


No. 81

External radio broadcasting and international understanding

Broadcasting to Yugoslavia

Reports and papers on mass communication



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External radio broadcasting and international understanding

Broadcasting to Yugoslavia

by
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Vlado Batagelj
Mojca D. Murko**



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Preface

In September 1971, Unesco proposed an international programme for communication research. Within that programme one of the most important themes which could best be co-ordinated by international organizations, was "research into international communication structures".

The questions were posed: "What are the possibilities and limitations of international communication networks? How much is really an equal exchange of communication, and how much is a one-way 'pipeline' from the industrially developed world to the developing countries? What should be national policy regarding 'cultural privacy' to protect the fragile pattern of autochthonous cultures against the massive intrusion of foreign mass media contents? Where is the demarcation line between a 'protective screening' and a harmful 'isolationist' policy which would deprive the nation of the cultural achievements of the 'universal' world? Do present communication structures and the content of the information transmitted through them really contribute to international understanding?"

From that time Unesco began to encourage a series of studies on international communication. In 1974 the first results in this direction were published under the title "Television traffic: A one-way street?". At present, within this same series of studies, inquiries are being made into the operation of international news agencies and into the effects of the transnational corporations on the conduct of international communication (which will be published shortly).

The 1971 Unesco proposals recognized that in such studies of international communication, new methodologies would have to be developed by the researchers, ensuring that as far as possible the research would not be conditioned by preconceived value judgements; that such studies must be multi-disciplinary and could only be seen to be meaningful if they were conducted over a long time period.

Almost three years of work have gone into the present study carried out by the Faculty of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism at the University of Ljubljana. It took over a year to establish a valid methodology for analysing the content of external broadcasting. The "test week" wherein broadcasting to and from Yugoslavia was monitored was a week of intense international activity. The coding and extrapolation of the data and their analysis into readable terms have expended much careful scientific work and editorial time.

During this same period a number of institutions asked to collaborate in Unesco's programme of communication research. Among them the Peace Research Institute of the University of Göteborg undertook a study on the content of external broadcasting in Sweden. The methodology was very similar to that of the Yugoslav study. The results of this second study will be published shortly. They provide a very interesting comparison.

This particular publication is probably the first of its kind within the series "Reports and Papers on Mass Communication". It is directed to two audiences: firstly, policy-makers who may wish to take advantage of a scientific analysis of the relationship between external broadcasting and international understanding and, secondly, research specialists who may wish to study the scientific techniques developed and adopted by the research team in Ljubljana in order to accomplish its task as objectively as possible.¹

1. Fuller reports of the scientific methodology employed can be obtained from the Faculty of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism at the University of Ljubljana.

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Introduction

When the Centre for Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research was approached by Unesco to conduct an analysis of external broadcasting, nobody expected that it would take the present shape. The original scope was more extended, since Unesco wanted the Centre to cover the world scene of all external broadcasting. The challenge was accepted with some misgivings as to the final outcome. The nature of external broadcasting, coupled with several serious international events made it impossible to carry out a global analysis of the physiognomy and structure of external broadcasting.

The Centre was forced, therefore, to narrow the scope of research on external broadcasting to Yugoslavia. Since 15 broadcasting stations from 14 different countries are daily beaming about 26 hours of foreign programmes in the languages of the Yugoslav nations, that was a huge enough task. In addition, the research team undertook a very elaborate analysis of the content of external broadcasting which more than amply "compensated" for the omission of a world-wide survey. Some of the results obtained could have been anticipated from the very outset. Nonetheless, they are interesting, since at least they have been scientifically proven and established. However, other results, fascinating in their revelation, even exceed expectations. We hope, therefore, that not only the research team but also a patient reader of the present study will find its outcome useful, interesting and thrilling.

This study presents the work of a research team consisting of Vladimir Batagelj, Anuška Ferligoj, Tomo Martelanc, Mojca Drčar-Murko, Breda Pavlič, and Slavko Splichal. Although the team worked together, certain parts of the report have been written by individual members of the team. Notably, the methodological design has been to a large extent developed by Slavko Splichal, and the programmes for data analysis by Anuška Ferligoj and Vladimir Batagelj.

Important financial assistance was given by the Science Fund of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia "Boris Kidrič", which we gratefully acknowledge.

The research team also wishes to thank Radio Belgrade, particularly its Director, Branko Dadić, and the Manager of the External Broadcasting Department, de Frančeski, as well as the Tanjug news agency, its Director, Pero Ivačić, and his staff for the large monitoring operation during the week under review.

Special credit goes to consultants, Egon Zakrajšek from the Faculty for Natural Sciences and Technology, Department of Mathematics (University of Ljubljana), Konstantin Momirović from the Institute for Kinesiology in Zagreb, and Niko Toš, Director of the Centre for Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research.

We feel that this list would not be complete without mentioning the students of the Communication Seminar in the scholastic year 1973-1974 and their contribution to the process of message coding, and Mrs. Rožca Hrvacki, Mrs. Hilda Balažic, and Mrs. Hristina Ferenc, who undertook the tiring job of typing the manuscript.

Research Team

Notes on the research team

The research presented in this publication was conducted by the Communication Research Group at the Centre for Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research (Faculty for Sociology, Political Science and Journalism, University of Ljubljana). The group comprises the following researchers:

Tomo Martelanc, senior lecturer at the Department of Journalism at the Faculty and the head of communication research at the Centre. He is a member of the Unesco Advisory Panel for International Mass Communication Research, a Trustee of the International Broadcast Institute, Chairman of the Information Committee of the Yugoslav Unesco Commission, and a member of the Executive Board of the Yugoslav Association "Science and Society". His main interest lies in the field of mass communication, particularly in intercultural and satellite communication, television, and theory and practice of journalism. He is author of a number of studies and articles on these topics (many of them published in English, French and Arabic).

Slavko Splichal, Head of the Department of Journalism at the Faculty. His basic areas of theoretical and empirical research are the functions of mass media, problems of news flow and selection, propaganda, and the methodological problems of communication research, especially content analysis methods. He has published many articles on these issues (The Productive Content Analysis, Communication

Activity and Human Disalienation, The Function of the Press in a Cumulative Consumption of Mass Media Contents, Socializing Contents on Television, Dimensions of Political Propaganda - M.A. Thesis, Information Flow through Radio and Television).

Anuška Ferligoj, graduate in mathematics and physics, Teaching and Research Assistant at the Faculty. She concentrates on applied mathematics and statistics in social sciences and humanities, and has recently been working on multivariate analyses and modelling. She has participated in many Yugoslav and international symposia, contributing methodological papers. She was one of the organizers of the International Workshop "Comparative Ecological Analysis of Social Change" in Ljubljana at which she presented two papers on determinants of Yugoslav internal migration and the social ecology of developmental change.

Vladimir Batagelj, graduate in mathematics, Teaching Assistant at the Faculty of Natural Sciences and Technology, Department of Mathematics. He specializes mainly in computer science and discrete mathematics. He is also involved in popularization activities of the Slovenian Society of Mathematics, Physics and Astronomy. He is co-author of the two-volume: "Collection of solved

problems from middle school mathematical competitions in Slovenia". He has contributed papers to many Yugoslav symposia. He published recently an article on quadratic hash methods for table searching in "Communications of the ACM".

Breda Pavlič, Teaching and Research Assistant at the Department of Journalism at the Faculty, post-graduate in sociology of communication in Regina (Canada) and Ljubljana. She is author of: The Self-Consuming Consumer Society: Some Effects of Education in Mass Society (M.A. thesis), Socialist Values and the Development of Social Consciousness, Multinational Corporations in International Communications. She is now doing a Ph.D. thesis on the impact of multinational corporations in the development of social consciousness in the developing countries.

Mojca Drčar-Murko, graduate in law, post-graduate in international public and private law, Assistant at the Department of Political Sciences (international relations) at the Faculty. For ten years she worked as editor at Radio Ljubljana, published numerous articles on international relations in Yugoslav newspapers and reviews, and participated in the work of some international meetings on European security and co-operation.

External radio broadcasting and propaganda

Concept and background

External sound broadcasting is even now, in the age of satellite communication, television and other new means of communication, considered as one of the most significant agents in international communication. Largely due to its technical ability to cover a large part of the globe, and to relatively low costs of transmission and reception, it has been in use for decades as one of the most influential and efficient propaganda instruments in international relations.

The modern concept of propaganda includes, therefore, the external radio as one of its essential components and operative instruments.

In using the term propaganda, we should like to clarify from the very beginning that it is not being employed in its derogatory, pejorative sense, but more comprehensively as a vehicle of information, opinions and ideas. As these can be "good" or "bad", "progressive" or "conservative", "truthful" or "slanted", they are not value-free and reflect the general ideological standpoint of the propagandist. But propaganda, by itself, is not necessarily a disreputable, deplorable notion, as its connotation generally implies in most languages.

There are various definitions of propaganda, although a large majority of them have one general trait in common, namely that the term implies all attempts to influence other people's opinions, attitudes, values and actions.

The basic prerequisite of propaganda is communication, which does not necessarily comprise only mass communication, although mass media have given a new, Gargantuan dimension to the modern concept of propaganda activity.

Propaganda implies conscious, planned and organized attempts at influencing people's attitudes and behaviour, despite the fact that most of its general effects are more intended than anticipated, more desired than foreseen. As Doob has put it, a propagandist can hardly ever anticipate the complete consequences of his own propaganda and therefore it must be said that some of those consequences are achieved unintentionally ... Many intentional propagandists eventually admit that they are surprised by some of the results of their own propaganda.¹

Even if that is to a large extent true, it nevertheless holds that propaganda is a systematic, organized, well-

planned enterprise in disseminating ideas, opinions and information. In order to be efficient in modern times, in the era of a tremendous flow of information, propaganda has to be total, continuous, and lasting. In other words, propaganda uses all means at its disposal, all mass media, each one of them in its own specific capacity and efficiency. As Jacques Ellul demonstrated, none of these instruments may be left out: they must all be used in combination. The propagandist uses a keyboard and composes a symphony. It is a matter of reaching and encircling the whole man and all men.²

Continuity and duration are of paramount importance to the efficiency of propaganda. It has been stressed many times that propaganda works only through constant repetition.³ For propaganda is not the touch of the magic wand, it is based on slow, constant impregnation.⁴ Speaking of the BBC External Broadcasting philosophy, Charles J. Curran said: "Once you stop, you lose your asset. Continuity, therefore, is a first principle".⁵

By the means of mass media propaganda functions massively although it is meant for individuals: not individuals as isolated units, but as parts of larger groups and of society. Through the mass approach individuals are affected, and through individuals, society. A radio listener is mostly alone while listening to the broadcasts; nevertheless, he is a social being and exhibits a mass mentality. A well-planned propaganda scheme is a mass one, but it is most effective when it gives the impression that it is especially meant for each individual, that it addresses an individual personally, that it is tailored to his needs.

Like all other forms of communication - says Robert Silvey - broadcasts have an impact only in so far as they meet, or seem to the listener to meet, some need in himself. The "need" may be one of which the listener is unconscious or one which he would find it hard to put into words.⁶ In offering gratification, propaganda fulfills its main purpose and pushes the door wide open for its possible effects. For this, radio is an ideal medium for propagation, since it is the fastest means of communication and knows practically no boundaries.⁷ Radio is the principal means for the diffusion of words. Human voice gives a life to argument, an illusion of presence, a reinforcement to reasoning.⁸

These are the main reasons for the adoption and wide use of broadcasting in propaganda, particularly in its international context and its various forms.

International propaganda may be of either political, economic, cultural, diplomatic or informative nature. In recent years, informational propaganda has gained in importance, since there is a growing need for information in any society and with most individuals. Public opinion at large is becoming aware of the fact that prompt, reliable information is a basic requirement for the genuine attainment of human freedom.

The free flow of information is, nevertheless, an unaccomplished ideal, since some societies are distrustful of foreign influence, and many are still subject to a one-way stream of information.

Various barriers have been raised against the free flow of information and cultural exchange, in order to protect a society politically, ideologically or culturally. Most of the propaganda messages trying to penetrate into another country in the form of press, reviews, books, films, exhibitions etc., can thus be filtered and eventually halted.

These impediments can most easily be surmounted by external broadcasting. Of all the means of communication, the spoken word is the most unwieldy to restrain. This was realized early by the powerful Nazi propaganda machinery, which started to use and abuse international radio as a powerful tool of its propaganda exercises.

Thus, the chance which sound broadcasting had in the early thirties to become a world medium of international understanding and co-operation for the free flow of information and cultural exchange, was lost.⁹ Consequently, during the second World War, international radio took over the role of one of the most forceful means of information, persuasion and war propaganda. Similarly, the "cold war" which started in the post-war period used the facilities of sound broadcasting on a large scale for the delivery of propaganda messages.

More recently, in the period of reduced international tension, where states, particularly the super powers, are reluctant to resort to armed conflicts and war, international broadcasting has assumed a different role. The balance of power between the two blocs, based on the precarious equilibrium of the mutual nuclear threat, has reduced the probability of an open armed collision, since it would inevitably lead to world catastrophe. Sheer brutal force has lost its dominance in international relations, and more sophisticated and subtle methods have been used including various pressures and propaganda efforts. States try systematically to reach individuals of foreign, particularly hostile, countries over the heads of their governments, to influence their opinion, to modify their value system, to direct their behaviour and activity. This propaganda effort can be carried out in an obvious, open way, although more frequently, in recent years, it goes for a "softer sell" offering just "more ample", "credible", "objective", "full" information and accounts of events.

This is why, at the present time, international sound broadcasting is even more flourishing as one of the main means of exchanging information and propaganda between different nations, states, cultures, and societies. It could be asserted that the difference between the various stages

of the development of external broadcasting is, in fact, that in the thirties it was used as an *introduction* to the war, during the Second World War it was adopted as a *weapon*, and nowadays it is employed *instead* of war. However, there exists a large variety of different approaches: from a friendly tone across the "neutral", "objective" information to the hard propaganda line.

A rough analysis indicates that at least three different approaches may be detected. Firstly, some broadcasters are mainly concerned with presenting the world scene and international events which are not directly (at least not apparently) linked to the target, and maybe not even to the originating country (although the non-political part of the programme - music, sports, features, etc. - may cover to a large extent the domestic scene).

It seems that these broadcasters do not believe in a direct, overt propaganda approach and they rarely try to change the basic attitude of listeners. Instead - as Horton and Hunt claim - they try to get the listeners to accept the broadcasters' definitions of the issue in terms of the recipients' own attitudes. The short-run effects of such propaganda seem to lie "... in providing people with a rationale for their existing convictions rather than in changing their attitudes" (Bogart, 1957). The long-run effects of a sustained propaganda programme may be greater, since it may gradually build up a body of factual information among its recipients and thus effect gradual changes of attitude and opinion. Horton and Hunt emphasize this point by adding: "This, at least, is the hope that motivates our 'Voice of America' broadcasts".¹⁰

Another larger group of external broadcasters, usually stemming from smaller countries, adopts a different view, a rather "strictly observed neutral position" towards the target country. They are generally engaged in the presentation of the originating country itself, of its political, economic, and cultural scene. When they turn to international events, it is only because it would be difficult to ignore them entirely, due to their significance, or when they have implications for the domestic country.

Their main aim seems to be an effort to promote the information flow and cultural exchange rather than influence the target audience. These broadcasts are not necessarily value-free since by assessing certain attitudes, results and successes of the originating country they may try indirectly to influence the target audience. Their main concern, however, seems to be to offer an additional source of information about the broadcasting country, thus serving only some "defensive" ends of propaganda over the radio waves.

The third category, in this crude hypothetical categorization, includes remnants from the cold war period, when a hard line of aggressive propaganda was used in external broadcasting. These external broadcasters still use strong, offensive language. They try to insert in every commentary an ideologically or politically-tinted interpretation regarding the target country.

It seems, however, that this type of broadcasting is outdated and not very efficient. The "boomerang effect" evidently acts in such a case. As a matter of fact, the

more a society is open to the free flow of information, the more such a hard line of broadcasting propaganda becomes obsolete and doomed to inefficiency.

At any rate, external broadcasting shows clearly a tendency of growth, despite some other, newer vehicles of the international flow of information and propaganda. The survey of the estimated total programme hours per week of some external broadcasters in the world (Table 1) shows clearly how the importance of international radio has gained over the last decades.

The table shows the tremendous increase of international broadcasting, which more than doubled from 1950 to 1960, and again from 1960 to 1970.

The number of short-wave voice broadcast transmitters in the world rose from 385 to 1,365 in 1972, of which 185 had a power of 200 kilowatts or more. There are now nearly one billion radio sets in the world, one for every four inhabitants of this planet, and approximately one third of them can receive programmes on short waves. Before World War II there were only 27 countries with external radio broadcasting services; immediately after the war there were already 55 and in 1974 there was hardly a country of any size that did not have at least some rudimentary External Service.¹¹

Many countries which practised no external broadcasting in the fifties and even in the sixties are now prominent external broadcasters. The outstanding examples among the "newcomers" are the People's Republic of China, which in 1950 had less than 10 hours of foreign broadcasting programmes daily, and is now ranked third with nearly 230 hours of external programmes; Federal Republic of Germany, now in fifth place ahead of the BBC, and new external broadcasters like the Arab Republic of Egypt, Cuba, Japan, Ghana, Israel, South Africa.

The BBC, which was the most prominent external broadcasting station during the Second World War¹² and in the immediate post-war period, has now dropped to sixth place in the ranking of the most powerful international broadcasters. "The BBC's share of the total presented in the table is some 6%, which may not seem much, although in fact the 720 hours broadcast weekly by the External Services are more than the total national and regional output of the Domestic Services, both Television, and Radio", stated Donald Hodson, Director of Programmes of the BBC External Broadcasting.¹³

Taking into account that the BBC is transmitting in English and 39 other languages, that it has a round-the-clock World Service in English, and nevertheless takes only sixth place in the ranking by the number of weekly transmitted hours of external services, one can obtain a rough idea of the size and importance of international sound broadcasting in the present international context.

