1999:11). These figures were updated and indications are that
the highest levels of unionisation are found in the public sector (7580%), the mining
and energy sectors (67%), the textile industry (63%) and the food, fishing, hospital-
ity, wholesale and retail sectors (49%). on the other hand, unionisation levels are low
among domestic workers, farm workers and in the banking and insurance sectors (see
Table 4). likewise, only about 10% of workers in the small business sector are organised
by trade unions (karuuombe 2002:47).

The labour force survey of 2004 put the unionisation rate among employees in the
public and private sectors at 29%. This figure is significantly lower than those provided
by trade unions and their accuracy would have to be established by examining the trade
union membership records. This is very difficult at present because of the lack of ac-
curate, computerised database systems. it is thus also impossible to determine the exact
number of women in trade unions. it is estimated that 3540% of union members are
women, roughly in line with womens share in the formal labour market. Women are,
however, underrepresented in decision-making structures and hardly any occupy the
key positions of general secretary or president.

Working conditions and minimum wages
The majority of Namibian workers fall into the category of unskilled and semi-skilled
workers. With the exception of a few sectors where strong trade unions managed to
negotiate reasonable working conditions (e.g., mining, fishing and the civil service),

B e t w e e n p o l i t i c s a n d t h e s h op f l o o r

TaBle 3: esTiMaTed uNioNisaTioN raTes, 2004

Sector Approximate number Estimated unionistaion rate
of employees (signed-up members)

agriculture 44,600 9,000 (20%)
Manufacturing, building and construction 27,000 10,500 (39%)
Mining and energy 6,700 4,500 (67%)
food, fishing, wholesale, retail and hospitality 45,000 22,000 (49%)
Textile 8,000 5,000 (63%)
public service, parastatals and municipalities
(excluding army, police and teachers) 80,000 60,000 (75%)
Teachers 15,000 12,000 ( 80%)
domestic work (private households) 21,500 3,500 (16%)
Banking, insurance, real estate
and business services 15,500 4,500 (29%)
Transport, communication and security 14,000 3,500 (25%)

ToTal 277,300 134,500 (49%)

sources: larri 1999; Jauch 2004, Ministry of labour and social services 2006; updates from
trade unions (2004). These figures do not include communal farmers and unpaid family labour.

these workers usually earn below N$ 1,000 per month (us$ 143) and enjoy very few
benefits. The only benefits that are compulsory by law are social security payments for
workers who work more than two days per week.

Workers at labour brokers, known as labour hire companies, experience the poorest
working conditions. Workers there earn between N$ 2 and N$ 5 (us$ 0.280.71) per
hour without benefits and job security. Wages are also extremely low for domestic and
farm workers, who often earn cash wages of only N$ 300500 per month (us$ 4271).
likewise, until recently Namibian textile workers at the Malaysian company ramatex
earned wages of only N$ 600800 per month (us$ 85114) (Jauch and shindondola
2003:1920).

The Namibia farmworkers union (NafWu) managed to reach an agreement with
agricultural employers to implement a national minimum wage of N$ 429 (us$ 54) per
month in addition to food and housing. This national minimum wage came into effect
on 1 april 2003 but was only implemented on most of the countrys commercial farms.
on communal farms, the average monthly wage was only N$ 201250 (us$ 2835)
per month (karamata 2006:3).

on the other hand, well-qualified and experienced professionals and managers earn
huge salary packages that compare favourably with the best in the world when the costs
of living are taken into account. Managers in the civil service earn packages of about N$

. Signed-upmembershipreferstothenumberofworkerswhoappliedforunionmembershipand
receivedtheirmembershipcards.Thenumberofpaid-upmembers(whosemembershipfeesare
receivedbyunionsonamonthlybasis)islikelytobeabout0%lowerthanthesigned-upmem-
bership.

. TheNamibiadollar(N$)ispeggedtotheSouthAfricanrandandtheexchangeratestoodat
aroundUS$toN$inJuly00.

Herbe r t Jau ch

250,000400,000 per year (us$ 35,00057,000), while some managers in parastatal
companies earn up to three times that amount.

These enormous differences in payment have created a four-tier labour market:
1. a small elite enjoying a standard of living comparable to first world countries;
2. a significant group of formal-sector workers with permanent jobs and low to

middle incomes;
3. a growing group of casual workers and labour hire workers who are the victims

of a labour market that virtually forces them to accept any job under any condi-
tions; and

4. unemployed workers who turned to the informal economy, to sex work or to
crime as a last resort.

Trade unions and politics
The NuNW played a prominent role during the liberation struggle and in the public
policy debates after independence. its history is in many ways similar to that of Con-
gress of south african Trade unions (CosaTu), as both played a critical role in terms
of mass mobilisation during the liberation struggle. after decades of intense repression,
the NuNW unions emerged from the mid-1980s onward as key players in the eco-
nomic and political arena. They linked the struggle at the workplace with the broader
struggle for political independence and formed links with other social and political
organisations such as the Namibia National students organisation (NaNso) and the
south West africa peoples organisation (sWapo). The NuNW understood its role as
that of a social movement, which could not address workers issues separately from those
affecting the broader community. exploitation at the workplace was thus linked to the
broader struggle against racial and political oppression.

Most of Namibias trade unions were established inside the country after the mid-
1980s. although several attempts to form unions had been made before, they were
suppressed by the colonial regime time and again. However, the earlier efforts laid
the foundation for the later emergence of the National union of Namibian Workers
(NuNW) and its affiliates (see peltola 1995:16797; Bauer 1997:69). Community or-
ganising surged inside Namibia from 1984 onwards, focusing on the crisis in housing,
employment, health, education and social welfare. in the absence of trade unions, work-
ers began to take their workplace problems to social workers at the roman Catholic
church and the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN). at that time, the umbrella
of the churches provided political activists with a shield under which they could start
organising workers. unlike trade unions, which had been crushed by the colonial state,
churches were able to operate across the country. By 1985, workers and community
activists had formed a Workers action Committee in katutura, which became the fore-
runner of trade unions (Bauer 1997:70).

during the mid-1980s, south africas National union of Mineworkers (NuM) be-
gan to organise workers at Namibias Consolidated diamond Mines and rossing mines
in oranjemund and arandis. They linked up with the Workers action Committee and
formed the rossing Mineworkers union by april 1986. This union later became the

B e t w e e n p o l i t i c s a n d t h e s h op f l o o r

Mineworkers union of Namibia (MuN) (loc. cit.). The MuN and other NuNW-af-
filiated unions provided workers with an organisational vehicle through which they
could take up workplace grievances as well as broader political issues, which were always
seen as linked to the economic struggle.

another factor that contributed to the emergence of trade unions inside Namibia
was the release of Namibian political prisoners from 1984 onwards. some returned to
Windhoek and began working for the sWapo structures again. a decision was taken
to reactivate the NuNW inside Namibia and by april 1986 a Workers steering Com-
mittee had been formed. it incorporated the Workers action Committee and all other
efforts to organise workers around the country. fieldworkers began organising different
workplaces and in september 1986 the NuNWs first industrial union was launched,
the Namibia food and allied Workers union (Nafau) led by John pandeni, one of the
former robben island prisoners (loc.cit.). shortly afterwards, the Mineworkers union
of Namibia (MuN) was launched, led by another former robben island prisoner, Ben
ulenga. in 1987 the Metal and allied Workers union (MaNWu) and the Namibia
public Workers union (NapWu) were launched, followed by the Namibia Transport
and allied Workers union (NaTau) in June 1988, the Namibia National Teachers
union (NaNTu) in March 1989, the Namibia domestic and allied Workers union
(NdaWu) in april 1990 and the Namibia farmworkers union (NafWu) in May
1994 (larri 1999:3). in 2000, the Namibia financial institutions union (NafiNu)
was launched as the first NuNW union catering to white-collar workers, while the
Namibia Music industry union (NaMiu) joined in 2001. These unions constitute the
affiliates of the NuNW today.

The exiled and internal wings of the NuNW were merged during a consolidation
congress held in Windhoek in 1989. at that time, the NuNW unions inside Namibia
had already established themselves and were a formidable force among grassroots or-
ganisations. They enjoyed huge support even beyond their membership and played a
critical role in ensuring sWapos victory in the elections of 1989.

The NuNW maintained its links with sWapo after independence through its
affiliation with the ruling party. This link has led to heated debates both within and
outside the federation. While the majority of NuNW affiliates argued that a continued
affiliation would help the federation to influence policies, critics have pointed out that
the affiliation would undermine the independence of the labour movement and that it
would wipe out prospects for trade union unity in Namibia.

Trade unions outside the NuNW have repeatedly stated that they differed fun-
damentally from NuNW over the question of political affiliation. They charged that
NuNW could not act independently and play the role of a watchdog over government
as long as it was linked to the ruling party. There was also a growing public perception
that NuNW was merely a workers wing of the ruling party, although the NuNW and
its affiliates have on several occasions been vocal critics of government policies. They
criticised government on issues such as the slow process of land redistribution and edu-
cation reform and self-enrichment by politicians. However, developments since 2004
point to an increasing influence of the ruling party over the NuNW and its affiliates,
as will be discussed below.

Herbe r t Jau ch

Challenges after independence
The achievement of independence in 1990 had a tremendous impact on the labour
movement and required a redefinition of the role that trade unions wanted (and were
able) to play. The function of political mobilisation, which had taken centre stage before
independence, was taken over by sWapo, whose leadership returned to Namibia in
1989 and became the government after independence. Given the close structural links
between the NuNW unions and sWapo as well as the fact that most union leaders
played a prominent role in the party as well, there was a widespread expectation among
workers that the sWapo government would be a workers government. a few years
before independence, leading sWapo intellectuals like kaire Mbuende had argued
that the interests of workers and peasants constituted the dominant position in sWapo
(Mbuende 1986:199). However, once in power sWapo did not pursue revolutionary
working class politics and instead maintained the predominantly capitalist structure of
the economy, while introducing the notion of social partnership into labour relations.
Trade unions were expected to define a new role within this framework and although
the NuNW had previously called for radical change, it accepted the new framework
with little resistance.

Social partnership?
once in office, the sWapo government embarked upon a path of reforming Namibias
colonial labour relations system. The overall aim was to move towards a new system of
social partnership governed by the labour act passed in 1992. Tripartite consultations
and collective bargaining were seen as critical for the implementation of this new labour
dispensation. The government envisaged an improvement in the living and working
conditions of Namibian workers to be brought about by a combination of successful
economic policies and successful trade union engagement with the private sector. The
government defined its own role merely as that of a referee, trying to create a level (and
enabling) playing field for collective bargaining between business and labour.

However, the consultative process leading to the formulation of the labour act
was driven by government as the dominant partner, which decided on the scope of
the consultations. unlike in a corporatist, institutionalised arrangement such as in
the classical cases of postwar, social democratic sweden and Germany where capital,
labour and state jointly formulate socioeconomic policies (sycholt and klerck 1997:88),
social partnership in Namibia did not take the form of a joint decision-making process.
in the process of drafting the labour act of 1992, for example, government consulted
with labour and capital but reserved the right to make the final decision without trying
to achieve consensus with the social partners.

The labour act of 1992 constituted a significant improvement compared with the
previous colonial labour legislation. it extended its coverage to all workers, including
domestic workers, farm workers and the public services. The new law encouraged col-
lective bargaining, entrenched basic workers and trade union rights, set out the proce-
dures for legal strikes and provided protections against unfair labour practices (Bauer
1993:11). However, the act fell short of some of the expectations of trade unions, which
felt that employers had unduly influenced the law through behind the scenes lobbying.

B e t w e e n p o l i t i c s a n d t h e s h op f l o o r

The act did not make provision for minimum wages (as sWapo had promised in its
1989 election manifesto) and it did not guarantee paid maternity leave. payment during
maternity leave was only introduced with the social security act of 1996. other key
demands of the NuNW that were not accommodated in the labour act were the 40-
hour working week and 21 days of annual leave for all workers (Jauch 1996:91).

overall, post-independence labour legislation constituted a significant improvement
for labour, but it also served to reduce worker militancy by shifting the emphasis away
from workplace struggles to negotiations between union leaders and management. Bar-
gaining issues in Namibia were (and still are) narrowly defined and usually deal with
conditions of employment only (klerck and Murray 1997:247). The trade unions main
function was thus narrowed to being the representative of workers in a tripartite ar-
rangement. While this enabled trade unions to win improved working conditions in
well-organised sectors like mining, fishing and the public service, collective bargaining
remained almost meaningless for vulnerable workers such as farm workers, domestic
workers and security guards. despite the introduction of national minimum wages in
2003 and 2005 for farm workers and security guards, these workers are still exposed to
highly exploitative practices. The ongoing adversarial nature of labour relations, coupled
with racial polarisation in many workplaces and huge wage gaps, are further obstacles
to the notion of social partnership.

Trade unions are also confronted with a threat of a dwindling membership base due
to the increasing casualisation of work. in an attempt to cut labour costs and to curb
trade union influence, employers in various economic sectors, including retail, fishing,
mining, hospitality and manufacturing, resorted to temporary and casual work con-
tracts for low-skilled workers. The emergence of labour hire companies (labour brokers)
in the late 1990s in particular, highlighted the threat of casualisation to workers in-
comes, job security and benefits. By 2006, over 12,000 workers were already employed
through labour hire companies, which retained a significant part of workers earnings
as their fees and deprived them of the benefits enjoyed by permanent workers. due to
the insecurity of their contracts and their shifts between different workplaces, trade
unions found it very difficult to recruit and represent labour hire workers (see Jauch and
Mwilima 2006). Thus trade union membership has become increasingly narrow in fo-
cus, covering permanent workers in traditional sectors such as the public service, min-
ing, fishing, construction and retail, while unions are unable to reach tens of thousands
of workers in precarious working conditions on farms, in private households, at labour
hire companies and in the informal economy.

against the background of huge imbalances in terms of economic power between
capital and labour, the states chosen role as neutral referee and creator of an enabling
environment for collective bargaining effectively benefited business interests. Business
representatives went as far as describing worker militancy as an obstacle to job creation
and economic development. such sentiments were even echoed by some government of-
ficials and politicians, which was just one indication that the close political ties between
labour and sWapo did not prevent the entrenchment of a pro-capitalist state after
independence. This process was also assisted by the lack of political clarity on the side of
trade unions regarding the development of a different social order after independence.
Notions of worker democracy, worker control and social transformation that had just

0

Herbe r t Jau ch

emerged in the late 1980s had not been developed into a coherent concept within the
labour movement at the time of independence.

Conservative economic policies
perhaps the biggest challenge facing labour after independence was to define an effec-
tive strategy for influencing broader socioeconomic policies in favour of its working
class base. This task proved to be extremely difficult in the face of an onslaught by the
neoliberal ideology that was usually portrayed as the only practical policy option for
Namibia and other countries in the region. klerck accurately described the Namibian
governments response to globalisation as:

& an open-ended encouragement of foreign investment; the marital stance towards the
international Monetary fund and World Bank; the confinement of social transformation
to an extension of representative institutions; a tendency to reduce black empowerment to
increasing the black entrepreneurial classes; and a failure to conceive of an economic policy
that departs in substance from that of the colonial powers (1997:364).

iMf and World Bank advisors have become regular visitors to Namibia and assisted
with the countrys public expenditure review and with training high-ranking staff
members of government economic institutions. local economists by and large seem
to be trapped in the neoliberal dogma and continue to promote the very policies (e.g.,
structural adjustment programmes) that have caused severe social hardships in oth-
er sadC countries. The Namibian governments increasing slide towards neoliberal
policies manifested itself, for example, in the introduction of export processing Zones
(epZs) and privatisation programmes. opposition to such policies by the labour move-
ment was frequently countered by accusations that trade unions were still living in the
(ideological) past and that trade unions were obstacles to economic growth and job
creation. in the absence of a comprehensive alternative development strategy by labour,
trade unions were forced on the defensive on several occasions and found themselves
sidelined in economic policy formulation.

a divided labour movement
The year 2006 in particular revealed deep-seated divisions within the Namibian labour
movement. failure to live up to the proclaimed ideal of one country, one federation
and one industry, one union resulted in a multitude of trade unions. in some indus-
tries, three or more trade unions compete with each other for membership, for example
in the fishing and security industries. even at federation level, the NuNW now faces
a significant rival. The Namibia peoples social Movement (NpsM) and the Namibia
federation of Trade unions (NafTu) merged in 2002 to form the Trade union Con-
gress of Namibia (TuCNa), which has 14 affiliates with a combined membership of
about 45,000. The TuCNa unions focus predominantly on workplace issues and are
less engaged with policy issues than the NuNW, which represents about 70,000 work-
ers. The main dividing line between the two federations is the question of the NuNWs
affiliation to sWapo, which the TuCNa unions reject.

B e t w e e n p o l i t i c s a n d t h e s h op f l o o r

Party-political conflicts
The influence of sWapo politics on the NuNW has repeatedly come into the lime-
light during the past two years. following the crystallisation of camps within the rul-
ing sWapo party during its extraordinary congress in 2004 (which decided on the
partys presidential candidate), the NuNW and its affiliates were drawn into the battle.
although there were no significant ideological differences between those in sWapo
who supported Hidipo Hamutenya and those who supported sam Nujoma, rival camps
began to emerge within the union federation. in the run-up to the NuNWs congress
in 2006, the former acting secretary-general of the NuNW, peter Naholo, who was
regarded as part of the Hamutenya group, was removed from his post in december
2005. This set the stage for the months to come as trade union leaders mobilised inten-
sively with a view to ensuring that candidates loyal to their own camp would be elected
at congress in april 2006 (New era, 4 april, 10 april, 11 april, 20 april, 26 april &
28 april 2006; republikein, 31 March 2006). during the congress, this battle for po-
litical control overshadowed proceedings despite the many labour, social and economic
issues that workers had raised during their regional conferences in preparation for the
congress. as the Nujoma group among the NuNW congress delegates gained the up-
per hand during the congress deliberations, an unprecedented step was taken to cancel
individual elections for each leadership position. instead, congress endorsed the list of
candidates that the Nujoma group had proposed.

in the aftermath of the NuNW congress, the political divisions lingered. some lead-
ers of the Namibia National Teachers union (NaNTu) openly criticised the NuNW
congress as undemocratic and in violation of constitutional provisions. The union even
suspended the payment of NuNW membership fees in protest. other NaNTu lead-
ers, however, disagreed with their colleagues and engaged in a battle for control of the
teachers union (New era, 18, 24 and 26 May 2006). during the NaNTu congress in
september 2006, those who were seen as being part of the Hamutenya group received
only about one-third of the congress votes and lost their leadership positions. once
again, the Nujoma group had gained the upper hand.

Ideological contradictions
Besides being drawn into intense party-political battles, Namibias trade unions also
experienced a loss of vision. The statements and practices of several trade unions during
the past few years revealed deep-seated ideological contradictions. sentiments of radical
nationalism and liberation, for example on the land issue, were mixed with an accept-
ance of neoliberalism as the ideology of the free market. as trade union leaders entered
(and continue to enter) company boards as part of a poorly defined union investment
strategy, their views (and interests) increasingly converged with those of government
and business. also, some trade union leaders are now occupying management posi-
tions in the public and private sectors, which contradicts the principle of worker control
within unions. These developments point to a lack of clarity regarding the working class
base of the labour movement and whose interests it is meant to serve. Nationalist and
populist sentiments are still dominant and only a few union leaders advance positions
based on a class analysis.

