

In the context of the UNESCO Project  
'TOWARDS A CULTURE OF PEACE'

INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

# FROM PARTIAL INSECURITY TO GLOBAL SECURITY

## PROCEEDINGS

UNESCO Headquarters  
12-14 June 1996

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CULTURE OF PEACE  
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*organized by*

**IHEDN**  
Institut des Hautes Études  
de Défense Nationale, France

**UNESCO**  
United Nations Educational,  
Scientific and Cultural Organization

*with the assistance of*

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# CONTENTS

<b>PREFACE BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF UNESCO</b> . . . . .	9
<b>OBJECTIVES OF THE SYMPOSIUM</b> . . . . .	13
<b>MESSAGES FROM GENERAL NORLAIN AND FEDERICO MAYOR</b> . . . . .	17
<b>OPENING OF THE SYMPOSIUM</b> . . . . .	23
<b>Addresses of welcome</b>	
<b>Mr Federico Mayor,</b> Director-General of UNESCO . . . . .	25
<b>Air-Force General Bernard Norlain,</b> Director of the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) . . . . .	26
<b>Mr Guido Lenzi,</b> Director of the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union (WEU) . . . . .	27
<b>Lieutenant-General Carlo Jean,</b> Director of the Centro di Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD) . . . . .	28
<b>Lieutenant-General Javier Pardo de Santayana,</b> Director of the Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN) represented by <b>Rear-Admiral Alexandro Artal,</b> Deputy Director of CESEDEN . . . . .	28
<b>Introductory address by Federico Mayor,</b> Director-General of UNESCO . . . . .	29
<b>I. FIRST ROUND TABLE:</b>	
<b>FROM CRISIS MANAGEMENT TO CONFLICT PREVENTION</b>	
Chairperson: <b>Mr Guido Lenzi,</b> Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies . . . . .	33
<b>How can we make war on war?</b> by Colonel Jean-Louis Dufour (Retd), Military consultant, professor at INALCO and lecturer at Saint-Cyr Special Military College . . . . .	35
<b>Non-military factors in the Middle-East peace process</b> by Mr Domenico Siniscalco, Lecturer at the Universities of Oxford, Louvain and Turin, Executive Director of the Fondazione Mattei . . . . .	41
<b>IFOR: from the imposition to the consolidation of peace</b> by Mr Patrice Van Ackere, Deputy Head of the 'Crisis Control' Section of NATO's Defence Planning and Policy Division . . . . .	45
<b>A Culture of Peace</b> by Mr Leslie Atherley, Director, UNESCO Culture of Peace Programme . . . . .	51
<b>II. SECOND ROUND TABLE:</b>	
<b>THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ROOTS OF INSECURITY</b>	
Chairperson: <b>Lieutenant-General Carlo Jean,</b> Director of the Centro di Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD) . . . . .	57

	<b>Defence and security: factors in development</b>	
	by Mr Jean-Christophe Rufin, Deputy Director of the Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, former Vice-President of Médecins sans Frontières . . . . .	59
	<b>Peace-building and reconstruction in southern Africa</b>	
	by Mr Oscar Monteiro, former Government Minister of Mozambique, International consultant . . . . .	63
	<b>The lessons of the Balkans war: the human and civilian dimension</b>	
	by Ms Anna-Maria Corrazza, Attachée to the Special Envoy of the Commission of the European Communities to Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . . .	67
	<b>United Nations and UNESCO initiatives in Africa</b>	
	by Mr Henri Lopes, Deputy Director-General for Africa, UNESCO . . . . .	71
<b>III.</b>	<b>THIRD ROUND TABLE:</b>	
	<b>THE CONDITIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT SECURITY</b>	
	Chairperson: <b>Mr Ahmed Sayyad</b> , Assistant Director-General for External Relations at UNESCO . . . . .	75
	<b>Democratic security</b>	
	by Mr Denis Winckler, Technical adviser on the SIGMA Programme at the OECD . . . . .	77
	<b>Ways and means of sustainable development</b>	
	by Mr Patrice Dufour, Chief External Relations Adviser at the European Office of the World Bank . . . . .	81
	<b>Conflict settlement mechanisms and approaches</b>	
	by H.E. Mr Mohamed Sahnoun, Ambassador, Special adviser to the Director-General of UNESCO . . . . .	85
<b>IV.</b>	<b>FOURTH ROUND TABLE:</b>	
	<b>DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICIES FOR PEACE</b>	
	Chairperson: <b>Mr Christian Decharrière</b> , Prefect, Deputy Director of the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) . . . . .	89
	<b>What role for African armies on the threshold of the twenty-first century?</b>	
	by Ms Dominique Bangoura, Education supervisor and President of the Observatoire Politique et Stratégique de l’Afrique (University of Paris I) . . . . .	91
	<b>Democratic control of armies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe</b>	
	by Mr Rudolf Joo, former Hungarian State Secretary of Defence, Professor at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies . . . . .	97
	and by Ms Réka Szemerkenyi, Researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) . . . . .	99
	<b>Use of military technological, scientific and logistical potential by the civilian sector</b>	
	by Mr Luciano Caglioti, Director of Strategic Projects at the Italian National Centre for Scientific Research . . . . .	101
	<b>The new role of the army in peace-building</b>	
	by Mr Janusz Symonides, Director of the Division of Human Rights, Democracy and Peace at UNESCO . . . . .	103
<b>V.</b>	<b>SUMMARY OF THE ROUND TABLES</b> . . . . .	107
	by <b>Mr Philippe Ratten</b> , Dean of studies of the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) . . . . .	109
<b>VI.</b>	<b>WORKSHOPS</b> . . . . .	117
	<b>A. FIRST WORKSHOP</b> . . . . .	119
	<b>Different perceptions of security and insecurity</b>	
	Chairperson: <b>Ms Anaisabel Prera Flores</b> , Senior special adviser to the Director-General of UNESCO . . . . .	121

<b>B. SECOND WORKSHOP</b> .....	129
<b>Action against insecurity</b>	
Chairperson: <b>Ms Moufida Goucha</b> ,	
Senior special adviser to the Director-General of UNESCO .....	131
<b>C. SUMMARY OF THE WORKSHOPS</b> .....	135
<b>General conclusions of the two workshops</b>	
by General Sofian Effendi, Representative of Indonesia .....	137
<b>Additional observations</b>	
by the rapporteurs of the Groups .....	139
<b>Remarks on the proceedings of the workshops</b>	
by Mr Larry Seaquist, Special adviser to the Director-General of UNESCO,	
co-ordinator of the workshops .....	143
<b>Prospects opened up by the proceedings of the workshops</b>	
by Ms Moufida Goucha, Chairperson of the second workshop .....	145
<b>Overview of the conclusions of the workshops</b>	
by Mr Philippe Ratte, Chief rapporteur .....	147
<b>VII. PROPOSALS FOR PURSUING THE DIALOGUE</b> .....	151
<b>VIII. CLOSURE OF THE SYMPOSIUM</b>	
Chairperson: <b>Air-Force General Bernard Norlain</b> ,	
Director of the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) .....	157
<b>Does humanitarian action ensure peace?</b>	
by Mr Xavier Emmanuelli,	
Secretary of State to the Prime Minister of France, with responsibility for	
emergency humanitarian action .....	159
<b>The values of peace in contemporary civilization</b>	
by Mr Federico Rampini, Editor-in-chief of the newspaper	
<i>La Repubblica</i> (Milan) .....	163
Chairperson: <b>Mr Adnan Badran</b> , Deputy Director-General of UNESCO	
Statement by Mr Adnan Badran .....	165
<b>Closing address</b>	
by <b>Air-Force General Bernard Norlain</b> ,	
Director of the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) .....	167
<b>IX. AGENDA 1994–1997</b> .....	171
<b>X. APPENDICES</b> .....	175
1. List of participants .....	177
2. The UNITWIN/UNESCO Chairs Programme .....	185
3. Extract from UNESCO's Constitution .....	189
4. Extract from UNESCO's Medium-Term Strategy for 1996–2001 .....	191
5. Extracts from Resolution 012 adopted by the twenty-eighth session	
of the General Conference of UNESCO on the Medium-Term Strategy	
for 1996–2001 .....	193
6. Extracts from UNESCO's Approved Programme and Budget for 1996–1997 .....	195
7. Other publications of interest .....	197
8. The Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN, France) .....	199
9. The Centro di Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD, Italy) .....	201
10. The Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN, Spain) .....	203
11. The Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union (WEU) .....	205

**PREFACE  
BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL  
OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,  
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION**

**Preface by  
Federico Mayor,  
Director-General of UNESCO**

Over the several months that have elapsed since the international symposium 'From Partial Insecurity to Global Security' took place, some hotbeds of violence have died down and others have flared up or been rekindled. We have found that the process which turns sources of instability into threats, and threats into causes of conflict, continues to pose formidable challenges to the international community when it comes to long-term conflict prevention.

Furthermore, we are all affected by this process, even in our everyday occupations and community activities, whether public or private, because the components of security are many and varied and are intertwined at the local, national, regional and international levels.