To obtain a full account of all the resources, human and material, behind these huge international operations, is a hard if not an impossible task, since most of the data regarding external broadcasting are confidential. But to illustrate further the significance of external broadcasting nowadays we may resort to some random examples, compiled from various sources.

Voice of America, which accounts for the larger bulk of the U.S.A.'s external broadcasting programme - the rest is taken by Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia - broadcasts in 35 languages and has about 2,300 employees.¹⁴ More than 10 years ago, USIA doubled its short-wave strength when the world's most powerful long-range radio transmitter - boasting an output of 4,8 million watts and equal to the 96 strongest US commercial stations - was placed in service at Greenville, North Carolina. By January 1967, VOA broadcasts were beamed to foreign listeners by 35 transmitters located in the US and overseas, with a total power of 15 million watts. VOA is able to reach any place in the world with reasonably strong signals.¹⁵

External broadcasting is not evenly spread across the world geopolitical map. The concentration zones are around the areas of international tension, hostility, and belligerency. A true radio war is still going on over the broadcasting frequencies between the West and the East. According to the London *Economist*, the Soviet Union and other eastern European countries beam nearly 10 million words per week to western Europe and North America; meanwhile the West is transmitting approximately 6 million words to the eastern European countries.¹⁶ According to the same source a tremendous amount of money is also allocated to jamming foreign messages.

Next to the "official" external broadcasting stations there are a certain number of clandestine "black" stations, which beam from extraterritorial sites.

Many people believe that external broadcasting is not in accordance with the general spirit of international co-operation, with detente and the mitigation of international tension. They consider external broadcasting, as Senator Fulbright has stated, "a relic of the cold war".

On the other hand, it seems that the efficiency of this kind of flow of information is considered essential in carrying out foreign policy by many official quarters, and that it merits the large slice of the state budget which is given to external broadcasting, since there is no other way of financing this kind of activity.

What is the real effect of external broadcasting? Again, this is a matter of pure speculation in most cases, or at least, in the most relevant instances. There are no available data from the socialist countries, and the statistics quoted by western sources have to be taken with reserve. The only reliable public opinion poll results in this respect have been published within the same sphere of political interest, e.g. in the case of western countries (such as BBC broadcasts to the Federal Republic of Germany).

The former Deputy Director of the USIA, Thomas C. Sorensen, quotes that Voice of America "estimates that world-wide 20 to 25 million people hear its broadcasts every day, with the figure increasing to around 80 million in times of crises. Listening varies from country to country; VOA believes it has 23% of the total potential audiences in East Europe, but only 3% in China."¹⁷

Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe claim even higher percentages of listeners in the socialist countries of eastern Europe.

Table 1: The growth of external broadcasting in the world (1950-1970)*

	programme hours per week		
	1950	1960	1970
USSR	533	1,015	1,908
United States of America	497	1,513	1,907
People's Republic of China	66	687	1,591
'Warsaw Pact' Countries	386	1,009	1,264
Federal Republic of Germany	0	315	779
United Kingdom (BBC)	643	589	723
Egypt	0	301	540
Albania	26	63	487
Australia	181	257	350
Netherlands	127	178	335
Cuba	0	0	320
Portugal	46	133	295
India	116	257	271
Japan	0	203	259
Spain	68	202	251
France	198	326	200
Ghana	0	0	186
Italy	170	205	165
Israel	0	91	158
South Africa	0	63	150
Canada	85	80	98
Yugoslavia	80	70	76
Total	3,222	7,457	12,313
Index	100	231	382

* The list was taken from the BBC Handbook and it includes less than half the world's external broadcasters. Among those excluded are Republic of Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, the domestic programmes of France and the Arab Republic of Egypt transmitted externally on short waves, and various international commercial and religious stations, as well as clandestine radio stations.

By various means - such as letters, visits to the west from listeners, travellers' estimates - they judge that about 70% of the adult population of the USSR listen to western broadcasts, and that six out of 10 people listen to Radio Liberty at least once a week. A similar estimate by Radio Free Europe claims that about 50% of all adults of five eastern European countries to which it broadcasts (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania) listen to its broadcasts.¹⁸ Since these figures have been published by the external broadcasters themselves, caution in accepting them may be more than justified.

Such an obscure situation in international sound broadcasting makes the whole issue even more intriguing. This is why more profound research into the nature, forms, and content of external broadcasting has been deemed a worthwhile effort.

Broadcasting to Yugoslavia: A Review

A Yugoslav institute and Yugoslavia as a target country for external broadcasting were chosen for rather obvious reasons. Yugoslavia is a country of many nations, national minorities and religions, and many different languages. Situated on a strategic cross-road between central Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean, nowadays a non-aligned state belonging to no political or military blocks, following its own pattern of socialist, self-governing social order, Yugoslavia presents a most interesting target for external broadcasting from different quarters.

For a number of years, Yugoslavia has been endeavouring to be an open society. In the Constitution of the SFR of Yugoslavia it is particularly stated:

"... the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall

strive: for the establishment and development of all forms of international co-operation conducive to the consolidation of peace, the strengthening of mutual respect, equality and friendship among nations and states and their rapprochement; for the broadest and freest possible exchange of material and intellectual goods, for the freedom of mutual exchange of information and for the development of other relations contributory to the realization of common economic, cultural and other interests of states, nations and people, ...”.

Accordingly, Yugoslav citizens are able to become acquainted with other nations, their cultural heritage and their economic and social achievements. The Yugoslavs may listen to foreign broadcasts, since there is no jamming. They may freely buy foreign newspapers and books, borrow them from many foreign libraries, view foreign films or watch foreign programmes on the TV screens, etc. They come in contact with millions of foreign tourists who flood Yugoslavia every year, particularly in summer time.

Thus, there is not much to be gained by “hard line” broadcasting to Yugoslavia. The majority of external broadcasters have therefore avoided overt, aggressive propaganda.

The hard approach could nevertheless be detected during periods of crisis, either of an international nature, or even more, within Yugoslavia or specifically related to her. Thus, for instance, intensified broadcasting from abroad with strong propaganda overtones was noticed during the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia, during the war in the Middle East, during the political crisis in Croatia, in the time of nationalistic outbursts in Kosovo, etc. The problems of multinational relations in Yugoslavia or social and economic difficulties are frequently exploited as topics for commentaries to Yugoslav audiences.

There are 14 foreign countries broadcasting regularly 15 external broadcasting programmes to Yugoslavia in the Serbo-Croat (or Croato-Serbian), Slovenian, and Macedonian languages. In addition, two neighbouring stations transmit daily programmes in Slovenian: Radio Trst (Trieste) in Italy, and Radio Celovec (Klagenfurt) in Austria. These are officially oriented towards covering the needs of the Slovenian minority in their respective countries, but are none the less, judging by the content of their programmes and by the power of their transmitters which largely surpass the technical demands of a local station, directed towards the Yugoslav audience in the adjacent Socialist Republic of Slovenia. Thus, these two stations are performing mainly, or at least partly, the function of an external service. It is even more difficult to identify how many of the regular domestic radio programmes of other countries, which have their national minorities within the Yugoslav borders, serve the purposes of external broadcasting. Such countries include Albania, Turkey, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Italy. Table 2 offers a general idea of the amount of foreign external broadcasting beamed to Yugoslavia.

For technical and financial reasons, only foreign broadcasts in Serbo-Croat language were taken into account for the analysis. They represent roughly 80% of all external broadcasting beamed at Yugoslavia. In most instances, the Serbo-Croat transmissions do not differ significantly from the Macedonian or Slovenian ones, if originated from the same station; thus the effort of including them into the analysis would not prove worthwhile.

Radio Trst (Trieste) and Celovec (Klagenfurt) were thus omitted, since their relevant broadcasts in the context of the present study are in the Slovenian language. This could be done without much harm because their position, as mentioned earlier, is specific since they are officially designated to serve the needs of the Slovenian minority within the borders of Italy and Austria, respectively.

Of the remaining 15 stations, two were not included in the sample - Radio Madrid, because of monitoring difficulties, and Radio Vatican, due to its peculiar content, which could not be analysed by the methodology adopted.

The content of 13 foreign radio stations broadcasting to Yugoslavia was analysed during the week from 8 to 15 September 1973, in the total amount of 7,700 minutes. In addition, External Services of Radio Belgrade were included in the analysis, so that the content of foreign programmes could be compared with that of the Yugoslav ones.

The week analysed was planned ahead since the monitoring, which was done in Belgrade through the kind offices of the Tanjug news agency, required elaborate preparations. It seems that, due to some international events of trenchant importance, although varied in their political nature, impact and consequences, the week selected was a fortunate choice speaking in terms of pure scientific research. This week was marked namely by the ending of the Algerian conference of the non-aligned states, by the coup d'état in Chile, and French President Pompidou's visit to the People's Republic of China. Each of these events, coupled with some other important happenings, like the Israelo-Syrian air battle (a portent of the later outburst of another Middle East war), the meeting of the EEC countries in Copenhagen, the GATT meeting in Tokyo, the meeting of three Arab leaders in Cairo, the campaign regarding the so-called “Soviet dissidents”, etc., offered a good opportunity to scrutinize and identify the selection, style and method of presentation of international news items and their interpretation.

Of course, for a more complete analysis, a study over a longer period would be desirable, including some of the “crisis” periods, when the true nature of external broadcasting becomes still more evident, and a larger sample of radio stations and target countries which would ensure more reliable data. None the less, the week analysed offers a fair picture of external broadcasting in the contemporary world in terms of the character, nature, presentation, selection, tone, level of propaganda, and basic aims of external broadcasters.

Table 2: Amount of external radio broadcasting to Yugoslavia

Broadcasting station	Amount of broadcasts daily				Duration of daily broadcasts			
	S-C.	Slov.	Mac.	Tot.	S-C.	Slov.	Mac.	Tot.
1. Moscow	7	1	1	9	210	30	30	270
2. Tirana	7	0	0	7	210	0	0	210
3. Deutsche Welle	3	1	1	5	129	30	15	174
4. BBC (London)	3	2	0	5	90	30	0	120
5. Sofia	4*	0	0*	4*	120*	0	0	120*
6. Madrid	3	0	0	3	90	0	0	90
7. Voice of America	1	2	0	3	60	80	0	90
8. Paris	1**	1	0**	2**	45**	10	0	55**
9. Bucharest	2	0	0	2	60	0	0	60
10. Peking	2	0	0	2	60	0	0	60
11. Rome	2	1	0	3	40	20	0	60
12. Deutschlandfunk	1	0	0	1	30	0	0	30
13. Vatican	1	1	0	1	15	15	0	30
14. Voice of Turkey	1	0	0	1	30	0	0	30
15. Athens	1***	0	0	1	15	0	0	15
Total daily	39	13	3	54	1,204	225	45	1,504

* On Sunday one additional broadcast of 60 minutes on medium waves and one of 30 minutes on short-waves.

** Musical show programme of Radio Paris -every second day in a different Yugoslav language, lasting 25 minutes is to be added; on Sunday the 45-minute programme is broken down into three parts, in Serbo-Croat, Slovenian or Macedonian, respectively.

***Except on Sunday.

Footnotes:

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Complementary or supplementary rôle of external broadcasting to Yugoslavia

Aims of research

Although the study of propaganda has a relatively long history, no common accepted definition of propaganda exists. In other words, there are different, mutually exclusive answers to the question of the essential characteristic(s) of propaganda. Since - from the point of view of content analysis itself - the research aim is primarily to establish a model of a set of propaganda messages, which ought to map or reflect in a selective and condensed way the original set of messages, the basic problem concerns the sample of variables capable of such a mapping.

From Lasswell onwards, the focus of international communication and propaganda research was directed primarily on the presence or absence of symbols as the most significant indicators of ideological or value systems (re)presented by propaganda.¹ The second group of indicators, which can map the propaganda messages into an analytical model, may be called "the evaluation of attitude objects by several dimensions"² such as good - bad, strong - weak, active - passive, etc., which has until now been dealt with mostly by Osgood and associates. The third group of indicators could be called, according to Pool, "the distribution of attention to various actions of various subjects in international relations".³ Especially, the studies of gate-keeping processes show the important role of editors' and journalists' selective perception of events in the processes of mass communication. Finally, we can include in the fourth group the indicators detecting or measuring the intentions of communicators, trying to inform the recipients, or giving them insight into controversial aspects of the issues, or forcing upon them certain political or ideological orientations. This group of indicators also includes those by which the so-called "propaganda style" or "propaganda technique" is determined.⁴

On the other hand, the research reported here is more "practically" oriented, attempting to determine significant profiles of propaganda programmes transmitted by the 13 scrutinized foreign radio stations in Serbo-Croat language to Yugoslav listeners. Furthermore, it attempts to compare them with the content orientation of Yugoslav mass media, and - finally - to conclude inductively about the potential (dis)socialization effects on Yugoslav listeners on the basis of the intentions of external communicators, as established by the analysis.

The operationalization of these two basic problems or research questions results in the *four main aims* of the present analysis:

1. The discovery of basic characteristics of propaganda programmes of single radio stations transmitting to Yugoslavia;
2. The definition, on the basis of single characteristics, of the common and essential characteristics of radio propaganda;
3. The isolation and explanation of the specific differences among the clusters of radio stations, and the particular characteristics of these clusters (supposing that the content orientation of single stations exceeds the level of the individual); and
4. The discovery of potential (dis)socializing effects of foreign propaganda programmes upon Yugoslav listeners by comparing the content of foreign and Yugoslav external radio programmes.

Hypotheses and data

The experimental design included three hypothetical groups of variables which were operationalized as (i) geopolitical orientation - (attention paid by stations to various symbols and subjects of international relations), (ii) the evaluative-thematic orientation - (evaluation of the six world events important at the time: Algerian conference of the non-aligned states, coup d'état in Chile, French President Pompidou's visit to the People's Republic of China, Israelo-Syrian air battle, the campaign regarding the so-called "Soviet dissidents", and the GATT meeting in Tokyo), and (iii) the propaganda level of propaganda messages. The variables were tested in order to discover how they behave in the real space of messages, i.e. if they have a sufficient discriminatory and explanatory power. Variables testing gave positive answers to both requests: F-factor analysis generated significant factors (four factors by Kaiser-Guttman's criterion) which explained 84% of the total variation of 14 experimental variables. The first factor was clearly "evaluative" (it included all evaluations of international events), the second factor was obviously of a propaganda character (it included four variables of propaganda level or propaganda style of programmes), while the third and fourth

factors were both in one way or another related to the perception of activity of various subjects of international relations. The Q-factor analysis produced five clusters extracted by Kaiser-Tuttman's criterion, explaining 86% of total variance, with small European stations clustering in Cluster I, Radio Belgrade and Yugoslav mass media in Cluster II, big western stations in Cluster III, and all eastern stations in Cluster IV. The fifth "cluster" included only Radio Paris.

On the basis of the discriminatory and explanatory power test of variables, the following indicators of content orientation of foreign radio programmes were determined:

1. The attention paid by stations to subjects of international relations (i.e. frequency of appearance of subjects);
2. The evaluation of subjects of international relations in the programmes of single stations;
3. The frequency of appearance of symbols in the analysed programmes;
4. The explicit evaluation of identified symbols;
5. Contingencies between various subjects of international relations, and between subjects and symbols;
6. The propaganda level of programmes transmitted to Yugoslav listeners.

In order to establish the model of the basic content characteristics, the messages of all propaganda programmes were analysed according to four types of semantically defined enumeration units. These enumeration units are not mutually exclusive, but rather explain each other (e.g. the subject can be evaluated by the source directly - as in Type II, or indirectly through the symbol evaluation - as in Type III and IV); which is simultaneously the criterion of internal validity of the analysis.

The constitutive elements of the four types of enumeration units were:

Type I	Source ⁵	Actor ⁶	Connection ⁷	Target ⁸
Type II	Source	Subject ⁹	Connection	Evaluation ¹⁰
Type III	Source	Subject	Connection	Symbol ¹¹
Type IV	Source	Symbol	Connection	Evaluation

Over 20,000 themes of all types of enumeration units were found and each was punched onto a separate computer card.

Since the first stage of analysis (messages' coding) was done manually, the coding reliability test was performed to discover the congruency of coders' decisions. The reliability test showed a satisfactory degree of intercoders' reliability. The criterion for the satisfactory degree of reliability was that the coders' error would not create clusters of radio stations where no real clusters existed, and vice versa. (If the coders generate from one single analysed radio station more than one "cluster" of stations, the conditions of reliability are not satisfied). In practice, the coding reliability was tested by Q-factor analysis.

On the basis of variables testing results, the hypothesis to be verified states that all the stations have similar orientations towards proper intrabloc relations, whereas the attitudes towards interbloc relations and towards other

groups of states diverge significantly among the stations. We therefore hypothesize that, at the level of distribution of attention to various subjects of international relations and evaluation of these subjects (and therefore relations between subjects), a relatively similar and positive evaluation of events inside a given group to which the particular radio stations belong, influences the clusters generated. On the other hand, we hypothesize that the stations have a lower degree of consensus in regard to events and subjects outside their own group.

The evaluation of one's own internal politics (i.e. the internal politics of the state to which a single station belongs) is hypothesized as playing no significant role in factoring out the clusters of propaganda programmes, since the intention of every propaganda station is to produce favourable attitudes towards "national interests". On the contrary, the symbol thesaurus and the evaluative allocation of the presented symbols into the value system, which is presented or propagated by foreign radio stations to the Yugoslav listeners, are expected to differ significantly among the foreign stations, and from the Yugoslav value system, too. Such a comparison is useful as it enables us to mark inferences about potential (dis)socializing effects of external radio propaganda. In this connection, socialization is understood in its widest sense, i.e. as a process by which political norms, values, and manners of behaviour are transferred from one social group to another, and in which individuals or groups are involved actively or passively.