Herbe r t Jau ch

Worker control?
There is also an increasing lack of accountability within unions, which need to reintro-
duce the practice of mandates and report-backs to their members before taking major
decisions. This applies to wage negotiations and policy interventions alike. unions need
to reverse the increasing trend towards becoming leaders organisations and instead
return to the practice of grassroots democracy and worker control. an encouraging
development in this regard was the strike at the Malaysian textile company ramatex in
october 2006. under pressure not only from a ruthless company management that con-
stantly threatened relocation but also from the Namibian government, which granted
ramatex special privileges and protection, the recognised trade union (Nafau) failed
to improve workers extremely poor conditions of service for four years. following the
resignation of many disillusioned ramatex workers from the union, Nafau managed
to reinvigorate itself after its congress in september 2006. The union finally resorted to
utilising its members dedication as a source of power. frustrated by ramatexs unwill-
ingness to accommodate even the most modest demands, the union finally held a strike
ballot among its members in early october 2006. over 90% of the Namibian ramatex
workers voted in favour of a strike and on 13 october the factory came to a standstill. in
an impressive show of determination, over 3,000 young, predominantly female workers
chanted and danced with their placards, indicating that they would not return to work
unless their demands were met.

faced with the prospect of huge losses and the pressure of delivering on time to its
clients in the us, the company management responded within hours and indicated its
willingness to improve its previous offers. on the second day of the strike, an agreement
was reached which paved the way for significantly improved wages and benefits and
thus constituted a victory for the ramatex workers. Throughout the strike, the union
leadership consulted the striking workers outside the factory building. Workers were
briefed and asked to approve the proposed agreement before it was signed. This was a
significant departure from the widespread practice of union leaders negotiating agree-
ments behind closed doors and informing their members through the media.

Conclusion
Namibias labour movement stands at the crossroads today as it tries to redefine its role
17 years after independence. Workers and their trade unions had to realise that the
changes after independence did not lead to the expected socioeconomic transformation.
There are signs that the labour movement lost its vision and now struggles to develop
a strategy about how to play a meaningful role in the process of social change. deep
political divisions, not only between NuNW and its rival federation TuCNa, but
also within the NuNW itself, worsen this dilemma. These divisions may serve indi-
vidual political interests but undermine the potential power of the Namibian labour
movement as a whole. a multitude of trade unions that are unable to work with each
other cannot provide Namibian workers with the strong organisational base needed to
advance a working class agenda.

although it can be argued that trade unions participation in tripartite arrangements
does not necessarily conflict with the larger goal of bringing about social transforma-

B e t w e e n p o l i t i c s a n d t h e s h op f l o o r

tion, collective bargaining and tripartite consultations alone are certainly insufficient
to address Namibias huge socioeconomic inequalities. in order to become an engine
of social change, trade unions will have to deepen their roots in Namibias working
class constituency and articulate its interests beyond the workplace. This implies that
the labour movement will need to develop effective strategies for influencing policies,
particularly in the economic arena, which is shaped by neoliberal dogma.

despite its current weaknesses, the Namibian labour movement still has the poten-
tial to become (again) a key organisation in the quest for socioeconomic justice. like
trade unions elsewhere in africa (see kester and sidibe 1997), Namibian unions have
a long experience of struggle, a massive potential for organisation and action and an
expectation to benefit from independence and democracy. Trade unions have structures
(although sometimes weak) all over the country and a significant membership base that
is only matched by the countrys churches. provided that unions can strengthen their
internal capacity and achieve the level of rootedness in their working class constituency
that they had in the late 1980s, the labour movement can become the driving force for
more fundamental socioeconomic social change. This will also require that trade un-
ions intensify and cement their links with other progressive organisations that represent
socially disadvantaged groups.

Namibias trade unions face two possible scenarios today. provided they can meet
the challenges outlined above and redefine their role as struggle organisations with
a specific class base and a strategic agenda, they are likely to play a central role in the
fight for the interests of the Namibias disadvantaged majority. failure to seize this op-
portunity will result in Namibian unions gradually losing their mass base while union
leaders are absorbed with bargaining issues, party-political careers, union investments
and tripartite participation without addressing (and challenging) the fundamental so-
cioeconomic structures that uphold the continued skewed distribution of wealth and
income.

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Volker Winterfeldt

The ultimate foundation of this entire economic order & is in effect the
structural violence of unemployment &
(pierre Bourdieu, The essence of neoliberalism)1

The backdrop
at the Namibian governments invitation, the Malaysian multinational ramatex Ber-
had group opened a subsidiary in Namibia in mid-2002 amid general applause. ra-
matex is an integrated textile manufacturer offering a range of textile products from
yarn to knitted garments. The Namibian branch went into production in the capital
Windhoek as an export processing Zone (epZ) enterprise. ramatex Textiles Namibia
profits from both its epZ status and the advantages derived from the us african
Growth and opportunity act of May 2000. aGoa i allows tariff preferences for
imports from southern africa countries into the us2. on Namibias side, such a good
haul of foreign direct investment (fdi) is not only seen as a success story in itself, it
also serves as a persuasive showpiece, pointing out to other potential global investors
the way to a profitable Namibian future.

as a Namibian epZ company, ramatex capitalises on ample tax and tariff exemp-
tions and is granted preferential treatment in capital and currency matters by way of
legislation. epZ act No. 9 of 1995 exempts companies from any sales or value added
tax payable in Namibia and from all customs or excise duties for goods imported into
the epZ or manufactured in the epZ. Corporate income is not taxed and capital in-
vested protected from expropriation. Companies are not subject to foreign exchange
controls, including the repatriation of capital and profits, and are authorised to hold
foreign currency accounts with local banks. in the interests of developing a skilled
national labour force, the act entitles epZ companies to apply for the reimbursement
of 75% of the costs incurred in training Namibian citizens employed by such com-

1. in Le Monde diplomatique, december 1998:issue: http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu
2. incorporated in the us Trade act of 2002, the act was amended and signed in august 2002.

aGoa ii expands preferential access for imports from beneficiary sub-saharan african coun-
tries to knit-to-shape or wholly assembled apparel articles. in particular, it grants lesser
developed beneficiary country status to Namibia. Thus Namibian epZ-companies are allowed
to use third country fabric in qualifying apparel & regardless of origin of fabric and regardless
of origin of yarn. <http:www.agoa.gov/agoa_legislation/aGoii_summary.pdf>

Vo lk e r Win t e r f e l d t

pany3. in addition to the competitive advantages derived from such stipulations, the
Namibian government offered ramatex most favourable investment conditions with
regard to industrial site, labour supply, energy, water, and political and administrative
handling. Thus, it convinced the Malaysian investor to relinquish a similar but less prof-
itable invitation by the eastern Cape regional government in south africa.

in attracting foreign investment such as ramatexs, Namibia pins its hopes on em-
ployment generation, dissemination of professional skills and technological advance-
ment. The chronic shortage of productive Namibian capital has shaped the countrys
planning for socioeconomic development and higher standards of living since independ-
ence. Thus, since 1990 developmental policies have attached great importance to the
attraction of foreign capital, from which a pivotal contribution to industrialisation and
accelerated growth is expected. article 99 of the Namibian constitution laid the foun-
dations. The foreign investments act No. 27 of 1990 provided for liberal investment
conditions and allowed for the institution of the Namibia investment Centre (NiC)
in the Ministry of Trade and industry (MTi). since then, as the epZ act exemplifies,
promoting an environment conducive to fdi has become a major political concern.
The Namibian government extends a plain invitation to global investors. its economic
policy rationale aims at combining the internal mobilisation of Namibias natural and
social resources with foreign capital resources. The economic impact of export-led in-
dustrialisation, it is hoped, will spur development and eradicate poverty.

economic liberalism vs. social equity: The developmental dilemma
as this quick glance has already shown, ramatexs certification in 2001 as a Namibian
epZ company did not come out of the blue. again, in 2004 the nations most promi-
nent policy document of the new millennium, Namibia Vision 2030, stays true to the
spirit of the outgoing millennium. Though markedly attenuated by a stronger orienta-
tion towards the national workforce as a developmental resource basis4, it reproduces
the familiar neoliberal fundamentals with regard to fdi. The remarkable partnership
between Namibias political elite and the Malaysian investor exemplifies, in several of
its aspects, an essential intellectual trait of Vision 2030: the combination of the vision
of socioeconomic justice on a national scale with the merciless dictates of profitability
emanating from global economic liberalism. Conceptually, such conflicting paradigms
rather represent the reconciliation of the irreconcilable.

The case study of ramatex also substantiates the hypothesis that the post-inde-
pendence economic policies of the south West africa peoples organisation (sWapo)
party government unequivocally dissociate themselves from the vision of a liberated
economy, which the former liberation movement had formulated at the time of the
struggle for national and social emancipation. Whatever the official wording of vision-

3. Cf. sections iii.5.1.a. and b.; iii.7.2.; Vi.16.1.; Viii.25.1. of epZ act No. 9 of 1995. republic of
Namibia, Government Gazette No. 1069.

4. Vision 2030 speaks of people-centred economic development, while the creation of a diversi-
fied open market economy, to be based on the competitiveness in the export sector, represents
the vision for the promotion of Namibias globalised macroeconomic environment. republic of
Namibia, Government of, office of the president (2004):9, 33.

Lib e r a t e d e c on om y ?

ary or policy documents, in actual practice social progress is increasingly devised as a
function of capitalist market forces only. The crude reality of the dictates of the neolib-
eral globalised market economy has long replaced the vision of a liberated independent
economy. Henning Melbers (2003) diagnosis of self-inflicted limits to liberation found
in Namibias political governance and political culture must, sadly, be extended to the
economic realm as well.

To shed light on Namibias developmental policies, it is appropriate to inquire into the
implementation of ramatexs investment and production scheme, looking critically
at both sides of this partnership. for years, in public statements by stakeholders this
scheme has been promoted as being sustainable in terms of its contribution to social and
economic development, as well as from an environmental perspective and in respect of
international relations. only recently, against the backdrop of exacerbated industrial
relations at ramatex, have a few critical comments been voiced.

There is sufficient circumstantial evidence to believe that Namibias practical en-
gagement with the Malaysian company should not be painted in just rosy colours. on
the contrary, on closer examination, the developmental impulse seems to prove rather
small. Moreover, it has to be offset against the saddening helplessness of politics so far,
which failed in transforming into social benefits what little impulse there may have
been. The evidence of the past five years appears to push the year 2030 to an even more
distant future.

The analysis of the ramatex example will inquire into the social limitations of the
neoliberal economic initiative. employment creation will have to be assessed in terms of
the generation of actual purchasing power on an individual level. on a macroeconomic
level, ramatexs investments will have to be weighed against the investment costs in-
curred by the state and the municipality of Windhoek in accommodating entrepreneur-
ial demands. The social costs of allowing a conflictual employment situation will have
to be looked into in terms of exploitation of labour, industrial relations, corporativism
and social freedom.

liberal economics assumes that globalisation is the most efficient tool to counter
marginalisation. its critics argue that globalisation takes place in an economic world
characterised by power differentials. ironically, a look back at the historical example of
the very first classical advocates for global liberalisation, the Manchester textile lobby,
demonstrates the Janus-faced reality of liberalism right from its beginnings: While in-
dia and the world were to open their markets to industrial textiles from england, the
representatives of Manchester capital lobbied for (and obtained) legislative tariff barriers
against the import of indias famous silk fabrics.

in a more general mode, therefore, the analysis of Namibias experience with rama-
tex will have to test the consistency of the above landmark assumption of the neoliberal
discourse: To whose advantage is such a process of globalisation, based as it is on the
superiority of extremely mobile international capital? Can the idea of an equal partner-
ship between the potent investor and the marginalised economy materialise? Can glo-
balisation show the way forward to social equity? or is globalisation, as it often was in
the past, the best tool to further marginalise the underdeveloped economy? one might
even ask how liberal in the classical understanding of the concept, calling for the
complete abstention of state involvement in the economy is an economic policy that

Vo lk e r Win t e r f e l d t

involves the state as an active political, administrative and infrastructural guarantor for
foreign investments?

a preliminary conclusion: The new (or not so new) economic rationale of liberalism
is characterised by neglect of genuine social responsibility. Contrary to its claim, liber-
alism does not halt marginalisation Nor can it prevent further exacerbation of internal
social structural inequalities and contradictions of a dependent economy and society
in the globalisation process in the long run. on the contrary, economic and social
marginalisation comes along with globalisation, as long as the conditional framework
of globalisation follows the well-established pattern dictated by the capitalist accumula-
tion process over the past five centuries.

ramatex in Namibia analysis of an unequal partnership
The players (1): The Namibian authorities

The first news of a major Malaysian textile manufacturer being certified by the govern-
ment as an epZ company was divulged by the NiC in July 2001 (Namibia Economist,
29/6/5/7/2001). This followed a heated public debate between the MTi and repre-
sentatives of the labour movement only months after a critical stocktaking of the first
quinquennium of the epZ policy. already in late 1999, the Namibian economic policy
research unit (Nepru) had critically reviewed the epZ concept. disturbed by the
poor achievements of Namibias foreign investment policies throughout the 1990s, the
analysts emphasised that epZ policies had to meet certain conditions to be successful.
They voiced concern at the early withdrawal of several epZ companies, questioning
their economic agenda (New Era, 18/4/1999). Nepru, in the 1990s an important ad-
visory voice to the Namibian government, pointed to the discrepancy between the gen-
erous incentives Namibia grants foreign investors and their relatively meagre response.
Nepru criticised the legislative and political framework. it suggested the removal of
administrative barriers and the streamlining of procedures for handling epZ companies
(the one-stop-shop; Nepru (october and december 1999). Neprus review, on the
other hand, also considered labour issues to be the crucial drawback to Namibias invest-
ment climate. in particular, it took aim at the limited supply of an educated workforce,
at rigid labour market regulations and the unstable labour relations in the countrys
highly unionised formal sector.

in March 2000, the labour resource and research institute (larri), an institution
often addressed as the think tank of the Namibian labour movement, published a study
critical of epZ. The report set off the initial expectations of the MTi against the actual
state of affairs in the epZ regime. of the envisaged 25,000 new jobs (larri 2000:38),
a mere 405 had materialised (Namibia Economist, 18/24/2/2000). MTi challenged this
figure, indicating employment at about 1,000 epZ workers (The Namibian, 26/4/2000).
still, the MTis offshore development Company (odC) had to confirm that only 405
of a projected total of 1,145 workplaces had been created so far5. The odC also calcu-

5. republic of Namibia (1999):3. The odC had been established in May 1995 by the government
of Namibia in execution of the epZ act as a marketing and management umbrella company for
the epZ regime. see part iX.26. of the act.

Lib e r a t e d e c on om y ?

lated the nominal total capital of the 80 companies that had been granted certificates
since the inception of the epZ programme: it amounted to approximately N$ 8.5 bn.
since only 18 of these companies had actually started operations, epZ capital totalled
N$ 280 m6. larris examination of the firms in operation confirmed a lower amount
of only N$ 130 m7.

Whichever evidence is taken as a basis, whether a total of us$ 21 or 45 m (calcu-
lated on the basis of the figures given above at the current exchange rate of N$ 6.25 per
us$), the inference remains the same: the invitation Namibia had extended globally
for fdi had not yet paid off. in 1990, the country had taken a general policy decision
to embark on an export driven industrialization (republic of Namibia (1995b):5). The
policy had been implemented based on an uncompromising liberalisation of trade and
investment regulations. The epZ regime had added to it, extending the tax holiday
granted to foreign investors indefinitely, and had made an effort to create the necessary
institutional and management structures. Yet, as Namibias founding president Nujoma
admitted at the launch of the odC in 1995, success in attracting new investments &
had been less than satisfactory (The Namibian, 30/5/1995).

it is against this background of a still unsatisfactory outcome of fdi policies and
in view of a critical phase in the development of the Gdp, which had considerably
decreased since the mid-1990s that the MTi decided to take the bull by the horns
when approaching ramatex. The company proposed an investment of N$ 1.2 bn8 for
a Namibian epZ-certified branch, ten times the amount of all previous epZ invest-
ments. The Namibian side offered a conspicuous package of incentives. in addition to
the profitability-oriented epZ advantages, in particular exemption from corporate, sales
and other taxation, duties and levies9, the MTi presented an extremely competitive cost-
cutting arrangement for infrastructural support.

ramatex was granted a 99-year lease on an industrial plot of 43 hectares in Wind-
hoeks otjomuise district (The Namibian, 28/9/2001). While the leasehold was valued
at N$ 16.9 m (New Era, 28/4/2005), the city of Windhoek placed the land at ramatexs
disposal for a nominal fee (AZ, 30/5/2003), as both city Mayor Matheus shikongo
and the citys former Ceo Martin shipanga confirmed. it emerged from the ranks of
the city council that the nominal fee amounted to a monthly N$ 110. subsequently, at

6. as of 30 december 1999, of 80 companies 41 still were in process to start operations, 21 had
withdrawn. all in all 113 companies had applied for an epZ certificate. republic of Namibia
(1999):13.

7. larri (2000):45. in January 2006, Minister of Trade and industry immanuel Ngatjizeko re-
ported that 177 enterprises had been granted epZ status so far, of which only 25 were fully
operational. Their investment totalled N$ 5.2 billion in July 2005, generating 6,976 new direct
jobs. New Era, 26/1/2006.

8. The Namibian, 16/5/2002. in a later statement, ramatexs executive director albert lim men-
tioned a sum of N$ 1.1 billion (The Namibian, 29/8/2002).

9. The picture concerning corporate taxation is ambiguous. in compliance with its epZ status, ra-
matex would be indefinitely exempted from taxes on profits realised in Namibia. The epZ act of
1995 had removed the limitations stipulated by the foreign investments act of 1990. The united
Nations Notes on Namibia report a 99-year tax exemption. iriN News Briefs 8 february 2005.
However, the Namibian media repeatedly referred to a 20-year tax holiday. Namibia Economist,
29/6/5/7/2001; AZ,5/9/2002.

10. N$ 1,188 for the duration of the lease, or us$ 150.

0

Vo lk e r Win t e r f e l d t

ramatexs insistent request, the leasehold had to be extended to a total of 160 hectares
(Republikein, 30/5/2003). The industrial site, situated in one of Windhoeks pristine
hilly and rocky areas, had first to be graded at the citys expense (Namibia Economist,
29/65/7/2001). The city also built an access road at a cost of N$ 1.5 m (New Era,
28/4/2005). ramatex was given free electricity, water and sewage infrastructure11 up
to the factory site, as well as preferential rates for water and electricity12. in return, the
company was under contract with the city to build a waste-water reclamation plant on
its premises, thus taking responsibility for the purification of the highly polluted water
used in the industrial dyeing process (AZ, 1/3/2005). Namport, the parastatal com-
pany managing Namibias only deep-sea harbour Walvis Bay, guaranteed free wharf-
age13. indirectly, Namibias incentives package also included the cost of building a new
container terminal. The decision had to be taken to enable TransNamib, the parastatal
transport company, to handle the transportation of 30 containers daily between Wind-
hoek and Walvis Bay14.

in total, the infrastructural support provided directly to ramatex out of the capital
Windhoeks coffers amounts to N$ 106.12 m15. To this, N$ 17 m for TransNamibs
new Windhoek terminal can be added, though the terminal obviously does not cater
exclusively to ramatex16. The city had entered into an agreement with the Namibian

11. Namibia Economist, 29/6/5/7/2001. The Namibian (28/9/2001) reports that in an agreement
signed between the city of Windhoek and ramatex at the end of september 2001 the City
authority and Government will each spend N$ 30 million for electricity, water and sewerage
infrastructure at the complex. New Era estimates free infrastructure at N$ 27 million (New
Era, 28/4/2005).

12. AZ, 5/9/2002. New Era, the government-owned weekly, reports Minister Hamutenya stat-
ing that he had a meeting with the two chief executive officers of NamWater and Nampower
[both parastatals servicing water and electricity nationwide] as well as the mayor of Windhoek
to give just a small discount on water, electricity and on land to be bought by the company.
13/15/7/2001. The small discount on water tariffs, as it transpired in 2004, was a rebate of
approximately 50% of the full municipal rate. The price of N$ 3.52 charged by the municipality
was below cost recovery (The Namibian, 2/7/2004). The rebate on electricity was such that the
N$ 0.185 per kilowatt/hour the municipality charged ramatex forced the capitals electricity
department to overspend its budget in 2004 by N$ 4.3 m in subsidising ramatexs consumption
of electrical energy (The Namibian, 25/2/2005. AZ, 1/3/2005).