For security and insecurity are felt by every human being in very different ways: they may involve human rights or the democratic principles of peace or, for many of us, quite simply the right to live. In order to take all these

factors into account, in the context of the interactions between peace, democracy and development, we have to lay the basis for a new approach to security and this, in turn, entails a dialogue with every single sector of society.

UNESCO considers it important for there to be a dialogue on this new approach to security with the defence institutes and strategic studies centres of different countries and regions and, through them, with the armed forces which, it is convinced, have a fundamental role to play in the construction of a culture of peace.

The symposium that was held at UNESCO Headquarters in June 1996 is a good illustration of this approach. The pages that follow show how rewarding such a dialogue can be, despite the diversity of outlooks, backgrounds and approaches. One thing is certain: a price has to be paid for peace, a price that more and more of us are willing to pay: the alternative costs too much in blood.

Paris, 30 January 1997



## **OBJECTIVES OF THE SYMPOSIUM**

## OBJECTIVES

*Since wars begin in the minds of men,  
it is in the minds of men  
that the defences of peace must be constructed.*

Preamble to the Constitution of UNESCO

This symposium, which is a joint initiative of the Director-General of UNESCO, Mr Federico Mayor, and the Director of the French Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN), French Air-Force General Bernard Norlain, and one with which the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union (WEU), the Italian Centro di Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD) and the Spanish Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN) are also associated, is intended:

1. to bring together representatives of defence studies institutes from several countries and regions, so that they may express their conceptions of a culture of defence and peace and share their views on the subject;
2. to encourage debate among them leading to suggestions on these topics, and in particular to work on outlining programmes of common interest: for example, to define an international security indicator;
3. to lay the foundations for more sustained contact between these institutions, forming as they do a network of key interfaces between defence problems and issues of development, peace, international security and cultural and social dynamics;
4. to plan specific projects, such as the establishment of new Chairs in peace studies in defence academies, and activities in the field of civil defence and development (especially in rural areas).

**MESSAGES  
FROM  
GENERAL NORLAIN  
AND  
FEDERICO MAYOR**

## WARDING OFF INSECURITY

In a world where divisions of various kinds have disintegrated one after another, situations of insecurity can no longer be so easily circumscribed. The world is now a global system, whose stability can be jeopardized by the weakness of any of its components, however small. The days when partial insecurity could be tolerated are now over. Every aspect of the functioning of our planet must now be viewed from the angle of global security.

This approach, which we have to accept as it has been imposed on us by the course of events, entails looking at the world very differently.

All failures in human progress, whether they be social, economic, ecological, cultural or the result of violence, cause insecurity, not only in the areas where they occur, but worldwide. Therefore they must all be identified and remedied.

All the strengths that humanity has acquired throughout its history, whether economic, technical, scientific or moral, cultural and political, must be brought to bear in this process, each in its own way. The market can play its part, as can democracy, charity and the dedication of individuals. The best possible combination will take account of circumstances and the

enlightened wishes of peoples, experts and political leaders.

It is impossible for such efforts to be deployed worldwide in a context of physical insecurity. It is vital that the foundations of security, that is the protection of life and the restoring of its basic requirements, should be guaranteed. The existence and commitment of the armed services can be a vital element in this process.

Careful consideration of the part that the armed services can play in restoring, maintaining and working towards peace, and in arriving at a better understanding of the interaction between security and development, have now become major issues in the management of world affairs.

Institutes of defence and security, meeting for the first time at a symposium to exchange ideas on these issues, have a decisive part to play in this respect. By airing all points of view and expressing them in clearer terms, they will help to make action more equitable, effective and reliable.

Air-Force General  
Bernard Norlain  
Director, IHEDN

## IN SEARCH OF HUMAN SECURITY

The 'global village' has come to stay. After the collapse of the Wall and the breakdown of ideologies, and with the explosion of communication technologies, no country or group of people can any longer live in isolation from the world community, an immense network whose strength, like that of any network, is that of its weakest link. This interdependence has now become widely recognized and discussed. But have all the conclusions concerning security been drawn and behaviour patterns adapted accordingly? The days when partial insecurity could be tolerated are over; the age of global security has begun.

This increasingly small planet is prey to a profound injustice: 20 per cent of its inhabitants possess 80 per cent of its resources and are reluctant to share them. This fundamental injustice has become the primary cause of insecurity. Dire poverty triggers off rural exodus, massive population movements, uncontrolled urbanization, frustration, violence, intolerance and corruption, which destabilize the world economy as a whole. Rectifying injustice and redressing North-South asymmetry by encouraging a sharing of wealth and the sustainable development of the poorer countries constitute the primary task of humanity aware of its inevitable solidarity as well as its ethical responsibilities.

Authentic, sustainable development must be conducted in a context of democracy, the only moral and political context that ensures that each individual has a sense of dignity and the means of preserving it. It is respect for democratic principles that allows citizens to take part in community life, to have some influence on the decisions that affect them and to feel actively engaged in the society in which they are living. It is respect for the same principles

that guarantees a genuine dialogue between states and communities, through which cooperation and mutual understanding can develop.

If development is undertaken by populations that have confidence in themselves and know they have the support and solidarity of those who are richer than they are, if democracy operates in accordance with the skills and traditions of each culture, then peace will have a chance of establishing itself in a world of reconciliation. What is the point of building peace on the quicksands of poverty, selfishness, ignorance, injustice and repression? Peace 'in the minds of men' – which UNESCO, according to the terms of its Constitution, has a duty to defend – the only peace that is worthwhile, will only endure if its foundations are not undermined by unacceptable material, social and moral living conditions.

Accordingly, peace, development and democracy constitute the three sides of an interactive triangle which is a virtuous rather than a vicious circle; the synergies so formed are irresistible and invulnerable. But for them to come into action the critical mass required must be assembled all over the world. No country will any longer be able to 'go it alone'. Ready-made models can no longer be imposed on sovereign peoples. No social category will any longer be privileged or sacrificed. All societies, and every component of each society, must join forces to preserve their common future. Governments, inter-governmental organizations, associations, municipal authorities, interest groups, ecclesiastical authorities, in short, all levels and all orders, all methods of social organization, must be mobilized.

In this process of 'general mobilization' for global security, the armed services obviously play a decisive role. As the protagonists in any war scenario, they are also a key factor in restoring, maintaining and building peace, a driving force in the logic of peace, making judicious use of the interactions between security, development and democracy. They can and do act directly, within this interactive triangle, as a lever whose force is still largely underestimated.

However different we may be, we must all help each other. If we are really aware of our common destiny, we shall make the right decisions and take the appropriate action, on a basis of justice, freedom, equity, tolerance and sharing. Human security depends on universal respect for these values.

Federico Mayor  
Director-General, UNESCO

## **OPENING OF THE SYMPOSIUM**

## ADDRESSES OF WELCOME

by  
*Mr Federico Mayor,  
Air-Force General Bernard Norlain,  
Mr Guido Lenzi,  
Lieutenant-General Carlo Jean,  
Rear-Admiral Alexandro Artal,  
representing Lieutenant-General Javier Pardo de Santayana*

General,  
General Officers,  
Director,  
Ambassadors,  
Colleagues,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

**W**ELCOME to this house of all cultures, this house of peace. UNESCO's vocation, as the 'intellectual' institution of the United Nations system, is to join with its partners to explore the new solutions and approaches that are demanded by new situations and new problems. In the case in point, this means the approaches and solutions entailed by present-day developments of the idea of international security. The idea is to anticipate those developments rather than merely try to keep pace with them or adapt to them.

Moreover, when I see you, General Norlain, Director of the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale, which is responsible for defending the democratic principles expressed in UNESCO's Constitution, when I see General Carlo Jean, Director of the Italian Centro di Alti Studi per la Difesa, and all the other eminent figures assembled here, when I recall General

James R. Harding,<sup>1</sup> I know that our dialogue, our research and our joint efforts will bear fruit.

As you know, this symposium is a joint initiative. General Norlain and I drafted the invitation together and we have been able to count on the co-operation of the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union (WEU), the Centro di Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD) of Italy and the Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN) of Spain.

In this very building we have held extremely important meetings with the French Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale, especially on the theme of defence in Africa and Madagascar. UNESCO is drawing a large number of useful lessons from the dialogue, exchanges and joint studies being pursued. Our co-operation with institutes, academies and national centres specializing in defence and security matters helps us to accomplish our mission, which is to construct peace in the minds of men. For the construction of peace to be possible, democracy has to be strong and democratic principles have to be respected. Welcome to all of you.

Federico Mayor

<sup>1</sup> Director of the Inter-American Defense College and President of the Inter-American Defense Board.



YOU are aware that the battle of Fontenoy has gone down in history because of the phrase addressed to the English enemy: 'Shoot first, gentlemen.' That is why I am speaking second, in homage to a time when the art of war yielded in favour of culture.

It is therefore not by accident, Mr Director-General, that the Place de Fontenoy, which unites our two institutions more than it separates them, should bear the name of that battle. Military history and the prestige of culture both benefit. This proximity has proved rewarding. As the Director-General of a prestigious institution dedicated to education, you have been able to see, from up in your office, that the school nearest to UNESCO is the École Militaire. You have also acknowledged, in the founding charter of UNESCO, that planting the roots of peace deep in the minds of men is a most noble mission.