General patterns of evaluation

Only a few general findings related to the socialization processes are presented here. The discussion will not be focused on the distribution of attention to subjects of international relations, or on the perception of the contingencies between subjects (actors and targets) by a single station, but rather on the value system and symbol thesaurus presented by foreign radio stations to the Yugoslav listeners.

To reveal the essential characteristics of radio propaganda, the prevailing pattern of evaluation, as suggested by Pool,¹² has been discovered first. On the one hand, the pattern of evaluation is operationalized as the relation between the symbol thesaurus in the programme (i.e. the number of different symbols) and the portion of explicitly evaluated symbols. On the other hand, the pattern of evaluation is related to the prevailing direction of evaluation, i.e. whether the stations use in the evaluation process a predominantly positive or negative form: it is possible to be against dictatorship or for democracy, against capitalism or for socialism, etc. The selection of symbols or subjects in international relations accommodated or subordinated to the tendency of positive or negative evaluation, can indicate which psychological mechanisms in the recipients' mind the communicators wish to launch in order to achieve the desired effects. Simultaneously, the prevalent direction of evaluation can indicate

the "Weltanschauung" of communicators, which is reflected in the propaganda as predominantly black or predominantly white painting of world events. In this respect we do not agree with Pool's statement that "probably the prevalent direction of judgement is not related to ideology". An affirmative approach to symbols and subjects which are presented in propaganda messages, can be understood foremost as a congruity between the perception of the trends of world affairs and the basic premises of the communicators' value system, and vice versa. The relationship between the prevalent pattern of evaluation and ideology appears in this case as quite obvious, although the nature of the relationship itself may be different. This statement confirms the Marxist thesis of the ideological nature of each propaganda activity, as well as being based on the empirical findings of the correspondence between the communicator's value system and his selection of messages. It is worth stressing Gerbner's empirically verified thesis that "there is no fundamentally non-ideological, apolitical, non-partisan news-gathering and reporting system" or, in other words, that "all editorial choice patterns in what and what not to make public (and in what portion, with what emphasis, etc.) have an ideological basis and a political dimension".¹³

If this is not only an important, but, as Gerbner thinks, also an imperative trait of every mass communication within a social system then it has to be even more explicit in propaganda, particularly in its international (cross-system) context.

In the research, the pattern of evaluation was defined (i) as general direction of evaluation (i.e. whether the broadcasting stations use in the process of evaluation predominantly positive or negative evaluative assertions), (ii) by the density and repetition of symbols, and (iii) by the degree of the explicit evaluation of symbols (i.e. how frequently symbols with evaluative determination appear in propaganda messages). Table 3 presents the first dimension of the pattern of evaluation - general tendencies of evaluation of subjects of international relations (i.e. states and international organizations as well as their representatives) and of the symbols used (e.g. capitalism, socialism, war, racism, democracy, etc.), while the other dimensions are demonstrated in Table 5.

A positive correlation between negative evaluation of presented symbols and negative evaluation of perceived subjects is rather obvious, which indubitably shows that the predominant positive or predominant negative evaluation is certainly not accidental. (Pearson's correlation $r = .79$ is significant at the .01 level).

The general tendency of evaluation of the programmes of Deutschlandfunk, Radio Athens, and Voice of Turkey cannot be explained since the results are based on too few evaluative assertions of Type II and Type IV of enumeration units. Thus, from 14 stations analysed (including Radio Belgrade) there are five with a general tendency TO BE AGAINST: Radio Tirana, Radio Peking, Radio Paris, Radio BBC, and Radio Rome, whereas the second group with a general tendency TO BE FOR consists

of three eastern European stations (Bucharest, Moscow and Sofia), of Voice of America, Deutsche Welle (Voice of Germany), and of Radio Belgrade. It is unnecessary to stress that it is not the abstract tendency TO BE FOR or TO BE AGAINST itself which is here at stake, but it is mainly such a selection of symbols and such a focus of attention to various subjects which enables (or produces) a "laudatory" or a "critical" tendency.

It is worth looking for the common denominator of each "group" of stations.

In the "to-be-for" group the stations of both superpowers (U.S.A. and USSR) are obviously leading, being to a large extent participants in all important events in the world. A similar tendency "to be for" is also shown by Radio Sofia. Radio Bucharest and Belgrade devote significant attention to the activity of the non-aligned nations, trusting in the future of the non-aligned policy.

The "to-be-against" group consists of the stations of the former European Concert's States, and Radio Peking and Radio Tirana. Their general tendency "to be against" certainly indicates their inability to take equal part in the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States (e.g. United Kingdom, France), or an explicit negative standpoint against the co-operation between the two superpowers (e.g. PR China, Albania). In complete accordance with such an interpretation is the rating of home-state's activity in international relations by single stations: the stations with the general tendency "to be for" perceive their own stations as highly active ones, whereas just the contrary is significant for the stations with the general tendency "to be against" (see Table 4).

The other three dimensions of the pattern of evaluation, i.e. the density of symbols, the index of repetition and the degree of the explicit evaluation of symbols, demonstrate some other interesting distinctions in the evaluative orientation of various broadcasting stations. In Table 5 are presented, first of all, the data indicating the density of symbols, i.e. the number of symbols used in a minute of broadcast programme. It includes also the index of repetition of symbols, which designates the ratio between all symbols used in a programme ("tokens"), the symbol thesaurus ("types") and the amount of programme. Finally, the percentage of symbols which are explicitly evaluated illustrates the last dimension of the pattern of evaluation as defined in the present research model.

The most interesting data in Table 5 are those indicating that the leading political powers (USSR, U.S.A., the People's Republic of China, but also the United Kingdom) emphasize their ideological orientation (a high density of symbols) to a much greater extent than the other (smaller) countries and their radio stations.

The index of repetition of symbols and percentage of evaluated symbols show the characteristics of ideological "repertoire" of single stations. A high index of repetition and a low percentage of evaluated symbols designate a weak, non-differentiated, and rigid repertoire of symbols. What might be the nature of such symbols? They can have a relative constant meaning in various socio-political

Table 3: General tendencies of evaluation in the programmes of the 14 radio stations

Station	General evaluation coefficients* for		Amount of programme analysed (in minutes)
	Subjects of international relations	Symbols	
Athens	(0.48)**	(0.00)	105
BBC	-0.15	-0.05	630
Bucharest	0.75	0.14	420
Deutsche Welle	-0.49	-0.03	910
Deutschlandfunk	(-0.15)	(0.04)	210
Moscow	0.21	0.05	1,470
Paris	0.17	-0.22	315
Peking	(0.00)	-0.04	420
Rome	-0.14	(-0.45)	280
Sofia	0.42	0.02	840
Tirana	-0.57	-0.22	1,470
Voice of America	0.10	0.02	420
Voice of Turkey	(0.48)	(0.24)	210
Belgrade	0.07	0.00	...

* General coefficient of evaluation is a simple calculation of the average evaluation of all subjects or symbols perceived by the broadcasting station on the basis of the following formula: $C_e = \frac{f - u}{f + n + u} [-1.1]$ where f = sum of favourable (positive) evaluations, u = sum

of unfavourable (negative), and n = sum of non-definable evaluations.

** The unreliable coefficients - based on too few evaluative assertions - are in parentheses.

Table 4: Perception of the home-state's activity ("actor-target" assertion type)*

Station	Coefficient of activity	No. of relevant assertions
Voice of America466	208
Radio Sofia329	279
Radio Moscow321	686
Radio Belgrade263	95
Radio Bucharest248	174
Voice of Turkey137	116
Deutsche Welle130	153
Radio Paris116	215
Radio Peking026	76
Radio BBC	-.009	105
Radio Athens	-.166	63

* Excluded are the stations Tirana, Deutschlandfunk and Rome because of too few relevant assertions of "actor-target" type (less than 30).

Table 5: Use of symbols in the external radio programmes

Station	Density of symbols (No. of symbols per minute)	Index of symbols repetition*	Percentage of evaluated symbols
Athens	0.17	5.7	33.3
BBC	2.28	4.6	25.8
Bucharest	0.81	4.3	31.4
Deutsche Welle	0.68	2.0	14.8
Deutschlandfunk	0.58	7.3	17.2
Moscow	1.35	2.5	23.6
Paris	0.85	2.8	22.0
Peking	1.26	5.2	58.1
Rome	0.33	3.0	28.3
Sophia	0.85	3.2	44.6
Tirana	0.51	1.6	24.0
Voice of America	1.64	5.5	10.6
Voice of Turkey	0.35	3.9	21.9
Belgrade	20.3

* Index of symbols repetition is calculated by the formula:
$$I_r = \frac{N * 100}{L * P}$$
 N = sum of all symbols appearing in a programme ("tokens"),

L = sum of different symbols in a programme ("types"), P = amount of analysed programme.

systems (especially the symbols of war and peace, economic and geopolitical symbols as in the case of Radio BBC) or they define the basis of ideological orientation of a single station or state (e.g. the use of the symbol "revisionism" in the case of Peking and Tirana). An opposite relation, i.e. a low index of repetition of symbols and a high percentage of evaluated symbols, expresses a more modernistic approach in propaganda, where the symbol thesaurus is much more adapted to concrete world situations. However, such an approach is not (yet) implemented in the external radio programmes for Yugoslav listeners.

Ideological groups of radio stations

Up-to-date findings of the general patterns of evaluation and the bearers of such tendencies - radio stations - can, of course, be interpreted only from the point of view of the communicator's perception of the world situation (which is what we tried to do above), but not from the point of view of the potential effects of different ways of the *evaluation itself* on the receivers. Thus, we will here look at the results of Q-factor analysis, which test the degree of association between the 14 radio stations on the basis of all assertion types. Q-analysis will be helpful in determining the characteristic clusters of stations to the programmes of which Yugoslav listeners are exposed, and the content characteristics of the programmes analysed.

Three principal types of data matrices were used for the Q-factor analysis: the matrix of variables' categories frequency occurrence in the programmes of the stations

analysed, the matrix of computed average evaluation scores of subjects and symbols in the programmes, and finally the matrix obtained by uniting both of the former. It should be emphasized that whatever the data matrix used, and whatever the way of looking at the factor space (standardization, normalization, orthogonal and oblique rotation), we always came to almost identical results, which undoubtedly demonstrates the stability of collected data and consequently the content (or "face") validity of research. Since data, which were to a large extent congruent, were obtained by different methods, we need not load the interpretation with all the procedures included in the research design, but will limit ourselves to the general data matrix processing, which includes frequencies of categories occurrence and coefficients of subjects and symbols evaluations.

We put the question, what are the "real" groups of radio stations - regardless of their formal belonging to a state, or to a specific social system, but with regard to the value system and to the attention focused on the events and subjects of international relations? To determine the mutual congruence of content orientation of radio stations, the correlation matrix was computed between all 14 radio stations. The correlation coefficients varied between .30 (Radio Moscow - Radio Sofia) and -.24 (Radio Rome - Radio Peking). The portion of positive and negative correlation coefficients was nearly the same, and the computed scores were not very high. This shows that we have to do with a relatively heterogeneous "group" of stations. Of course, we must not neglect the influence of the research instruments, which were also relatively non-homogeneous as compared with hypothetical generators applied in the testing of variables.

In order to reveal the clusters of types of the programmes within the sample of 14 radio stations, the Q-correlation matrix was factorized. The principal factor analysis generated factors with the following explanatory power:

	Percent of total variance	Eigenvalue
Factor I	15.82	2.21
Factor II	10.09	1.41
Factor III	9.51	1.33
Factor IV	9.08	1.27
Factor V	7.85	1.09
<hr/>		
Total	52.35	

The five factors together show quite a high amount of variance. Regarding the instruments used, the fact that less than half of the characteristics in the orientation of the stations are unique or very individual, and more than half of the characteristics tendencies are common to all the stations, can be satisfactorily evaluated from the viewpoint of our research aims. Evidently, the instruments of research include as much the indicators characteristic for (radio) propaganda as a whole, as the indicators showing differentia specifica in the programmes of single stations.

The first orthogonal factor has moderate or high loadings for all the entities, including both positive and negative loadings. This factor represents ideologic systems, since all the stations belonging to capitalist socio-political systems have relatively high negative loadings, while the stations of socialist countries have relatively high positive loadings.

The first factor which explains *the most part of total variance* is an “ideologic” one, not only because it divides foreign propaganda stations into western (capitalist) and eastern (socialist) groups, but rather because of its objective determination by categories of obviously ideologic character. From the first 40 categories (from 384 in total) which qualitatively determine the first dimension, there are 25 directly connected with the selection of significant symbols or evaluation of symbols and subjects of international relations. The ratio between the first ten categories which determine the first factor is even higher – 8 : 2 – for symbols as categories with the highest factor scores:

Category - assertion type	Factor score
1. COLONIALISM - evaluation	2.25
2. EAST - frequency of appearance	2.17
3. WEST - frequency of appearance	2.17
4. CHILE (Allende) - evaluation	2.16
5. GATT - distribution of attention - actor	2.14
6. WAR - evaluation	2.11
7. NON-ALIGNMENT - evaluation	2.01
8. IMPERIALISM - evaluation	1.94
9. REACTION - frequency of appearance	1.88
10. EEC - distribution of attention - target	1.74

From the symbols whose frequency of appearance and/or evaluation *diverge significantly* in each (western and eastern) group, the following are of crucial importance in a statistical and epistemological sense: WORKING CLASS, LIBERATION MOVEMENT, INDEPENDENCE, RACISM, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, FREE TRADE, FASCISM, COMMUNISM, SOCIALISM and MARXISM. Doubtlessly, these are *characteristic* ideologic symbols which are frequently used by both groups of stations but from different evaluative or ideologic points of views and with different (or even opposed) intentions as to the potential effects of the implied value systems on the Yugoslav listeners.

The second factor was named “interbloc versus intrabloc orientation”, based on the attention given by the station, in its programmes for Yugoslavia, to events in the world and at home, i.e. on the basis of perceived actors and targets, and evaluated subjects in international relations. On this factor some stations have very low, practically insignificant, loadings as for instance Radio BBC and Radio Paris among the western stations, and Radio Bucharest, Radio Moscow, and Radio Sofia among the eastern group. In general, however, we may state that the stations which have positive loadings on this bipolar factor devote the greater part of their attention to events that are within their political (or military) bloc, while the stations with negative loadings give more attention to events in the other bloc, and to relations between the blocs (and to PR China). The stations in the quadrant I - II + (Radio Athens, Radio Rome and Voice of Turkey) are not only intrabloc-oriented but, moreover, clearly introverted, i.e. in their programmes they speak foremost of events in their own country, and discuss international affairs only in so far as they concern their country. Finally, Radio Belgrade deserves to be mentioned in particular: most of its programme does not deal with events in the so-called “socialist camp”, but rather with events that are linked to the non-aligned countries (e.g. the Algerian Conference).

As regards the two very significant types of radio programme destined for the Yugoslav listeners, we may - according to Marx - ask the question, which programmes are “good” and which are “bad”? “Which speak the truth and which speak the desired truth? Which represent the public opinion and which substitute the public opinion?”¹⁴ The data obtained do not allow us to answer the question directly.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to disprove the statement that Yugoslav listeners are potentially exposed to (at least) two relatively complex value systems - the “eastern” and the “western”. “A complex value system” is of course a synonym for an ideology. At the same time, the eastern value system seems to be obviously more congruent with the Yugoslav system (as shown in Radio Belgrade) than the western one; but this does not mean that it is completely acceptable - it only contains the elements congruent with the Yugoslav “Weltanschauung”. In any case these facts are also congruent with the theses of G.A. Arbatow,¹⁵ whose point of departure is that,

Table 6: Orthogonal Q-factor matrix

Stations	Factors					Communa- lities h^2
	I	II	III	IV	V	
Athens	-.443	.404	-.235	-.219	-.128	.480
BBC	-.275	-.128	-.055	.537	.168	.412
Belgrade256	.317	.121	.255	-.245	.306
Bucharest330	.049	-.044	-.018	.748	.673
Deutsche Welle	-.372	-.503	.294	.045	.085	.488
Deutschlandfunk	-.363	-.358	.563	-.383	.113	.736
Moscow588	.176	.263	.260	.180	.546
Paris	-.411	.026	-.350	.351	-.081	.422
Peking410	-.355	-.421	-.333	.039	.585
Rome	-.383	.247	.345	-.275	-.348	.523
Sofia551	.034	.395	.190	-.063	.500
Tirana357	-.338	-.398	-.310	-.380	.641
Voice of America	-.436	-.248	-.195	.371	.088	.435
Voice of Turkey	-.217	.594	-.113	-.133	.308	.582

with socialism and capitalism, for the first time in history two *world systems* exist, although this does not necessarily mean that the character of the basic antagonism of our epoch should lead to tensions in international relations.

However, the following four factors extracted by Kaiser-Guttman's "lower bound criterion" are difficult to interpret reasonably, since we obtained very overlapping factors. But the visual interpretation of the factor space with the point plot turns out well. Since we had more than two factors which are also the bipolar ones, a selection of the most interesting two factors with the highest percent of variance had to be made for the plot. In Figure 1, the 14 radio stations are plotted in the space of the first two orthogonal factors. Some clusters of the stations can be identified, although all the stations do not appear as equally salient. Into the space of the first two factors we can identify, besides the two "original" factors, a new - PROPAGANDA LEVEL - dimension. This dimension would extend from the quadrant I-II+ up to the quadrant I + II-. The two bipolar factors and the new dimension are named according to the categories that contribute most importantly to them as: SOCIALIST-CAPITALIST IDEOLOGY, INTERBLOC-INTRABLOC ORIENTATION, and PROPAGANDA LEVEL with characteristic fields LOW PROPAGANDA LEVEL (I- II+), VALUE-FREE ORIENTATION (I- II-), VALUE-LOADED ORIENTATION (I+ II+), and HIGH PROPAGANDA LEVEL (or AFFECTIVITY, I+ II-).