13. Namibia Economist, 29/6/5/7/2001. However, Namport benefits from port charges. on the
other hand, Namibias economy is not commissioned to handle ocean freight for ramatex, which
is taken over by the us-american Gulf africa line. Gal ships about 700 containers of textile
and apparel every month to the states (Namibia Economist, 20/26/7/2001).

14. initially, TransNamibs capacity was limited to about half of this number. in september 2002,
ramatex complained about capacity-related bottlenecks created by TransNamib and Namport.
TransNamib, insolvent as it was at that time, decided to invest N$ 17 m in a new and modern
container terminal in Windhoek. The sum had to be made available to the parastatal by govern-
ment (AZ, 5/9/2002; 6/9/2002. The Namibian, 5/9/2002).

15. statement of Hafeni Nghinamwaani, the then strategic executive of the department for economic
development of the city of Windhoek. The money comes from the citys capital development
fund (Namibia Economist, 5/11/2002; AZ, 1/4/2002). in april 2005, The Namibian divulged
some details of the package: the first 43 hectares of the industrial plot were valued at N$ 16.9 m,
the access road at N$ 1.5 m, subsidised electricity and free infrastructure were estimated at N$
27 m, subsidised free water supply and infrastructure at N$ 39 m, the sewage system at N$ 17.3
m (The Namibian, 1/4/2005).

16. larri, in an excellent study of the working and social conditions at the ramatex factory that
caused quite a political stir, concludes: Based on the assumption that ramatex and its subsidi-

Lib e r a t e d e c on om y ?

authorities obliging the government to reimburse the capital city half the costs incurred
in serving ramatex. The state proved quite slow in honouring the contract17.

last but not least, the issue of the reimbursement of costs incurred in the vocational
training of Namibian employees of ramatex has to be addressed. The wording of the
epZ act entitles ramatex to a refund of up to 75%. it would be quite surprising if ra-
matex had not seized this financial opportunity, given that the firm is forced to employ
most of its Namibian workforce first on a trainee basis due to the lack of a sound voca-
tional background. Moreover, the act makes the development of labour skills a condi-
tion for granting epZ status18. However, official statements on the matter have been
strictly avoided. on the contrary, whenever they rated the significance of ramatexs
economic venture for Namibias economic progress, stakeholders regularly emphasised
the multiplier effect of the skills transfer made possible by the employment generated
by the company. also, in september 2004, the permanent secretary in MTi, andrew
Ndishishi, revealed vague government plans to facilitate the future training of ramatex
workers at public expense, in order to obviate the need for the Malaysian company to
continuously resort to the employment of foreign workers (The Namibian, 15/9/2004).

What the permanent secretary withheld, however, was the fact that the Namibian
authorities had already started financing the training of ramatex workers as from the
200203 financial year. since then, the Namibian state budget had provided an annual
N$ 500,00019. To date, the state revenue fund has subsidised ramatex for the voca-
tional training of its employees to the tune of N$ 2.05 m. This subsidy is all the more
surprising given that the firm is under an obligation to self-finance the training of its
workers in full. Ramatex had signed a contractual statement on the matter in 2001 in
return for the incentives package granted by the city of Windhoek (AZ, 1/3/2005).

The players (2): The multinational conglomerate

ramatex Berhad, ramatex Namibias parent company, is Malaysias largest and only
fully vertically integrated textile manufacturing enterprise. it produces mainly for the
export markets of the developed capitalist world. The group, registered on the kua-
la lumpur stock exchange since 1996, employs 45,000 workers (Namibia Economist,
29/6/5/7/2001). founded in 1982, the company expanded into China in 1997. it is

aries will employ about 7,000 Namibian workers at the end of 2003 with an average wage of
N$ 500 per month, and given the expenses of about N$ 120 million in public funds to set up
infrastructure for the company, the following calculation can be made: The financial support that
ramatex received from the Namibian government is equivalent to the salaries of all worker for 34
months almost 3 years! larri (2003):39.

17. until april 2005, the city had received only N$ 19.8 m from the state (The Namibian,
1/4/2005).

18. republic of Namibia (1999), parts Viii.25.(1)(3) and ii, 3(e).
19. under budget vote 27/04/045 (respectively, for 200506, N$ 550,000 under budget vote

10/10/45). Government of Namibia (2003), p. 379 and Government of Namibia (2004), p. 384:
Budget vote 27, Higher education, Training and employment Creation, Main division 04: Vo-
cational and Technical Training, item 045: ramatex. Government of Namibia (2005), p. 151:
Budget vote 10, education, Main division 10: Vocational education and Training (VeT), item
45: ramatex. see also: sherbourne (2005):6.

Vo lk e r Win t e r f e l d t

controlled by the Ma family, which owns 59% of the shares. Branches operate in singa-
pore, Cambodia, China, Mauritius and Namibia20.

ramatex Textiles Namibia (pty) ltd. is certified as a single-factory export process-
ing Zone. it counts four subsidiaries, all located in Windhoeks otjomuise district: fla-
mingo Garments, rhino Garments, Tai Wah and lichen apparel. The otjomuise fac-
tory operates a spinning mill (ring spun), two dye houses and 2 knitting mills (Cotton
News 2003:3). its production is directed towards the eu, the Middle east and mainly
the east coast of the us, favoured by the aGoa stipulations. The plant was built with
imported prefabricated materials21. The means of production, as well, were imported,
partly by falling back on machinery from the south african subsidiaries. To date, all
the raw materials and semi-processed goods are imported into Namibia, as the country
does not produce sufficient cotton of its own to satisfy ramatexs demands. ramatexs
monthly production totals N$ 50 m22.

prior to their closure in october 2003, ramatex operated three factories in dim-
baza, king Williams Town, not far from east london in the eastern Cape province,
south africa. With the prospect of considerably reducing its capital costs in Namibia,
the parent company decided to terminate the operations of Tai Wah Textiles south
africa and May Garments Company south africa (larri 2003:8). Trade union calcu-
lations show the following comparison of average salaries paid by ramatex: N$ 625 in
Namibia, N$ 809 in Mauritius, N$ 1,184 in south africa and N$ 1,398 in Malaysia.

originally, ramatex south africa had entered into negotiations for expansion with
the eastern Cape regional authorities, presenting its plans for the employment of an
additional 18,000 workers. The provincial authorities offered a 100-hectare factory site
on flat land for r 250,000 in Buffalo City, supported by Buffalo Citys Mayor sindisile
Maclean. The company was granted a tax holiday for six years, approved by the sa
ministry for trade and industry. However, the south african cabinet opposed further
privileges demanded by the Malaysian subsidiary. as a result, ramatex sa was on the
lookout for alternatives, criticising the eastern Cape governments incentives for not
being strategically fit for ramatexs investment criteria and vision23. one of the sa
subsidiaries apparently turned down an offer from lesotho (AZ, 14/3/2002). eventu-
ally, the attractiveness of Namibias incentives package lured the concern to otjomuise.
The south african factories closed down after just two and a half years. This fact points
to the extreme mobility of international textile capital. ramatex Namibia went into
production in mid-2002, only one year after successfully concluding its negotiations
with the Namibian authorities, a development marked by the official inauguration on
14 June 2001 (http://www.windhoekcc.org.na/default. aspx?page=120).

20. Der Standard, 30/6/2005. international Textile, leather & Garment Workers federation (no
year of publication), Mollet 2001:94. <http://www.ramatex.com.>

21. The Namibia Economist reported the arrival at Namibias international harbour Walvis Bay of
forty two containers containing prefabricated materials to be used in building the plant & port
authorities said this week that they are expecting 600 to 700 more containers (20/26/7/2001).
see also: The Namibian, 28/10/2005.

22. as of the second half of 2003. AZ, 27/10/2003. The MTi agencies, Namibia investment Centre
and offshore development Centre, in december 2003 estimated a monthly volume of produc-
tion of about N$ 28 m (investdevelop Namibias investment Newsletter, 8/12/2003:2).

23. dispatch online, 21/6/2001.

Lib e r a t e d e c on om y ?

ramatex Namibia had intended to go into production in september 2001, but con-
struction work started only in august 2001. at first, MTi announced the employ-
ment of 18,000 workers (New Era, 13/15/7/2001), whereas the concern planned for
15,000, 8,000 of them to be taken on in the first three years (Namibia Economist, 20/
26/7/2001). However, only by March 2002 had the first 1,000 workers completed their
training at the Windhoek Vocational Training Centre (larri 2003:11). at peak times,
ramatexs workforce amounted to approximately 8,000 employees (AZ, 27/10/2003).
Currently, after the closure of rhino Garments at the end of 2005, the number of work-
ers has levelled out at 6,500.

The company again postponed the start of its garment production to april 2002
(AZ, 24/4/2002), waiting for further liberalisation of imports into the us through
aGoa ii, which eventually became us law in august 2002 (<fdiMagazine foreigndi-
rectinvestment>:1.8.2002). Namibia had been presented its original aGoa i certificate
only in december 2001 (AZ, 11/12/2001). in this agreement, the country had not been
listed as a Lesser Developed Country (ldC). Thus, Namibian exporters were restricted
to purchasing their raw materials and semi-finished products either from america or
from specific african countries. in the meantime, Namibia continued negotiating for
its ldC-status. Namibias reclassification under aGoa ii would allow the company
to procure the bulk of its production-related imports directly from its own plants in
Malaysia. eventually, ramatex went into apparel production in June 2002, once the
us House of representatives had successfully passed aGoa ii legislation (http://www.
grnnet.gov.na/News/archive/2002/april/ Week4/ramatex.htm).

on several occasions, ramatex brought into play its remarkable economic heft
in negotiations for further support from the Namibian side. The concern demanded
a spatial extension of its lease in september 2002 to be used for industrial expansion.
initially, the city of Windhoek reacted reluctantly to the companys demand for more
land. as a result, executive director albert lim bypassed the municipal authorities
and approached prime Minister Gurirab directly. Quite uncouthly, lim hinted at the
possibility of disinvestment. The Namibian government mediated between the two
parties. eventually, the city bowed to the pressure from both sides and placed two more
industrial plots at ramatexs disposal free of charge.

some of the initial hopes for forward linkages for Namibian entrepreneurship
seemed to materialise. Jesaya Nyamu, Hamutenyas successor as minister for trade and
industry, particularly emphasised increased revenues in the transport sector (The Na-
mibian, 28/3/2003). undoubtedly, employment creation has to be added on the com-
panys credit side, as well. after all, ramatex has become the biggest single employer
in Namibias private sector economy. some hopes, on the other hand, did not come to
much. after receiving the second portion of land for free from the city of Windhoek in
2002, the firm announced its plans to establish its own subsidiaries to complement the
textile sector: a factory for plastic and carton packaging, another manufacturing elastic
bands, facilities for producing garment labels, buttons, and zips, as well as a printing

24. We are now faced with the dilemma of whether to move to Malawi or Botswana for expansion
(The Namibian, 5/9/2002).

25. 5 ha in July 2002 and 112 ha in May 2003. in total, ramatexs leasehold amounts to 160 ha. (AZ,
25/9/2002; 30/5/2003).

Vo lk e r Win t e r f e l d t

house. also, the firm considered setting up department stores for about 10,000 employ-
ees on its premises, as well as a sports centre (New Era, 23/26/9/2002). By mid-2007,
none of these ambitious plans had materialised. on the contrary, the only additional
use made of the industrial plot was an improper one, as ramatex erected buildings for
residential purposes (AZ, 25/9/2002). Windhoek officials complained to the govern-
ment, to no avail.

despite its importance as an employer, ramatexs contribution to boosting the pur-
chasing power of Namibias formal sector is clearly limited by the low level of salaries
paid to the production workers, mainly female. Moreover, there are reasonable doubts
as to the positive effect of ramatexs economic activity on the countrys public funds.
The wage structure agreed to between management and trade union, coming into ef-
fect on 1 february 2003, shows that the annual income levels of the companys african
workforce remain below the taxation threshold.

in the first two years of its existence in Namibia, the Malaysian company displayed a
certain liberal nonchalance in complying with the laws and policies of the host country.
These are some of the issues on public record:
no publication of an environmental impact assessment report, as required by Na-

mibian environment-related policies;
issuing a written demand to female workers to undergo pregnancy tests as a prereq-

uisite for employment;
no registration as a factory with the ministry of labour;
withholding contributions to the social security commission funds until august

2002 (The Namibian, 12/7/2002;
denying the union(s) access to the premises for the purpose of unionising, thus

denying workers the right of collective bargaining (ibid.);
setting up residential units within an industrial area, as well as lined ponds, with-

out an approved plan, without written permission from municipal authorities, and
against their written wishes to stop building activities (AZ, 25/9/2002): such resi-
dential units contravene a clause in the epZ act precluding residence in an epZ;

violation of quality standard regulations iso 14,000 and saBs regarding industri-
al sewage; violation of regulations concerning the installation of electrical cables;

feeding cheap industrial power into the electrical net of residential units built on
ramatexs premises (The Namibian, 23/1/2002).

on 18 May 2005, after several months during which rumours were regularly brushed
aside by the Namibian authorities as unfounded, ramatex Textiles Namibia closed
down its otjomuise subsidiary rhino Garments and 1,600 workers were retrenched
(<http://www.laborrights.org/press/namibia_tex-tiles0505.htm>: 19/5/2005). Their mea-
gre retrenchment packages, the fruit of weeks of negotiations between trade union and
management, granted workers a severance allowance equivalent to one weeks salary in
appreciation of their service, in addition to a lump sum of N$ 300 . ramatex accused
the Namibia food and allied Workers union (Nafau) of having plotted with the

26. one and a half weeks for workers with a minimum of two years service, plus N$ 375 (New Era,
17/5/2005).

Lib e r a t e d e c on om y ?

Brussels-based international Textile Garment and leather Workers federation (iT-
GlWf) to stage an abstention campaign among american consumers, which allegedly
curbed orders from the us market. in January 2005, the iTGlWf in an open letter
had turned to Namibias founding president sam Nujoma, MTi, the ministry of labour,
as well as to the international labour organisation (ilo), complaining of appalling
labour practices and workers rights abuses. The same letter of complaint reached sev-
eral major us chain stores such as sears, kMart, shopko, oshkosh BGosh inc. and
Childrens place. The appeal attracted considerable attention from the general public in
Namibia and the commercial world in the us.

However, rhino Garments closure may well have been motivated by other consid-
erations, such as the expiry of the international Multi-fibre arrangement (Mfa) and
the agreement on Textiles and Clothing (aTC) on 1 January 2005, and the power
game initiated by the companys management to send a message of intimidation to its
employees in the remaining three otjomuise subsidiaries. Based on the first bilateral
agreements signed in the 1960s, the Mfa in 1974 and (on Mfas expiry in 1994) the
aCT in 1994 had governed the international textile sector, restricting textile and cloth-
ing imports from low-wage economies. strict quotas favoured producers in the industr-
ialised world. for ramatex, this meant two things: in future, the outlet in its classical
metropolitan markets would narrow, as competition with other low-wage producers
from developing economies, especially from China, stiffened. on the other hand, being
itself well placed as a producer in China and in other asian countries, the multinational
mother conglomerate benefited from the scrapping of quotas. since the us has already
signalled that aGoas validity would be extended to 2015, ramatex Namibia, though
facing stronger competition, could still avail itself of its preferential treatment on the us
market as an African producer reason enough to carry on production in Namibia for
the time being, while threatening to close shop.

The combination of all these factors may have induced ramatex Textiles Namibia
to send a message of intimidation to its remaining workforce of 6,000 by closing down
rhino Garments after three years of strained industrial relations in all the otjomuise
factories. The intention was not difficult to decipher: since the signing of the first wage
agreement in 2002, ramatex workers had not received any salary increase. salary nego-
tiations were protracted for years and only concluded in october 2006 when the union
finally mustered its courage and prompted workers to down tools. even then, after be-
ing forced to make remarkable concessions, ramatex insisted on publicly voicing the
possibility that it could transfer its production any day now, and altogether, to other
african countries.

The players (3): The Namibian workers and trade unions

ramatexs workforce represents the weakest link in the tripartite game between the
state, the multinational company and labour. in mid-2004, the company employed
approximately 8,000 workers, thus becoming the biggest single private employer in
post-independence Namibia. around 1,900 of them were Chinese, Malaysian, filipino
and Bangladeshi nationals, the first three groups also serving as trainers on the job and

Vo lk e r Win t e r f e l d t

supervisors. Considering the restrictive immigration policy of the Namibian govern-
ment, their number appears rather surprising.

in september 2002, after some months of training Namibian workers on the job and
paying them extremely low salaries, a three-tier salary scheme was adopted. it is based
on skills, piecework27, and in actual practice, nationality. Both Namibian and asian
workers earn a basic salary. Where the piece rate is met, a piecework wage is added.
Wages differ markedly between Namibians and their asian fellow workers in better job
positions, the Namibian workforce being at a disadvantage. Their wages, on account of
the minimal rating of their professional skills, hardly exceed the basic salary.

until 31 august 2002, ramatex paid N$ 1.76 per hour to a trained worker (The
Namibian, 30/8/2002). The new salary scheme again put trainees into the lowest salary
bracket. until october 2006, they earned an hourly wage of N$ 1.50, whereas work-
ers were paid N$ 3.00, quality controllers N$ 3.50 and supervisors N$ 4.00 (larri
2003:19). on the basis of the contractual nine-hour shift calculated for 23 work days
per month, monthly salaries in the respective categories amount to N$ 301.50, N$ 621,
N$ 724.50 and N$ 828. in actual practice, ramatexs employees are asked to work on
saturdays (paid overtime at a rate of 1.5) and occasionally on public holidays (double
time). even then, a supervisors salary, the highest category, would not be subject to
taxation. in comparison, the minimum wage introduced in 2004 for commercial farm
workers, traditionally one of the most underprivileged employee groups in the formal
labour sector in Namibia, is fixed at N$ 421 in cash and additional N$ 250 in kind,
that is at N$ 671. Correspondingly, annual salaries of ramatex workers in the respective
categories amount to N$ 3,726, N$ 7,452, N$ 8,694 and N$ 9,936. Thus, wages range
between a monthly us$ 48 and us$ 13328, with an average calculated at us$ 90. The
only contribution deducted from the workers salaries and apportioned to a public fund
is the monthly premium paid to the social security commission.

ramatex introduced a complex six-step recruitment and training procedure. Work-
ers are only taken on probation, a period covering approximately 3 to 6 months at the
companys discretion. during this time they qualify only for a trainee salary29. Wages
do not provide for medical benefits or for any housing or transport allowances (The Na-

27. Cf. flexible remuneration scheme, clauses 2.1 and 2.2 of template letter of appointment
from flamingo Garments. ramatex Textiles Namibia (pty) ltd (2002a):1.

28. Calculated at a rate of 6.25 Namibian dollar per us dollar (april 2006).
29. a leaflet handed out to applicants outlines the recruitment procedure. it states the following

steps: applicants register with the ministry of labour, which according to the trade union, com-
piles a list of applicants and communicates it to the company (step 1). an interview follows (step
2). passing the interview, the applicant is admitted to a training programme after a test period
of 35 days (step 3). once taken into the training programme, she/he signs a training agreement
and undergoes further training for two weeks until the next evaluation. passing the evaluation,
10 more weeks of training ensue (step 4). step 5 consists of a performance appraisal. as far as
step 6 is concerned, the leaflet remains ambiguous. it states: sign contract after three months
and salary increased [sic!]. This may imply that now, after three months, a contract is signed. it
may also mean that after an initial 3 months of training, another 3 months of trainee status are
required before the worker is granted a workers salary of an hourly N$ 3. larris study confirms
that training periods in individual cases may span even more than half a year. Training takes
place either at the Windhoek Vocational Training Centre, and/or on the job at ramatex. With
regard to the recruitment procedure, ramatexs management corroborates workers information
that the ministry of labour keeps a database of applicants (cf. larri 2003:1516).