Over and above this fortunate proximity, we can now acknowledge that we have a mission in common. Like a coin, peace only has substance or consistency if it has two faces: that of security and that of humanism. To understand real peace, not only the peace of wild dreams or of cemeteries, neither approach should be neglected. This is what we are undertaking here today and I am extremely pleased that

from the outset this project is shared by our friends Guido Lenzi, Carlo Jean and Javier Pardo de Santayana, who have pledged the support of their respective institutions. Together, we have received a response from all those who are here, among whom are so many old friends, and from all those who, through the Internet, are keeping in direct communication with us and are genuinely participating in this symposium.

I should particularly like to greet those of you who have been attending the 10th African and Malagasy International Session and who, together with the defence and security institutes, form the core of this meeting.

Our task is twofold: first, it is what might be described as substantive, in that our work will allow us to deepen our knowledge and precise understanding of insecurity and the means of remedying it. Even more important, however, our task is qualitative, in that it will allow us to know and understand each other better and hence to initiate a promising form of co-operation, the guarantee of our co-operation to ensure global security.

Thank you.

General Bernard Norlain

I think that we should all be indebted to UNESCO and its Director-General for continuing their search for the culture of peace, for peace is an attitude of mind and its foundations lie in the perceptions of individuals and nations.

During periods of transition, national and international alike, such as those currently affecting all nations without distinction, stress is laid on multilateral co-operation, of which the United Nations system represents the highest expression. The United Nations, in fact, has the authority to legitimize the use of force for peacekeeping.

The system of international security arising from this – in particular through the regional organizations provided for under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter – is, in fact, no longer founded solely on collective territorial defence, but rather on security as co-operative solidarity, in an attempt to forestall conflicts by addressing their causes rather than their consequences.

The trend towards globalization that we are witnessing does not deny the existence of national specificities, which have to be visualized and perceived as the expression of democratic pluralism and as a source of enrichment to every one of us, as a source of energy and impetus. It was the strength of national specificities that brought about the collapse of the ideological confrontation between East and West. The specific identities which had grown unduly rigid as a result of the Cold War now have to rediscover their functions as agents of gradual change instead of nourishment for feeding ethnocentric attitudes, exclusion and xenophobia.

Everywhere, at national and international levels, different traditions and civilizations are not necessarily opposed to each other, as some people contend. The collective imagination is now more wide-ranging than ever, and this should make it possible to include all aspirations in a system of common values that draws on the universality of human nature. In other

words, although the paths may be different, the direction has to be constant and convergent.

Everywhere we can see the whittling away of the functions that the state claimed for itself in a period of international confrontation, in favour of decentralization towards local communities and non-governmental organizations. This pluralism is not harmful, since it allows more freedom for participation, decision-making and expression. It is at the international and multilateral levels that states have to recover their primary function of protecting the well-being and progress of citizens from the present-day transnational challenges. In these circumstances, even security organizations become an instrument of political consultation for the prevention of crises between their members and towards the outside world.

The Western European Union (WEU), which I represent here today, is no exception to this function, in that it brings together, in various capacities, twenty-seven European countries as well as engaging in a dialogue with the Mediterranean countries and, naturally, with the United States of America and Canada. However, our mission is not confined to these countries. The priority missions that were assigned to the WEU at the Petersberg ministerial meeting confer on it a humanitarian intervention role within an operational and political framework which the Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union is currently drawing up. The aim is to increase Europe's capacity to contribute to international stability by preventing crises and conflicts.

Like the whole of the human community, the Europe under construction must be founded in people's mental outlooks and in their cultures. This is the task that is entrusted to institutes such as the one I represent and it is the important contribution which UNESCO is making on a worldwide scale. For this reason, I am delighted to be among you.

Guido Lenzi

I should like to join in the thanks that my colleagues have tendered to the Director-General of UNESCO for taking this initiative to respond to the new concept of security, which is organized not against others but with others.

Security has become a multi-dimensional, multi-purpose function. Starting from the purely military sphere, which was dominant during the Cold War, it is being broadened to cover the cultural, economic and ecological spheres, the protection of civilians and of the cultural heritage.

The main danger with which we have to contend is the mental outlook that accepts the idea of the 'clash of civilizations' and, in my opinion, UNESCO's initiative is very important in this respect. We have to 'prevent conflicts' rather than 'intervene in conflicts'. The armed forces, along with security and defence centres and experts, can make their contribution to the struggle against this idea of inevitable opposition between different cultures and civilizations. The Italian Ministry of Defence, together with the Minister, Mr Beniamino Andreatta, and the Chief of Staff, Admiral Guido Venturoni, very strongly support UNESCO's initiative, and I have been asked to thank its Director-General for everything he has achieved in this area.

This initiative is very important, especially in the geopolitical fracture zones such as the Mediterranean, where there are quite significant demographic, economic and cultural discrepancies, because it makes it possible to build bridges, links and dialogue between North and South (without forgetting that there are several Norths and several Souths, since each country and each nation has its own particular identity).

Thank you.

Lieutenant-General Carlo Jean

I should also like to bid you welcome and to say how very happy I am to be among you to reflect on ways and means of moving forward from partial insecurity to global security. I do not know whether our meetings will take the form of an investigation or will be devoted to discussions but, as the Chinese say, I hope that you will live in interesting times.

Indeed I know that this will be the case, since the fact that so many participants have come together to reflect and act in favour of peace and the defence of peace is remarkable. I also think that we must be grateful for having been given so noble a goal.

I hope that your meetings will be rewarding and will allow you to draw fresh conclusions. I should also like to take this opportunity to thank the Director-General of UNESCO and General Norlain of IHEDN, who have given us this invaluable opportunity of coming together.

Rear-Admiral Alexandro Artal,  
representing Lieutenant-General  
Javier Pardo de Santayana

## INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS

*by Federico Mayor,  
Director-General of UNESCO*

General, general officers, Director, ambassadors, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to this house of the world's cultures, to this house of peace.

Within the framework of this symposium, we are going to be able to explore together the new approaches that we need to adopt in order to cope with new problems and new situations. I welcome all the participants – from some forty countries – and turn to the Director of France's Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) at the opening of this meeting, confident that you – that we – will be able to enter into an exchange of views on this vital matter and carry our discussions forward.

The symposium is a joint initiative of IHEDN and UNESCO, in co-operation with the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union (WEU), Italy's Centro di Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD) and Spain's Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN).

We have already held some very important meetings here with IHEDN on certain aspects of African and Malagasy defence and UNESCO found these discussions, as well as those held in Washington and Rome, extremely helpful. The thinking being done and the approaches being adopted by defence institutes, centres for strategic studies, military academies and similar bodies are of interest to UNESCO on the one hand in that they have become part of the transition from a culture of war to a culture of peace and, on the other, in that these institutions are among those responsible for defending the democratic principles of freedom and dignity which underpin our societies and which are set forth in UNESCO's Constitution.

For several years the world has been undergoing profound changes. We used to live in a

bipolar world in which we observed a confrontation between two ideologies, two visions of the world. Suddenly, that bipolar world collapsed as one of its poles gave way. We may not have been aware of the values that were recognized in that large part of the world, because one of the two poles represented oppression, reduction to silence. In fact, it was not only a system that operated a planned economy but also a system that placed constraints on the individual. A chosen few expressed their views on behalf of all those who remained silent in the background.

Together with the demise of the bipolar model, we saw an end to the period in which conflict and misfortune seemed inevitable. Who, apart from UNESCO, had always believed that we would one day see the end of apartheid? Very few. Yet all of a sudden, thanks to the luminous vision of Nelson Mandela who, during his twenty-six years in prison, had garnered a store of wisdom instead of hate, and thanks to the lucidity of Frederik de Klerk, the system of apartheid, which had posed so many problems of conscience, was no more. Today, South Africa is a democracy, even if it is not very firmly established. Sensitive problems and feelings of bitterness will certainly still continue to be encountered, but the open wound that it represented on that continent has begun to heal.

Concerning an end to the inevitability of conflict, we can cite many examples – El Salvador, Namibia, Mozambique and, more recently, Angola, the Near East – to show that all those who regarded these situations as so many cases of hopeless deadlock were mistaken. The time had come to use some imagination and find ways of ending armed conflict and initiating national reconciliation.

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UNESCO's mission is to construct the defences of peace in the minds of men. How can we maintain national reconciliation? How can we really say to all the citizens of these countries that 'starting again' after the conflict will not be to the disadvantage of any of the parties? How can we tell them that solutions exist, that it takes two riverbanks to form a river?

The end of the implacable reign of force, of inevitable conflicts, imposes urgent tasks on UNESCO and on all those who have a duty to maintain peace and defend the democratic principles of justice, freedom, equality and solidarity.

We have to acknowledge our lack of preparedness for new types of conflict. Events in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Liberia have shown us how powerless we are.

In today's world, interaction is total. We hear the world's news in real time. We have access to knowledge in real time. The threats hanging over this global village are due to social and economic disparities, injustice and discrimination. In most countries, the voice of half the population, the women, is still raised very timidly. A mere 6 per cent of the world's decision-making jobs are occupied by women and just 10 per cent of parliamentarians are women. One half of humanity still remains almost invisible.