We have named the first factor as the "ideologic factor": the stations with positive factor loadings on this factor are, roughly speaking, pro-socialist and/or pro-communist in their orientation, while the stations with negative loadings are taken to be pro-capitalist and/or anti-socialist. The orientation of particular stations obtained is based primarily on their symbol funds and the evaluations of these symbols, which will be shown later when each group of stations will be described in more detail.

The second factor was named "interbloc versus intrabloc orientation" based on the attention given by the station, in its programmes for Yugoslavia, to events in the world and at home, i.e. on the basis of perceived actors and targets, and evaluated subjects in international relations. It becomes obvious that some stations have in this regard very low, practically insignificant loadings as, for instance, Radio BBC and Radio Paris of the western stations, and Radio Bucharest, Radio Moscow, and Radio Sofia of the eastern group. In general, however, we may state that the stations which have positive loadings on this bipolar factor devote the greater part of their attention to events that are within their political (or military) bloc, while the stations with negative loading give more attention to events in the other bloc, and to relations between the blocs (and to the People's Republic of China). The stations in the quadrant I - II + (Radio Athens, Radio Rome, and Voice of Turkey) are not only intrabloc-oriented but, moreover, clearly introverted, i.e. in their programmes they speak foremost of events within their own country, and discuss international affairs only in so far as they concern their country. Finally, Radio Belgrade deserves to be mentioned in particular: most of its programme does not deal with events in the so-called "socialist camp", but rather with events that are linked to the non-aligned countries (e.g. the Algerian Conference).

As has already been mentioned, it is possible to recognize in the space of the first two orthogonal factors the dimension which we name "propaganda level", in accordance with the variables that are included in the model. The stations in quadrant I - II + present their messages predominantly on the first two levels of propaganda - as information or analytically - documentary messages. Stations in the quadrant I-II - broadcast messages on the higher propaganda level, which is the analytically-declarative level, while stations in quadrant I + II + include frequently, besides the declarative messages, (ideologically




Figure 1: Point plot of the radio stations analysed in the space of the first two orthogonal factors

- politically orientated messages. The highest level is reached by the two stations belonging to quadrant I + II —, which has explicit ideologically-politically oriented messages and a strong emotional appeal.

The plot suggested that the factors would better represent the clusters of radio stations if they were rotated. Thus we rotated the factors from Table 7 once by varimax and then by oblimin technique. In both cases we obtained less overlapping group factors, but in both of them, understandably, we lost the first unrotated - "ideological" - factor. Since both rotation techniques led to almost identical results (i.e. factors or clusters of the radio stations), the following interpretation will be focused only on the latter, i.e. on the factor matrix obtained by oblique rotation.

By oblique rotation we obtained in five factors actually five *clusters* of the stations and two more specific stations (Radio Bucharest and Radio Rome). Because of low loadings of Radio Belgrade on all the factors (including the first) this station can also be evaluated as a specificum.

The first rotated factor is expressedly bipolar with two relatively high negative loadings (Radio Athens and Voice of Turkey), and two high positive loadings (Radio Moscow and Radio Sofia). We could call it for two reasons the "East-European" factor of the "East-European group of stations". The first reason is that the radio stations of eastern (and south-eastern) Europe have high loadings on this factor, hence we may speak of the East-European *factor*. When we look at the variables or categories that contribute most heavily to this factor, we are led to conclude that the major contributors are categories (or "systems" of categories) which are in one way or another related to the Soviet Union. This is the second reason. From this it is possible to understand why the factor is bipolar, having on its positive extreme stations of countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact (Ia), and on its negative extreme stations of countries belonging to the NATO Pact (Ib).

The group Ia is determined foremost by the large attention directed at events which concern the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, and Yugoslavia; compared with programmes of other stations, there is a significant positive evaluation of subjects in international relations of the Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic, and the Allende Government in Chile; and, on the other hand, negative evaluation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the new Chilean Government, Israel, the NATO Pact, and People's Republic of China. These characteristics are significant in the case of Radio Moscow and Radio Sofia, which have very high factor loadings on the first factor (over .600); on the other hand, they are not completely valid in the case of Radio Belgrade because of its relatively low factor loading (thus, e.g. Radio Belgrade does not evaluate at all the Federal Republic of Germany, NATO, the People's Republic of China, as is seen in Figure 14, Chapter III). The specific orientation of these stations is also demonstrated by their symbol fund, which emphasizes socialist and anti-imperialist notions (WORKERS' MOVEMENT,

INTERNATIONALISM, PLANNING, SOLIDARITY, SOCIALISM, COMMUNISM, SOVEREIGNTY, and on the other side FASCISM, IMPERIALISM, COLONIALISM, WAR - if we mention only the most significant symbols).

The Ib group (which had in the orthogonal factor matrix "its own factor" - Factor II) is determined foremost by the attention it pays to relations between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, and to the relations between the first two with the European Economic Community and NATO; the programmes of both stations are obviously inverted, concentrating on the internal problems of each country, which is directly contrary to the characteristics of group Ia. It is interesting to note that both groups (Ia and Ib) take a characteristically average interest in Romania and Albania: the Ib group pays attention to them in accord with the general (relatively small) attention given to the Balkan countries, while the Ia group gives very little attention not only to Albania, which does not belong to the eastern bloc, but also to Romania, which is following an ever more independent political line.

The next two rotated factors are distinctly "doublet factors". The second group consists of Radio Peking and Radio Tirana. These two stations are the only ones to load even very highly on this factor. It is superfluous to stress the degree of accordance between the politics of these two countries, in both internal and external matters, in spite of the fact that one of them belongs to the world super-powers, while the other is, both in the size of its population and in natural resources, among the smallest countries in the world. They share in common the attention they address to organized struggles of liberation movements in the world, and particularly in South-East Asia. Even more significant for the II group is its symbol fund and/or value orientation of both programmes which have, of all the programmes analysed, the highest and most explicit level of propaganda. Among the first ten items with categories of variable subject that contribute most significantly to this factor, as many as eight subjects are evaluated negatively: Jordan, United States of America, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Legal Government in Laos and three western international organizations NATO, GATT, and the EEC, while positive ratings were given only to two: People's Republic of China and Allende's Democratic Republic of Chile. There is a similar case with the variable symbol, having six of the ten most prominent evaluated symbols negatively evaluated (CAPITALISM, COLONIALISM, IMPERIALISM, RACISM, WAR, ARMAMENT, and four that were positively evaluated (SOCIALISM, REVOLUTION, COMMUNISM and DISARMAMENT).

The third group consists of both German radio stations (Deutsche-Welle and Deutschlandfunk); along with these, Radio Rome has its only positive loading on the third factor, as can be seen in Table 7. Both programmes share in common negative evaluation of the German Democratic Republic, while giving support to Israel in the Middle-East "crisis", and to the leaders of the coup d'état in Chile. In addition, they give much attention to

Table 7: Loading order of 14 radio stations on oblique rotated factors*

Stations	Oblique rotated factors				
	I'	II'	III'	IV'	V'
Moscow	(.679)	-.090	-.250	-.130	-.040
Sofia	(.691)	-.095	-.024	-.127	.054
Belgrade	(.373)	-.196	-.335	-.081	-.194
Athens	(-.532)	-.121	-.192	-.204	-.266
Voice of Turkey	(-.454)	-.302	-.191	-.430	.182
Peking	-.093	(.720)	-.030	-.075	.231
Tirana	-.006	(.785)	-.100	-.064	-.188
Deutsche Welle	-.022	-.065	(.585)	.338	-.018
Deutschlandfunk	-.048	-.085	(.838)	-.134	-.049
BBC	-.023	-.310	-.059	(.572)	.116
Paris	-.323	-.130	-.266	(.453)	-.144
Voice of America	-.209	-.079	-.011	(.584)	-.153
Bucharest001	-.082	-.003	-.108	(.810)
Rome	-.099	-.231	.222	-.326	(-.517)

* The highest loading of every station is shown in parentheses.

the idea of a united West Europe and express rather clearly their negative attitudes towards socialist states and - somewhat less explicitly - towards Yugoslav policy.

The fourth rotated factor applies to the Voice of America, Radio BBC, and Radio Paris. They are united by the distinct extroverted character of their programmes which transmit attitudes on all major (which is, of course, a subjective judgement) events in the world: war in the Middle-East and South-East Asia, the coup d'état in Chile, the visit of the late President Pompidou to the People's Republic of China, the case of the so-called "Soviet dissidents". Only the Algerian Conference of non-aligned countries is not among the most prominent news. Yugoslavia also, with only very rare exceptions, is not discussed in their programmes. Their use of the symbols of war and peace and the geopolitical symbols (INCIDENT, TENSION, ARMAMENT, AGGRESSION, NEAR EAST, ARABS, EAST EUROPE, EUROPE) is characteristic, and an obvious ideologic orientation which expresses itself in a negative evaluation of SOCIALISM, COMMUNISM, LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, MARXISM, SOVIET UNION, and a seemingly neutral attitude towards the coup d'état in Chile, which is more often on the side of the leaders of the coup than in favour of Allende.

Finally, there is the last specific factor with high positive loading of Radio Bucharest. Radio Rome has also a relatively high negative loading on this factor, but we have thought it more adequate to locate it in the third group along with the stations of the Federal Republic of Germany. This factor is specific foremost in its treatment of the visit of Romanian State and party leader Ciucesco to Latin America. The attention this visit was given in the programmes of Radio Bucharest overshadowed

all other events, so that it is quite difficult to interpret this factor validly. Compared with all other groups of stations it is worth mentioning that the specificity of Radio Bucharest lies in its constructive attitude towards world events. Of 20 significant items, 15 were positively and only 5 negatively evaluated categories.

Supplementary function of external propaganda

The fact that the Yugoslav radio station (Radio Belgrade) has no common characteristic of the generated groups of radio stations which transmit their programmes to Yugoslavia, leads us to consider the (potential) effects of these programmes on Yugoslav listeners. The consideration is facilitated in a sense by the fact, already discovered in the research design, that the results in the testing of variables show a high congruence between Radio Belgrade and the Yugoslav media in general, regarding the distribution of attention to world - and home - events, and evaluative orientation of messages.

These facts lead us to the following conclusion: **Yugoslav listeners are exposed to the programmes of various stations with specific value and/or ideologic orientations, which are significantly different from the predominant Yugoslav value system.**

Such orientation of foreign radio programmes destined for the Yugoslav listeners can, from the point of view of the Yugoslav communication and social system in general, be defined as disfunctional or dissocializational. The presentation of tendencies and aspirations alien to the socialist construction of Yugoslav society can cause value disorientation, without, of course, taking into account all other factors affecting the social consciousness.

Since we have not found differences between Radio Belgrade's external programmes and the content of the Yugoslav mass media in the testing of variables, we can, on the basis of the characteristics of Radio Belgrade's programmes, determine comparatively the potential impact of external radio programmes on Yugoslav listeners. On this occasion, we are less interested in the distribution of attention to various events in the world and at home by single stations, and more in their symbol fund and value orientations. Namely, we hypothesize that the value orientation is a relatively consistent and, in any case, more significant indicator than the distribution of attention, which is to a larger extent dependent on the objective reality, i.e. on the various activity (or non-activity) of subjects of international relations.

First of all, we can state that no station in practice pays attention to the events in Yugoslavia *directly*. (Only Radio Madrid should be mentioned as an exception, but the amount of programme which could be recorded was too small to enable us to perform a valid analysis).

If we also take into account the manifested symbol fund, only the programmes of Radio Athens and Voice of Turkey are "irrelevant" from the viewpoint of the socialization of Yugoslav listeners. Their basic characteristic is an introvert direction of the content, which is focused mainly on their domestic policy and bilateral relations with each other, with Cyprus, and with their allies.

But the above statements cannot be made concerning Radio Rome, which, like the stations mentioned above, is focused predominantly on domestic policy, but contrary to them, presents a value system which is incongruent with the Yugoslav one: non-alignment, socialism, and the Soviet Union, for example, are highly negatively evaluated by Radio Rome.

The only station which is, by its symbol fund, in accord with the Yugoslav value system is Radio Bucharest. Although there exist appreciably different distributions of attention to world events in both programmes, their symbol funds are quite congruent. The congruency does not express itself only in the fact that both stations rate highly (in the positive sense) the non-alignment policy and the Conference of non-aligned countries in Algeria. Among the ten frequently presented and positively evaluated symbols, eight are identical: INDEPENDENCE, NON-ALIGNMENT, FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, SOCIALISM, PEACE, SOVEREIGNTY, and WORKING CLASS. The other two symbols in the programme of Radio Belgrade are: SELF-GOVERNMENT and THIRD WORLD while in the programme of Radio Bucharest it is PATRIOTISM and COMMUNISM. In accordance with the characteristic symbol fund which it presents, Radio Bucharest does not evaluate negatively any of the subjects of international relations, with only one exception: the coup d'état in Chile. At the same time, Radio Bucharest is one of the few stations that rate Yugoslavia highly in the positive sense. Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to say that Radio Bucharest might serve as an example of how radio programmes for foreign audiences

should be made, if they are to contribute to a better understanding among nations.

In contrast to the Romanian radio, Radio Moscow and Radio Sofia have also a symbol fund similar to that of Belgrade radio, but it already implies one of the characteristics of the propaganda message: the bipolar value system. In the results of our research this means that the coefficients of symbol evaluation come close to the limits, i.e. the extreme points of the interval $(-1, +1)$, especially in cases of negatively evaluated symbols. Both stations are evidently separated from the Yugoslav value orientation by their anti-Chinese tendency, evaluating the symbol MAOISM very much as negatively as, for instance, the symbols AGGRESSION, TERRORISM, RACISM and IMPERIALISM.

The bipolarity of the symbol fund is best expressed in the programmes of Radio Peking and Radio Tirana, emphasizing particularly the negatively evaluated symbols, which are frequently attributed to the western countries and the Soviet Union: symbols CAPITALISM, COLONIALISM, IMPERIALISM, HEGEMONY, DICTATORSHIP, FASCISM, BOURGEOISIE and REVISIONISM, which both stations use in a sense as a synonym for the politics of the Soviet Union. The evaluative presentation of these symbols is significantly one-sided, "black-and-white", in spite of the fact that the index of symbol evaluativeness (or the percentage of evaluations of symbols among all presentations of symbols) was lower than that of Radio Sofia and Radio Bucharest. We can state with certitude that Radio Peking and Radio Tirana are the most explicit examples of propaganda stations which, by presenting two diametrically opposite value systems, try to achieve intense orientation of the listeners for the "right" value system, which is represented by extremely positively evaluated symbols, and against the "untruthful" value system, which is presented by the extremely negative evaluated symbols.

The last group of stations which have programmes for Yugoslavia and which, however, as a group is not entirely homogeneous, consists of the major part of West-European radio stations and the Voice of America. Their common characteristic is their attempt to cloak the propaganda intentions (character) of the messages presented, and their specific thematic-value orientation. It is characteristic of all the stations in this group that they evaluate negatively the activity of the Allende Government in Chile and the politics of the Soviet Union and the Arab countries. Their "aspiring to be objective" and seeming value neutrality expresses itself in the fact that these stations evaluate negatively not only the Allende Government and the Arab States but also the forces opposed to these as, for example, the military junta in Chile, and Israel (although with less intensity) - which means that they evaluate in this way all those who "threaten peace and order in the world". This is in complete accordance with the symbol fund which represents the value orientation of the enumerated stations, and for which the most characteristic positively evaluated symbols are: FREEDOM and PEACE. The characteristically negative

attitude to the three most "interesting" subjects in international relations at the time of analysis (Chile: coup d'état against Allende; in the USSR: the activity of the "dissidents" Sakharov, Solzenitzyn and others, and in the Arab States, especially in Egypt and Syria: exposure to Israeli military action) is quite in accord with the negative evaluation of symbols such as: NON-ALIGNMENT, SOCIALISM, COMMUNISM, MARXISM and LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. Such a profile of the West-European stations and the Voice of America is not only different from the Yugoslav foreign policy, i.e. the prevailing socializing content of the Yugoslav mass media, but is moreover diametrically opposed to it.

In summarizing the characteristics of foreign radio stations for Yugoslav listeners from the point of view of their potential socializing (non)effectiveness, we can conclude in the first place that the function of these programmes is *by no means complementary* (i.e. the messages do not provide a more detailed knowledge and better understanding of the events than is given by the Yugoslav mass media), but is *rather obviously of a supplementary nature* (i.e. the messages treat more or less the same events that are treated by the Yugoslav mass media, without providing deeper knowledge, but evaluating them differently and locating them in a different value system). Obviously, there is a competitive relationship between the orientation of foreign programmes intended for Yugoslav listeners and the content of the Yugoslav media.

In order to find out what is the *actual* effect of the analysed messages (and others that are similar to these) of particular foreign radio programmes upon the Yugoslav listeners, we should, of course, undertake a very demanding empirical (opinion) research, which we had to forego for financial and technical reasons. The attitude of Yugoslav listeners to foreign radio stations which have programmes in their languages can, however, be derived, in part from the results of the research carried out in 1968 by the Institute for Social Studies in Belgrade.¹⁶ Attention should be paid to the following characteristics brought out in the 1968 research: in three years the number of listeners (to foreign radio programmes) decreased nearly fifty percent. More than half of the listeners to foreign programmes listened to *more than one station*. In accordance with that, only 10% of the respondents - listeners to foreign programmes - thought that the foreign stations always report in an objective way. On the basis of this we conclude that listening to foreign programmes is cumulative because of the tendency to compare messages from various sources.