Lib e r a t e d e c on om y ?

mibian, 24/4/2003). The latter, as a rule, is of substantial significance for every employee
in Windhoek. in the capital, as in all the urban centres of southern africa, apartheid
had not only segregated black workers in distant townships but also hindered the devel-
opment of a public transport system. Today, the municipality lacks the means to provide
sufficient public transport30. forced by their meagre wages to economise, the (mainly
female) workers have to walk long distances in an unprotected and unsafe area that has
since become a focus for crime.

Working conditions are reported to be problematic in various ways. at the height
of the first recruitment wave at the beginning of 2002, ramatex demanded pregnancy
tests at the applicants own expense. The firm refused to appoint pregnant women. a
public outcry followed, condemning the employment practice as a violation of Na-
mibian labour laws. The companys management first denied any such measure, then
admitted to having issued a letter prescribing the pregnancy test and eventually revoked
it31. employees also complained of health and safety issues, especially skin rashes caused
by dyes (larri 2003:224). When their complaints were taken up in media reports,
ramatex reacted with a full-page advert questioning the reliability of the report (New
Era, 5/11/7/2002).

initially, staff was denied the right to collective bargaining. The company forbade
unions from entering the premises to enlist members (The Namibian, 8/7/2002). only
on 2 october 2002 did ramatex and the Namibia food and allied Workers union
(Nafau) signed a recognition agreement. The document emphasises the concept of
freedom of association and grants the union collective and exclusive bargaining rights.
in its turn, Nafau committed itself to answering for the legality of all industrial ac-
tion32. under such a corporativist scheme, the union is under a legal obligation to assist
in law enforcement in cases of industrial action. in mid-2003, nine shop stewards repre-
sented the workers at the four subsidiaries in otjomuise (The Namibian, 2/6/2003).

Various seeds of conflict created a delicate situation. as a result, since the inception
of production five so-called wild cat strikes have brought ramatex to a temporary halt.
This sparked off conflict between the trade union and workers and prompted action

30. private taxis cater for most of the capitals commuters. Normally, Namibian companies either
provide transport to and from work or pay transport allowances on top of the salary. as a result of
the habitational structures of apartheid, the vast majority of ramatexs workers live in katutura,
Windhoeks african town centre, and the northwestern districts, at a distance of at least seven
to eight kilometres from their workplace. Thus, working in otjomuise requires paying two taxi
fare stages. at the current rate of N$ 6.5 per stage, transport costs amount to N$ 26 per day, or
approximately N$ 650 to 700 per month. Comparing such expenses with the salaries indicated
above sheds light on the plight of ramatexs workforce.

31. ramatexs demand was allegedly aimed at avoiding later applications for maternity leave. The
minister of womens affairs and child welfare condemned managements demand as discrimina-
tory and infringing the countrys labour act (New Era, 1/3/3/2002). executive director albert
lim countered that no employee had been forced to undergo pregnancy tests. (The Namibian,
14/3/2002). The same newspaper (26/6/2002) claimed to be in possession of a letter to employees
from ramatex, which confirmed the allegation. Calle schlettwein, the permanent secretary at
the ministry of labour, declared the request for pregnancy tests illegal. in July, ramatex admitted
to having issued the letter demanding pregnancy tests to applicants in february 2002, stating
that the letter had been revoked (New Era, 5/11/7/2002).

32. Clause 11 of the recognition agreement between ramatex Textiles Namibia (pty) ltd and the
Namibian food and allied Workers union. ramatex Textiles Namibia (pty) ltd (2002c).

Vo lk e r Win t e r f e l d t

by government officials, who accused the employees of sabotaging Namibias efforts to
attract foreign investment. While two of the strikes involved only the Namibian labour-
ers, the other three engaged the asian employees.

The first downing of tools in protest against new contracts occurred on 28 august
2002 and involved approximately 100 discontented workers (The Namibian, 29/8/2002).
for several weeks, the atmosphere at ramatex had been disturbed by the protraction of
the recognition talks between the union and the company and by widespread confusion
over contracts aimed at introducing productivity-related piece rates. in that difficult sit-
uation, Namibian officials intervened. They asserted the governments official political
stance, countering the workers demands. a large delegation of members of the National
Council, the second chamber of the Namibian legislature, visited the ramatex plant in
otjomuise, publicly expressing their satisfaction with the companys achievements. The
NiC headed by david Nuyoma accompanied them (New Era, 16/18/8/2002). only a
minority of workers went on strike, but ramatex reacted by locking out all 1,500 em-
ployees (The Namibian, 30/8/2002), who then staged a demonstration at the ministry of
labour. The strike was called off after both Nafau and the ministry intervened. sub-
sequent negotiations between the union and the company resulted in the salary scheme
coming into effect on 1 september 2002. However, locked-out workers had to reapply
for their jobs (New Era, 30/8/2/9/2002).

The second occurrence involved about 3,000 textile workers on 15 april 2003. Their
action over wage increases and transport allowances again met with a total lock-out by
the company, this time for two weeks. Nafau intervened, mediating between man-
agement and labourers as Namibian riot police entered the factory. ramatex declared
the dismissal of the initiators of the strike. it rejected all claims for higher wages, citing
its fears for the multinationals competitiveness under the Charles darwin economic
Theory (executive director albert lim in The Namibian, 23/4/2003) as a pretext. on
29 april, employees resumed work. They were again forced to sign new contracts and
416 workers remained suspended for allegedly masterminding the strike (The Namibian,
8/5/2003). The strike yielded no result, meeting multiple resistance. in a concerted
move, management and Namibian officials dismissed the industrial action as economic
sabotage33. likewise, the union labelled it as illegal (The Namibian, 22/4/2003). above
all, the strikers bargaining power was severely weakened by the fact that the company
countered their action by recruiting workers for its newly opened subsidiary rhino
Garments. every day, for about a week, some 1,000 workers flocked to the gates, pre-
pared to accept any salary as long as they could gain employment (Namibia Economist,
9/15/5/2003).

The high rating that ramatexs initiative had gained in the economic policies of the
Namibian government showed again in october 2003. The Namibian trade unions re-
search arm, the labour resource and research institute (larri), published its critical
assessment of labour issues at the multinationals Namibian affiliate. The in-depth re-
port received great attention from the media. in response, MTis Jesaya Nyamu denied
that ramatexs labour relations could be classified as exploitative (AZ, 24/10/2003). Just

33. state president Nujoma on labour day 2003. He condemned the strike as illegal, called one of
the worker activists a spy (AZ, 2/5/2003). previously, david Nuyoma had stated that the illegal
strike sent the wrong signal to potential investors (AZ, 24/4/2003).

Lib e r a t e d e c on om y ?

a week after the publication of the report, president Nujoma started a media offensive
in support of ramatex and ostentatiously visited otjomuise (AZ, 27/10/2003). Nahas
angula, then minister of higher education, presently Namibias prime minister, justi-
fied the companys wage structure as reflecting the workers low productivity levels (The
Namibian, 5/11/2003).

To this day, industrial labour relations have hardly improved. Conflicts continue at
the companys premises. in december 2003, ramatexs 500 filipino employees brought
their grievances about poor wages, cramped living conditions and health concerns (The
Namibian, 17/12/2003) before the public. The conflict simmered at low intensity until
July, when the workers again took action, finally forcing the company to honour some of
their requests. in January 2004, a majority of the 1,000 Chinese workers downed tools,
both Malaysian Chinese and Chinese workers from the mainlands peoples republic
(Asian Labour News, 5/2/2004). The case of the 416 Namibian workers who had been
suspended after the industrial action in april 2003 kept the interest of the media alive
during the first half of 2004 (New Era, 26/1/2004). The employees, while still waiting
for a disciplinary hearing to be instituted by ramatex as prescribed by the procedural
stipulations of the Namibian labour act, had taken their case to court.

in august and september 2005, the sad saga of the 438 Bangladeshi workers at
ramatex swept through the press. The company finally managed to get the labourers
deported from the country by the Namibian authorities, after hiring them overseas only
a few months before. The Namibian unions umbrella organisation, the National union
of Namibian Workers (NuNW), and Nafau threatened to stage a general strike but
were overtaken by the swift action of the state in rescinding the Bangladeshis work
permits. in october 2004, the infection control unit of the katutura state hospital in
Namibias capital Windhoek informed the city of Windhoek and the general public
of its investigations into the alarming rate of skin infections among factory workers at
ramatex34.

in January 2005, the iTGlWfs boycott appeal sent a shock wave through the pub-
lic, forcing government, ramatex and Nafau to engage in tripartite discussions in the
following weeks (The Namibian, 31/3/2005). in april 2005, Bishop Zephania kameeta
of the evangelical lutheran Church of the republic of Namibia (elCrN) gave his
view on the questionable effects of globalisation on Namibian society. Bringing his high
moral repute to bear, he publicly exhorted the Namibian churches to take a stand (AZ,
29/4/2005). in the meantime, the first media rumours about rhino Garments closure
shook the public.

The second half of 2005 and the early part of 2006 were marked by the protracted
dispute over the long overdue salary increase. since the first salary agreement, rama-
tex labourers had kept working for the same monthly pay. Nafau asked for salary
increases from N$ 3 an hour to N$ 6.50 for the lower income bracket and from N$
4.50 to N$ 8.50 for supervisors. The company smugly let its employees know that it had
opened four new factories in China, and then countered the unions demand by offer-
ing an increase in the hourly pay rate of 10 Namibian cents. Nafau, well aware of the
predicament of the workers who might be caught between an insufficient income and

34. Media reports spoke of more than 20 cases of skin irritation a day, and the numbers appeared to
have increased over the last two or three months (The Namibian, 22/10/2004).

0

Vo lk e r Win t e r f e l d t

no income at all in the not unlikely case of total disinvestment by ramatex, offered to
lower its demand to 50 cents. Management raised its offer by a further 5 cents, main-
taining that the Namibian staffs miserable productivity did not allow for more.

following these skirmishes in december 2005, Namibias prime Minister Nahas
angula intervened to try to end the deadlock in January 2006, to no avail (The Na-
mibian, 26/1/2006). Months of rumours followed during which the Malaysian com-
pany engaged in a scathing censure of the productivity of its Namibian workforce. The
textile multinational created the impression that it had already made the firm decision
to cease its operations altogether. its threat of final closure seemed to be corroborated
in May 2006 when details of a letter addressed to the Namibian government filtered
through. ramatexs management had offered its Namibian subsidiary to the Namibian
state for sale at an asking price of above N$ 500 m (The Namibian, 15/5/2006). The
executive director of the ramatex Berhad group, albert lim poh Boon, stated his inten-
tion to close shop by 30 May 2006 should the Namibian partner not show immediate
interest (AZ, 17/5/2006).

ramatexs assertion of the uncompetitive productivity of its local workforce weighed
heavily in the public debate, as it touched on a sensitive nerve, Namibias want of a skilled
industrial labour force. resulting from tried and tested apartheid practices of prevented
industrialisation, Bantu education and bonded migrant labour in colonial times, the
countrys post-colonial economy indeed experiences marked vocational shortcomings.
against the neoliberal backdrop of economic policies aiming to attract fdi, such want
is seen as a major handicap with the potential to scare off international investors. ironi-
cally, the blame is laid on the Namibian labourers.

ramatexs case, on the other hand, is hardly verifiable. Not being a listed company in
Namibia, no audit reports are made available by the company, which makes it difficult
to establish the facts (The Namibian, 17/5/2006). Herbert Jauch, larris director and
researcher, undertook to question the companys assertion closely. in a study of africas
clothing and textile industry focusing on ramatex Namibia, he related the value of Na-
mibian exports to the us in the years 200204 to the estimated labour costs incurred
by ramatex. The findings are startling: labour costs, including both the Namibian and
asian labour force in ramatexs service, total approximately 10% of Namibian export
value (Jauch 2006:2167). even taking only the strictly aGoa-related statistics for
total Namibian imports of textiles and apparel to the us in 2004 as a basis for a similar
calculation, ramatexs labour costs would barely exceed 15% of the customs value of
the companys Namibian exports to the us35. Whatever the accuracy of the contention
about low productivity levels, these certainly cannot be put forward to explain the (al-
leged) lack of profitability in ramatexs case.

35. http;//www.agoa.info/?view=country_info&country=na&stay=trade. This aGoa website indi-
cates a volume of Namibian textile and apparel imports into the us in 2004 classified under
aGoa and Gsp (Generalized system of preferences) of us$ 161.193 m. The lack of any Na-
mibian textile industry other than ramatex makes it likely that the exports listed above are to
be ascribed to ramatex only. The companys labour costs of us$ 24.8 m are then related to the
export value.

Lib e r a t e d e c on om y ?

The Namibian government reacted to the companys blackmail by setting up a high-
level technical committee of cabinet ministers and the NuNW36. as an alternative to
the proposed takeover, a turnaround plan intended to salvage the situation (New
Era, 22/5/2006) was soon announced. it included:
the provision of N$ 13 m by the Namibian state to finance the water reclamation

plant that ramatex (in 2002) had contractually agreed to build and pay for37;
the refund of vocational training costs. However, the plan avoided mentioning the

fact tha such refunds had been regularly provided for in the nations annual
budget legislation since 2002;

the promise to induce the parastatals Nampower and NamWater, as well as the
municipality of Windhoek to grant ramatex preferential tariffs for electricity and
water. possibly, the promise was made in view of the expiry of the favourable terms
ramatex had enjoyed since 2002;

the assurance that the trade unions would be reminded of their national obligation
to contribute to industrial peace;

the firm intention to mobilise the southern african Customs union (saCu) and
the southern african development Community (sadC) to negotiate for rama-
texs preferential treatment in southern african and european markets (New Era,
22/5/2006).

The Malaysian multinational, staging yet another uncompromising tactical move, re-
jected the governments offer. instead, it renewed its bid to sell the business to the state.
Concurrently, it began removing all equipment from its otjomuise spinning and knitting
factories, relocating the machinery to its overseas subsidiaries (AZ, 2/6/2006). Though
it refrained from any direct intervention, this last move might have prompted the Na-
mibian government to begin opposing ramatexs pressure. The authorities launched a
series of routine audits and checks intended to establish the companys compliance with
environmental and aGoa rules. at the beginning of June 2006, the government finally
rejected ramatexs offer of a buy-out (AZ, 7/6/2006).

The states negative response marked a turning point. ramatex indicated its willing-
ness to reconsider the generous incentives programme offered by the government. By
the end of June, it resumed negotiations with Nafau on the disputed salary increase.
Company and unions decided to set up a joint committee tasked with monitoring pro-
ductivity (AZ, 4/7/2006). Thus, for the first time in months, ramatex sent a signal that
it indeed intended to maintain production in Namibia. in august 2006, media reports
revealed secret negotiations between government officials and ramatex Berhads execu-
tive director, albert lim, flown in from kuala lumpur. This time, the talks excluded
the unions. it transpired that lim pressurised the Namibian government to grant work
visas in considerable numbers to allow the entry of additional asian employees to Na-
mibia. The request was again motivated by the Namibian staffs alleged productivity

36. on the governments side, the committee included the permanent secretary of the ministry of
finance, Calle schlettwein, as a chair; the representatives of MTi, the ministry of foreign affairs,
the attorney generals office and of odC (The Namibian, 15/5/2006; 22/5/2006; 30/6/2006).

37. Criticised for the environmental damage caused by its production process, ramatex had pledged
N$ 25 m for the construction of the plant in a full-page newspaper advert in 2002.

Vo lk e r Win t e r f e l d t

backlog, provoking harsh reactions from Nafau and the NuNW (The Namibian,
11/8/2006).

The last act, for the time being, took place in october 2006. The inconclusive wage
negotiations, governments pliability in complying with the multinationals request to
employ a foreign workforce and especially the unrest among the Namibian labourers
at ramatex induced the unions to call for a strike ballot. Nine out of ten workers voted
for industrial action (The Namibian, 11/10/2006). Concurrently, the city of Windhoek
announced its decision to take charge of the factorys waste management at ramatexs
expense, after publishing the devastating findings of the citys investigation into water
pollution in otjomuise. However, the city also confirmed the companys release from its
contractual obligation to build a water reclamation plant38.

on 13 october 2006, ramatex workers downed tools. Two days of abstention from
work combined with the states refusal of a take-over and the recent hard line taken by
the municipal authorities induced the company to eventually make remarkable conces-
sions:
a salary increase of 36.7%, from N$ 3 to N$ 4.10 per hour;
a monthly housing allowance of N$ 150;
a monthly transport allowance of N$ 100;
an annual bonus of 60% of the monthly salary.
in addition, the parties to the wage settlement agreed to the introduction of a medical
aid scheme, to which the company is to contribute 70%, and to the establishment of
a pension fund, to which both employee and employer are to pay in a contribution at
the rate of 5% of the employees salary. The agreement became effective on 1 october
2006, 49 months after the first salary agreement (New Era, 16/10/2006). Combining
salary and benefits, the pay cheque of a ramatex worker would currently amount to
approximately N$ 1,10039, an increase of 43% over the previous salary. in return, ra-
matex Namibia was granted a rebate of N$ 13 m for the water reclamation plant as well
as permission to bring additional asian labourers into the country.

The current situation indicates that despite all threats of total disinvestment ra-
matex Textiles Namibia intends to make the most of aGoa and the preferential treat-
ment that flows from it. The multinationals line of approach reveals a two-pronged
strategy. for as long as aGoa facilitates access to the us-market for apparel, Namibias
epZ environment, as well as the countrys affordable labour costs, seem to make up for
the possible skills shortages of its labour force. at the same time, spinning and knitting
production have been shifted to the asian branches of the ramatex Berhad Group.

38. The Namibian, 12/10/2006. The plant is now constructed under the responsibility of the city, and
(partially) financed with the N$ 13 m made available by the state.

39. Calculated, as was done in calculating the previous average salary of N$ 621, on the basis of
a contractual 9-hours working day for 23 days a month. Thus the basic salary amounts to N$
848.70. Housing and transport allowances bring the salary to N$ 1098.70. adding one-twelfth
of the annual bonus to the monthly salary brings the monthly pay cheque to N$ 1,141.35. of the
monthly basic salary, 5%, that is N$ 42.44, has to be deducted for the employees contribution
to the pension scheme, resulting in a salary of N$ 1098.70. deductions for medical aid are not
taken into account in this calculation. The annual salary of N$ 13,200 still ranges below the
Namibian tax threshold of N$ 20,000. No tax, therefore, accrues to the state from salaries of
trained ramatex workers.

Lib e r a t e d e c on om y ?

ramatexs threat-and-smile strategy points to the fact that the profitability of its entre-
preneurial activities in Namibia is not determined solely by the productivity of labour.
The political landscape shaped by the Namibian governments fdi-friendly policies,
offering the company massive opportunities for saving capital costs over the past five
years, as well as the preferential market access facilitated by Namibias aGoa certifica-
tion, are of equal if not greater importance.