Social exclusion and imbalances of all kinds are at the root of many a conflict. People may be excluded from access to material goods and knowledge on the basis of geographical, economic, social, cultural, religious or linguistic factors. I should add, in my capacity as Director-General of UNESCO, that exclusion also exists in education.

In today's traditional education system, those who 'missed the boat' to education in their childhood suffer from exclusion for the rest of their lives. If we wish education to help all men and women to be in control of their own lives and be able to act on their own plans for the future, we must include the excluded. We must use communication technology to reach those who are living in scattered settlements or in the most remote areas. We must tell them: 'Take courage. Education is a lifelong process. Missing one boat does not mean you are stranded forever. You will have other opportunities to access education and training. Education is a fundamental right of all human beings.'

Similarly, we must include those among the excluded who are labouring under a burden of

bitterness, hatred or violence. Exclusion is not inevitable. Just as conflicts can be avoided, all types of exclusion can be combated. But the state cannot do everything alone and it is not for that matter its job to do everything. Formerly omnipresent and all-powerful, the state has loosened its hold, and the areas from which it has retreated are now occupied by society. By that I mean 'society', not 'civil society'. Democratic society must take joint responsibility for including the excluded and going to the root of conflicts, poverty, ignorance and selfishness and it must help in shaping the new framework in which conflicts will no longer arise or, if they do, will be settled by peaceful means.

This society therefore includes all its social actors – civilian, military and ecclesiastical – all schools of thought and all the different social groups. The world community must include all of its actors, since global problems cannot be settled by only one part of the world.

Every day, the vessel Earth takes on board 254,000 more passengers. And these new arrivals 'embark' in the poorest areas, where people are still not in control of their actions. For behaviour patterns are not exportable commodities.

We of the Western world were mistaken in thinking that we could give lessons to others. If we had been wiser we would have listened instead to the civilizations which, over the centuries, have taken time to reflect, without books perhaps, but with the help of their oral traditions, their sensitivity and their memory.

Global communication is double-edged. It makes possible the instant sharing of an event, an immediate connection, from one end of the world to the other. But we must not forget the risk that it poses to our cultural diversity and to the preservation of specific characteristics and identities.

Diversity is our wealth, just as unity is our strength. What can form the cement to bind such different components together? The four democratic principles that at the end of the Second World War – monstrous and perverse as it was – a number of visionaries defined as the pillars of peace: justice, freedom, equality and solidarity.

You play a fundamental role in the defence of democracy. There are many vulnerable democracies today. Great efforts have been made to set up democratic regimes, sometimes prematurely or precipitately. Hence the large number of failures.

Another problem stemming from North-South imbalance and demographic growth is that of population migration. As an African on the road to voluntary exile said to me: 'I have nothing to lose so I have taken to the road.' Without a doubt, endogenous development must be stimulated. Sometimes the rich gave too much and hindered more than they helped by applying standardized solutions to different situations. They 'provided' without encouraging this internal, endogenous capacity that can transform a people and stabilize a regime.

Where should we start? In 1990, UNESCO and other agencies of the United Nations system launched education for all, by all, throughout life. Today, already, spectacular results have been achieved. While increasing external funding, we requested countries to augment the budget earmarked for education. In all the most populated countries, when the level of instruction rises, birth rates fall. Whatever the religious or ideological context, only education gives each human being command of his or her destiny. Ultimately, only education can solve the problems posed by overpopulation.

What can be said about violence? Violence often results from a refusal to share, from social exclusion or a lack of education, as I have just said. It is in shantytowns, among the poverty-stricken, that the feeling of frustration grows and withdrawal into oneself fosters all types of violence. The solution is there, within reach: we must invest in the human mind, in values, in such a way as to fulfil not only material aspirations but also make good the 'soullessness' that the most affluent countries suffer from.

Most of the difficulties now confronting us are transnational. In cultural matters especially, transnational problems only have transnational solutions, and transfrontier problems only have transfrontier solutions.

Five days ago I was in Istanbul, where I addressed the mayors attending the World Congress on Towns and Local Authorities. While mayors represent decentralized power, municipal action constitutes the direct framework of democracy. Citizens live in villages and towns; it is there they can play their part and really take over their own lives. Municipalities are, in my opinion, among the partners that should from now on be given pride of place – in the same way as parliamentarians and the military – if we wish to accomplish the task that was entrusted to us fifty years ago: to construct peace so as to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

I would like to conclude these introductory remarks by underlining how farsighted were the founders of the United Nations, in affirming in its Charter their determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. They were being farsighted, as we must be. We must honour the promise made on behalf of us all – civilians, the military, people of every belief and profession – to make peace our supreme goal.

In his report entitled *Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, identified two main functions for the international community in this domain – peace-building and peace-keeping. Peacekeeping, to which we currently devote immense efforts, occurs after conflict has taken place. Peace-building, on the other hand, includes such diverse activities as promoting development, consolidating democracy and setting up a judicial system. When we prepare lawyers to be judges and help create a framework of justice within a country, when we prepare journalists to reflect responsibly on what is happening and express themselves freely, we are helping to build peace.

Unfortunately, there is an immense disparity between the resources devoted to peacekeeping and those devoted to peace-building. This is why we must all act together in our mutual interest. We must share knowledge – as you must within your military academies, colleges and study centres – in the cause of conflict prevention. There is so much that you can do in this respect, from the educational point of view and in terms of engineering projects. Note that I am not talking about waiting until a natural disaster occurs. For example, there is no shortage of actions that can be undertaken in peacetime to provide those who live in rural areas with facilities to improve their quality of life. There are so many countries where solar panels would be sufficient to generate electricity and thereby improve communications with people living in remote settlements (some 30 per cent of the world population) who are too often excluded from the mainstream of society.

I always remember a very interesting meeting with Vice-President Al Gore of the United States at which he told me how important it is today to be in the forefront of research and development on the information superhighways. But he was kind enough to agree with me that we must never forget the importance of the byways of communication. Because we have still 600,000 villages without electricity,

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*Increasing the emphasis on peace-building must be our common task, our common mission.*

and it is this situation that explains why people flee the countryside – because they feel cut off.

We are today faced with new post-conflict peacekeeping functions – such as protecting humanitarian assistance or installing observers to ensure free and fair elections. Prevention would have been so much better. Of course, prevention – and this applies equally to the military sphere, to medicine, to politics and to UNESCO's action – is largely invisible. When you prevent something, do not expect to be thanked for doing so, since nobody will realize what might have happened had you not intervened. Peace, like health or happiness, does not make the headlines, it is not newsworthy. We know this, but we still do our best to fulfil our peace-building role in order to progressively decrease the need for peacekeeping, for the recourse to force. Increasing the emphasis on peace-building must be our common task, our common mission.

I would add that there are some situations in which we know we must act swiftly and firmly in order to guarantee security; and I believe that UNESCO must, with others, help to provide the criteria by which the Security Council could take the decision to prevent or contain conflict in this way. The task is a demanding one, ladies and gentlemen, and I would like to conclude by saying that the great challenge at this end-of-century is to equip ourselves to deal with complexity, to think globally, and to be as far-sighted as the founders of the United Nations Charter when they committed themselves to save future generations from the scourge of war. The only way to honour this promise is by facilitating the transition from a culture of war, in which we have been living for too long, to a culture of peace. I am persuaded that you can make a decisive contribution to this historic transition.

# I. FIRST ROUND TABLE

*From crisis management to conflict prevention*

*Chairperson: Mr Guido Lenzi,  
Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies*

The strategic situation in today's world consists of a series of crises of varying magnitude which, however circumscribed they may be, have a devastating effect in the areas in which they occur. The international community feels bound to contain these crises, to reduce their effects and, whenever possible, to prevent them.

The practical experience of crises that have had to be managed is an invaluable lesson for taking a realistic and level-headed approach to conflict prevention, which is more constructive, more efficient and less costly than any form of crisis management, however successful.



## HOW CAN WE MAKE WAR ON WAR?

*by Colonel Jean-Louis Dufour (Retd),<sup>1</sup>  
Military consultant, professor at INALCO  
and lecturer at the Collège Interarmées de Défense (CID)*

I should like to begin with two preliminary remarks:

First, my choice of title does not now seem, with hindsight, entirely appropriate. 'Make war on war' was the famous cry of the pacifists at the beginning of this century. However, in the meantime we have learnt that pacifism alone is not enough to fend off war. The use of force, to maintain or restore peace, is occasionally not only necessary but indispensable, as the experience of recent years has graphically shown.

Second, we must define what peace is, observe its nature and determine its foundations, the better to preserve it.

Raymond Aron, whose thinking was coloured by the Cold War, identified three different kinds of peace:

- the peace of satisfaction: states are content with their lot and have no intention of going to war to settle minor disputes which are not worth the expense or the risk of an armed conflict;
- the peace of impotence: the threat of a nuclear holocaust makes war impossible; the means of waging war are there to use, but only at the risk of incineration!
- the peace of empire: whether Soviet, American or colonial, empires can at least claim credit for trying to maintain some sort of order within their boundaries. This has involved the use of various methods, some brutal, others more diplomatic, political or economic.