Two things can be perceived: a relatively selective attitude of the listeners to the programmes of foreign radio stations, and the fact that among the four most listened-to-radio stations (the Voice of America, Radio Moscow, Radio Bucharest, and Radio Tirana), each belongs to a different group, having a specific value and/or ideological orientation. This can be seen quite clearly by looking at Figure 1.

A comparison with prevalent directions of evaluation, of which we have spoken at the beginning of this paper, demonstrates the interesting fact that the stations which are listened to most frequently in Yugoslavia (with the exception of Radio Tirana) fall into the group with the general tendency "*to be for*" which doubtless reflects, within the context of the research categories used, a more constructive approach to world events and their development than the general tendency "*to be against*". If we are allowed to generalize on the basis of the Yugoslav example, we can conclude that in the thirty years following the Second World War, the affirmative approach in propaganda activity has become much more efficient than the hostility or indignation approach, which was characteristic during the Second World War and the Cold War that followed it. This, however, does not mean that this kind of propaganda has become predominant!

Footnotes:

1. Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites, and Ass., *Language of Politics*, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1949.
2. Charles E. Osgod, George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum, *The Measurement of Meaning*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1957. Charles E. Osgod, "Studies of the Generality of Affective Meaning Systems", *American Psychologist*, 1926/27, pp. 10-28.
3. Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed.), *The Prestige Press: A Comparative Study of Political Symbols*, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1965.
4. Bernard Berelson, *Content Analysis in Communication Research*, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1952.
5. The variable source is operationalized by the category system of states, quoted directly or indirectly by radio stations as perceivers of reported events.
6. The actor is operationalized by the category system of subjects in international relations (e.g. states, regional or world organizations). Only exceptionally, an actor category may be narrower than a state, i.e. more than one category of actor variable may appear within a state. This rule has to be applied only when two or more organized political groups exist within a state, denying the legitimate rights of the legislature to each other. The actor is a subject in international relations whose effect or action is reported by the station.
7. The connection (e.g. between the actor and the target) indicates whether the perceived action or situation ties or separates given actors and targets.
8. The target is operationalized by the same category system as the actor, yet a subject in international relations is in this case in the role of the recipient of the action.
9. The subject is operationalized by the same category system as actor and target.

10. The evaluation includes all those signs which are used by a source to express his attitudes towards a subject, i.e. the signs with explicit or even accentuated emotive function or affective meaning, which is practically independent of the language users.
11. The symbol is here understood as any concept of evaluative abstract objects, such as moral principles, political doctrines, or ideas such as justice, liberation movement, or socialism, the allocation of which into the value continuum depends upon the frame of reference of language users.
12. Ithiel de Sola Pool, *ibid*, p. 101.
13. George Gerbner, "Ideological Perspectives and Political Tendencies in News Reporting", *Journalism Quarterly*, 1964, Vol, 41, pp. 495-508.
14. Karl Marx, "Die gute und die schlechte Presse", *Rheinische Zeitung*, 6 January 1843.
15. G.A. Arbatow, *Ideologischer Klassenkampf und Imperialismus*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1972, p. 412.
16. Firdus Džinić, Ljiljana Bačević, *Inostrana propaganda u Jugoslaviji*, Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd, 1968.

Specific content and value orientations of external radio broadcasting to Yugoslavia

In Chapter II we have tried to summarize the results of our research in order to determine the common characteristics of radio propaganda in the world today, and to locate and explain specific differences between groups of stations and the specific characteristics of these groups (on the basis of our hypothesis that the content and/or value orientation of particular stations surpasses the level of the particular - in other words, that it is possible to group the stations). We shall now deal with the characteristics of particular radio stations' propaganda programmes, by following the particular group characteristics. This chapter is devoted mainly to a more precise and concrete explanation of the characteristics found in propaganda messages, without any particular theoretical ambition or attempt to reach conclusions about the communicators' intentions or the effects of the analysed messages on Yugoslav listeners on the basis of content characteristics, which was our goal in the preceding Chapter.

In the preceding Chapter we discussed in greater detail the (ideological) nature of the "prevalent tendency of evaluation"; at this point it is necessary to set out those textual elements in the propaganda messages which we have named "symbols". In accordance with the previously determined characteristics of propaganda messages, we take as the starting point for this discussion the fact that it is not possible to interpret political and/or propaganda texts without considering ideological implications.

We have named as symbols the notions which cannot be defined exclusively, but which produce certain value attitudes and/or behaviour which are characteristically dependent on the context of the message, of the entire language-competence, and the general socio-political environment. We are thus dealing with notions which usually have a rather long tradition, and which in the course of this tradition change their meaning while maintaining their significant (or even fundamental) characteristic: its stimulative nature. (e.g. democracy, freedom, socialism, capitalism, hegemony, etc.).

It is not our intention to discuss specifically the criteria for defining exclusively "symbols". One of the most important criteria is doubtless frequent appearance and/or repetition. The second fundamental characteristic is the relatively loose content which, depending on the concrete context and situation, enables the actualization of various meanings. The symbols are, finally, a fundamental

characteristic of the propaganda message because it is precisely through them that the suggestibility of the propaganda activity manifests itself. Symbols are positively or negatively value-loaded, so that the mere appearance of a symbol can instigate a desired reaction, which is interiorized in the lasting process of socialization.

In international propaganda, as a typical form of international (as differentiated from intercultural) communication, where the communicator and the recipient belong each to his own specific social system, one can expect that the symbols do not appear alone but significantly interconnected while, at the same time, being linked to direct negative or positive evaluations and certain groups ("enemies" or "friends") - in our case, of particular subjects in international relations. Given the fact that the amount and the content of symbols are very variable, while their applicability is always aimed at the *value orientation* of the recipient, it is possible that the value dimension implied in the symbols is at the same time their common denominator and, hence, the indicator on the basis of which it is possible to compare them. In accordance with the general, and, particularly, the ideological meaning which is attributed to the symbols, it is precisely to them that we devote most attention in this Chapter (while we proved their indicative nature, from the viewpoint of the entire propaganda activity, in the preceding Chapter). However, the symbols which are presented by various sources cannot be directly compared in our research, even though we are dealing with a unified language - competence (Serbo-Croat language). The differences still express themselves in the context of the message within which a particular symbol appears, and in the socio-political system to which the communicator belongs, or which he represents. It is particularly important to draw attention to the tendency of the value dimension of a symbol (or its connotation) to become more established the longer the symbol appears *within the framework* of a given socio-political system, and regardless of whether such a socio-political system exists in reality, or is a goal which should be either reached or refuted (e.g. socialism). In our research this practically means that we may expect to find the symbols in particular propaganda programmes less extremely evaluated or located, the more frequent and habitual (uniform) their use in the socio-political system of which the particular propaganda programmes are an instrument.

We therefore should not be surprised by the apparently “neutral” evaluation of Marxism and Communism in the programmes of Radio Tirana, especially given the fact that the socio-political systems which are the developmental aim in both societies (Source-Albania and Target-Yugoslavia), coincide. And vice-versa: the less frequent the appearance of symbols, the greater the probability that they are extremely evaluated (e.g. symbols the presentation of which is conditioned by some new event; to illustrate: F.J. Strauss’s speech on freedom and democracy doubtlessly influenced that Radio Moscow once again to evaluate explicitly the symbols FREEDOM and DEMOCRACY, congruent to the event. The fact that the symbol FREEDOM was in this case given a highly negative evaluation, can be explained by the incongruence between Strauss’s highly positive evaluation of the same symbol and Radio Moscow’s negative evaluation of Strauss.)

The expected tendency of a clear presence or absence of the value dimension in the symbols presented is, at the same time, also *dependent on the chosen propaganda tactics* as an operationalization of the global strategy of propaganda activity, which is linked to the emotional language - performance. The closer propaganda language is to the tactic of black-white depicting of events (presentation of bipolar value system), the more extremely evaluated will be the symbols that are less frequently used. Such a tendency will, however, be less manifest the farther removed the propaganda activity is from the beguiling and concealing techniques of influencing the consciousness and the behaviour of the recipients, and the closer it is to the explicative-argumentative use of the language. Let us take an example: we expect that in the ordinary (or “average”) language the words are normally distributed on the value continuum. Propaganda activity operates with a bimodal (good-bad) distribution of words. In the “black-white” depicting of events we are already dealing with such a bimodal distribution, in which the distance between the two modes is maximal (the concentration of words used on the positive and negative poles of the value continuum).

Cluster I: Radio Moscow and Radio Sofia

The Soviet and the Bulgarian radio stations are among the stations that have the largest propaganda programmes intended for Yugoslav listeners. Moscow emits each day nine thirty-minute programmes (seven in Serbo-Croat, one in Slovene, and one in Macedonian), amounting to 270 minutes. Sofia emits on workdays four, and on Sundays five thirty-minute programmes in Serbo-Croat, which means on the average 125 minutes per day. The congruence between their content orientation can be seen from the following tables, which show the evaluation of symbols and subjects in international relations, and the distribution of attention given by both stations to world events.

Even without going into deeper comparison, it is possible to see that there is a high degree of identity between Radio Sofia and the Moscow programmes for Yugoslavia. All the seven subjects explicitly evaluated by Radio Sofia are totally congruent with the evaluations figuring in Radio Moscow programmes. Of the 27 symbols evaluated by Radio Sofia, 21 are identical to those of Radio Moscow, five are not presented by Radio Moscow, while only one symbol (FREEDOM) is evaluated differently. A similar situation exists with world events: those treated by Radio Sofia follow the pattern of distribution of attention found in Radio Moscow, the only difference being that Radio Sofia limits itself to those events to which Radio Moscow attributes the greatest importance: the first eight events which are most frequently “perceived” by Radio Moscow, are also presented by Radio Sofia.

Both stations give most attention to international relations (Moscow 63.5% and Sofia 51.1%), followed by domestic news, culture, and sports (Moscow 19.2%, and Sofia 30.8%) and, finally, news concerning bilateral relations (Moscow 17.3% and Sofia 18.1%).

Where does the selectivity of both stations express itself? Some of the themes which were in the foreground of attention elsewhere, were neglected by Radio Moscow and Radio Sofia; thus the visit of French President Pompidou to the People’s Republic of China was ranked very low by Radio Moscow, while the Bulgarian programmes for Yugoslavia mentioned it only once. “Disinterestedness” of both stations in the activity of the non-aligned countries - even at the time of the Algerian Conference - as expressed by Table 8, is only apparent. We must remember that Table 8 includes only “actor-target assertion type”, and not evaluations of subjects in international relations. The Algerian Conference is a typical example of an event which, on the one hand, does not involve to any great extent explicit connections *among* non-aligned countries, but rather the connections between the *group* of non-aligned countries and other subjects in international relations; on the other hand, it is an example of an event which is perceived by the propaganda stations first at the level of evaluation (assertion type II) and not at the level of actor-target contingencies. This can be seen also in Figure 2 and Figure 3, in which the non-aligned countries have a value allocation, even though only those subjects in international relations which have more than 10 value assertions in a particular station have been considered.

The classification (distribution) of events to which the two stations gave most attention reflects the general international political orientation in the policy of the “home” states. Frequent mention of the coup d’état in Chile demonstrates that the event was interesting for the Soviet Union in two ways: first, because it seemed to prove that socialism cannot be built by parliamentary means, thereby inflicting a hard blow to the international workers’ movement role in deciding on future tactics, and secondly, because this event brought about a change in the balance of power between the two world superpowers.

Table 8: Distribution of attention given to world events in the period 8-15 September 1973 (identified by "actor-target" contingencies; domestic policy excluded)

Event	Number and rank of relevant assertions			
	MOSCOW		SOFIA	
	No.	Rank	No.	Rank
Coup d'état in Chile	463	1	114	2
USSR - Yugoslavia	194	2	-	-
Bulgaria - Yugoslavia	-	-	21	4
Relations between the States of the socialist block	143	3	128	1
Near-East crisis	128	4	41	3
War in Viet Nam	36	5	9	6
NATO activity	29	6	-	-
U.S.A. - USSR	29	6	10	5
German Democratic Republic-UNO- Federal Republic of Germany	28	8	-	-
People's Republic of China-USSR	28	8	5	7
War in Laos	20	10	-	-
India-Bangladesh-Pakistan	18	11	-	-
Greece-Cyprus	16	12	-	-
USSR-France	12	13	5	7
People's Republic of China-France	11	14	-	-
War in Cambodia	9	15	-	-

The brutality of the blow against the constitutionally-elected government of President Allende could also be used as a reinforced proof of the destructive characteristic traits of imperialism, and to unmask the words of "freedom" and "democracy" as the façades of unfree and undemocratic systems. The aggressiveness of the conservative forces which overthrew the government in Chile was, therefore, because of its symbolic role in the international workers' movement, given an important place in external radio programmes.

One may conclude that the event received increased value in the broadcasts of the Soviet radio station (in approximately the same ratio as the Bulgarian) for Yugoslav listeners. The Yugoslav political evaluation of the Chilean event did not differ from the Soviet, but it had many different undertones because of the difference in the international position of both countries. The quantity of information regarding Chile served also to "clarify" views on the various possible ways of reaching socialism. The Chilean way was based on specific conditions, and it formed its strategy of socialist transformation in accordance with these conditions. The failure of such a way, which was a pioneering act that followed no models, was therefore used to sharpen the attitudes about the nature of developed capitalism, and about the nature of the class struggle and its links to the principle of proletarian internationalism. The coup d'état in Chile carried, however, a side effect which reflects itself in the destiny of those small nations which have opted for the policy of non-alignment. The Soviet Union has not entirely accepted non-alignment as a practical political

platform, but has always emphasized that part of it which expresses the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. The relative loneliness of Chile in its conflict with the mighty supranational capitalist interests therefore led to a reinforced emphasis on the security which comes from blocs and particularly from being connected with the bloc of socialist countries. Such emphasis differed essentially from the information which Yugoslav listeners received from the Yugoslav mass media. This explanation of the double meaning of the Chilean events in the political orientation of the two stations under consideration is probably also valid if we compare the quantity of contributions devoted to other important events. In the case of the Middle-East crisis, it was again a matter of the world balance of power, but it did not have any special meaning for the unification policy of socialist countries.

The propaganda tendency is also expressed in the choice of events concerning relations among nations of the socialist bloc. In this kind of emphasis one can feel the programmers' desire to demonstrate the good sides of the union, giving the impression that the union is a very strong one. Radio Sofia is very similar to Radio Moscow in the way it gives attention to international events, but clearly advocates bloc-loyalty when addressing the Yugoslav listeners. In this sense it is less world-oriented and more "locally"-oriented (in the week under consideration, for instance, it did not mention important events in Indochina, the relations between the two German States which were preparing to normalize relations, nor did it mention the annual meeting of the West-European defense alliance). Radio Sofia characteristically chooses from the




Figure 2: Radio SOFIA: Allocation of subjects in international relations and symbols on value continuum




Figure 3: Radio MOSCOW: Allocation of subjects of international relations and symbols on value continuum

spectrum of international relations those events which inform listeners most about relations between blocs, and those which in some way concern the Soviet Union. (It is interesting that the station did not comment more extensively on the statement made on 12 September by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Brandt, that the Federal Republic of Germany would be prepared to establish diplomatic relations with Hungary and Bulgaria.)

The analysis of the symbol fund used in the week under observation, in the case of Radio Sofia and Radio Moscow, and its comparison with the evaluation of subjects in international relations reflect the ideological orientation which can be placed within the framework of the "eastern communications system". The quotients of evaluation of symbols approach the extreme upper and lower limit of the interval. In the case of Radio Sofia the positive evaluation of the Soviet Union approaches the extreme upper limit (0.9), while the authors of the coup d'état in Chile descend towards the lower limit (-0.94). The bipolar evaluation of subjects in international relations also suits the evaluation of international events in the period and the distribution of attention given to them. The Chilean coup d'état drew most attention from the Bulgarian station in its broadcasts for Yugoslav listeners on international events, which characterized the new leaders in a negative way. This is linked to the fact that the extreme lower limit of the interval is approached by the symbols which were used by Radio Sofia at the time of the coup d'état in Chile (COUP D'ETAT - 0.73, IMPERIALISM - 0.81, JUNTA - 0.57, FASCISM - 0.82).

On the other hand, the highly positive evaluation of the Soviet Union is a constant trait in broadcasts addressed to Yugoslav listeners by the Bulgarian radio station. Even considering the relative suddenness of the coup d'état in Chile it can be said that the way it was treated by Radio Sofia (negative evaluation) speaks for selectivity in depicting the events for Yugoslav listeners. The amount of "ideological nature" of negatively evaluated subjects and symbols (the station is otherwise more inclined towards positive evaluation!) can best be seen in the relatively less negative evaluation of the People's Republic of China and of those symbols which can be logically and on the basis of experience linked to China (-0.62 for MAOISM, -0.50 TENSION). To obtain a more complete picture, it is necessary to mention that in the week under review China did not figure prominently in Bulgarian broadcasting to Yugoslavia (nor in the Radio Moscow broadcasting in Serbo-Croat) despite Pompidou's visit to Peking.

The low quotient of evaluated symbols regarding Europe presented by Radio Sofia, refers solely to Europe outside the eastern bloc, indicating once again the selective approach on the basis of the home country's value system. The relatively low positive quotient (0.14) relates to reporting which is mostly limited to positive aspects of European co-operation and to the process of détente, in which Western Europe appears as one side. Special emphasis in this sense is also provided, at least partly, by symbols SECURITY (0.40) and PEACE (0.48).