The players (4): The Asian workers

ramatex Namibia has always been secretive about the number of foreign workers of
asian origin it employs. information supplied by Nafau representatives and govern-
ment officials level out at approximately 1,900 in mid-2004 (The Namibian, 15/9/2004).
detailed media reports add up to a higher total. They estimate the Chinese workforce at
1,000, 800 of them Malaysian and the rest from mainland China (Asian Labour News,
5/2/2004). a further 750 are filipinos and some 510 were recruited in Bangladesh
(AZ, 10/9/2004). Before the dismissal of rhino Garments 1,600 employees, the total
number of foreigners represented roughly a quarter of ramatexs workforce. To date,
figures indicating the number of the additional asian trainers admitted to Namibia on
the basis of the negotiations in mid-2006 have not been released. it transpired that the
Namibian factory runs separate human resource departments for its Namibian and for-
eign employees. The foreign workforce is requested to sign contracts of three years dura-
tion before entering the country (The Namibian, 17/12/2003). The company holds the
foreign workers passports, ostensibly for safekeeping (Asian Labour News, 5/2/2004).

Time and again, cultural conflicts are reported to have affected working relation-
ships between Malaysian management and asian supervisors on the one hand and the
african workforce on the other. The asian superiors are accused of cultural arrogance
(larri 2003:257), whereas management complains about the low performance and
lack of discipline of african workers, which they ascribe to considerable deficiencies
in work ethic that is culturally not up to asian standards (The Namibian, 23/4/2003).
However, positions are not at all as clearly entrenched as may seem to be the case. ra-
matexs productive workforce of asian origin, though privileged compared with its af-
rican counterparts, proved a hard nut for management to crack. several labour disputes
prominently involving its asian employees rocked the company.

on 10 May 2003, about 700 Chinese Malaysians remained in their hostels built
on the premises, demanding wage increases and better conditions of service. at first,
ramatex, the NiC and the ministry of labour denied that there had been any industrial
action at all40. subsequent information alleged that only 216 asian workers had gone on

40. The Namibian, 13/5/2003. in parliament, deputy labour Minister rosalia Nghidinwa referred
to ramatexs explanation that the stay-away occurred on a weekend, when workers were not on
duty. Therefore, it could not have been a strike. Moreover, the date coincided with the Buddhist
full moon religious festival (The Namibian, 16/6/2003). However, in 2003 the Wesak festival
started only on 15 May, 5 days after the work stoppage (ibid.). as to the closure of the plants
over weekends, the contract template of flamingo Garments states under clause 7.2: as the
companys operation is continuous, it operates for 24 hours and 7 days per week and you may
work on shifts. You should not refuse such shift work. letter of appointment from flamingo
Garments. ramatex Textiles Namibia (pty) ltd (2002a):1. Mocks shivute, permanent secretary

Vo lk e r Win t e r f e l d t

strike. seven were dismissed together with three managers accused of mishandling the
work stoppage that officially had not taken place41. The asian workers resumed work on
13 May, without any information being released as to the compromise they had obvi-
ously reached with management.

Half a year later, in december 2003, after two filipino workers charged with having
contracted Hepatitis C were sent home, 700 fellow workers, mainly filipinos, reacted
with a petition. ramatexs management had classified hepatitis as a sexually transmit-
ted disease (sTd) and refused to honour the medical bill. The petition complained
about working and living conditions. it emphasised the low monthly basic wage paid
out in Namibian dollars, equivalent to us$ 200. The adverse exchange rate translated
into approximately N$ 1,400, while at the time of signing their contracts, the salary
in Namibian currency amounted to N$ 2,400 to 2,600. The workers demanded pay-
ment in us currency, which their contract provided for as an option (The Namibian,
17/12/2003). They also turned to their embassy in south africa. a filipino diplomat,
Consul-General oscar orcine, then visited Namibia in January 2004 to discuss the
grievances with ramatex officials after the company had not responded to official let-
ters. He was given the cold shoulder by the Malaysian management. The dispute re-
mained unresolved until, in July 2004, the filipino workers decided to partially down
tools, refusing to work overtime. on 26 July, ramatex eventually gave in to the de-
mand, promising to pay monthly salaries in us dollars (The Namibian, 21/1/2004;
20/7/2004; 27/7/2004).

in the meantime, unrest amongst ethnic Chinese workers from Malaysia and na-
tionals of the peoples republic over poor contract conditions had become apparent in
december 2003. The unrest led to industrial action, with a majority of the 1,000 Chi-
nese employees refusing to work as from 8 January 2004. They demanded a reduction
of their contract term from three to two years, and the implementation of their con-
tractual claim to be reimbursed for medical expenses. Though accepting the workers
demand, the company suspended the Chinese workforce for 17 days without pay, as it
was low season (Asian Labour News, 5/2/2004). officially, this move was motivated by
the wish to afford workers unpaid leave for the celebration of the Chinese New Year (The
Namibian, 14/1/2004). in early february 2004, a group of 80 mainland Chinese work-
ers quit, severing their contracts and leaving for home, indignant at the working and
living conditions at the factory. a further 150 followed their example (The Namibian,
14/1/2004).

during the first two weeks of august 2004, news confirmed that ramatex had
dismissed 66 of its 438 Bangladeshi workers for allegedly poor work performance. The
dismissed had been hired in august 2003, whereas the majority of the Bangladeshi
employees had just come to work in Namibia in July 2004 (The Namibian, 5/8/2004;
10/8/2004). as the dismissal of the 66 implied the cancellation of their work permits,
the workers challenged their imminent deportation in court, claiming their dismissal
had been unfair and in breach of the labour law. They were allowed by the court to stay

of the ministry of information and broadcasting, stated in a press release that the workers had
merely been released from work to allow them to celebrate their own national religious festival,
just as we celebrate Christmas, easter and other religious holidays (New Era, 1/6/2003).

41. according to ramatexs management, the company at that time employed 525 foreigners, 460 of
them as trainers and 65 as part of the management team (The Namibian, 16/6/2003).

Lib e r a t e d e c on om y ?

in the country and fight their case. The company reacted by offering to reinstate the
workers at a lower salary, us$ 120 instead of their previous monthly pay of us$ 200
(The Namibian, 24/8/2004)

The affair had far-reaching implications, as the public had been alerted to the dire
labour relations at ramatex over a long period of two years. The municipality of Wind-
hoek was called in, as neighbours informed city officials of the apparently intolerable
housing conditions of Bangladeshi workers. They were accommodated in a private house
in Windhoek West. More than 300 tenants shared a small space including a garage,
with unsuitable sanitary facilities. The property had been rented by desmond Gertze, a
local representative of Bay eastern overseas ltd., an agency under contract to ramatex
for the supply of 2,000 Bangladeshi workers (The Namibian, 10/9/2004; 25/8/2004).
desmond Gertze, a rehoboth resident and brother of Neville Gertze, the Namibian
high commissioner in Malaysia, had entered an equal partnership with a certain Hanif
to form saujana Blossom import and export Namibia, a Namibian-Bangladeshi joint
venture. saujana Blossom acted as Namibian pendant of Bay eastern overseas, and was
ramatexs accommodation-service provider for the workers from Bangladesh42. The al-
leged family connections sparked suspicions in the media that the high commissioner
was involved not only in providing work permits to the Bangladeshi workers in Malay-
sia. Neville Gertze was also said to be indirectly linked with the recruitment of workers
and the provision of their accommodation in Windhoek (The Namibian, 10/9/2004;
New Era, 15/9/2004).

The high commissions procurement of work permits was commonly assessed as
violating Namibian immigration regulations, as most of the workers were unskilled
(AZ, 10/9/2004). The ministry of home affairs criticised the high commission, which
had granted work permits instead of work visas, again in violation of the Namibian
immigration Control act. However, in laying the sole blame on High Commissioner
Gertze, the ministry omitted to mention that in a letter written to ramatex, dated 30
april 2004, MTi had already acknowledged the factorys request to employ expatriates.
Based on previous negotiations between Gertze and ramatexs albert lim poh Boon,
the ministry had given the green light to the company to employ foreign workers for a
period not exceeding two years. The NuNW suspected high-level corruption in the
granting of work permits43.

These events resulted in a generally critical stance being taken by the Namibian au-
thorities, stakeholders and the public. The municipality turned to the courts to obtain an
injunction against saujana Blossoms illegal building renovations at the notorious Hotel
ramatex, made to accommodate tenants in large numbers in an unsuitable building.
Various representatives of political parties and trade unions condemned the constant vi-
olations of workers rights in what was perceived as a sweatshop. The NuNW, together

42. according to information given by Willy Gertze, Nevilles and desmonds father. in an inter-
view, father Gertze added that his nephew, the Windhoek municipalitys strategic executive for
finance roger Gertze, had no role to play in the accommodation of foreign workers, though he
had been approached for advice on the citys building procedures (The Namibian, 14/9/2004;
AZ, 13/9/2004; New Era, 13/9/2004).

43. The Namibian, 21/9/2004. The umbrella organisation claimed that its investigations brought to
light the sum of us$ 21 m in undocumented payments & made in the instance of the Bangla-
deshi workers (The Namibian, 13/9/2004).

Vo lk e r Win t e r f e l d t

with the Namibian red Cross, opened an account for legal aid expenses for the workers.
living conditions of ramatex workers were widely perceived as a humanitarian crisis
of a scandalous nature (New Era, 14/9/2004). They were equated with apartheid prac-
tices such as single-sex dormitories, and ethnic and racial divide-and-rule techniques
(The star [south africa], 13/10/2004). on the other hand, the authorities also had to
put up with critical questions from the media. Why had a substantial Namibian delega-
tion consisting of stakeholders of MTi and the city of Windhoek, who in July 2003
had visited the Ceo albert lim at his invitation at ramatexs headquarters in kuala
lumpur, not managed to persuade the company of the need to respect Namibian epZ
and labour laws (AZ, 14/9/2004)?

after serious riots at the factory on the occasion of the visit of alif Hossain, the
managing director of eastern overseas flown in to account for the evident mess, the
company eventually decided to terminate all contracts with its Bangladeshi workforce.
repeatedly, the workers had vehemently protested against their living conditions. They
also complained about substantial deductions from their salaries not provided for in
their contracts. as a consequence of their dismissal, their work and residence permits
had to be rescinded by the Namibian authorities. By mid-september 2004, all workers
from Bangladesh, with the exception of the first group of 66 allowed to fight their case
in court, were removed from Namibia.

The Bangladeshi migrants had invested us$ 3,500 each for their recruitment by Bay
eastern overseas44. in a letter detailing the demand for recruits, ramatex stipulated
that the immigrants would be hired for two years and paid a monthly salary of us$
120, based on a 48-working-hour week. Medical services in Namibia were to be granted
free of charge, as well as accommodation and transport (The Namibian, 21/9/2004). The
final contract signed by the workers, once in Namibia, formally provided for a monthly
salary of us$ 200. The company deducted us$ 70 for accommodation, us$ 45 for the
provision of canteen food and another N$ 20 for transport (New Era, 13/9/2004; The
Namibian, 14/9/2004).

The Bangladeshi employees had been made to foot the bill. once again, the unskilled
workers represented the weakest link in the tripartite scenario linking state, capital and
labour. in a thoughtful opinion piece, larris Jauch summarised the deportation of
the ramatex workers as a classic example of human trafficking that capitalised on the
globalisation of unemployment and poverty. Contradictory and conflictual as it may be
in the Namibian case, the interaction between multinational conglomerate, shady agen-
cies and authorities reflects both the crude logic of the present-day neoliberal economics
of globalisation and the tragic irony of Namibias developmental hopes, hooked as they
are to foreign investment.

The players (5): Room for manoeuvre?

in particular, ramatexs environmental attitude raised questions among the general
public about the actual room for manoeuvre that both the Namibian authorities and
civil society enjoyed. To date, the firm still has to publish an adequate report on its

44. The Namibian, 10/9/2004. it appears that ramatex also paid for the service rendered for recruit-
ment, i.e., a sum of us$ 580 per recruit (The Namibian, 13/9/2004).

Lib e r a t e d e c on om y ?

environmental impact assessment (eia). for over four years the factory has operated
production processes based on water, like dyeing, so-called wet processing, which are
strictly regulated by international and Namibian norms, and which are to be publicly
monitored. Namibias environmental policies, though not yet integrated into an envi-
ronmental act as such, prescribe the report of an investigation into the environmen-
tal impact to be a public document. it is a binding prerequisite for decision-making
previous to the establishment of a project of this order of magnitude (The Namibian,
25/1/2002).

To date, there is only contradictory information as to whether or not ramatex did
carry out an adequate eia. in early March 2002, three-quarters of a year after the start
of construction work at the factory site, ramatexs lim stated that an eia had already
been completed. His statement followed a public confrontation between Namibian en-
vironmentalists and municipal and government authorities. earlier in January 2002,
MTi Minister Hamutenya, assisted by NiC director david Nuyoma, had ruled out
the possibility that ramatex would start operating unless its environmental systems on
waste disposal, recycling and sewage meet municipal requirements. according to the
media, an environmental document assessing the textile project was due at the end of
that month. The MTi maintained that it had been produced by an australian consul-
tancy, whereas the environmental department of the city of Windhoek indicated that
it originated from Malaysia. it transpired later that the Malaysian document, prepared
by a company named perunding environmental planning Consultancy, merely pro-
vided a general picture of the industrial production processes at the otjomuise factory,
not an assessment of their impact (The Namibian, 23/1/2002; 25/1/2002; 14/3/2002;
5/4/2005; 4/5/2005).

To add to the blurred picture, ramatexs albert lim maintained in october 2003
that a team of danish consultants had recently finalised an assessment. He stated that
the company could not disclose its contents because of its trade-sensitive information
(The Namibian, 27/10/2003). indirectly, his statement revealed the helplessness of the
Namibian authorities. Contrary to the epZ act (part V, 14.5.a ), they had not insisted
on the assessment of the environmental impact as a precondition for issuing an epZ
certificate in 2001. Nor did they now insist on the publication of the alleged report.
already at the beginning of december 2001, earthlife Namibia, a branch of the en-
vironmentalist NGo earthlife africa, had alerted four ministries, the municipality,
ramatex and the trade unions by writing of their concerns. earthlife demanded details
of the eia report now that the company had been certified. The reactions of the officials
concentrated rather on condemning the request. The environmentalists were accused of
putting at risk the countrys developmental efforts to attract foreign investors45. ironi-
cally, a year later, the phalanx of critics split. Minister Hamutenya condemned the city

45. Martin shipanga, the citys Ceo, suspected a south african plot behind earthlifes environ-
mental concerns, since sa had lost ramatex to Namibia (AZ, 19/12/2001). Minister Hamutenya
reacted with an open letter published in The Namibian on 1 february. He condemned earth-
lifes propaganda charade, dressed up as environmental concerns, their environmental concerns
being subversive to government development efforts and harmful to the national image. a
few days later, president Nujoma joined in the harsh critique (AZ, 4/2/2002). The mayor of
Windhoek, Matheus shikongo, accused the NGo of the sabotage of ramatex. (The Namibian,
1/2/2002).

Vo lk e r Win t e r f e l d t

for producing a subjective account of ramatexs environmental status (The Namibian,
28/3/2003).

from the start, the city had been in an awkward position. The city council felt that
it had to seize this seemingly golden opportunity for the industrial development of the
capital, which promised to give fresh impetus to the labour market. The citys executive
therefore warmly welcomed ramatex. on the other hand, a large part of the financial
and practical burden resulting from the incentives package offered by the government
to ramatex fell on the municipal budget. This included N$ 106 m for infrastructural
services, 160 hectares of municipal land free of charge and carrying the considerable
costs of urban development for the several thousand migrant jobseekers who flooded
the town in two major waves in January 2002 and May 2003, when flamingo Gar-
ment and rhino Textile started recruitment of trainees (AZ, 28/9/2001; The Namibian,
15/1/2002; Namibia Economist, 9/15/5/2003). in the meantime, the state watched from
the sidelines, being itself a debtor to the city to the tune of N$ 30 m for infrastructural
developments (The Namibian, 28/10/2005).

as well, ramatexs water consumption constitutes a substantial portion of Wind-
hoeks total consumption46. shortly after ramatex went into production, the munici-
pality had to declare a sizeable price increase in order to reduce consumption (AZ,
1/8/2002). Whether this was just a coincidence or not, Windhoeks residents were asked
to pay for the increase, whereas the firm had been granted preferential rates as part of
the initial incentives package. The preferential rates granted to ramatex amounted to
only 48% of the rates payable by other industrial water consumers (AZ, 2/7/2004).

in april 2004, Windhoeks residents were also called on to pay for an environmental
audit the city council decided to conduct at the otjomuise factory. Numerous concerns
had been raised about the evident water pollution. Towards the end of 2003, prelimi-
nary tests indicated that toxic substances from the factory might have seeped into one
of Windhoeks major aquifers. The following months revealed the extent of systematic
contamination. The wet processing for the purpose of dyeing textiles produces several
thousand cubic metres of polluted waste water and 1.9 tonnes of toxic salt daily (The
Namibian, 30/1/2004; 28/9/2004). The capital city has no facility for its safe disposal.

To this day, the company has not built the required plant for waste water treatment,
as had been stipulated in the contract between the city and ramatex. in the absence
of such a plant, ramatex temporarily stores the water in large evaporation/oxidation
ponds. filled beyond the limits of their capacity, the ponds overflow, dumping pollut-

46. Windhoeks consumption in the financial year 200102 amounted to 19.465 m cubic metres. as
far as ramatexs consumption is concerned, the picture is not clear. The percentages published by
the media vary considerably from 4.3% (i.e., 840,000 cubic metres, according to the city council)
to 3% (according to Martin shipanga, the citys Ceo), to 2.7% or 3.6% (according to the citys
chief environmentalist). in January 2002, ramatex had stated that its water consumption would
amount to 1,440 cubic metres of water per day. This figure adds up to the abovementioned 2.7%.
in March 2004, the municipality of Windhoek recorded a water consumption of 27,000 cubic
metres, in april 2004 of 53,671, in May of 47,000, corresponding throughout the year to
2.6% of the capitals total consumption. in october 2005, a consumption of 2,000 cubic metres
per day was indicated by the media, i.e., 3.7% of the capitals total consumption (AZ, 1/8/2002;
The Namibian, 23/1/2002; 2/4/2003; 2/7/2004; 12/10/2004; 28/10/2004). initially, Hafeni Ng-
hinamwaani, the then strategic executive of the department for economic development of the city
of Windhoek, maintained that the ramatex plant will not use potable (tap) water, but instead
use semi-purified water. Namibia Economist, 5/11/4/2002.

Lib e r a t e d e c on om y ?

ants into the groundwater as well as into the Goreangab dam, one of Windhoeks major
water reservoirs. The factory has also been accused of sprinkling excess waste water on
to open areas of its premises. residents in the neighbourhood of the works complained
not only of the stench emanating from the disposal of the waste water on the premises
but also recorded irritation to their skin and respiratory tracts. in violation of municipal
regulations, the company hired a private contractor to dispose of the sludge that forms
in the ponds (The Namibian, 21/12/2004; 4/11/2005).

several injunctions by the City fell on deaf ears. Caught in this environmental pre-
dicament, the municipality called in the Namibian government. after difficult negotia-
tions, an interministerial technical committee agreed on the decision that the city was
to build the recycling plant for ramatex. The costs, estimated at N$ 13 m, are to be
borne by the state (AZ, 28/12/2005).

Conclusions: liberalisation of social equity
The case study cannot but raise sceptical questions as to the developmental rating of
ramatexs Namibian initiative. enticing as the prospect of export-led industrialisation47
may seem, the structure within which it is to take place sets narrow limits to its eco-
nomic implementation, and even narrower ones to its potential for the social progress of
the majority of the population.

The players involved in this game of skewed give and take are unequal in power.
Their actions follow rules dictated by their respective contrasting economic, political
and social interests, but they are also shaped by the conditions set by the neoliberal im-
peratives of the global economy. Where the international mobility of capital invariably
outdistances the mobility of labour, tripartite relations between multinational capital,
state and labour are all the more skewed, right from the outset, where poverty provides
the national setting for the labour market in a developing economy.

acting within these structural constraints, the invitation that the Namibian gov-
ernment extends to international capital becomes logical. it is driven by the interest to
overcome the national economys dependence on the export of mineral resources and its
related negative global terms of trade. The drain of natural and social resources in co-
lonial times has left the countrys post-independence economy with insufficient capital
means for their processing, and with a skewed social structure.