Where do we stand today? Of these three kinds of peace, only the peace of satisfaction still exists in what is, fortunately, a relatively large number of countries.

The peace of impotence can probably no longer be counted upon. The nuclear weapon, while effective in deterring two military

alliances which, though opposed, remain rational and determined not to cross swords, cannot guarantee peace for ever.

The peace of empire, however, has almost certainly disappeared along with the dismantling of the empires themselves. As soon as order is no longer imposed by a protecting power, disorder is always a possibility, as confirmed by events in various countries of Africa, Asia and Europe such as Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and the republics of the former Soviet Central Asia. However, recent developments in the Central African Republic illustrate the lingering presence of the peace of empire as well as the reluctance of countries to intervene in an internal dispute, a sign that the empire in question hesitates to speak out.

I should like to structure my remarks as simply as possible by relating them to the two types of war encountered in the world today: war between states and civil war.

I will begin by asking whether war between states is dead or not. If it is, we might consider what can be done to ensure that it stays that way.

As far as the second type of war, civil war, is concerned, it is probably up to states, in so far as there are any left, to invent effective methods of maintaining and restoring peace. Despite the international community's praiseworthy efforts, nobody really knows how to separate two peoples that are at each other's throats.

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<sup>1</sup>. Most recent publication: *Les crises internationales: de Pékin (1900) à Sarajevo (1995)*, Brussels, Éditions Complexe, 1996.

*The past cannot guarantee the future, but it can at least throw some light on it.*

## **1. No more war between states, or war is dead**

### **1.1. The facts**

War used to be waged by one state against another; today it is internal. The trends are strong and clear and could perhaps serve as a guide to action.

Before 1939, four conflicts out of five were between states; since 1945, four conflicts out of five have been internal, generally complicated by foreign intervention. Since 1980, there has been no more than a handful of interstate conflicts: Iran/Iraq, United Kingdom/Argentina, Chad/Libya, Iraq/Kuwait, Grenada/United States, Panama/United States, Burkina Faso/Mali. Since 1991, there have been clashes between Peru and Ecuador, an inter-Yemeni quarrel, a dispute between Eritrea and Yemen – nothing in fact of great moment.

### **1.2. The causes**

Why are there no longer wars between states? This is a vital question and, to some extent, the future of the world depends upon the answer.

The globalization of the economy, that is to say the integration of national economies, may be partly responsible. In *Le bel avenir de la guerre*, Philippe Delmas quotes the English author Norman Angell who, in 1912, wrote: 'War with Germany is an impossibility. Our fates are too closely linked; its destruction would mean the destruction of so large a proportion of our debtors that it would inevitably ruin us too. The consequences would be such that we should not even be able to take Germany's place in the markets it controlled, not to mention the loss of the German market itself...'.

The exorbitant cost of war and hence its irrationality may also be a reason (see Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*), but after all this can be circumvented by using less sophisticated weapons.

Severe technological imbalance between different nations may make war impossible (after the last air battle, in Lebanon on 10 June 1982, the score was sixty-four to zero; no country can wage war under these conditions).

There are also strategic reasons, such as the non-availability, since the end of the Cold War, of the automatic support of one or other of the 'big two'.

Legal considerations may also play a part: making war may be forbidden on pain, for the

violators, of harsh international sanctions. The effects on Serbia, for example, were devastating, whence the use of various subterfuges such as recourse to 'volunteers', as in the Republic of Korea or the former Yugoslavia.

Finally, there are the political factors: democracy has made progress, and democracies do not make war on each other. Unless one of you can cite a serious precedent, I would maintain that there has never been a case of one democracy waging war on another. The past cannot guarantee the future, but it can at least throw some light on it.

### **1.3. Perpetual peace**

It is appropriate at this point to recall the project for perpetual peace conceived by Emmanuel Kant, according to which peace will reign on Earth when three preconditions are simultaneously satisfied:

- when territorial acquisitions become less and less relevant as a means of enhancing national power, that is, when territory and the control of that territory are no longer synonymous with power;
- when economies are interdependent;
- when political systems converge.

If states were capable of working towards these three objectives, there might be a chance of reducing the number of international armed conflicts.

Let us look more closely at Kant's three conditions to see how far they can be generalized and if the world is moving in the right direction.

First, territory and power: this condition is still far from being met. Land and mineral wealth were the prize in the Gulf War, India and Pakistan fought over Kashmir, and territory was also at stake in the crises of winter 1996, pitting Greece against Turkey, China against Taiwan, and Japan against the Republic of Korea.

Next, national economies are well on the way to becoming interdependent. However, for economies to be interdependent there must be an economy. In other words, integration is only possible when there is something to integrate. The economic organizations of the Gulf states, the African states and the states of the Maghreb are merely hollow shells; there is no economic integration, and while trade continues to flow in the North-South direction, country by country, it hardly flows at all from South to South, for lack of goods to exchange, relevant skills and an international specialization of labour capable of mutually enriching the states concerned.

There remains the convergence of political systems, the abandonment of conquering ideologies. Who would dare confess to being fundamentally opposed to liberal democracy? Democracy has made enormous progress in Central Europe, in Africa, in South America, even in Asia. Democracy, of course, means the rule of law, recourse to justice, the existence of checks and balances. But is this enough?

As I have said, democracies are loath to make war on one another, but they may cast democracy aside specifically to wage war. Everything depends on the quality of the democracy, the mere trappings of democracy being far from sufficient to prevent war: think of the democratically elected Milosevic, who started and supported the war in Bosnia; of Yeltsin, who, after being elected fair and square, started the war in Chechnya; and of Israel, which carries a heavy share of responsibility for the war in Lebanon in 1982 and again in 1996.

In other words, it is not enough to have a head of state elected more or less democratically. That person must also be a good head of state. This is a huge problem which could lead us onto the slippery slopes of interference, but which also brings us to the subject of civil war and its underlying causes.

## 2. Putting an end to civil war

Even if, on the whole, war between states is in the process of disappearing, civil war is still with us and indeed widespread.

It is commonly said that civil wars have proliferated since the end of the Cold War; I should prefer to say that there is a risk of their proliferating. In fact, today, civil wars are breaking out at the rate of twenty to twenty-five a year, roughly the same rate as for the last fifty years.

The problem seems to me to be the existence of a factor common to the disappearance of war between states and to civil war. This unique factor is the present weakness of states or, as Ghassan Salamé puts it, their breakdown.

### 2.1. The weakness of states

Making war and treating it, rightly or wrongly, as a useful and desirable means to an end is a privilege of the state, of the strong state capable of rallying, organizing and holding the allegiance of its people, its electors and its soldiers. If there are no wars between states it is often because of a lack of means and a lack

of states. Thus, in Africa there are fifty states and practically no international wars.

We are witnessing the gradual disappearance of the nation-state on the European model, that is, a structured entity capable of carrying out various missions.

For the lack of a state, problems in such areas as public assistance, disaster aid, debt, desertification, over-urbanization, police, health and education are not or are no longer being tackled. Thus, in those countries in which all the usual forms of state sovereignty are disappearing, it is natural to find the emergence of insurrection, in varying degrees anarchic or integrationist or linked with organized crime.

The same phenomenon is also discernible in the North, in the old democracies: the use of the army to maintain law and order (Italy, Spain, France, United States); the growth of centrifugal forces in Belgium, Italy and Canada; the emergence of pockets of lawlessness in urban ghettos, and of entire regions of lawlessness, of which Corsica is a good example.

Indeed, France provides an illustration of the progressive dismantling of the power of the state and hence of its capabilities. Domestically, this takes the form of decentralization or regionalization, where the responsibilities of the state are transferred to innumerable intermediaries, and drastic cutbacks in military budgets, admittedly an economic necessity but also the expression of a refusal to accept more serious commitments. In foreign affairs, the process implies the abandonment of the natural and traditional tasks of the nation-state which are handed over to inherently irresponsible international organizations such as the United Nations or indeed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

All this means that, while incapable of waging war on one another, which is just as well, crumbling state structures favour outbreaks of civil war, which is unfortunate.

Of course, the fact of being 'something less than a state' is not going to make those powers that may be inclined to maintain international order more effective or determined. However, hope is not a prerequisite for action.

### 2.2. Action in the face of armed conflict

Should action be taken to bolster up states at the risk of seeing them sufficiently reinvigorated to contemplate making war on one another?

*Democracy, of course, means the rule of law, recourse to justice, the existence of checks and balances. But is this enough?*

More seriously, what should these powers be doing?

### *2.2.1. Predicting war*

Prediction is based on information. It can only be said that, in this area, international co-operation is more fragile than ever. Co-operation is difficult to organize even within the same country, and it should therefore come as no surprise that international co-operation between state intelligence services, whether military, strategic or political, is even more problematic.

Nevertheless, such intelligence is of fundamental importance for the states acting as guarantors of order. In this respect, European co-operation in the field of military observation of the Earth is a step in the right direction. Provided, however, that the information does not come exclusively from technical sources since, although a satellite image can show a missile ready for firing in a certain direction, it is incapable of revealing whether or not the head of state in question does or does not intend to press the button and, if so, when that will be.