Such symbols as socialism and communism are connected through high quotients (0.33; 0.38) with the greatest attention paid by the station to co-operation within the framework of socialist states; in this sense, it can be said, it fulfills its most complementary role in informing Yugoslav listeners. This is congruent with the high quotients of positively evaluated subjects of the COMECON (0.71) as the framework for economic and political co-operation among East-European States. As regards the symbol DEMOCRACY, both stations of the first group can be said to place it highly, thus defining a specific ideological orientation of the "eastern communications system". Positive quotients for the symbols ANTIFASCISM (0.20) and LEGALITY (0.36) result from a number of international events, particularly the coup d'état in Chile, reactions to the question of the so-called Soviet dissidents, and the European process of détente. Within this general schema of Radio Sofia's conspicuous anti-imperialist orientation, non-alignment was given its place (0.39), which demonstrates that the station does attempt to adjust its commenting on international events to the knowledge and mood of the Yugoslav listeners. A more detailed look into the logical connections does indicate a one-sided (biased) treatment of the non-alignment policy, considering it only to a very limited extent as an international movement that has a political and economic platform. However, the fact that the station evaluates it positively, at least in its general aspect, demonstrates that the public who are the target of this information are being taken into account.

Judging by the symbol fund used, Radio Moscow comes across as somewhat more "international". The list of symbols is more comprehensive, less obviously "ideologically" biased, but remains similar to Radio Sofia's in the main, strategic traits. The quotients for subject evaluation in some cases lean closer to the extreme points of the interval (e.g. Bulgaria 1.00, Israel - 1.00), but the span seems greater because Radio Moscow also treats those subjects which were not characteristic of Radio Sofia's reporting in the week under study. However, those symbols which are used by both stations are practically identical in positive and negative evaluation. This is true of Chile (0.93), for symbols of FASCISM (-0.95), COUP D'ETAT (-0.45), IMPERIALISM (-0.57) and particularly significant for MAOISM (-0.65) and the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (-0.92).

A great deal of attention is given to co-operation within the socialist camp, which is also in congruence with the quotients of symbol and subject evaluation. The East European countries are on the upper extreme point of the interval, and with them are characteristic symbols (SOCIALISM 0.48, SOLIDARITY 0.40, ECONOMIC PLANNING 0.79). Also characteristic is the high evaluation of DEMOCRACY with the quotient 0.59, and PATRIOTISM with 0.33. The high evaluation of the latter is dictated by reports on "dissidents", which should be seen as a counter-balance to the importance that was given to this event by the western mass media.

More attention is given to non-alignment as a political movement, which is congruent with the general finding that Radio Moscow is more open to the international politics that are in accord with the external political orientation of the USSR. A very high positive quotient is directed at events that are either linked to Yugoslavia or concern Yugoslavia itself, from which it is possible to reach conclusions about the selective perception of international events, i.e. to understand it as an attempt to smoothe out the existing differences in evaluating symbols, and in removing possibilities for interpreting that the two States differ in their understanding of international events. The intention is to create the impression that there is an ideal coinciding of interests. Considering that Radio Moscow is, on the average, the most listened-to foreign broadcast in Yugoslavia, and that its trend towards forming a generally affirmative approach makes the station's propaganda influence particularly advantageous, gives it a certain priority compared with the possibilities of other radio stations. Since its specific ideological nature is beyond doubt, and it has an advantage compared with Radio Sofia in the sense that it is more "universally" oriented and, at the same time, less burdened with negative experiences in interstate relations, it belongs among the more important sources of international communication which offer Yugoslav listeners supplementary information in regard to evaluation. Because of its local nature Radio Sofia is less influential and its influence is also limited by occasional intensification in disagreements between the two states regarding Bulgarian statements on Macedonians' nationality.

Cluster II: Radio Athens and Voice of Turkey

In quantity, the Greek and Turkish propaganda radio programmes for Yugoslavia are among the lowest, each station having only one programme per day in the Serbo-Croat language: Voice of Turkey with 30 minutes each day, and Radio Athens only 15 minutes on workdays. Two structural characteristics of the contents may lead us to conclude that in both stations' broadcasts to Yugoslavia there is a stress on domestic politics. Most of the news items deal with events in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus; on the international scene, attention is focused on relations between the members of NATO and the EEC; even such events as the coup d'état in Chile were not given precedence over domestic political events. The perceived actions and/or events outside the source-state (Greece or Turkey) are very rarely the object of explicit interpretation or commentaries, although they imply the evaluation of events, as we shall see later. To a lesser extent, the principle of "sticking to facts" is characteristic of reporting on domestic politics and on bilateral relations between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

It is characteristic of both stations that they give relatively little attention to Yugoslavia, and that they occupy the last two places in the list of foreign stations which broadcast to Yugoslavia in terms of length of programmes

Table 9: Distribution of attention given to world events in the period 8-15 September 1973 ("actor-target" contingencies; domestic policy excluded)

Event	Number and rank of relevant items			
	ATHENS		VOICE OF TURKEY	
	No.	R	No.	R
Intrabloc relations	29	1	5	3
Middle East	14	2	14	2
Turkey-Greece-Cyprus	11	3	32	1
People's Republic of China-France	10	4	5	3
People's Republic of China-USSR	6	5	-	-

per week. Judging by their choice of international events, they may be classified among those stations which inform the recipients mostly about matters that concern the stations' home states. The position of Greece within the NATO pact also led Radio Athens to discuss in the week under review the events which were linked to relations in this organization. Other events which the communicator found interesting to convey to Yugoslav listeners concerned mainly the Middle East, and the relations between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

A somewhat different distribution of attention is to be found with the Voice of Turkey which, although similarly introverted, placed the relations between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus at the highest point. This choice may be attributed to the enduring Turkish stand that the leading condition for resolving the Cyprus question is a fundamental change in the situation of the Turkish minority, even at the expense of dividing the island. At the same time, it is quite probable that the authors of the programmes wished to influence the Yugoslav listeners, whom they obviously assumed to be largely in favour of conserving Cyprus as a sovereign, non-aligned, and united State - which is indeed the official Yugoslav position.

In the light of relations with Greece, there was characteristically less reporting on relations within the NATO pact, which accorded with the prevalent thesis in Ankara regarding "neglected" Turkey, as compared to "privileged" Greece.

Both stations, Radio Athens as well as the Voice of Turkey, are by their programme content orientation distinctly introverted; none the less, the Voice of Turkey is somewhat more open towards world events than Radio Athens. This gives rise to the question whether this was influenced in part by Turkey's less stable internal situation, which was characteristic of that period (workers' protests, state of siege in certain parts of the country, etc.); such a hypothesis cannot however be confirmed.

It is hardly surprising that both stations devoted much attention to the development of events in the Middle East. The first reason for this is the geographic nearness, the second is the very nature of the conflict which was at that time acquiring new dimensions (the front of Arab countries was increasing, while the meeting of King Hussein




Figure 4: Radio ATHENS: Allocation of subjects of international relations and symbols on value continuum




Figure 5: VOICE OF TURKEY: Allocation of subjects of international relations and symbols on value continuum

with Presidents Sadat and Assad, together with Libya's decision to nationalize some of the oil companies, indicated the future trend of developments). All this concerned both Greece and Turkey: Turkey because of its adherence to Islam and Greece because of the NATO military bases on its territory.

The only reporting which steps out of this distinct introversion is that on Chinese-Soviet relations by Radio Athens, which may be explained by the bloc orientation of the station's home state. The conflict between the Soviet Union and China figures as a constant element in the new world balance of power, and plays an important role in the indirect determination of the power held by the Soviet Union and its group. The fact that there was reporting on these matters to Yugoslav listeners even though nothing particular was happening in this regard in the course of the week, has a marked propaganda dimension; at the same time, it does not justify concluding that Radio Athens has a larger degree of interest in international politics.

The relatively little attention given to international politics and the introversion are congruent with the inconspicuous evaluation of subjects in international relations and the symbols which should define the value system of both radio stations. Both are oriented towards negative evaluation.

The Voice of Turkey expanded its evaluation of subjects and symbols in several areas of international activity. The European Economic Community received a high place in positive evaluation, which is in general congruent with the politics of the Turkish Government regarding their integration into the circle of European industrial states (quotient 1.00). A large degree of attention was given also to the meeting of the Ministers of states which are members of GATT (0.83), while the evaluation of events in the Middle East was congruent with the alliance of the home state (Turkey) with the Arab countries. This is expressed by the high positive quotient in evaluating Egypt (0.77) and the negative evaluation of Israel (-0.43).

As in the case of Radio Athens, which evaluated positively Turkey's role in international relations, the Voice of Turkey also evaluated Greece positively; these evaluations, in the matter of Cyprus, coincided with relatively correct inter-state relations at that time. The Voice of Turkey ventured into wider international politics only in regard to Chile, with a negative evaluation quotient of -0.22. In evaluating subjects in international relations, Yugoslavia appeared in the Voice of Turkey with the quotient 0.25, which is congruent with the correct relations between the two countries.

Because of the lack of explicit evaluation of subjects and symbols, and because of their prevalent introversion (this is especially true in regard to international relations in the Mediterranean area), both Radio Athens and the Voice of Turkey follow the positions of the home states, which are characterized by less concern for international relations. This does not mean, however, that they do not convey to the Yugoslav listeners the elements of their value systems (both may be classified as belonging to the

"Western" communications system), but such influence is generally limited to a narrower choice of events.

The Turkish radio station takes more interest in Yugoslavia, and it appears that this orientation is dictated by the need of the home state to give the target audience new and, usually, different information from that which they receive from their own mass media. On the other hand, Radio Athens' lack of interest expresses a kind of "extraterritorial" position of Greece which, in its relations to neighbouring Yugoslavia, has very little in common in regard to politics, and has no points of conflict. The minimal attention Radio Athens and the Voice of Turkey give to Yugoslav listeners reflects a situation in which the communicator has no concrete idea as to what degree he should seek to draw the attention of the audience in another country. Hence, in spite of the fact that we are here dealing with radio stations that have essentially different ideological orientations, their lack of interest in influencing Yugoslav listeners indicates a probably weak propaganda effect.

Cluster III: Radio Peking and Radio Tirana

To judge by the number of radio programmes for Yugoslav listeners, Albania and the People's Republic of China would be classified among the most active. In quantity of programmes, Radio Tirana shares the first place with Radio Moscow, having 1,470 minutes of programmes per week, although in fact it has only two 30-minute programmes each day. These are repeated in full three times at noon, and twice in the evening. With its 420 minutes of programme per week (a half-hour programme daily, which is repeated in full), Radio Peking expresses an extraordinarily strong interest in Yugoslav listeners, considering the geographic distance. As has been stated already in Chapter II, the two stations share a similar value system, both are characterized by a very high degree of negative evaluation of symbols, and both fall into the category of stations with a conspicuously "propagandistic" sound.

The choice of international events which were treated by the two stations in the week 8-15 September confirms the hypotheses posed at the beginning of the research, and the findings reached on the basis of other criteria for measuring the programmes. In a sense, Radio Peking can also be labelled as introvert, i.e. it places much emphasis on its own way of seeing international events, especially regarding Asia, which is of the greatest interest for China. Such a conclusion, which is confirmed especially by the content analysis of attention given by Radio Peking to international events, does not mean, however, that we are here dealing with the same kind of introversion as in the case of Greece and Turkey. It is true that here also an attempt is made to "correct" or offer other sorts of information to listeners regarding areas of the world which are geographically very far from them, but at the same time attempts are made at active persuasion in the direction of Radio Peking's attitudes. The analysis of events

Table 10: Distribution of attention given to world events in the period 8-15 September 1973 ("actor-target" contingencies; domestic policy excluded).

Event	Number and rank of relevant items			
	PEKING		TIRANA	
	No.	R	No.	R
France-People's Republic of China	31	1	5	7
Korea	21	2	16	4
Cambodia	8	3	22	3
U.S.A.-USSR	5	4	32	1
People's Republic of China-USSR	5	4	-	-
Middle East	-	-	24	2
Chile	-	-	15	5
Eastern bloc	-	-	15	5

to which Radio Peking gave attention during the week under review is thus in this case also part of the value orientation in the manner of reporting, and it expresses the propaganda level which is directed to Yugoslav listeners. To a greater degree than elsewhere, the evaluation is marked by a distinctly negative approach which weakens the original impression that the programmes are of an introvert nature, thereby indicating the role that the station's home state wishes to have in the world, the fulfilment of which it believes to be hindered by the existing structure in international relations.

A more detailed look into the distribution of attention given to international events indicates the extraordinary importance which Radio Peking accorded to relations between France and the People's Republic of China. This resulted directly from President Pompidou's State visit to China, but it seems justified to conclude that such unusual attention also arises from France's special role in international relations, particularly in creating political balance within the triangle U.S.A.-USSR-People's Republic of China. France, with its expressed tendency towards finding the "European identity" was, at that time, still a kind of "privileged" potential ally of the Soviet Union, which also paid attention to questions of inter-European cooperation. Its weight was therefore obvious for Radio Peking which follows Chinese politics in its manner of reporting on European questions. Every agreement which would suit the Soviet Union was seen as a danger by the Chinese. The marked emphasis on the state visit of the French President was, therefore, not simply a consequence of the station's orientation towards its domestic affairs, but carried within it the quality of evaluating the international political scene, in which China appears as the awakening power. With the "European" part of its reporting, Radio Peking gave Yugoslav listeners mainly a quantitatively new dimension which completed the information they received from the Yugoslav mass media without adding any essentially new elements.

Reporting on other international events tends to be more locally-oriented as, for instance, the case of Korea, but here too it is linked to the main trait of Chinese

politics which is a critical attitude to both sides of the power triangle, i.e. approximately the same towards the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The strong emphasis given to Korea has its roots in the situation within the international workers' movement. The privileged position of the Korean alliance means for China an opportunity to express its ideological nature not only against imperialism (and against the role of the U.S.A. in the relations between the two Koreas), but also against "revisionism" and "hegemonism" (i.e. against the Soviet Union). A high place in the distribution of attention was given to Cambodia because of the strong material and moral support which the Chinese Government gave the Government of Norodom Sihanouk, but this is not the only reason. Sihanouk's Cambodia, whose representatives appear at the conferences of the non-aligned countries, is a precious point of support for Chinese politics which desire to play "a creative role in the Third World". This explains why Radio Peking devoted relatively a great deal of attention to Cambodia; other events in Indochina, as for instance the signing of the protocol regarding the establishment of peace in Laos, between representatives of the government and the Pathet Lao movement, were given insufficient treatment in Radio Peking's programmes for Yugoslav listeners.

It is understandable that the station also devoted much attention to its direct relations with the two superpowers, and to relation between these two.

The fact that it paid no attention to events in Chile cannot be explained merely by its introversion. Various explanations are possible. One possibility would be the assumption that, at the time of the Chilean coup d'état the front led by the Soviet Union increased its strength. Another possibility could be that the Chinese mass media habitually react with reserve to international events, and that, most probably, at that very time they had still not found the right form of qualified reporting on the Chinese point of view regarding the events in Chile.

Similarly in reporting on the Middle East, which at that time was undergoing a new restructuring, China either could not or did not wish to comment on these developments, in its programmes for the Yugoslav audience.

An analysis of the distribution of attention gives a completely different picture in the case of Radio Tirana. Its geographical situation on the Mediterranean area obliges it to state its position on Middle East events. On the other hand, it would be rather difficult to define, on the basis of its geographic situation alone, the high place given by Radio Tirana in its programmes for Yugoslav listeners to relations between China and the Soviet Union, to events in Cambodia, and to the French President's visit to China. In a number of elements, therefore, it is obvious that Radio Tirana's reporting coincides with Radio Peking's methods of influence. This can be explained by the special political relations existing between these two countries. Regarding the quantity of events and the distribution of attention, the prevalence of reporting on events which are characteristic of the Chinese point of view




Figure 6: Radio PEKING: Allocation of subjects of international relations and symbols on value continuum




Figure 7: Radio TIRANA: Allocation of subjects of international relations and symbols on value continuum

is already part of the evaluation of international events within the framework of the alliance between China and Albania. Only in the case of its reporting on the events in Chile, did Radio Tirana, in its programmes for Yugoslav listeners, differ significantly from the charted course; even then, the quantity of its contributions is much smaller than reporting on other events which naturally, and considering long-term implications, fall more readily into the programme scheme of the radio programmes intended for Yugoslav listeners. Radio Tirana is characterized by a bipolar approach in evaluating symbols and subjects in international relations, which indicates the communicator's intention to force upon the listeners, by depicting events in the black-white technique and using an exclusive vocabulary, a different view of international events. The symbols with which Radio Tirana evaluates the international scene in its programmes for Yugoslav listeners tend to be predominantly negative. The manner of reporting expresses self-confidence and, at the same time, indicates a certain discontent which the home state feels in international life. The similarity of the socio-political system and the nature of the relations Albania has with other socialist countries permits Radio Tirana to use a similar symbol fund (also similarly positively or negatively evaluated, e.g. IMPERIALISM, having quotient -0.45 , CAPITALISM (-0.45), FASCISM (-0.58), RACISM (-0.80), and MARXISM (0.80), COMMUNISM (0.10), etc.), but the meaning connections indicate essentially different stresses which Radio Tirana conveys to Yugoslav listeners. Among the symbols which are characteristic of these two stations only, the first place goes to REVISIONISM (-0.35), and here the station places itself against all socialist countries and against Yugoslavia, the only exception being the People's Republic of China. Extremes are characteristic in its evaluation of the role of subjects: the People's Republic of China and Albania are placed at the upper limit of the interval, while the Chilean authors of the coup, Israel, U.S.A., and the USSR are altogether at the negative pole (-1.00).