The Namibian stakeholders, on the other hand, not only just identify with, and ex-
ecute, the governments developmental policies, but also, to an increasing extent, their
attitudes reflect their elitist perceptions and interests, both economic and social. They
form an emerging bourgeois class, more and more affluent, which in the new post-colo-

47. in debating the industrialisation strategy for developing economies based on a case study of ra-
matex, endresen and Bergene advocate small-scale industrialisation where production first serves
the national market and then selectively approaches the world market. Cogently arguing their
case, the authors point to the paradox in developmental policies of epZ-based textile industri-
alisation: Host governments subsidise heavily to keep them [the textile multinationals], which
paradoxically makes it easier for them to leave and relocate production. (endresen and Bergene
2006:89.) However, in the specific case of Namibia, the extreme limitations of a national market
with a population of just about 1.8 million of whom only one-tenth are taxpayers representing
worthwhile purchasing power, are also to be considered.

0

Vo lk e r Win t e r f e l d t

nial setting of Namibian society steps to the side of the traditional white middle classes
and capitalist entrepreneurship. Together, they nurture vested capitalist interests, which
tend to dupe other classes developmental aspirations. Thus, in adopting neoliberal para-
digms, both Namibian policies and Namibian political actors come to accept the social
costs of economic development and, as the case study shows, to neglect the social dam-
age. in departing from pre-independence visions of social equity, a characteristic theme
of the liberation struggle, present-day Namibian developmental strategies of financial
de-regulation reflect the class-shaped, capitalist restructuring of Namibian society.

Ramatexs demanding and ruthless attitude may seem extortionate due to the sheer
extent of its economic power, and it certainly is. But the multinational conglomerate
also submits to the force of circumstances, finding itself compelled to establish optimal
conditions of profitability in order to compete in the fierce global textile market. as a
result, the multinationals economic might cannot but call into doubt the expedience
of any unreserved liberalisation of capital imports. Much as the import of capital in
principle may be expected to have spin-off effects, in ramatexs Namibian case they do
not materialise.

The endeavours of Namibian labourers inevitably collide with any regime of maxim-
ised profitability. as well, they clash with the efforts of a set of national policies that aim
at establishing an attractive investment climate without being in a position to attach
strings to it that may be beneficial to the country. Too weak is their position as an un-
skilled workforce, too easily replaceable the individual employee, given the inexhaust-
ible reservoir of internal labour migrants in an economy ruled by poverty and more and
more de-regulated by flexible labour relations. Where, on top of that, national politics
bow to economic power to the extent of ignoring the countrys immigration rules, al-
lowing a substantial influx of an un- or semi-skilled foreign industrial workers, the vul-
nerability of its own internal migrants becomes even more pronounced. last but not
least, the trade unions room for manoeuvre has been narrowly restricted by ramatexs
short-sighted managerial arrogance, and, arguably, by their own close political affilia-
tion to the ruling party and government. The company successfully manages to play the
actors involved in the game off against each other different government institutions,
municipal bodies, national and foreign workforces, civil society and the public. labour-
ers and their corporate representatives are in a desperate position.

Contrasting economic and social interests, cultural conflicts over work ethos, dif-
ferent rules of the game for each player and unequally distributed power: the case study
of ramatex cannot but question the developmental impact of such policies of de-regu-
lation and of such generous incentives as were granted to attract the Malaysian com-
pany. Where investment is imported in kind, no additional capital circulates in the host
economy; no related expansion of investing or commercial activities ensues. Where the
productive employment of capital goods yields commodities exported without customs
revenue, the host country cannot capitalise on them. Where the internal market is not
given impetus, the host country cannot profit. Where exemption from taxation does not
stand the national budget in good stead, the only benefits are to be expected from em-
ployment of labour. Where the states budget finances most of the costs for vocational
training, it might be inappropriate to speak of skills transfer, as we rather witness inter-
nal skills generation. Where the additional purchasing power of salaries barely satisfies
the most basic needs, further productive incentives for the internal market are few and

Lib e r a t e d e c on om y ?

far from sustainable. Where fiscal revenue from salaries does not accrue, owing to small
annual incomes below the taxation threshold, there is no positive effect on the national
income.

does this hold out the prospect of social progress, as measured against the principles
of social equity? The liberal discourse, whether in its classical or its present shape, boldly
rests on the glorification of the principle of social retardation: first comes the successful
individual, the entrepreneur, then (if all goes well, and always to a lesser extent) society,
that productive majority actually instrumental in creating economic wealth. first come,
first served. The liberal economic ideology is not the epitome of social responsibility. it
is class-biased, and so is its concept of development.

The introductory remarks to this case study pointed to the contradictory paradig-
matic body of Namibias Vision 2030 document. it attempts to harmonise harsh eco-
nomic liberalism and the tempting vision of social welfare within the difficult frame-
work of a developing society. The analysis of ramatexs Namibian operations shows that
neoliberal economic orientations, seen in the long term, tend to affect or even negate
collective structures based on social solidarity. Conversely, any vision of social welfare
must make the preservation and promotion of collective structures of social solidarity
the focal point of accelerated sustainable development. Certainly, Vision 2030 warns of
the dangers of unbalanced globalisation to a much greater extent than the relevant Na-
mibian legislation and policies of de-regulation do. Yet, this conceptual contradiction
still remains central to the document and unresolved.

references

Cotton News from sub-saharan africa (2003), Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Lesotho
and Senegal a special issue of the Cotton Importer, update from the Cotton Board.
Memphis, Tennessee, usa

endresen, sylvi B. and ann Cecilie Bergene (2006), labour standards and the question of
industrialisation strategy. an african example, in H. Jauch and r. Traub-Merz (eds),
The future of the textile and clothing industry in sub-Saharan Africa. Bonn: friedrich
ebert stiftung, pp. 8095

eTi forum (ethical Trade initiative) (2004), MFA phase-out who gains? who loses?
london, 27 october 2004

Gurirab, Theo Ben (1988), Namibia in the context of imperialism, in B. Wood (ed),
Namibia 18841984: Readings on Namibias history and society. london and lusaka:
Namibia support Committee and united Nations institute for Namibia, pp. 413

institute for public policy research (2003), IPPR Economic Outlook One lump or two? (by
robin sherbourne). Windhoek, february 2003

international Textile, leather & Garment Workers federation, Targeting Multinationals
Project Ramatex Berhad profile. (No date or place of publication.)

Jauch, Herbert (2000), export processing Zones and the quest for sustainable
development: a southern african perspective, Environment & Urbanization, Vol. 14,
No. 1

Vo lk e r Win t e r f e l d t

(2006), africas clothing and textile industry: the case of ramatex in Namibia, in H.
Jauch and r. Traub-Merz (eds), The future of the textile and clothing industry in sub-
Saharan Africa. Bonn: friedrich ebert stiftung, pp. 21226

labour resource and research institute (larri) (2000), Export Processing Zones in
Namibia taking a closer look. Windhoek, March 2000

(2003), Ramatex on the other side of the fence. Windhoek, october 2003
Melber, Henning (2003), limits to liberation an introduction to Namibias postcolonial

political culture, in H. Melber (ed), Re-examining liberation in Namibia political
culture since independence. uppsala: Nordic africa institute

Mollet, andrew (2001), profile of ramatex a Malaysian group with investments in China
and south africa, Textile Outlook International, January 2001

Namibia investment Centre / offshore development Company (2003), InvestDevelop
Namibias Investment Newsletter: Smart partnerships drive development forward, issue
11, 8 december 2003, Windhoek

Namibian economic policy research unit (Nepru), Quarterly Economic Review No. 23,
october 1999, Windhoek

Quarterly Economic Review No. 27, december 1999, Windhoek
Quarterly Economic Review No. 44, March 2002, Windhoek
south West africa peoples organisation (2004), Vision, life and times of Hifikepunye Lucas

Pohamba. Windhoek (election pamphlet)
ramatex Textiles Namibia (pty) ltd (2002a), Flamingo Garments (Proprietary) Limited:

Letter of Appointment (template)
(2002b), Recognition Agreement between Ramatex Textiles Namibia (Pty) Ltd and the

Namibian Food and Allied Workers Union, 2 october 2002, Windhoek
(2002c), Recruitment Procedure (leaflet)
republic of Namibia (1990a), Government Gazette No. 2, Windhoek, 21 March 1990:

Constitution of the republic of Namibia
(1990b), Government Gazette No. 129, Windhoek, 28 december 1990: foreign

investments act No. 27 of 1990
(1995), Government Gazette No. 1069, Windhoek, 18 april 1995: export processing

Zones act No. 9 of 1995
republic of Namibia (1995b), Government of, Ministry of Trade and industry: EPZ

Business Plan for proposed Offshore Development Company. Windhoek, april 1995
republic of Namibia, Government of, Ministry of finance (2003),State Revenue Fund

Estimate of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 1 April 2003 31 March
2004. Windhoek

(2004), State Revenue Fund Estimate of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 1
April 2004 31 March 2005. Windhoek

(2005), State Revenue Fund Estimate of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 1
April 2005 31 March 2006. Windhoek

republic of Namibia, Government of, Ministry of Trade and industry, offshore
development Company (1999),EPZ Progress Report of December 1999

sherbourne, robin (2005), National Budget 2005/06: The continuity candidates budget,
in Intitute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) Opinion No. 17, May 2005, Windhoek

Lib e r a t e d e c on om y ?

Newspapers
Allgemeine Zeitung (AZ)
Namibia Economist
New Era
Republikein
The Namibian
Windhoek Observer

Websites
<http:www.agoa.gov/agoa_legislation/aGoii_summary.pdf>: US Trade Act of 2002
<http;//www.agoa.info/?view=country_info&country=na&stay=trade>: US imports from Namibia,

textiles and apparel
<http:www.asianlabour.org/archives/000772.php> (2004): Asian Labour News an online database

of news about workers in southeast asia and China and the issues that affect them: Mainlnd
workers at Malaysian factory in Namibia call it quits 5 february 2004

<http://derstandard.at/druck/?id=2092228>: Der Standard online: Ironie der Globalisierung
<http;//www.dispatch.co.za/2001/06/21/easterncape/aaiNCeNT.HTM>: Eddie Botha: Call for

review of tax incentives
<http://www.fdimagazine&/aGoa_extension_to_boost_us-africa_textile_trade.htm>
<http://www.foei.org/trade/activistguide/mfa.htm>: The Citizens Guide to Trade, Environment and

Sustainability Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA) and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
(ATC)

<http://www.grnnet.gov.na/News/archive/2002/april/Week4/ramatex.htm>
<http://www.grnnet.gov.na/News/archive/2005/february/week2/agreements_rpt.htm>: Joint press

statement by the Government, NAFAU and Ramatex February 2005
<http;//www.irinnews.org/print.asp?reportid+45451>: UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs Namibia: Textile industry faces multiple challenges
<http;//www.itglwf.org>: website of the international Textile, Garment and leather Workers

federation
<http://www.laborrights.org/press/namibia_textiles0505.htm>: UN Integrated Regional Information

Networks Namibia: Textile sector stumbles as foreign owners pull out
<http://www.namibweb.com/tin.htm>: NamibWeb.com The online guide to Namibia: incentives

for investors
<http:www.namibianembassyusa.org/Trade%20&%20investment/profiles.php>: official website of

the embassy of the republic of Namibia in Washington, usa
<http;//www.queensu.ca/samp/migration>: February 2005
<http://www.ramatex.com.>
<http;//www.sadocc.at/news/2005/2005-105.shtml>: Southern Africa Documentation and Cooperation

Centre Uncertain future for the countrys textile industry 22 April 2005
<http://www.un.namibia.de/uN-arch/2005/un_05_02.php#news02>: IRIN News Brief
<http://www.windhoekcc.org.na/default.aspx?page=120>: City of Windhoek Ramatex investment in

the City of Windhoek

old ties or new shackles?
China in Namibia

Gregor Dobler

one of the first things you see of Namibia when you drive into the country from angola
on oshikangos main road (after passing large billboards promoting the frequent use of
Tafel lager, Coca Cola and safe ryder condoms) are the large red letters on the brown
wall of a new warehouse complex, welcoming you to China Town. China Town is one
of two large complexes currently under construction in oshikango by Chinese investors
(the other is called China Village). Together, they will add about 70 new Chinese shops
to the 20 odd already in existence in oshikango.

China Village and China Town are very real symbols of Chinas growing presence in
africa. Both shop owners and investors are Chinese, the complex was built by Chinese
construction companies, and the new shops prospective angolan clients will pay for the
Chinese goods with petrodollars in turn earned largely from exports to China.

symbolic as they may be, the new shops are just a small example of Chinas growing
influence in africa. The peoples republic re-entered the african scene only towards
the turn of the millennium, but since then the countrys engagement in africa has been
growing at a truly amazing pace and Chinas rise as an economic and political power is
likely to change africas international relations more profoundly than any other major
trend since the crumbling of the soviet union and the end of apartheid. Chinas high
need for raw materials and the equally high output of the countrys immensely competi-
tive export industry have profoundly altered terms of trade and thus affected the distri-
bution of wealth both between and within many african countries, while the political
engagement accompanying economic expansion has changed the african diplomatic
landscape.

in oshikangos China Village, three major trends of Chinas growing influence on
african countries are visible in a nutshell: africa is supplying China with commodities
for its expanding industries while importing more and more goods manufactured by
these industries. Chinas economic engagement is accompanied by financial aid that has
contributed to the creation of a market for Chinese industries most visible in the con-

. TheconstructionofChinaTownhadstartedslightlyearlier,in00.Theinvestmentwasmade
bythepioneering Chinesebusinessmanin independentNamibia, ironicallyaTaiwanesena-
tionalwhohadalreadybuiltWindhoeksChinaTown.ChinaVillagewasbuiltbyanotherlong-
standingexpatriatemainlandChinesebusinessmanforaboutN$m.

. AccordingtoITCtrademapdata(UNCTAD),Chinaimported%ofAngolastotaloilexports
in00,withoilexportsmakingup.%oftotalAngolanexportstoChina(Goldsteinetal.
00:).TheIMFsDirectionofTradedatastatethat%oftotalAngolanexportswentto
China in00 (Goldsteinetal.00:0),whileoil accounted for.%ofAngolasoverall
exports.

O l d t i e s o r n e w s h a ck l e s ?

struction sector, where the market share of Chinese companies has been rapidly growing
throughout southern africa.

These three elements commodity export, competition in the construction industry
and the import of manufactured goods by Chinese migrant entrepreneurs will be used
in the current article as examples to assess Chinas role in the Namibian economy. The
aim of this overview is neither to praise Chinas growing presence as a south-south al-
ternative to neocolonialism nor to deplore it as new economic imperialism. instead, the
article intends to show the extent to which the Namibian economy is already linked to
the Chinese. The real question will not be whether to applaud or condemn the Chinese
influence, but how to channel it in ways that benefit Namibia instead of cementing its
old role in global structures of economic and political dependency.

Before concentrating on Namibia, however, it is useful to review some of the major
trends in China-africa relations.

China in africa: some major trends
during the Cold War years, Chinas interest in africa was largely political. The peoples
republic was trying to overcome its political isolation through links with the conti-
nents socialist governments and liberation movements. economic benefits for China
were mostly small or negative. China-africa cooperation rested largely on a rhetoric of
anti-imperialistic solidarity symbolised by the Bandung conference in 1955: the afro-
asian bloc was seeking to counter the dominance of Western colonial countries.

since Chinese economic reforms triggered an unprecedented economic boom based
on manufacturing, Chinas interests in africa have shifted from the political arena to the
economic. The main motivation is the increasing need for the raw materials of industrial
production. Today, China is the worlds largest producer of personal computers: even in
2001, 50% of all cameras, 30% of all air conditioners and 25% of all washing machines
were manufactured in China. in order to sustain an average annual economic growth
of around 8%, China needs to secure the import of a wide array of commodities and it
is mainly due to Chinese demand that world market prices for virtually all commodities
have risen sharply over the last years. Between 2000 and 2003, China contributed 76%,
95%, 99% and 100% of the increase in global demand for aluminium, steel, nickel and
copper respectively (kaplinsky, McCormick, Morris 2006:5). The most visible example
of growing Chinese demand, however, is oil. China changed from a net exporter of pet-
rol to a net importer in 2001 and has since been seeking new import markets in african
countries such as sudan, Chad and angola. Today, the country procures 28% of its oil
and natural gas from africa (CCS China Monitor 04, 2006:3).

on the other hand, Chinese exports of manufactured goods to african countries
have been increasing tremendously. imports from China still represented only 6.5%
of african imports in 2004, but this figure was only 1% in 1990. since 2000, african

. Foranoverview,seee.g.,Alden00;Goldsteinetal.00;Humphrey,Messner00;Kaplin-
sky,McCormick,Morris00,Lyman00;Payne,Veney;Shinn00.

. www.worldbank.org/transitionnewsletter/octnovdec0/pgs-.htm(Oct00).

Grego r Dob l e r

imports from China have shown average annual growth rates of 33% (Goldstein et al.
2006:7f.).

Chinas increasing demand for commodities and its high output of cheap manufac-
tured goods have shifted terms of trade in favour of countries exporting raw materials
and importing manufactured goods among them many african countries. They profit
from higher export gains and cheaper import prices. Without the appropriate policy
measures, however, Chinas emergence may cement the dependency of many african
countries on the export of raw materials an economic position that tends to come with
high vulnerability due to price volatility and with high inequality due to corruption and
rent-seeking.

The main losers in the shift in the terms of trade have been countries exporting
manufactured goods. in africa, the textile sector has suffered most severely from Chi-
nese competition on third markets after the trade barriers for Chinese textile imports
to the us and the eu were partially lifted in 2004 (see Volker Winterfelds article on
ramatex in this volume).

While China used economic aid to gain political benefits during the Cold War
years, this relation has shifted today. The peoples republic promotes its trade interests
by political means: high profile diplomacy and the rhetoric of anti-colonial solidarity
are still omnipresent 50 years after Bandung. Chinese foreign policy in africa relies on a
large number of embassies and on many high-profile visits to and from africa. Chinese
foreign ministers have been visiting african countries every year since the late 1980s,
and Chinese presidents have made frequent official visits to the continent. Whenever
Chinese diplomats meet their african counterparts, both sides stress mutual friend-
ship and common interests as formerly colonised developing countries. as the Chinese
africa policy issued in early 2006 puts it, sharing similar historical experience, China
and africa have all along sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle for
national liberation and forged a profound friendship. The Chinese government stresses
african countries independent choice of road and does not link aid to political con-
ditionalities apart from the acceptance of the one China principle, prohibiting official
relations to Taiwan. This policy of non-interference paved the way for substantial oil
deals with sudan and infrastructure projects and military deals in Zimbabwe when
these countries where internationally isolated and shunned by both Western donors and
multinationals.

all in all, China has been very successful in establishing and maintaining the rheto-
ric of mutual solidarity and south-south cooperation. This insistence on common inter-
ests and historic friendship often masks very tangible economic and political advantages
for China. its political impact in africa, however, is considerable all the more as it
comes with real benefits, like debt relief, diplomatic cooperation in the international
arena and an increasing amount of development assistance.

. TheAfricapolicyisavailableonvariousofficialinternetsites;ahandypdfversionwasprepared
bytheInstituteforSecurityStudies:http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/chi-
naafrica/afrpolicyjan0.pdf(May00).

. Chinahasbeenquitesuccessful inenforcingitsTaiwanpolicy inAfrica.In000,onlyeight
AfricanstatesstillhadofficialrelationswithTaiwan.Liberia(00)andSenegal(00)have
sincesidedwithChina,leavingonlyBurkinaFaso,Chad,TheGambia,Malawi,SãoToméand
PrincipeandSwaziland.