Thus, for the great democracies, prediction depends on a certain input of human input – espionage, in other words. The so-called secret services seem likely to have a rosy future.

### *2.2.2. Preventing war*

The ability to predict war forms the basis of every policy of prevention. When one knows what one has to fear, then it is theoretically possible to act. Only theoretically, since the democracies, like the international community as a whole, are not predisposed to look ahead. Eyes fixed on the opinion polls, constantly preparing for the next elections, their leaders have difficulty anticipating the future, being too heavily preoccupied with the present.

Nevertheless, much preventive action is still being taken, both civil (diplomatic, economic, administrative and financial) and military.

In extreme cases, revolutionary measures may be taken to place states under tutelage, when the international community deems them no longer able to discharge their duties. To prevent the anarchic proliferation of states, should not those peoples, ethnic groups and minorities desirous of setting up their own states, today so numerous, be made to sit some sort of examination?

More traditionally, the measures may be aimed at defusing a potentially dangerous situation, dissuading a firebrand or discouraging aggression.

Preventive action can be short-term, like the advance positioning of American troops in Macedonia in 1993, or longer-term, like the French co-operation initiatives.

It may be a question of lending democracy a helping hand by overseeing the election of heads of state, as France did recently in Chad and in 1993 in the Central African Republic.

Another way of helping a state to achieve stability is to assist with the training of its armed services and police force. States can be helped to function smoothly in every area of government: health, justice, education, infrastructure, etc. All these measures, generally known as co-operation, tend to prevent war. Aimed at strengthening the state and its services, their primary purpose is to prevent conflicts from breaking out.

It should also be noted that the advance positioning of troops, intended in principle to discourage an outside troublemaker from disturbing the international order, can also have the secondary effect of stabilizing a state. At the same time, it should be recognized that this system of advance deployment is no panacea.

Advance deployment sometimes makes it possible to have at one's disposal, in the right place and at the right time, a friendly force capable of facilitating a larger-scale intervention, thanks to its knowledge of the local conditions, as well as restoring calm and stability to the country in which it is stationed. At the same time, however, it has the disadvantage of dispersing the troops available, whereas the military principle of economy of forces requires that they be concentrated, and the danger is that it will give rise to precisely the incident or crisis which it was hoped to avoid (as recently in the Central African Republic or last winter in Okinawa).

However, these preventive measures are clearly not enough, as evidenced by the spectacular French failure in the Central African Republic. The Central African mutiny shows that assistance alone is not the answer; it shows that formal democracy is meaningless without leaders who are concerned for the public good and imbued with a sense of statehood, honesty, and a genuine will to govern and to govern well.

### 2.2.3. *Stopping a war in progress*

It will generally be necessary, therefore, to attempt to stop a war that it was not possible to foresee, still less prevent.

The police know how to break up a fight between two individuals, but the international community is less well-equipped to prevent two sectors of the population from coming to blows.

Very simply, there are three possible and conceivable responses to a civil war.

First, stand back and do nothing. This is the solution typified by the American Civil War. The stronger side is left to get on with it, as in the Sudan, Afghanistan and Liberia. This is not necessarily the worst approach, resembling the situation in economics when market forces are given free play.

Second, place the country in which internal violence has broken out under the protection of a third country. This is the solution being applied in Lebanon, where Syria is imposing an order which is clearly its own. It presupposes the existence of a country willing to provide protection and prepared to accept the risks and disadvantages. It may be a form of dictatorship or recolonization, but it also brings peace. The international community is quite happy with it, the Lebanese perhaps less so.

Finally, intervention by an international force with orders to impose peace. This may take various forms:

- The force may position itself between the belligerents when they are willing to be thus separated. This is the Cyprus solution, the main disadvantage of which is that it postpones the resolution of the conflict by freezing the situation. It is an ineffective form of the Lebanese solution, since it lacks the means of coercion.
- The UNPROFOR solution, a somewhat hypocritical attempt to maintain an even balance between the aggressors and the victims of aggression.
- The Anglo-French-Dutch reaction force, which relies on force or the certainty that it will use force.
- An ad hoc coalition that keeps the belligerents apart until calm is restored and elections can be held; this is exemplified by the NATO force IFOR in the former Yugoslavia, which is hoping that after a year of intervention the causes of the war will have disappeared.

As Ghassan Salamé points out in *Appels d'empire* (Éditions Fayard), the end of the Cold War has brought a change in the nature of intervention: '...during the Cold War, intervention had a dissuasive value, whereas today we are in the era of coercion. Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia testify to this. While the great powers now have more room for initiative and manoeuvre, this is making them more selective in their intervention.'

## Conclusion

Finally, allow me to lay down the limits of the exercise by making two observations:

- The peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations have largely failed. However, it is not the United Nations that is at fault but the states which make up that world organization. In particular, much of the blame for its impotence must lie with the abstention of the Americans, their refusal to commit themselves to United Nations operations.
- States will always find themselves in the position of having to keep the peace while being aware that the peace can probably not be kept everywhere that it is threatened.

Napoleon put this well when he said: 'The way to be strong nowhere is to try to be strong everywhere.' Similarly, democracies will not be able to ensure peace effectively unless they set themselves priorities. This is particularly true of the many middle-ranking powers such as France. Our countries must choose. The sound management of financial and human resources depends upon it, especially as peacekeeping (one might equally well say making war on war) will continue to rely mainly on the use of military means.

What will these priorities be? One can hazard a guess at the probable underlying consideration: defence of the national interest. The United States has shown the way: it intends to intervene only where and to the extent that its own interests are involved. Thus, we may expect a certain partitioning of the world into three levels, varying with each power, which several authors have, in fact, already outlined.

- Level 1: the state proper and the defence of its frontiers.
- Level 2: the priority zones of interest (Eastern Europe for Western Europe, the Gulf for the United States).

- Level 3: the rest of the world, 'the barbarians' as Jean-Christophe Rufin calls them, where a lower level of security is acceptable in so far as there is no risk of insecurity spreading – although this can never be guaranteed.

One thing is certain: peacekeeping does not and will not work without an extremely high level of political commitment. Moreover, it will not work unless the democracies are prepared to pay the price, and to pay it, where necessary, in blood.

## NON-MILITARY FACTORS IN THE MIDDLE-EAST PEACE PROCESS

*by Domenico Siniscalco,  
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Executive Director of the Fondazione Mattei*

Let me start with a disclaimer: I am not an expert in security, nor an expert in conflict, I am simply an economist very much interested in the relationship between the economy and security, the economy and peace, so I will analyse the issue I am discussing today, which is the issue of the relationship between economic integration and peace in the Middle East, primarily from the economic standpoint.

Let me start with the general argument which is stated in the introduction to this conference, to the effect that the world today is faced with a series of crises of varying magnitude which have a devastating effect in the areas where they occur, in terms of welfare of the population involved, but also in terms of negative repercussions on the rest of the world. There is no such thing as a local crisis, no matter how confined it may be. Let me accept fully, as an axiom if you wish, the point of view stated here, that the international community is bound to contain these crises, to defuse them and, most of all, to prevent them through non-military intervention and non-military means. As the title of my talk makes clear, I shall discuss this issue with primary reference to the Mediterranean, but the argument applies to any integrated area. So, as we shall see, it can be applied to any more general situation of the same kind.

The Mediterranean is a partially enclosed region with very strong links between the different countries. The key players in this area are, travelling in a clockwise direction, the European Union countries, the former Yugoslav countries, Turkey, Israel and the Middle East and North African countries. It is a densely populated area. It contains 360 million people today, mostly concentrated in urban areas, basically divided into two halves. Half of

the population lives in the Northern countries, and half in the Southern countries. By the year 2025, the population will have increased substantially; the estimates range from 520 million to 570 million people, primarily depending on the demographic movement of Turkey, which is highly uncertain. Indeed, this is the principal unknown factor. It is important to note that urbanization will be much greater than at present, and the population distribution between the two subregions – North and South – will change dramatically. The population of the North will remain more or less constant, while that of the South will increase dramatically.

I was prepared to stress the importance of population growth, but the opening statement by the Director-General, Mr Federico Mayor, showed very clearly why population increase has powerful repercussions on the economy, why it can create poverty, even severe hardship in some areas, and why it can lead to mass migrations.

Mass migrations, as you know, are very important destabilizing factors in Mediterranean countries. If these countries tend to experience social crises, it is because they must cope with population movements of the order of 2 million to 3 million. I refer here, however, to potentially much larger migrations, which, I repeat, could seriously jeopardize local economies. The same may be said of urbanization, which was discussed recently at the Habitat II Conference in Istanbul. Urbanization means much greater pressure on environmental resources. A person with similar per capita income uses three times as much energy and three times as much infrastructure in an urban area as in a rural area. People in cities, in megalopolises, pose problems that are completely different to those of people in rural areas.

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Accordingly, they can create a degree of social unrest which is of concern over a much wider area.