The bipolar approach in reporting news regarding international events is also characteristic of Radio Peking. Its symbol fund is congruent with the prevalent attention given to those events and movements in the international scene which are interesting from the Chinese point of view and in regard to their view on relations among the socialist countries. The symbols which carry a great deal of weight in Chinese internal politics (revisionism, hegemony, bourgeoisie), are, in the evaluation of international events, placed at the negative border. In general, this approach indicates the prevalence of expressing the ideological nature with negative evaluation. Negative evaluations are, in the case of subject evaluation, 50% (in the case of Radio Tirana, 71%), and for symbols 42% (Tirana 65%).

The fact that we are here dealing with a clear example of reporting which does not take into account the target audience's previous information, but follows its own views can also be seen from the very highly evaluated notions attached to the specifically Chinese internal confrontations (the Cultural Revolution having a quotient of

0.83 , the proletarian dictatorship 0.86 , revolution 0.90). In contrast to Radio Tirana, which is very explicit in its use of the symbol fund, Radio Peking is oriented towards negative evaluation, while at the same time stressing the symbols which fit into the framework of its long-term policy. In this sense, regarding the influence it might have upon the Yugoslav listeners, its evaluation of the "Third World" (quotient 0.83) is particularly interesting and entirely congruent with China's long-term political orientation regarding the developing countries. As a force which is just awakening and which, according to its own claims, will not become a super-power, it attributes a great deal of importance to the "Third World" from the point of view of the balance of power in world politics. The high positive quotient, therefore, is not intended only for the Third World, as a group of developing (or in any other way similar to China) countries, but rather, through them Radio Peking introduces a political notion of primordial importance.

The two radio stations belonging to Cluster III could have a strong propaganda influence on Yugoslav listeners, given the great importance they accord to propagating their own views on international events. However, their unwillingness to consider the manner of reporting used by the Yugoslav mass media, and their distinctly negative evaluation of the international scene, decrease their possibilities of achieving a real propaganda effect. By also paying attention to events that were in the international spotlight during the week under review, Radio Tirana moved somewhat closer to the Yugoslav listeners' interest; this cannot be said for Radio Peking.

By explicitly emphasizing their own value structure and denying the importance of any other, the two stations remain at a level of propaganda activity which lessens their chances of influencing the recipients to any important degree. This, however, does not mean that it is impossible to determine the "different nature" of their information, and through this also the dissocializing effects of both stations' activities.

Cluster IV: Deutschlandfunk, Deutsche Welle, Radio Rome

The radio stations in this group differ to a rather large degree in the number of programmes produced: while Deutsche Welle takes third place among all stations analysed with its 910 minutes per week, both Deutschlandfunk and Radio Rome are much more modest in their programmes for Yugoslav listeners (the former having 210 minutes, and the latter 280 minutes per week).

As far as the distribution of attention to international events is concerned, there are certain differences between the two German stations and Radio Rome. Their geographic position led the first two to pay the greatest attention to events connected with relations between the two German States. The negotiations that preceded, and which should have led to the signing of an agreement between the two States, and the question of membership of the

United Nations Organization, indicate the communicator's wish to inform the Yugoslav audience of its views. The events in Chile were treated by both stations; Deutsche Welle placed it, judging by the number of messages, even before the relations between the two German States. It is important to add - if this fact is compared to the evaluation of the event - that the station attributed to the coup d'état in Chile considerable importance as a means of measuring the power of the two world ideological systems and, indirectly, in the inter-bloc measuring of power. Deutsche Welle understood the events in Chile as a victory of the western political system over "Marxist dominance", which gave its reporting in programmes for Yugoslav listeners a clear bloc emphasis, regardless of the fact that Chile had opted for its own particular way of developing socialism by constitutional means. The potential effect upon Yugoslav listeners is, in this regard, similar to the effects of Radio Moscow's and Radio Sofia's reporting: it emphasized the need for bloc organization and order, with both groups measuring their success and failure in the so-called grey areas. At this point we limit ourselves only to stating the general tendencies in reporting about events in Chile, while the nature of evaluation of the coup d'état in Chile will be discussed in the part dealing with the evaluation of symbols and subjects.

Relatively high importance was given by all three stations to the French-Chinese relations, which may again be attributed to the special place France occupies in European politics; at the same time, it indicates the significance of China's presence in the relations between the two blocs. Considering the fact that Yugoslav listeners do not attach any particular significance to these relations - if we take as a basis Yugoslavia's international position - this information belongs to the less "propaganda"-coloured reporting.

The distinct ideological nature of all three stations can be seen in the great attention given to relations within the bloc, and identification with the goals of the western world. Several events in this domain (meeting of NATO, parliamentary elections in Norway, political confrontations in the Federal Republic of Germany concerning Brandt's "Ost-politik") justify such attention, but the radio stations doubtless wish to contribute to changing the image of relations between western countries which Yugoslav listeners might form on the basis of the information received from the Yugoslav mass media. The distinct intra-bloc topics could indicate a degree of introversion in the projection of the events' significance, as seen by them, but this evaluation does not hold since the stations also discuss matters of world politics. It is therefore more accurate to say that we are dealing here with a selection of international events which provide the communicator with the possibility to affirm his own value system. Frequently, in this sense, there is a conscious attempt to offer listeners complementary information, which is also illustrated indirectly by the omission, or only very modest mention of those events which were at the peak of attention in Yugoslavia during the period under review.

Only Deutsche Welle took into consideration the degree and nature of the Yugoslav audience's information: for instance, it mentioned the Conference of non-aligned countries in Algeria, which was prominent at that time in the Yugoslav mass media. The fact that the station belongs to the developed countries dictated a different point of view in discussing the non-aligned countries, but it is significant that it paid attention to the Conference in its programmes intended for Yugoslav listeners.

Due to its large amount of programming, Deutsche Welle is very interesting for the analysis of its attitudes towards the Yugoslav audience. It is characterized by a tendency towards a more negative evaluation of symbols and events in international relations. The quotient of evaluating symbols which are used in radio programmes for Yugoslavia, is characterized by the exposure of notions which are readily integrated into the "western ideological complex" (on the one hand: 0.67 for FREEDOM, 0.60 for INDEPENDENCE, 0.20 for DEMOCRACY, and on the other: -0.38 for COMMUNISM, -0.10 for SOCIALISM, -0.57 for MARXISM, -1.00 for HEGEMONY). The negative quotient for the COUP D'ETAT (-0.63) would seem, at first glance, to indicate a negative evaluation of the events in Chile, but when completed with the similarly negative evaluation of Marxism, the station's treatment of the events acquires a quite different dimension. The authors of the Chilean coup are negatively evaluated because they threatened peace and not because they overthrew the legally-elected government. The latter was evaluated in their symbol fund as "Marxist", which automatically gave it a negative place in the evaluation of symbols. In this regard the information given by this radio station differed fundamentally from the interpretation of the Yugoslav mass media, thereby having a clearly supplementary and ideologically propagandistic nature.

The high quotient for FREEDOM (0.67) acquires a "western" dimension when compared with the negative quotient (-1.00) of HEGEMONY; it is linked to the treatment of events related to the "dissidents" in the Soviet Union; the negative evaluation of the Soviet Union itself is also partly due to this.

Europe, with the important events that took place in the week under review (Chancellor Brandt's speeches in the Bundestag, announcement of possible negotiations between the two German States) - received a relatively high quotient of evaluated symbols. A positive evaluation was given particularly to the GATT meeting of ministers (0.4). The negative quotient for COLONIALISM (-0.50), could be connected in a certain way with the evaluation of symbols which are familiar to Yugoslav listeners, while the negative evaluation of the Arabs (-0.13) probably had dividing effects upon Yugoslav listeners.

Deutschlandfunk can be characterized by its tendency towards a predominantly negative evaluation of symbols and subjects and a relatively low percentage of explicitly evaluated symbols (38%, while the Deutsche Welle has 59%). The different orientation of this radio station may




Figure 8: Radio ROME: Allocation of subjects of international relations and symbols on value continuum




Figure 9: DEUTSCHLANDFUNK: Allocation of subjects of international relations and symbols on value continuum




Figure 10: DEUTSCHE WELLE: Allocation of symbols of international relations and symbols on value continuum

be explained by its higher degree of introversion, its smaller ambition to propagate the western value system, and by less interest in the Yugoslav audience. This, however, does not mean that the station is indistinct in the ideologic sense: the quotient for the symbol of SOCIALISM is placed at - 0.40.

Similarly, Radio Rome does not approach the Yugoslav listeners with contemporary propaganda activity

which pays special attention to the recipients and tries to find "holes" in their information which it then fills in with well-thought out news of its own. If we consider the quotients of symbol evaluation, it is possible to determine a distinct adherence to the western ideological complex: SOCIALISM with the negative quotient (- 0.40) and NON-ALIGNMENT with the negative quotient (- 0.20) indicate a tendency in evaluating notions which

Table 11: The distribution of attention given to world events between 8 and 15 September 1973 ("actor-target" contingencies; domestic policy excluded)

Event	Number and rank of relevant items					
	Deutschlandfunk		Deutsche Welle		Radio Rome	
	N	R	N	R	N	R
Germany-UNO	19	1	48	2	-	-
Chile	43	2	59	1	26	2
PR China-France	6	3	39	4	-	-
Intra-bloc relations	4	4	32	5	27	1
Middle East	3	5	35	3	16	3
U.S.A.-USSR	-	-	16	6	6	4
Non-aligned countries	-	-	12	7	-	-
PR China-USSR	-	-	10	8	-	-
France-USSR	-	-	10	8	-	-




Figure 11: VOICE OF AMERICA: Allocation of subjects of international relations and symbols on value continuum




Figure 12: Radio PARIS: Allocation of subjects of international relations and symbols on value continuum




Figure 13: Radio BBC: Allocation of subjects of international relations and symbols on value continuum

Table 12: The distribution of attention given to world events between 8 and 15 September 1973 ("actor-target" contingencies; domestic policy excluded)

Event	Number and rank of relevant items					
	BBC		Paris		Voice of America	
	N	R	N	R	N	R
Middle East	183	1	72	2	103	1
Chile	90	2	25	3	55	4
France-People's Republic of China	56	3	118	1	35	5
Laos	42	4	11	7	64	3
Viet Nam	29	5	10	9	14	7
Intrabloc relation	25	6	19	4	33	6
Cambodia	20	7	5	11	-	-
USSR-Great Britain	19	8	-	-	-	-
U.S.A.-USSR	16	9	12	5	69	2
People's Republic of China-USSR	13	10	12	5	7	10
France-USSR	13	10	7	10	-	-
People's Republic of China-U.S.A.	-	-	11	7	11	8
U.S.A.-Japan	-	-	-	-	10	9
Greece-Turkey-Cyprus	-	-	-	-	6	11

are otherwise highly regarded in Yugoslavia. Its orientation towards affairs concerning Western Europe is proved by the high quotient for the European Economic Community (1.00), and on the other side the negative evaluation of the Soviet Union (- 0.92) and partly also the U.S.A. (- 0.20).

A relatively critical attitude is demonstrated by Radio Rome in its treatment of the coup d'état in Chile, while even more surprising is its extremely negative evaluation of Israel (- 1.00). A possible explanation for such a surprising evaluation of Israel could be Italy's close connections with the Arab countries, the investment of Arab capital in the development of Italian industry and the significant dependence of the Italian economy on Arab oil supplies.

Judging by their content characteristics in conveying their attitudes regarding international events to Yugoslav listeners, the radio stations of this cluster belong to the relatively anti-socialist orientation; somewhat less marked, but nevertheless present, is their tendency towards an anti-Yugoslav approach. In general they concentrate on conveying their views on international relations, even though these are totally opposed to the attitudes held by the Yugoslav mass media. In this sense, of course, they express a clear tendency towards forcing upon the listeners their own value system - which means ideology. It is characteristic of them not to attribute any significance to Yugoslavia's role in international relations; that cannot be ascribed simply to a lack of attention, but can be understood as part of a propaganda plan which, by intentional "omission" evidently minimizes the importance of a coun-

try, when it is impossible to speak of its internal difficulties and of evaluating it negatively.

Cluster V: Radio BBC, Radio Paris, Voice of America

Among the stations which form this cluster, Radio BBC stands out with its 630 minutes of programme per week; it is followed by Voice of America which has 420 minutes, and Radio Paris with 315 minutes of programme in Serbo-Croat per week.

It is characteristic of all three stations, but especially of the BBC and VOA, that they have a very high distribution of attention to international relations. Radio Paris appears to pay less attention to international events and this may be linked to its emphasis on a negative evaluation of symbols. It is possible to associate this with France's position today, as compared to the position of the other two home States (the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom).

It is obvious, however, that we are here dealing with stations with distinctly extrovert orientations, whose interest in the most diverse world events is only a logical consequence of their countries' orientation and activity in foreign affairs.

By analysing the attention which these stations gave to international events, it is obvious that they were extraordinarily attentive to events in the Middle East; a slight exception is Radio Paris, which gave priority to the French-Chinese bilateral relations during the French President's State visit to Peking. The attention given to the Middle

East surpasses even interest in Chile which, however, follows closely in the amount of attention received.

In contrast to other stations described so far, all three stations of this cluster devoted a relatively large amount of attention to the Laos agreement. The international orientation of the stations, whose home states are big powers and among the most influential industrial states, dictates a wider treatment of international questions; it can be said that already by their choice of events they stimulate a sort of broad-minded approach and greater objectivity than is found in some other stations which are more distinctly "bloc-oriented". Hence, relations within the bloc were given much less attention in BBC's reporting as well as in the Voice of America, which could lead us to conclude that they have a higher degree of ideologic neutrality. This, however, is only apparently so. When compared with the evaluation of symbols and the connections existing between symbols and actors, we get a more precise picture regarding the nature of propaganda activity of these big States.

None of the three stations pays any attention to reporting on the relations between Yugoslavia and the stations' home states if one is to judge by the period of 8-15 September. This method of reporting has most certainly a by-product, which has a dissocializing effect upon the recipients: namely, it creates the impression that something is "happening" only in the relations between the big states, i.e. that international events consist only of events which concern the big world areas and in which the "important" states are included, or at least those areas in which the big states have conflicting interests. Such reporting could be justified by a lack of "important events" in other parts of the world, but the characteristic and prevalent orientation towards world events of all three stations does not justify their omission of events which do have long-term consequences for the "Third World".

For the BBC in particular it is possible to say that it tries, by the way it formulates its attitudes toward international events, to convey a certain ideologic neutrality; this can at least be said for its reserved attitude in giving distinct emphasis which could be understood as anti-Yugoslav. The nature of ideological expression in international communication being the subject of this study, the following general conclusions can be made for the BBC: in spite of its reserved attitude and a relatively greater attention given to the Yugoslav listeners, the evaluation of symbols and subjects expresses the outline of the "western" value system. The symbols FREEDOM and DEMOCRACY are, as in the case of the other two stations in this cluster, placed very high in the scale; on the other side MARXISM, with a negative quotient -0.18 and COMMUNISM -0.27, follow the pattern of the symbol fund characteristic of the western communication system. Negative evaluation was also given to the coup d'état in Chile (-0.53), but this evaluation, taken with the positive evaluation of the junta (0.3) receives a distinctly different value from the one which would be attributed at first glance, and which was offered to Yugoslav

listeners by their home mass media. A negative evaluation was given to all symbols which bring about change in an aggressive way: TERRORISM (-0.60), OPPOSITION (-0.75), CIVIL WAR (-1.00), CRISIS (-1.00), while positive quotients were given to notions of stability and order, as for instance PEACE (0.85), and SECURITY (0.29).

It is possible to detect a specific orientation of the BBC towards Yugoslav listeners in the symbols: WORKING CLASS (0.27), NON-ALIGNMENT (0.21) and SOCIALISM (0.17), and particularly the positive evaluation of the non-aligned countries (0.16) and Yugoslavia (0.14).

Very interesting are the negative evaluations of the states most involved in the Middle East conflict; this can be linked to the finding stated earlier, which speaks of a negative evaluation of anything that implies dissatisfaction with the status quo and desires change, especially by aggressive means. Syria with the negative quotient -0.75 and Egypt (-0.54) belong to the sphere in which BBC had a dividing effect upon Yugoslav listeners; this is true also partly of its information on the "Soviet dissidents", and of the evaluation of those notions which either are linked to it, or define it in some way.

For Radio Paris it is possible to say that it fits into the western ideological cluster in its general traits: by evaluating negatively SOCIALISM (-0.30), and the SOVIET UNION (-0.58). But it also has traits which should be ascribed to the main trends in French international policy, which are distinctly different from those of the United Kingdom, and especially of the U.S.A., and hence, are not particularly tailored for Yugoslav listeners. This is expressed in the relatively high positive evaluation of the non-aligned countries (0.66), People's Republic of China (0.61), and the European Economic Community (0.64). In contrast to the BBC, this station evaluated negatively the junta (-0.40), thereby giving the coup d'état in Chile a different content (-0.57). In general, with such evaluation it coincided to a higher degree with the information which Yugoslav listeners received from their own mass media. Its evaluation of the Middle East situation should also be understood in the light of France's general orientation in foreign affairs: a negative evaluation was given to the Arabs (-0.25), as well as to the Israeli (-0.45), although the latter received a greater negative evaluation.

It is possible to find a great deal of similarity among the three stations of this cluster, especially in matters which concern distinct ideologically coloured notions (freedom, democracy in the positive and communism in the negative sense). It is true of all three stations that their evaluations are similar in those domains which concern European co-operation, and the activity of international organizations, such as GATT. The differences noticed in the Voice of America's evaluations are linked to the particularities of the United States' foreign policy, and can be best seen in the case of the coup d'état in Chile: the events were given a positive quotient (0.40). A certain duality can be felt in the evaluation of the European Economic Community, which has a relatively

modest positive quotient, while the relatively high positive quotient for the People's Republic of China (0.31), for the East (0.20) and for Egypt (0.22) follows another set of tendencies in American politics, these countries being the ones with which the United States were at that time developing closer ties; this is counter-balanced by negative evaluations for Syria (-0.58) and the Arabs (-0.42).