O l d t i e s o r n e w s h a ck l e s ?

China-Namibia diplomatic ties are no exception to the general trend. They are root-
ed in Chinese support of sWapo and the liberation struggle before 1990. in 1964,
when Moscow and Beijing were competing for allies among africas left wing liberation
movements, sam Nujoma was invited to Beijing: he came back with funds he used to
buy a land rover for sWapos exile work and with high esteem for the Chinese leader-
ship (appolus 2004). sWapo was officially allied to Moscow and never really changed
sides, while the rival sWaNu movement was on Chinas side for some time (Gibson
1972:12031). in spite of these rivalries, relations between the peoples republic and
sWapo remained good (for a detailed analysis, see Taylor 1997). Chinas support in
the uN security Council for Namibias case against the south african occupation and
the detachment of military instructors to train sWapos plaN combatants in Tan-
zania are often evoked by politicians from both sides, as is the fact that China was one
of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the newly independent state
in 1990. still today, sWapo party sees China as a natural ally and as a partner in the
struggle for economic independence from neocolonialism.

over the years, sam Nujoma has visited China 12 times, often accompanied by
important trade delegations. on his last official visit in 2004, he was presented with the
Chinese translation of his autobiography a well-received symbolic gesture typical of
Chinese-african diplomatic relations. Jiang Zemin came to Namibia in 1996 and other
high-level representatives of both countries exchange visits on a regular basis. on all
these occasions, both sides have stressed mutual friendship and the common struggle
for a more just world system, often mentioning stronger south-south ties as a means to
improve african lives. as He shijing, Chinese chargé daffaires in Namibia, put it, We
both faced a common task and struggle against imperialism, but now have a similar one
which is for the economic development of our countries.

primary sector commodities
although Namibian exports rely heavily on primary sector commodities, direct Chi-
nese involvement in the Namibia raw material market has until now not been very
prominent. While Chinese firms are concluding deals with commodity exporters all
over the continent, no major contracts have been negotiated with Namibian producers
yet. This is partly due to the tight control over Namibias mineral production through
established distribution networks and long-term contracts. in 2003, 41% of overall
Namibian exports were diamonds, exclusively controlled by Namdeb, a joint venture
between de Beers and the Namibian government, and 15% consisted of other mineral
products (mainly copper, uranium and zinc) stemming from large mines mostly owned
and controlled by overseas firms (directorate of international Trade 2005:4).

as there are no known oil reserves in Namibia, Chinese interests in this field have
so far been confined to neighbouring angola. The most substantial Namibian explora-
tion deal of recent years, however, included a Chinese contractor. in february 2005,
Circle oil (an oil company based in limerick, ireland, and listed on the london stock

. New Era,/0/00.Thestatementwasmadeontheoccasionofadonationof$0,000to
SWAPOpartyby theChineseCommunistParty, earmarked forprintinganddistributionof
partymaterials.

Grego r Dob l e r

exchange alternative investment Market) announced an agreement by which China
shine H f, a Chinese state-owned company was said to take over 72% of Circle oils
prospecting licence (later upgraded to an exploration licence) covering most of northern
Namibia: Circle oil was to retain 18% and the Namibian state-owned NaMCor
10%. High expectations were somewhat dampened when it turned out that China
shine would pay its share not in cash but by drilling at least three wells and acquiring
seismic data, but still, the companys budget for the Namibian project was announced
to be over $ 1 bn and 2,000 workers were expected to start work on the ground in late
2005. in June 2006, however, the deal was still not finalised and Circle oil was negoti-
ating with other possible investors, as China shine had not yet fulfilled its commitments
and no work had started on the ground.

in 2004, Namibias rössing mine became the first Western producer to export ura-
nium oxide to China. The mine increased its output to counter the negative effects of
the weak us dollar and found a willing buyer in Chinas national nuclear industry. so
far, the amounts exported have been rather small (106 tons in 2004, Allgemeine Zeitung,
14/7/2005 and 109 tons in 2005, Republikein, 7/6/2006), but as China is planning to
increase its nuclear power-generating capacity from 6 GW to over 30 GW by 2020
while a second Namibian uranium mine is scheduled to become operational in late
2006, uranium oxide exports from Namibia to China may increase in the future.

The most important field of primary sector exports to China is less publicised, as
it does not involve mineral resources: Chinese firms have invested in joint ventures in
Namibias fishing industry since independence and in 2003 about 80% of Namibian
exports to China consisted of fish and fish products.

overall, the export of Namibian primary sector commodities to China (as indeed
Namibian exports to China as a whole) is rather insignificant if compared to, for ex-
ample, angolan exports to China. The indirect effects of Chinas emergence on the
Namibian primary sector economy, however, are large. as outlined above, commodity
prices have risen sharply over the last years mainly due to the increasing Chinese and
indian demand. World market copper prices, for example, rose by 58% in 2004 (Gold-
stein et al. 2006:31), largely triggered by rising demand from China (and, to a lesser
degree, from india). This should have profited ongopolo Mining and processing, the
principal Namibian copper producer, after a strong south african rand had negatively
affected the company in the years before 2004. The expansion process took longer than
expected, however, and the debts amassed while financing new production sites proved
fatal for the company. amid allegations of mismanagement, ongopolo was taken over
by the British company Weatherly international in June 2006.

World market prices for other minerals produced by Namibia mostly uranium,
zinc, gold and marble have risen sharply since 2004, helping the Namibian economy
to achieve a growth rate of 5.9% in 2004.0 The commodity boom has triggered inten-

. See, among others: http://www.circleoil.com/site/news/press_release000.htm; http://
www.circleoil.com/site/news/press_release0000.html; http://www.circleoil.com/site/doc-
uments/Interim_Report_%0June000.pdf(allJune00).

. http://www.altonsa.co.za/rossing/reports/Rossing%0Stakeholder%0Report%000.pdf
(June00)

0. IncreaseinrealGDP.Thisexceptionallyhighfigureispartlyduetoa%increaseindiamond
productionafter theextensionof theElisabethBaymineandan increase inoffshoremining

O l d t i e s o r n e w s h a ck l e s ?

sive prospecting activity in the country. New mining sites for zinc, uranium, copper and
gold have become operational or are scheduled to become operational in the near future,
while the projected life of existing mines is constantly extended due to higher marginal
gains. rössing, for example, has announced that the uranium mines projected life has
been extended from 2009 to 2016.

due to the rise of China in the world economy, terms of trade become more favoura-
ble for commodity exporters such Namibia (just as they became less favourable after the
end of the soviet union, when exports from the former soviet union increased compe-
tition and made prices crumble). depending on the political and economic framework,
however, this can be a mixed blessing. income from mining is not sustainable, but will
cease over time: it will only provide the means for sustainable growth when it is used to
further the economic potential of a country in other sectors. unlike the export of manu-
factured goods, however, the export of primary commodities creates income without
any constructive effort, often tempting elites to seek quick rents rather than to invest in
sustainable economic development. Commodity exports thus often increase vulnerabil-
ity from external factors without benefiting larger portions of the population.

This is aggravated when world market demand and prices for a commodity are vola-
tile. Many economists have voiced concern about Chinas effect on commodity price
volatility. China is regarded as a swing producer, quickly adapting its export produc-
tion to changes in the price for manufactured goods. due to the size of the Chinese
economy and its high importance for global commodity demand, shifts in the countrys
production can quickly affect world market prices (for a more detailed discussion, see
e.g., Goldstein et al. 2006:31).

it is too early to assess the effects of Chinas rise on the resource curse and on the
vulnerability of the Namibian economy. one thing, however, is clear: when a countrys
dependency on commodity exports increases, the economic policy framework must
become more intelligent and more resourceful. partly due to Chinas growing weight
in the world economy, the relative importance of commodity export for the Namibian
economy is increasing. it remains to be seen if economic policy follows, translating im-
proving terms of trade into improved livelihoods for the majority of Namibian citizens.

Construction industry
Many export contracts in the mining and energy sector have been facilitated through
active Chinese diplomacy in africa. The same channel has been decisive for infrastruc-
ture projects and for the Chinese construction industry in general. Chinese building
contractors have often made their first appearance on african markets through public
projects funded by Chinese government loans or grants (for an early assessment of the
strategies, see Bräutigam 1983). it has, of course, long been common for Western gov-
ernments to link development assistance to contracts for the donor countrys industry
and it comes as no surprise that China is imitating the practice. it seems, however, that

activity;butothermininggrewby0.%,profitingfromthefactthatanewzincminebecame
operational (http://www.bon.com.na/docs/pub/economic%0outlook%0000.PDF,
June00).

00

Grego r Dob l e r

China is playing the game more skilfully and in some cases more ruthlessly than
Western donor countries.

The list of public contracts awarded to Chinese companies and backed by Chinese
government money is long. in angola, China today accounts for over 60% of the coun-
trys foreign loans. from 2002 to early 2006, angola received $ 5.5 bn in Chinese loans
and an additional $ 3 bn was granted in June 2006 (CCS China Monitor, 04/2006:16;
The Namibian, 27/06/2006). The major part of that sum has been awarded through
the Chinese eximbank for a credit line for reconstruction, guaranteed by oil exports.
The building projects financed with the amount are mostly carried through by Chinese
firms among many others, hundreds of kilometres of road construction, a $ 3 bn oil
refinery in lobito (CCS China Monitor 03/2006:19), 44 15-floor buildings in Cabinda
and 5,000 additional apartments in a village nearby. Copper mining by China-based
pan asia oasis inc. is also profiting from a $ 211 m loan from the Chinese government
to rebuild roads leading to the area.

Chinese help for its own industry not only comprises loans and guarantees, it also
includes logistical and political support. in Mozambique, for example, the Chinese
embassy is actively informing Chinese construction companies of upcoming tenders.
partly due to this promotion of tender opportunities, a third of Mozambiques current
road construction projects (approx. 600 km of roads) are carried out by Chinese road
contractors (Bosten 2006:5f).

While projects of that size have so far been absent in Namibia, a large variety of
prominent public construction contracts have gone to Chinese companies. China Jiang-
su international Namibia ltd. was responsible for the construction of the supreme court
in Windhoek (199497), the new police and prison training college in the same city
(199697) and the new magistrates court in katutura (199799). China Beijing Cor-
poration for international economic Co-operation built 102 houses in katima Mulilo
in 1999, funded through an interest-free Chinese government loan. Northern Tannery
in ondangwa, built in 200002 and shut down in 2006, was financed by the Chinese
government as well and constructed by China Nanjing international Namibia Con-
struction (The Namibian, 14/06/2000). The private Chinese firm New era investment
was responsible for, among many other public projects, the new town council building
in Helao Nafidi Town, inaugurated in april 2006 by president pohamba.

The most prominent instance of Chinese involvement in public construction projects
is the new state House on the outskirts of Windhoek. as with Heroes acre, the main
contractors are North korean firms. after the Chinese government donated N$ 55 m

.Theplanning andprojectionof the citysproject is expected tomatchAsian andEuropean
urbanconceptswhileutmostcarewillbetakentoensurethat it fallswithinthe lifestyleand
architectoniccharacteristicsofthecountry,JuLizao,arepresentativeoftheChinesefirmsaid.
This urbanisation project will create ,000 local and ,000 Chinese jobs at minimum cost
whileensuringquality.Theprojectisexpectedtospanover0months.CCS China Monitor,
0/00:.

. CCS China Monitor 0/00:.TheseloansandgrantswidenthepoliticalmarginfortheAn-
golangovernment,allowingnon-compliancewithWesternandinternationaldonoragendas.A
Chinesesoftloanof$bntoAngolacameafterWesterndonorspostponedadonorsconference
meetingduetoconcernsaboutcorruption.Theloancamewithagraceperiodofyearsandis
repayableoveryearsat.%.ItisboundtobespentonChinesecontractsandhelpedChina
outbidIndiaonanoildeal.(Kaplinsky,McCormick,Morris00:0).

0

O l d t i e s o r n e w s h a ck l e s ?

for the construction of state House in 2002 (with no strings attached, as a spokesman
of the Namibian government told the press), a Chinese company was given a share in
the project without public tender. in May 2005, another generous grant by the Chinese
government for the building of the new state House was announced, but its amount was
not disclosed. in april 2006, during the budget debate in parliament, it surfaced that
the presidential home attached to state House would be wholly donated by the Chi-
nese government and built by Chinese companies. it was announced that the Chinese
government would tender for the construction in China (The Namibian, 21/04/2006),
thereby possibly introducing new players to the Namibian market.

While Chinese construction companies came into the Namibian market in the late
1990s by tendering for public projects often backed by Chinese government money,
they have since moved into the private sector and are making life very difficult for the
remaining Namibian and south african construction companies. Chinese companies
market share is estimated to be anywhere between a third and two thirds of the con-
struction market (Insight Namibia 04/2006:19) and it is growing. The main reason for
the Chinese success is pricing: Chinese firms are undercutting Namibian competitors
on a regular basis. experts say that profit margins on government construction projects
have declined from 30% to 10% or 15% due to Chinese companies (Insight Namibia
04/2006:20) a reduction that simultaneously saves public funds and creates local
unemployment. Chinese contractors claim that their success is due to hard work, reli-
ability and efficiency, while local construction companies were characterised by inflated
profit margins, the frequent missing of deadlines and low productivity prior to the ar-
rival of international competitors.

local companies reply by accusing Chinese firms of unfair competition. industry
representatives such as the Cif (Construction industry federation) have claimed that
Chinese firms profited from preferential treatment in the allocation of tenders and that
government was unwilling to force Chinese companies to comply with Namibian la-
bour laws. They even spread rumours that convicts were used as forced labour on the
construction sites in order to cut costs. allegations of political protection and favourit-
ism are difficult to prove or disprove. While it is not unlikely that political influence and
corruption play a role in large public contracts (government infrastructure projects are
notoriously prone to corruption worldwide), i have not come across any tangible proof of
rigged tenders or unfair competition. at the very least, these allegations are an indicator
of the growing resentment against Chinese competitors among local businesspeople.

all in all, while Chinese competition makes life difficult for the Namibian construc-
tion industry, Chinese competition seems to have had a favourable effect on productiv-
ity and efficiency in the sector and lowered construction costs in the country. Chinese
firms should, however, be more rigorously supervised as to their compliance with Na-
mibian labour laws, and, where public tenders are concerned, preferential treatment
of local firms or stricter regulations regarding the employment of local workers should
certainly be considered.

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Grego r Dob l e r

Chinese migrant entrepreneurs
China shops

in everyday life, the most striking aspect of Chinas growing importance for Namibia
is the omnipresence of Chinese shops in the country, selling everything from tractors
to sports bags, from camping tables to pirated perfumes. There is no Namibian town
without its China shop, and in many larger villages the only shop selling anything other
than sugar, cooking oil, soap and beer is owned by a Chinese migrant. all of these mi-
grants have come from China since 1990, looking for business opportunities outside the
highly regulated and crowded Chinese economy.

The following overview is informed by a case study in oshikango, the main trading
post on the angolan border a special situation, as most shops in the town are living
off the offshore wholesale trade into angola (for more details see dobler 2005, 2007,
2008). Many aspects, however, from trade organisation to the difficulties with work
permits, are general features of the life of Chinese migrants in Namibia.

oshikango is a small but vibrant town on the border with angola. due to the towns
position on the main road linking Namibia to angola, it is also the main trade hub
between the two countries. large warehouses sell all kinds of imported goods wholesale
to angolan traders. Most of the warehouses operate offshore the goods are imported
in bond for export to angola, without paying Namibian import duties and taxes on
them. The most important goods traded in oshikango are used cars, beer and liquor,
furniture, white goods and clothing articles. Chinese shops mainly deal in clothing, tex-
tiles, shoes, electronics and all kinds of cheap consumer goods, but also in motorcycles,
furniture and small tractors.

oshikango is the ideal place to do business in the angolan market without actually
investing in angola. political and economic conditions are stable and foreseeable, and
an excellent road (and in the near future a railway line) links the town to the southern
african ports of durban, Cape Town and Walvis Bay. Many investors are still reluctant
to invest in angola: they fear political interference and insecurity, and are unwilling
to comply with the more demanding angolan rules for foreign investments (like the
obligation to form a joint venture with an angolan partner). since about 2003, how-
ever, oshikango has lost some of its appeal. apart from infrastructure development in
angola, giving viable in-country alternatives to angolan wholesalers, this is mainly due
to the strong rand and to the enforcement of angolan import duties. a large part of
the angolan economy functions on a us-dollar basis. While one us dollar would buy
13 rands/Namibian dollars in 2003, it was worth only N$ 6.2 in early 2006, signifi-
cantly lessening angolan buying power in oshikango. an even heavier blow came in
2004, when angola employed the British firm Crown agents to supervise the customs
office in santa Clara, the angolan border post opposite oshikango. Before that, import

. Thirteenmonthsoffieldworkwerecarriedoutin00and00,focusingoneconomicandpo-
liticaltransformationintheborderboomtown.Toprotectmyinformants,whopartlyentrusted
mewithrathersensitivebusinessinformation,Ihavetriedtomakethemunrecognisableinmy
descriptions.Thisaccountsformyoftenrathervagueascriptionofcitations.

. Consequences forAngolan clients arenot asheavy asonemight expect, asmany imports to
OshikangoarealsopaidinUSdollars,particularlyusedcars,furnitureandallkindsofChinese
goods.Beerandliquorsales,however,havebeenhighlyaffectedbythestrongRand.

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O l d t i e s o r n e w s h a ck l e s ?

duties and consumption taxes, introduced in 2002 and amounting to up to 60%, were
often avoided through bribery. as this practice continues at other border posts, many
angolan traders make large and costly detours in order to import goods purchased in
oshikango through the katwitwe or Calueque border posts.

Most Chinese-owned shops in oshikango sell wholesale to the angolan market.
They import large quantities of goods: many shops receive up to ten 40 foot containers
of merchandise per month. for larger quantities, the goods are usually ordered directly
from the factory, while lesser quantities are bought through wholesalers in China. The
ability to deal with Chinese suppliers and government offices and to find new articles or
better suppliers for the same article is the main asset Chinese traders in oshikango have.
The problem is to bring the things here. once they are here, selling is easy. angolans
buy everything, a trader told me. The cultural skills necessary to buy successfully on
the cheap Chinese market (obviously including language skills) makes them exclusive
and prevents Namibian competition. The cultural skills for selling in oshikango are
acquired by most migrants on the job including rudimentary english and portu-
guese.

due to their access to Chinese markets, the migrant entrepreneurs can undercut
prices for comparable goods produced elsewhere. You can buy leather belts for N$ 5,
radio cassette players for N$ 40 or soccer shoes for N$ 45 (Namibian retail prices, in-
cluding all taxes). Quality is poor for some goods, but not for all: Chinese traders often
complain that angolan and Namibian customers do not perceive differences in quality
and only compare prices.

The profit margins of the first Chinese traders were very high, but competition
quickly led to lower margins. Chinese shops in oshikango are fierce competitors for
each other. They do not fix prices, nor are they shy to copy successful business ideas
from their neighbours. Whenever new merchandise introduced by one of the shops is
selling nicely, other shops are quick to order similar items and sell them at lower prices.
even brands established by one of the larger traders have been pirated by his colleagues
through different Chinese factories.

The Chinese migrants come to Namibia to create a living for themselves and to
escape the constraints of the Chinese domestic economy. They expend a lot of energy,
hard work and creativity on their business, and many of them are very successful. How-
ever, their work benefits not only themselves and their families, it is also of enormous
relevance to the Chinese economy. Today, Chinese migrant entrepreneurs are living in
every country of the world, and in every african town there are Chinese shops selling
goods produced in the peoples republic. The single shops are often small, but collec-
tively they form a highly efficient network of sales outlets for Chinese industries largely
independent of government initiatives. The Chinese government has certainly changed
emigration rules and created greater room for business initiatives and its diplomats are
constantly busy with securing the favours of foreign governments, but the main input
for Chinese shops comes from the migrant entrepreneurs. if there is today no country in

. Thereis,however,agenerationalgaphere:whiletheolderChinesemigrantsoftendonotspeak
anyforeignlanguagebeforecomingtoNamibia,manyoftheyounghaveagoodworkingknowl-
edgeofEnglish.ThisreflectstheenormousimprovementsintheChineseeducationsystemin
thelasttwodecades.