Interdependence in the Mediterranean area flows through many channels which are already substantial but which, as we shall see, could develop a great deal in the near future. The first source of interdependence – and when I say interdependence I do not mean only North-South, but also South-South – consists of agricultural goods, manufactured goods, construction, public works and energy. Energy flows primarily from South to North for the moment, but could become a South-South flow as soon as the population grows and urbanization starts developing, for the simple reason that I have just mentioned: the population in urban areas of the South is going to double. Since people in urban areas consume much more energy, there will be a growing need for a network of energy distribution – whether electricity or primary sources of energy such as natural gas – within the subregion. But it is in the service sector that interdependence is most marked. I am referring to tourism and the media, because people speak a similar, if not the same, language from Morocco to Iraq, which in a sense opens up the possibility of exchanging information and services of all kinds in this area, even if such exchanges are not yet particularly developed.

Moreover, the countries of this region are very interdependent regarding capital and the movement of capital. At the moment, these movements are, to say the least, ill-directed. It was quite a surprise to me when I started working in this field to discover that the largest capital flow in the Mediterranean area was from South to North, in the sense that people from the Southern countries place their money in Northern banks. This is not exactly what one would expect, given the pattern of income distribution in the area. By capital flow, I mean investment. There is already a substantial stream of investment in various forms within joint ventures linking the countries of the region. I should also mention labour, by which I mean immigrant labour. This is a very considerable flow, in both the South-North and South-South directions, not to mention the North-North exchange. For example, there are movements in the Mediterranean region towards France and Italy.

Nor should we overlook the environment. We do not usually think of the environment as being a place for interaction, and yet it is – on

a grand scale. All the countries in all the regions of the Mediterranean share a common environment, which is very important both for tourism and for the development of the area as a whole. This environment is highly interdependent, as is made clear in the Plan Bleu, sponsored by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). For example, Northern polluting emissions could severely affect countries on the Southern shores. We must therefore pay very careful attention to the environment. Lastly, the Mediterranean countries share approximately the same culture and the same set of values, even if religions differ, in other words there are more similarities than differences in the region. This, I believe, is an important asset on which we should try to build.

In this region, already irrigated by these flows, which are probably insufficiently developed, our aim is to develop peace. It is not difficult to argue that peace is good for prosperity, although we economists require lengthy explanations. Economic growth cements peace. Stability is a broader concept than peace, because it also involves the internal stability of each country. So stability is, in a sense, a larger and more pervasive concept than peace itself.

For the economists involved in this debate, and for some of the consequent diplomatic activity, one of the most important instruments through which we should foster stability in the region, which means peace between countries and the internal stability of each of them, is economic growth. We feel that we cannot live in this area unless something is done to at least promote growth in all areas, or somehow to increase prosperity. Even more than growth, we believe that peace – and stability – will be enhanced, promoted and sustained through greater interconnection and greater interdependence between countries than that already existing through the channels I have described. So diplomatic efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East, and more generally to achieve stability in this area (which means stabilizing migration, and promoting growth and well-being) must strive to develop the economy but also to promote greater interdependence between the different subregions and territories. This is, for example, the doctrine of the so-called peace dividend developed in the last few years by the United States Administration, its Department of State, Shimon Peres, the King of Morocco and other influential people in the region. The idea is that if we increase prosperity and if we reinforce interconnection and



interdependence between countries, their inhabitants will immediately recognize – or more easily recognize – the advantages of peace, the peace dividend, and will accept peace much more readily than now.

Why is this so? The underlying idea is that interconnection and interdependence between countries in different dimensions – the circulation of goods, services, capital, labour, information, culture, whatever – are in a sense the best possible reply to any unilateral action, and increase the scope for co-operation. Neither I nor any economist, I believe, would go so far as to claim that economic interdependence is a sufficient condition for peace. I wholly agree with the previous speaker, who recalled the debate on Franco-German relations between the wars, in which some French thinkers claimed that Germany's debt was enough to stop the outbreak of war. History proved the opposite, because Germany had a strong interest in cancelling its debt through war. Moreover, no one is so naïve as to believe that greater interdependence is enough to prevent war. But certainly it affects and changes substantially the balance between cost and benefit. Whatever the benefit to be gained from instability – attacking a neighbour, internal destabilization, or whatever – if one increases interdependence, one simultaneously increases the cost of such action. So the rationale of the 'best response' changes greatly and war or instability become more costly. Of course, we shall also witness spells of instability and spells of war if the benefit nevertheless outweighs the cost. But by increasing the cost, the risks of instability and the whole pattern of warfare and negative interactions in the region will be scaled down to a more acceptable level.

This is conventional wisdom. The problem is how to improve interconnection and interdependence in the region: it is one thing to set the objectives and another to implement them. For example, I had the opportunity to follow the economic summits relating to the problem of peace, held in Casablanca and Amman, where this doctrine of the peace dividend was recommended by various countries, and I must admit that the results justified a rather pessimistic outlook. It is not sufficient to say that close links foster peace: the links still have to be consolidated.

In this area there are two main approaches. One is the grand diplomatic approach that says 'Let's sit around a table, open all the files,

examine all the possible courses of mutual co-operation, and see what we can achieve together on all these points'. This is the Casablanca and Amman approach through international diplomacy, this is the approach of Warren Christopher and Shimon Peres, and in my opinion it is slightly utopian. For business people must still be persuaded to go there, open up their wallets and put their money on the table, always a rather complex process. Be this as it may, if this approach is followed, the first step must be the creation of a common market for goods and services, a regional bank to finance investments, and an agency to promote the environment, labour, information and so on.

In times of high uncertainty, like the present, in times when we all need to be aware of the risks involved, there is another route which is not an alternative to the former but which is very much complementary to it. It entails starting with very small measures, building up co-operation in limited areas and then, step by step, increasing the scope for co-operation to other areas, expanding its dimensions and involving a growing number of countries. Take areas that do not require particularly high investment, such as the environment, civil defence, or the cultural heritage. It is altogether possible to set up co-operation in these areas between Northern and Southern countries, and among Southern countries themselves, and to mobilize resources in a different way than in the past. This would not require billions of dollars or agreements between heads of state. If we begin in this way (which, incidentally, would have positive effects on tourism – I am thinking of the environment, infrastructure, and so on) we can build up, step by step, a substantial coalition of interests in order thereafter to deal with more serious problems. This, in my opinion, is an opportunity to be seized immediately. We already have a good example in the shape of the build-up of the European Union. As you may recall, the European Union started from a community of coal and steel, then expanded gradually to other dimensions, became a common market, and so forth. Today it has become a still wider community and may even lead to political agreement in several areas. Advancing step by step is clearly less satisfactory than reaching a wide-ranging agreement at the negotiating table, but it is also safer, and in my opinion it is the road that we should endeavour to take.

*The problem is how to improve interconnection and interdependence in the region: it is one thing to set the objectives and another to implement them.*

*It is not sufficient to say that close links foster peace: the links still have to be consolidated.*

# IFOR: FROM THE IMPOSITION TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE

*by Patrice Van Ackere,  
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of NATO's Defence Planning and Policy Division*

Since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declared itself, in December 1992, ready to support peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority of the United Nations Security Council, it has been increasingly involved in the international community's efforts to find peace in the former Yugoslavia.

NATO's involvement began by monitoring enforcement of the embargo in the Adriatic, and control, then implementation, of the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The former operation was soon transformed into enforcement of the embargo, which was initially conducted separately by NATO and the WEU and then run jointly by the two organizations.

Greater involvement came in 1993 with the launching of air operations designed to guarantee the security of United Nations forces in Bosnia (by close air support) and the safe areas (by air strikes). This action culminated in summer 1995 with operation Deliberate Force, conducted after the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, which was successful in so far as it made it possible to end the siege of Sarajevo and favoured the opening of the negotiations that resulted in the peace agreement.

The military aspects of the agreement are being implemented in the framework of an operation led by NATO (Joint Endeavour). Six months after it was launched, some suggestions may be made as to the reasons for its success, as well as the future implications for Bosnia and Herzegovina and peacekeeping operations generally.

## **1. An imposed peace in the process of consolidation**

At the mid-point of its mandate, the mission of NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) may be

regarded as a success. The parties are respecting the ceasefire and the zone of separation, which has been implemented without major clashes. They have also essentially respected the various deadlines, and the violations of commitments that have occurred are generally less a reflection of lack of political will than the persistence of technical problems.

Analysis of the reasons for this success shows that IFOR has several major advantages: a structure appropriate to the mission, a flexible decision-making process, resources adequate to the objectives, strong legitimacy, close co-operation with other organizations and simultaneous complementary actions.

### **1.1. A structure appropriate to the mission**

IFOR has advantages that the United Nations protection force previously deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina lacked. It enjoys an integrated military structure – that of NATO – which after forty years' experience began to be suitably adapted in 1991 (notably with the creation of a rapid reaction force). This structure was able to deploy with remarkable speed, thanks in particular to the availability of a staff ready for action (the staff of ARRC, the Alliance's Rapid Reaction Corps). IFOR has also had the advantage of a particularly well-tried command, control and communications structure. Furthermore, its forces are used to working together and exploit to the full their high degree of interoperability.