Generally speaking, the Voice of America tends to select events which may be rounded off with its own value system; it reflects the importance of the U.S.A. in international politics, and generally does not pay any detailed attention to Yugoslavia.

The radio stations of the fifth cluster have a rather significant influence upon Yugoslav listeners, in spite of the fact that they are world oriented and pay little attention to smaller and middle-size countries.

The BBC devotes particular attention to its contact with Yugoslav listeners. This can be seen in its method of searching for Yugoslav journalists, who work in their mother tongue for the BBC for several years. The competition is public and is carried out through Yugoslav radio and television organizations, which increases the degree of mutual confidence and certainly reflects definite "Yugoslavian" stresses in this station's programme. In other words, by selecting in this way its journalists for the programmes intended for Yugoslav audiences, the BBC expresses its readiness to co-operate, and tries to prevent possible anti-Yugoslav tendencies in its programmes. Such conclusions are confirmed by the analysis of the programme, which shows that the BBC precedes by far all the other stations analysed in the degree to which it is adjusted to the Yugoslav listeners' knowledge (this, of course, should include taking into consideration other characteristics, especially the international position of a station's home state).

Radio Bucharest, Radio Belgrade

An analysis of the attention given to international events would not, on the whole, put these two radio stations in the same cluster. Romania's bloc-adherence, and particularly the visit of the Romanian Prime Minister to Latin America, which took place at that time, on the one hand, and Yugoslavia's policy of non-alliance, on the other, conditioned a somewhat different distribution of attention (in the Romanian case, relations between the blocs are in first place, while in Yugoslavia greatest attention was given to the Middle East, followed by the non-aligned countries). It should be added, however, that the rather limited mention of the non-aligned countries by the Romanian radio does not necessarily mean that it does not consider non-alliance as an important element in international relations; such an analysis follows only the relation between actors and targets, while the value orientation can be seen through an analysis of relations between subjects and symbols. Romania's attachment to the eastern socialist countries is confirmed by the choice of events among relations concerning the east

European States; a great difference can be seen in the attention it gives to relations between France and the People's Republic of China. This expresses Romania's international political line - its friendly relations with China and, on the other hand, its interest in the French "in-between" attitudes within the framework of European relations. This distribution of attention is striking because, after all, this was just a State visit but one which, by the number of messages devoted to it, received as much attention as the coup d'état in Chile.

The amount of time devoted to relations between Romania and Yugoslavia in the week under review indicates the Romanian station's readiness to co-operate; a similar readiness, although to a somewhat lesser extent, is expressed also by Radio Belgrade. The closeness of the two countries has therefore almost direct effects in the manner of communicating across the border; this, however, would be nothing extraordinary (such behaviour is true of Radio Sofia as well), if the quantity were not accompanied by a content which is suitable for Yugoslav listeners. A comparison of the two criteria gives us the opportunity to see the similar orientation in international communication.

We have already mentioned that, judging by the symbol fund used and the fundamental value orientation, Radio Bucharest comes closest to the Yugoslav value system. Judging by the amount of programming intended for Yugoslav listeners in a week, this station belongs to the average. However, because of its similar views on international communication and its openness to different flows in international life, it is of great interest to Yugoslavia.

Radio Bucharest reports in a predominantly positive way, which also partly reflects Romania's position in the world (i.e. in spite of its formal belonging to a bloc, it maintains relations with many countries which are "problematic" from the point of view of the bloc of socialist countries). The information it selects is congruent with the general value orientation of the stations's home state, and it doubtlessly endeavours to affirm its social system. However, in doing so, it endeavours also to develop international communication which would overcome the existing barriers between nations and groups with different ideologies.

In their treatment of international questions, Radio Bucharest and Radio Belgrade come very close to each other in the way they express their symbol evaluations. Symbols such as NON-ALIGNMENT, INDEPENDENCE, PEACE, DEMOCRACY, WORKING CLASS, SOCIALISM, are evaluated in nearly the same positive way. This is true also of such subjects as the non-aligned countries (Radio Belgrade has the positive quotient 1.00, and Radio Bucharest 0.87), while the symbol SOVEREIGNTY received a much more positive evaluation in the Romanian radio, which is understandable from the point of view of Romania's international position. The two stations also complement each other in the evaluation of symbols that belong to the lower part of the interval: COUP D'ETAT, JUNTA, and IMPERIALISM were given similar negative evaluations. Similarity in evaluation exists also for some

Table 13: Distribution of attention given to world events in the period between 8-15 September 1973 ("actor-target" contingencies, domestic policy excluded)

Event	Number and rank of relevant items			
	BUCHAREST		BELGRADE	
	No.	R	No.	R
Intrabloc relations	21	1	-	
France-People's Republic of China	20	2	15	5
Chile	20	2	51	3
Middle East	18	4	124	1
Cambodia	17	5	11	6
Romania-Yugoslavia	15	6	11	6
Viet Nam	8	7	20	4
Laos	8	7	9	8
Non-aligned countries	-		97	2
USSR-U.S.A.	-		6	9

subjects, especially for Chile, while for others it is possible to say that the Romanian radio evaluates them rather positively. The difference is particularly evident in the

evaluation of the United States of America, which was given in Radio Belgrade a negative evaluation (- 0.78), while the Romanian radio gave it a positive one (0.37). This difference should be ascribed to the somewhat different evaluation of events in the Middle East, which is confirmed by the obvious difference in evaluating Israel (Radio Belgrade evaluated it with the negative quotient -1.00).

Both stations belong to the group which has predominantly positive evaluation of symbols, having a high amount of explicitly evaluated symbols and subjects. Of the two, Radio Bucharest gives more attention to co-operation between the two countries. A certain selectivity in evaluating symbols concerning the home state's value system can be seen from the choice of symbols which are closely linked to the nature of the home state's social system: Radio Belgrade evaluates highly self-government, which is hardly mentioned by Radio Bucharest.

In spite of this, it is possible to state that the Romanian programme for Yugoslav listeners conflicts relatively little with the values of the Yugoslav mass media. This is to be ascribed partly to the similarity of the two socio-political systems, and to a great extent to their endeavours to use the radio as an instrument for bringing nations together, and not as an instrument of national intolerance.

Conclusion

We live at a time of the communications' explosion and of a revolution in communications. Among the many technological innovations in communications, ranging from videodiscs to satellite diffusion, radio has retained an important place within an increasingly complicated communications network. External radio broadcasting is still considered to be one of the most significant agents in international communication. Because of its technical ability to cover a large part of the globe and its low costs of programme production and reception, it has been widely used for decades as one of the most influential and efficient propaganda instruments in international relations, having a significant political, economical, ideological and cultural influence.

To protect their societies against alien propaganda messages some countries try to filter or even to halt incoming messages. This is possible to a certain extent in the case of the press, reviews, books, films, exhibitions, and even television, but becomes inconceivable when trying to stop the radio signal. Among the various means of communication the spoken word is the most difficult to restrain. The modern concept of international propaganda includes, therefore, external radio broadcasting as one of its essential components and operative instruments.

Although the aim and impact of external radio broadcasting has been constantly changing, its fundamental role has remained the same. In simplified terms, it can be said that in the thirties' radio was used as an introduction to the war, during the Second World War it was adopted as a weapon of war, and nowadays it is employed instead of war.

At the present time, international broadcasting is flourishing as one of the main instruments of the information flow and for the diffusion of propaganda messages between different nations and societies. Despite some newer means of international communication, external radio broadcasting is constantly increasing, and many countries which did not make use of it some twenty years ago, are now prominent external broadcasters.

External broadcasting is not evenly spread across the world map. Generally speaking the concentration zones are those surrounding areas of international tension. On the other hand, external broadcasting can also be an integral part of friendly relations between nations.

What then is the role of international radio, of external broadcasting in the contemporary world, in the international flow of information, in relations between different societies and nations?

This was the original point of departure for the present study; later on, in the course of analysing the data, some more diversified and sophisticated questions came to our attention, thus widening the scope of the research. A global analysis of the scope and structure of foreign broadcasting in the world has proved, for various reasons, to be an insurmountable task. We tried therefore, to obtain the answers through an analysis of the experiences of a single country. Yugoslavia was chosen for this study, as it is a non-aligned country, i.e. it does not belong to any military or political bloc, and has been constantly exposed to external broadcasting from many different directions.

Our analysis of propaganda reveals that it is directly connected with ideology, as has been pointed out by Lenin, Gramsci, and others. The general character of mass communication as *public* communication, which supposedly goes beyond particular interests with its "universality", conceals the ideologic legitimization function of the mass media. This concealment is greatest in those definitions of mass communication which operationalize the "public" nature of the functioning or "publicity" of the mass media as their being accessible to everyone (and anyone). Precisely because of this formally "quite technical" character the mass media appear to be particularly appropriate for achieving social integration of all classes and layers which is, of course, only seemingly so, in reality, this makes them particularly appropriate for the transfer of ideology, and for the stabilization of ideologic norms, values and meanings.

The definition of propaganda which particularly emphasizes its social and ideologic determinateness has important implications for empirical research of propaganda: in carrying out research on propaganda activities and determining the characteristics of propaganda, the method of content analysis must not limit itself to interpreting the content of the messages, but must reveal their social essence and function. Such an analysis which enables the researcher to discover, explain and prove the social essence of messages, may be regarded as being productive, considering that in practical communications policy only such knowledge can be used effectively.

Foreign programmes of 13 radio stations broadcasting daily to Yugoslavia were chosen in order to test the initial hypothesis of ideological determination of external radio propaganda, which was operationalized by a set of sub-hypotheses. There are, in fact, 15 foreign broadcasting stations in 14 countries regularly beaming their daily programmes to Yugoslavia in the languages of the Yugoslav nations, but two of them were not included in the analysis because of monitoring difficulties (Radio Madrid) and because the content was too specific (Radio Vatican). The week between Sunday, 9 September and Saturday, 15 September 1973 was chosen for the content analysis of 13 foreign radio programmes in the Serbo-Croat language, a total amount of 7,700 minutes. In addition, External Services of Radio Belgrade (Yugoslavia) were included in the analysis in order to compare foreign programmes with the Yugoslav ones.

The findings of this empirical research confirm the significance of the ideological dimension of propaganda, which stood out in the sample of radio propaganda stations as a particular factor having the largest discriminatory power (the "ideological factor" explained the largest part of common variance in the five-dimensional factor space). The frequency of appearance of symbols, the fact that they either appear or do not, and particularly their explicit evaluation in the analysed messages, are those basic characteristics of propaganda which make it possible to distinguish clearly between various sorts of propaganda on the basis of its value and prescriptive orientation. The results indicate a class-ideological determination of foreign radio programmes, in which the stations of the socialist countries do not coincide with the evaluative orientation of Radio Belgrade, as representative of the Yugoslav media. The analysis revealed five typical clusters of broadcasting stations, three generated by western and two by eastern stations: (1) Moscow and Sofia, (2) Peking and Tirana, (3) Deutsche Welle and Deutschlandfunk, (4) BBC, Paris, and Voice of America, (5) Athens and Voice of Turkey. Each cluster of stations is rather clearly defined by its symbol fund and the evaluations of presented symbols in first dimension, and by the specific selection of world events in second dimension. The orientations of individual clusters differ more or less significantly from the orientation of Radio Belgrade, thus indicating incongruency with the prevalent Yugoslav value system and potential dissocializing effects upon Yugoslav listeners.

The results of the analysis confirm also the soundness of defining symbols as signs with relatively overlapping objective meaning: symbols which appear as "operational values" (their function is to define the aims to be achieved), are often evaluated similarly or even identically by different sources. However, when the same sources present the same symbols as values which are attributed to a definite object or situation (in our analysis, to the subjects of international relations) in order to stimulate in the target group sympathy or repulsion with regard to the given object or situation, it becomes obvious that different latent meanings are actualized.

The results of the empirical analysis of propaganda messages show that in general each symbol has more than one meaning, but in propaganda only one meaning is always actualized, thereby clearly defining the content and scope of the term, which is the precondition of its organizing function. The meaning of symbols as operationalizing values becomes more constant the longer the symbols appear within the framework of a stabilized socio-political system, regardless of whether such a socio-political system exists in reality or is only a goal which should either be achieved or obstructed. In our research this means that the symbols in particular propaganda programmes are less extreme in their explicit evaluation the more frequent and common is their use in the socio-political system served by these programmes, and the more their meaning is congruent with the meaning which these symbols have in the language of the target groups (in our case: Yugoslavia). The results of the analysis show also the validity of the above-stated hypothesis in reverse: the more infrequently the symbols appear, or appear with new shades of meaning, or even with completely new meanings, the greater the probability of their extreme manifest evaluation.

The expected tendency of a clear presence or absence of the value dimension in the presented symbols also depends, on the other hand, upon the selected propaganda tactics as an operationalization of the global strategy of propaganda activity. The closer the propaganda is to the tactics of black-and-white depiction of reality (the presentation of a bipolar value system), the more extremely evaluated are the presented symbols. When this tendency is less clearly expressed the propaganda activity is further removed from the misleading and obscuring techniques of influencing the consciousness and the behaviour of target groups. In the language of statistics, one could say that words are "normally distributed" on the value continuum in the habitual ("average") use of language. Propaganda activity, however, operates with a sample of words which are bi-modally (good-bad) distributed. In the black-white depiction of reality we deal with a bi-modal distribution in which the distance between the two modes is maximal, since we are dealing with a concentration of words on the positive and the negative poles of the value continuum. The research on external radio broadcasting to Yugoslavia shows that this sort of propaganda is hardly used any more in the world, and that the more affirmative approach prevails. This is described best by the figures in Chapter Three.

The findings regarding ideologic determinateness of international radio propaganda, i.e. external radio broadcasts for Yugoslav listeners, naturally have a special meaning when seen from the angle of their (potential) effects. The function of these broadcasts is by no means complementary to the functioning of the Yugoslav mass media, given the fact that there are no essential differences between the content of the external broadcasts and of those of Yugoslav mass media with regard to the events that are treated. More or less significant differences can be detected, however, in the evaluation of the treated events and in the symbol fund, which is presented in general or in

reference to particular events. Such dissonance between the content of external broadcasts and of the Yugoslav media has obviously negative effects from the point of view of the communications system which appears in the role of the "target". These negative effects become more pronounced as the difference increases in the degree of development of the communications system which emits the propaganda messages on the one hand, and the communications system which receives them, on the other hand. In the case of external radio broadcasting to Yugoslavia this problem does not assume fateful dimensions because of the relatively high degree of development of the Yugoslav communications system; this can be seen

in several research projects carried out in Yugoslavia. It does, however, have significance for the less developed countries.*

This raises a problem which goes beyond the intentions of the present research, but which deserves immediate serious investigation on the part of communications researchers.

* This is illustrated by the research carried out by Tapio Varis and Kaarle Nordenstreng, *Television Traffic - A One-Way Street?* Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 70, Unesco, Paris 1974.

Appendix:

List of subjects of international relations identified in the content analysis of "external broadcasting to Yugoslavia"

AFG Afganistan	IRE Ireland
ALB Albania	ISR Israel
ALG Algeria	ITA Italy
ANG Angola	JAP Japan
ARG Argentina	JOR Jordan
AUS Australia	KEN Kenya
AUT Austria	KOS Republic of Korea (South)
BAN Bangladesh	KON North Korea
BEL Belgium	KUW Kuwait
BOL Bolivia	LAE Laos (establishment)
BRA Brazil	LAR Laos (Pathet Lao)
BLG Bulgaria	LEB Lebanon
BUR Burma	LYB Libya
CAE Cambodia (Lon Nol)	LUX Luxembourg
CAS Cambodia (Sihanuk)	MAL Mali
CAN Canada	MLT Malta
CAR Central African Republic (Central African Empire)	MEX Mexico
CEY Ceylon (Sri Lanka)	MON Mongolia
CHA Republic of Chad	MOR Morocco
DRC Chile (Allende)	NEL The Netherlands
CHI Chile (Junta)	NZE New Zealand
PRC China (People's Republic of)	NOR Norway
COL Colombia	PAK Pakistan
CON People's Republic of Congo (Brazzaville)	PAN Panama
CYP Cyprus	PAR Paraguay
CSR Czechoslovakia	PER Peru
CUB Cuba	PHI Philippines
DMK Denmark	POL Poland
ECU Ecuador	POR Portugal
EGY Egypt	RHO Rhodesia
ETH Ethiopia	ROM Romania
FIN Finland	SAR Saudi Arabia
FRA France	SEN Senegal
GBR Great Britain	SOM Somalia
GER Germany - West	RSA Republic of South Africa
GDR Germany - East	SPA Spain
GHA Ghana	SUD Sudan
GRE Greece	SWE Sweden
GRL Greenland	SUI Switzerland
HUN Hungary	SYR Syria
ICE Iceland	TAN Tanzania
IND India	THA Thailand
INO Indonesia	TUN Tunisia
IRA Iran	TUR Turkey
IRQ Iraq	UGA Uganda

USR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UAE United Arab Emirates
USA United States of America
URU Uruguay
VAT State of Vatican City
VEN Venezuela
SVI Viet Nam - South
NVI Viet Nam - North
RVI Viet Nam - Revolutionary Front of South Viet Nam
YUG Yugoslavia
ZAI Zaire (Congo-Kinshasa)
ZAM Zambia

International organizations

GAT GATT General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
NAT NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
WAR Warsaw Pact
EEC European Economic Community
UNO United Nations Organization
NAL ESC Organization of Non-aligned States
IBD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IMF International Monetary Fund
SEV COMECON Councillor Mutual Economic Aid
OAS Organization of American States
EFT EFTA European Free Trade Association

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