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Grego r Dob l e r

the world where Chinese goods do not form part of peoples everyday life, that is largely
due to these migrants.

starting from a very low basis, Namibias imports from China have grown at a stag-
gering pace since approximately the turn of the millennium. according to iTs trade data,
Namibian imports of manufactured goods from China have grown from $ 132,700 in
1996 to $ 1.5 m in 1999, $ 9.3 m in 2002 and more than $ 20 m in 2003. as the growth
rates reflect the process of adjustment due to Chinas integration into the world markets,
they will eventually slow down when Chinas relative weight in the world economy is
reflected by its weight on the Namibian market. until that point is reached, however,
both Namibian businesses and traditional exporters on the Namibian market will have
to live with constantly declining market shares and dwindling margins.

Problems of legality

for most Chinese nationals in Namibia today, getting a work permit is the single most
essential prerequisite for success in business. When we are here, we can always make
money in some way or the other. if we have to go back to China, it is much more dif-
ficult. The days when one could easily get a work permit for establishing a retail shop
are over. Chinese shops are present in every Namibian town, and both the public and
politicians are growing more and more concerned about the negative effects on local
industries and on the locally owned retail trade. it has even become difficult for shop
owners to get work permits for relatives as assistants in their businesses, and a new
migrant without connections (and more often than not without the necessary language
skills) does not have a realistic chance on his own to get a work permit issued. There are,
however, still several options for new migrants.

perhaps the most common option is to pay established Chinese businessmen in
Namibia who act as immigration brokers. They take charge of the necessary docu-
ments and provide both housing and a work place for the new arrival. Their charges can
amount to well over N$ 100,000. Most of that sum is gradually paid back by working
for the broker. after about three or four years, when they have paid back the brokers
fees, new arrivals have also acquired the necessary skills and local knowledge to start a
business of their own.

a second option seems to be more common still. instead of paying a broker for the
whole package, new migrants (either people with business experience elsewhere and
some capital, or new business partners or relatives of Chinese living in Namibia) only
pay for the service of a well-connected Chinese person who assists them in getting their
work permit. informants differed as to the price of this service, but the average sum
mentioned was about N$ 20,000. all informants were convinced that part of that sum
went to senior Home affairs officials, the rest to the broker, but they were unclear about
the respective shares.

While migrants complain about the rising sums involved, they accept them as the
unavoidable entrance fee into a new world of opportunities. They are taught the rules of
the game by their predecessors and they care more about the outcome than about legal-
ity. None of these rules are made by them, anyway. if they are concerned about the lack
of legality, it is because it heightens both their risks and the leverage of the brokers. You

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O l d t i e s o r n e w s h a ck l e s ?

know, people talk so much about corruption. You cant just go there and give money to
an officer. if he doesnt know you, he will not take it, and maybe arrest you. so there are
only very few people who know those in charge for a long time, they are friends, and
they know, if i take money from this one, it will be okay.

With work permits becoming scarcer or more expensive, more and more Chinese
entrepreneurs are looking for alternative, cheaper ways to come by them or simply
ignore the risks of illegality. There are Chinese citizens who have been living in the
country for years on a long expired tourist visa, relying on their luck not to get caught.
a more promising way for creative entrepreneurs is to serve or to do lip service to the
penchants of their host countrys officials. While the Namibian government has gradu-
ally realised that there may be enough Chinese retail shops in Namibia, they are still
keen to attract investors for manufacturing. More and more Chinese are thus thinking
about establishing production facilities in Namibia. There is, for example, a Chinese
firm producing duvets for export in the otherwise more or less manufacturing-deserted
oshikango export processing Zone (epZ) park. Nothing could be more welcome to
Namibia, even if the cotton, the textiles and the sewing machines are imported from
China. i was at first puzzled why anyone should care to sew duvets in Namibia instead
of importing them from China at lower costs. The answer, at least according to the gen-
eral consensus of Chinese pavement radio, is simple: the main outcome of the venture
is not duvets, but work permits. With such a workshop, you will get work permits for
maybe 20 or 30 technicians. Two or three of them actually work there, the rest is work-
ing somewhere in a shop.

The shops the additional migrants are working in often have no connection to the
manufacturing business. Work permits have actually become just another commodity,
a source of income for Chinese businessmen established in Namibia. Many of them are
now busy establishing all sorts of manufacturing plants in order to sell the opportunity
of legal employment to fellow countrymen. They typically spend about N$ 50,000 for
the import of machinery, money easily recovered by the selling of three work permits.

Chinese who have been in the country for some time and are keen on establishing
their own businesses usually keep a close watch on government policy. When president
pohamba in a speech urged Namibians to enhance computer skills and infrastructure, a
young Chinese took it as a sign that a computer service and training centre could meet
with the favour of Home affairs. everybody talks about manufacturing. But service
is, i think, good too. it is good for Namibia. and you dont need so much money. if
you import machines, even if they dont work, just for show, you have to pay a lot of
money for transport. With computers, that could work. i can still do some business at
the same time.

immigration laws are a field of state administration in which migrants all over the
world are likely to become criminal at one point or another. Most of those who have
tried to get a work permit or a new id card from Home affairs will probably under-
stand, if not approve of, the temptation for somebody who is neither proficient in the
language nor familiar with the system to get his papers in a more expeditious way. il-
licit activities of Chinese nationals in Namibia are not limited to immigration offences,
however. There are indicators that organised crime in Namibia has its Chinese face,
too. Chinese shops in Windhoek are paying for protection: the gangs who control that
business are equally involved in international drug dealing into and through Namibia,

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Grego r Dob l e r

in cigarette smuggling and in the human trafficking of illegal prostitutes from south
africa to Namibia. in the north, Chinese nationals are involved in large-scale illegal
currency deals, privately buying us dollars earned in the cross-border trade from local
businessmen and reselling them at slightly higher rates in south africa. i was unable to
establish the source of the funds used for these currency deals, but due to the high risk
involved, there is some likelihood of reinvestment of illicit gains and of money launder-
ing.

Economic benefits?

The business opportunities in Namibia certainly benefit the Chinese migrant entrepre-
neurs. But how much does their work benefit the Namibian economy and the Namibian
people? To answer this question (and to decide what stance the Namibian government
should adopt towards Chinese businesses), it is useful to distinguish short-term effects
from long-term hopes and aims.

in the short run, the presence of Chinese shops makes some goods more accessible to
the average consumer. Clothing, blankets, mattresses or shoes have become a lot cheap-
er not to mention the plethora of unnecessary gadgets one can buy in China shops all
over Namibia. upper class consumers may raise a dismissive eyebrow at the quality, or
argue that many of these items are rather useless. But for many people, a cheap radio of
inferior quality at an affordable price looks more convincing than one of superior qual-
ity that is beyond their means, and even unnecessary material possessions can create a
strong feeling of exclusion if you are not able to afford them.

in addition to that, Chinese businesses create employment for Namibians. once
oshikangos China Village is completed, around 200 Namibian people will find a job
there. Most China shops in Namibia actually employ at least some people shop as-
sistants, store hands or security guards. Most of these jobs are for unskilled workers,
however, and there have been many complaints about ill-treatment of workers.

in the short run, while Chinese shops benefit some of the more vulnerable Na-
mibians, it is doubtful whether these benefits outweigh the losses experienced by ex-
isting businesses and, most importantly, the export of profits earned to China where
they can no longer fuel the Namibian economy. The real issues, however, emerge in a
long-term perspective. Throughout history, migrant entrepreneurs, and especially for-
eign shop owners, have been accused of parasitism and exploitation. But history equally
abounds with examples of the constructive economic role played by migrant entrepre-
neurs who come into a country with capital, energy and new skills. What really mat-

. Mostoftheseallegations,however,restoninformedhearsayonly.WhilesomeChinesenation-
alswereconvictedinWindhoekandWalvisBayfor,amongotherthings,cigarettecontraband,
drugdealing,armedassaultandattemptedmurder,neithermajorstructuresoforganisedcrime
noritslinkstoSouthAfricangangshavesofaremergedincourtcases.Themostprominentcase
judgedincourtinvolvedachargeofheroindealingandaburstfromanillegallyownedRau-
tomaticrifleintheupmarketWindhoekCountryClubresort(SeeThe Namibian, /0/00,
//00).When,in00,smuggledcigarettesforoverN$mwereseized,Policesaidit
suspectedthatthesourcewasawellorganisedsyndicatefromChina.Contrabandcigarettesare
normallytransportedfromChinatoDurbaninSouthAfricabeforebeingshippedtoWalvisBay
andbacktoSouthAfrica.(The Namibian /0/00).

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O l d t i e s o r n e w s h a ck l e s ?

ters for the Namibian economy is not whether the Namibian government should grant
more or less work permits, or whether Chinese shops compete with existing ones owned
by Namibians. The real question is whether the self-interest of Chinese migrants can
be channelled into directions that will create genuine development, skills transfer and
added value that stays within the Namibian economy.

deborah Bräutigam (2003) has shown how, in the case of Mauritius, Chinese busi-
nessmen have moved from trade into manufacturing, creating the germs of successful
indigenous industrialisation. This has not happened in Namibia yet and there are not
many signs that it is about to happen. Government is certainly trying to push Chinese
investors in that direction, but i know of only two or three real Chinese manufactur-
ing investments in Namibia, compared to hundreds of Chinese shops and a growing
number of potemkin villages in the manufacturing sector. Trade is still easier, more
lucrative and less risky than manufacturing not only for Chinese migrants. But com-
petition among shops is already tough and profit margins will decline further. Many es-
tablished Chinese shop owners are already looking for different markets where they can
swim ahead of the crowd (two of them told me they wanted to move to iraq as soon as
the situation becomes a bit more stable; for a parallel example see Haugen and Carling
2005). if Namibia can offer them alternative investment opportunities outside trading,
they might be induced to put their formidable energy, and their money, into projects
that really further economic development.

Conclusion
This overview of the role China plays for the Namibian economy is far from exhaustive.
i have concentrated on primary commodities, the construction industry and retail trade
by migrant entrepreneurs only, leaving many other issues aside. There are many further
fields where Chinas growing presence has large consequences for Namibia from mili-
tary cooperation, technical assistance and cultural exchange programmes to traditional
Chinese medicine or the growing number of twinning agreements between Namibian
and Chinese towns, let alone diplomatic ties at government level.

But even such a short review, bound to be outdated soon, shows how much the bal-
ance of the world economy has already shifted towards China. africa (and the world)
will have to face this fact, instead of wishing it did not happen. only then can african
countries implement policy measures that will allow them to benefit from the Chinese
boom. More favourable terms of trade may, of course, make a crucial difference to
commodity exporters, but unless Chinas role is rendered more constructive through
economic legislation and diplomacy, oshikangos China Village could become a sym-
bol for the revamping of the old economic world system with a different trade partner
once again reducing african countries to the export of raw materials and the import
of manufactured goods.

Notwithstanding that danger, Chinas emergence can create real possibilities. Quite
apart from its interest in raw materials, there are signs that China is really willing to
contribute to development in africa, from the surge of donor moneys coming from the
peoples republic to the willingness of the Chinese government to reduce textile exports
to southern africa in order to protect local industries. on a local scale, the immense

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Grego r Dob l e r

energy and creativity of Chinese migrants in Namibia could certainly be put to more
constructive use than to obtaining and selling work permits, or the import of broken
machinery for false manufacturing sites. african governments will not change Chinas
role in the world economy nor the leverage that comes with it, but policy measures they
implement now may contribute to transforming its consequences and may determine
whether Chinas emergence will reshuffle the cards in africas international economic
relations or simply change the players.

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poverty, politics, power and privilege
Namibias black economic elite formation

Henning Melber

In Namibia & we are clear & No exploitation of man by man.
That will not be allowed here. Namibias first head of state, sam Nujoma,
during an interview (Nujoma 2003:Xiii)

The Policy of National Reconciliation has served our people well. Instead
of retributions and backlash, we have created a stable society where our
people work together for the achievement of our common goals of economic
development and the improvement of the living standards of all our people.
Namibias second head of state, Hifikepunye pohamba, in his address to the
nation on the 17th anniversary of independence, 21 March 2007

ever since independence, the government of Namibia has held the exploitative and dis-
criminatory nature of the century of firm occupation under German and south african
settler colonialism and its infamous apartheid system as being responsible for the gross
inequalities characterising the postcolonial social order. indeed, the inherited socioeco-
nomic structures placed a heavy burden on the erstwhile freedom fighters of the south
West african peoples organisation (sWapo of Namibia) after they had seized legiti-
mate political power and, subsequently, as the swapo party, assumed ever greater and
ultimately absolute political control over the country (cf., Melber 2007). The challenges
ahead were by no means eased by the compromises made at the outset to secure the
final stage of the decolonisation process and a transition and transfer of political power
under an arrangement of controlled change. after all, the way to independence required
acceptance of the socioeconomic structures in existence by constitutionally endorsing
the status quo in terms of ownership and property rights. as part of the negotiated set-
tlement, the scope of social change was confined to reforms within this constitutional
framework guided by a policy of national reconciliation.

Notwithstanding these limitations on politics claiming to be guided by the notion
of fundamental emancipation, from the mid-1990s onward the liberation movement
democratically consolidated its position by securing a two-thirds majority in parliament
and complete control over the institutionalised political decision-making process. The
former comrades in the struggle were now political office bearers confronted with the
mammoth task of social delivery of reforms to the previously colonised and marginal-
ised majority. after all, the anti-colonial movements proclaimed goals and perspectives
were not only those of fighting the oppressive and exploitative system of apartheid co-
lonialism. The liberation struggle was at the same time about creating conditions for a
better life after apartheid, not only in terms of political and civil rights, but also of the

0

inextricably linked material dimensions of human well being and a decent living for
those previously marginalised and excluded from the benefits of the wealth created (to
a large extent by them!).

Given the scale of chronic poverty existing at independence, the formulation and
implementation of a rigorous strategy to achieve a coherent and cohesive social pro-
tection policy might have been expected to be at the forefront of postcolonial efforts
to secure further emancipation. Governments responsibility to its electorate would, in
those circumstances, have been reflected in concerted attempts to transform the socio-
economic environment in order to combine further exploitation of the countrys natural
resource base with redistributive interventions in the interests of the majority of the
population. article 23(2) of Namibias constitution, which was adopted in early 1990,
entrusts elected law-makers in parliament with passing legislation aimed at redressing
social, economic or educational imbalances in the Namibian society arising out of
past discriminatory laws or practices. But as the social reality presented in this chapter
documents, painfully little has changed since then in terms of correcting the scandalous
inequalities.

poverty and wealth
in terms of conventional econometric measurements for income inequality (the lorenz
curve and its related numerical index, the Gini coefficient), Namibia ranks in the top
category of countries with the deepest social divides. Based on data in the mid-1990s,
Namibia had a Gini coefficient of 0.701, not only an extremely unequal distribution of
income, but the highest such coefficient for all countries for which it had been reliably
calculated.2 The deep internal socioeconomic divides are along both regional-ethnic as
well as class lines. Geographical disparities were exacerbated by the legacy of the mi-
grant labour system, which during the 20th century had promoted the rural-urban bias
and the further and lasting marginalisation of whole regions (cf., frayne 2005; Tvedten
2004; Winterfeldt 2002). economic data and statistics gathered since independence

. see also earlier versions of this considerably updated and revised text, which offer additional
information on related aspects (Melber 2005c and 2006).

. see for background information on measuring inequality in the Namibian context, Hastings
(1999). The Gini coefficient can range in theory from 0 to 1, where the former would indicate
that every person has exactly the same income (total equality), and the latter case would indicate
that one individual received all income (total inequality). Notably, the degree of (in)equality
measured does not allow for any conclusions to be drawn about the absolute amount of per capita
income. This is illustrated by the fact that Namibia has the highest Gini coefficient, while in the
mid-1990s the (generally poorer) Bangladesh had one of the lowest Gini coefficients, at less than
0.3. in contrast to Bangladeshs status as a least developed Country, however, the average an-
nual per capita income of Namibia of the order of $ 2,000 places it in the lower middle-income
country category. so much for the contrast between aggregated data and social realities! Not
surprisingly, Namibia has one of the widest discrepancies between its ranking in terms of average
annual per capita income and its Human development index. as the resident representative of
uNdp pointed out during the launch of Namibias first Human development report, estonia
in 1996 had a lower per capita income than Namibia but ranked 48 positions higher in terms of
human development. except for the oil enclaves of Qatar, kuwait, oman and Gabon, Namibia
had the highest disparity between its real Gdp per capita and human development rankings
(adei 1996:3).

P o v e r t y , P o l i t i c s , P o w e r a n d P r i v i l e g e

Henn ing Me lb e r

confirm that the luxury which a small elite enjoys contrasts with the abject poverty of
the majority of the people. a large-scale National Household income and expenditure
survey (NHies) undertaken during 199394 concluded that there are vast dispari-
ties between a small, wealthy minority and a big majority of which many live below
the poverty line (Central statistics office 1996:4). according to the report, 10% of
the households (amounting to 5.3% of the population) accounted for 44% of private
household consumption while the remaining 90% of households (amounting to 94.7%
of Namibias population) consumed 56% (ibid., p. 15). The figures also show that, in
economic terms, the average Namibian does not exist. The notion of an average income
becomes rather meaningless when half the population survives on approximately 10%
of such fictive average income while 5% of the population enjoys an income more than
five times higher than this abstract average. as a direct result of the inequalities, more
than 40% of households were rated below the poverty line, and, sadly, Namibia has the
highest malnutrition level of any country in the world with an average per capita income
above $ 1,000.3 The Namibia occupational wages survey of 2002, tabled in parliament
in June 2006, shows the gross income inequalities in salaried employment: 14.9% of
employees earn below N$ 600 (about $ 100) a month, while only 0.1% of employees
earn above N$ 33,000 (about $ 5,500) a month, with the majority of salaries ranging
between N$ 1,000 and N$ 5,000 (dentlinger 2006).

as the first Human development report (Hdr) published for Namibia in 1996 by
the local uNdp office concluded: Namibia is one of the worst performers in the world
in terms of human development levels relative to national income (uNdp 1996:73).
With a Human development index (Hdi) of 0.573 in 1996, the report commented
with regard to the countrys ranking in the world that considerable advances still have
to be realized before Namibia rises from its current position of 116th (out of 174) to its
Gdp ranking of 79th (ibid., p. 74).

according to the social and demographic indicators presented in an overview table
in a recent iMf assessment (2005:30), the latest available World Bank figures at the
time suggested a Gdp per capita (in constant 1995 prices) of $ 2,184 for 2004, while
figures from the latest household income and expenditure survey undertaken by Na-
mibian authorities highlight the unabatedly scandalous degree of skewed income distri-
bution: the wealthiest fifth of the population controls 78.7% of income share, while the
poorest fifth has to live on a mere 1.4%. even neighbouring south africa (with a Gdp
per capita of $ 4,020) has a less radical social divide, the corresponding figures being
66.5% and 2.0% respectively, hence indicating a broader band of social strata between
the extreme haves and have-nots. little, as the data suggest, has actually changed since
independence in terms of the general distribution of wealth and poverty among the
countrys population, of which too many live in destitution.

. studies based on the available data offer further evidence of the magnitude of the challenges aris-
ing from the massive scale of poverty (cf., Hansohm, presland 1998; Nepru 1999; schade 2000
and 2004).