It must be emphasized here that during the operations against Iraq in 1991, the French forces had the opportunity to take stock of how they were lagging behind in interoperability with the forces of the NATO countries,

and to take the necessary measures. This process is not yet complete but is beginning to bear fruit, as can be seen in Bosnia on a daily basis.

It is also important to emphasize that a sixth of the military forces committed to IFOR do not belong to NATO and that half of these non-NATO forces are provided by former Warsaw Pact countries. Co-operation with the forces of the Alliance has not presented any insurmountable problems and is progressing particularly well. The great political will to co-operate with NATO is an important factor here, particularly as in the case of some states it is motivated by a desire to show themselves equal to a defence organization they are keen to join. The fact that such co-operation can exist on the ground is also to a great extent due to the development of practical programmes in the framework of the Partnership for Peace.

### **1.2. A decision-making process appropriate to this type of operation**

The North Atlantic Council is the mainspring of NATO's decision-making process. It is characterized by flexibility of operation, which guarantees the system's efficiency. The Council defined the basic concept and asked NATO's military authorities to develop the detailed plan following from it, and then approved its essential elements. The plan was, of course, submitted to the countries supplying troops. The Member States of NATO have long been involved in planning, begun in 1993, for the possible implementation of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, as well as subsequent plans.

The Council delegated implementation of its decisions to Supreme Allied Command, Europe (SACEUR). In return, the latter reports to the Council all the important measures it orders and requests fresh instructions whenever a military decision likely to have political repercussions has to be taken. SACEUR sees that the Council is informed of every significant military act or incident and regularly reports to Council meetings. NATO's highest decision-making body thus avoids interfering in the everyday management of military operations.

In its turn, SACEUR has delegated implementation of its decisions to the commander of the theatre of operations. NATO's establishment of a single chain of command, a major advantage for IFOR that was lacking in the system

in place in Bosnia before the arrival of this force, must be assessed in this context. It allows decisions to be taken speedily and immediately implemented. It also makes it possible to carry out any decision to use force when one of the warring parties violates its commitments or important provisions of international law.

The integrated structure of the Alliance has been able to incorporate new participants very quickly. Preparation of the operation provided the opportunity for associating countries that were going to provide troops in the framework of an ad hoc planning group.

As far as the decision-making process is concerned, the openness of the integrated structure, which includes representation at the main stages of decision-making, at the Headquarters in Brussels and Headquarters (SHAPE) in Mons, must be emphasized. All these structures and procedures have been tested over a long period and this has allowed different countries, which do not necessarily have the same rules of internal procedure, to conduct a common operation. It is also important to state that the decision-making process is based on respect for state sovereignty, both concerning decision-making (by consensus) and execution (some rules of engagement approved by the North Atlantic Council may not be authorized by national authorities for their own forces).

The operations under way in Bosnia are the source of a completely new relationship with Russia, which goes beyond the arrangements made in the framework of the Partnership for Peace. NATO is now able to associate Russia with its decisions concerning IFOR, taking account of its special status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and the Contact Group. As far as command of Russian troops is concerned, an arrangement was negotiated with the political authorities in Russia to take them out of direct NATO control, in accordance with their government's wish.

### **1.3. Means appropriate to the mission**

IFOR's strength is an essential factor of its success. The force is composed of some thirty brigades, most of which are equipped with armoured vehicles, totalling 55,000 personnel, with considerable fire power. This force is

supported by some 130 planes (200 at the beginning of the operation) and backed up by a naval force of half-a-dozen warships, which could, if necessary, be considerably reinforced. IFOR also enjoys rules of engagement that are particularly protective of its security and the accomplishment of its mission. It also has the great advantage of a strong political will to use force whenever necessary. These were the factors that the United Nations troops deployed in Bosnia lacked, at least during the first part of their mission.

To this must be added the fact that some of the troops were already on the spot (as part of the United Nations forces) before IFOR arrived, and therefore had a good knowledge of the area.

#### 1.4. Strong legitimacy

Operation Joint Endeavour draws its legitimacy from a United Nations Security Council resolution (which called on NATO without naming it, Resolution 1031), a decision taken by the sixteen Member States of the Atlantic Alliance and the acceptance of its presence by all parties (who in the peace agreement indicated in advance their acceptance of the use of force to ensure the implementation of military aspects, if necessary).<sup>1</sup> Added to this is the considerable representativeness of IFOR, which includes forces from thirty-two countries, including four of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

The support of neighbouring countries (Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) testifies to their acceptance of the operation.

The fact that IFOR has a clear mandate accepted by all parties increases its legitimacy. The mandate is to maintain the cessation of hostilities, establish a zone of separation, control mine-clearing and, secondarily, to create a safe environment to favour the missions of other organizations involved in implementing the peace agreement.

The operation is taking place in the framework of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which is a guarantee of effectiveness and security. However, the operation can only be a complete success if it is accepted by all parties. This means that the use of force must be handled in a balanced manner, that is, in a manner resolute enough to ensure the protection of the troops and the accomplishment of the mission, but taking care that IFOR is always perceived as impartial and contact with all parties is maintained in all circumstances.

#### 1.5. Close co-operation with other organizations

The operations conducted in Bosnia have provided the opportunity of developing very close links with the United Nations, the WEU and, more recently, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In addition, since the beginning of the operations NATO Member States have been kept informed of all the decisions and actions of these organizations as regards political and military actions in the former Yugoslavia. The same is true of the actions of the European Union and the Contact Group.

The military aspects of the peace plan are the most visible, but the civilian aspects are also extremely important for the country's future. Even though a High Representative has been appointed to co-ordinate civilian actions, these are still carried out by a large number of organizations of many different kinds, all jealous of their autonomy.

This is why the many links between IFOR and these bodies are essential. It is a matter of providing co-ordination and logistic support in addition to IFOR's principal mission. As well as establishing and maintaining a safe environment (from which all civilian organizations benefit), IFOR provides the High Representative with significant transport, logistics, security, communications and planning back-up. IFOR assists the United Nations international police force by reinforcing its patrols in Mostar and Sarajevo and above all by making rapid reaction forces available in case of emergency. IFOR also co-operates with the International War Crimes Tribunal by delivering to it any suspected war criminals that it may have apprehended, guaranteeing the security of teams of inspectors and guarding the mass graves the Court wishes to have examined by experts.

It will be recalled that NATO is represented at all major international conferences called to deal with problems relating to Bosnia and that the North Atlantic Council

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1. The artifice by which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia represented the Bosnian Serbs in the negotiation and signing of the peace agreement (and therefore made commitments on their behalf) does not alter this statement.

regularly receives those responsible for implementing non-military aspects of the peace agreement.

### **1.6. Simultaneous complementary actions**

The operations carried out to implement the Bosnian peace agreement are strengthened by actions that are independent of it but help increase its effectiveness.

- The disarmament agreement about to be signed under the auspices of the OSCE, in application of Annex 1B of the peace agreement, will contribute to disarmament in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Croatia and Bosnia, and will therefore have a stabilizing effect for the last of these. The same is true of the confidence and security measures which have already been the subject of an agreement.
- The demilitarization of Eastern Slavonia, on the point of completion, should have a very positive effect on Bosnia by eliminating a source of tension that might have sparked renewed conflict.
- The continuing presence of United Nations prevention forces in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is helping to stabilize this state, with beneficial effects on neighbouring states.
- The ability of the High Representative and NATO to trigger the reimposition of the embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serbs (if they seriously breach the obligations they accepted as part of the peace agreement) gives them a useful way of applying pressure to secure the fulfilment of those obligations.

## **2. Future challenges and lessons**

IFOR has been able to enforce the peace agreement, but its mission obviously goes further than that: by laying the foundations of reconciliation, restoring stability and freedom of movement, by the trust being restored through the dialogue necessary for implementing the peace plan, IFOR is actually consolidating peace. IFOR's experience will provide many lessons for the debate on peacekeeping operations (in the broad sense) and the European security structure.

### **2.1. A unitary Bosnia?**

The viability of Bosnia and Herzegovina will depend on the international community's ability to lay the foundations for the country's economic reconstruction, the result of the September 1996 elections (which should make it possible to ensure the existence of a true state), and the decisions taken for the post-IFOR period.

The international community has committed more than \$1.8 billion to economic reconstruction. However, the problem that arises now is perhaps less the inadequacy of available funds than the limited capacity of absorption of Bosnia's economic structures.

IFOR reacted speedily to a number of urgent needs: it undertook the reconstruction of seventy bridges, mainly on the borders (thus opening up the country) and, more generally, became involved in almost 300 reconstruction projects (roads, schools, infrastructure).

The prospects for the September elections, held under the auspices of the OSCE, are not promising. The nationalist parties seem to have great control over the media and possess financial resources that the other parties were not able to accumulate during the war; they also seem to be favoured by electoral rules. To this must be added an economic crisis (an unemployment rate greatly above 50 per cent) that they have learned to exploit. Furthermore, the 'Republic of Serbia' has ceased to be a multi-ethnic society as a result of the effects of ethnic cleansing.

The difficulty faced by the International War Crimes Tribunal in bringing those charged with war crimes to trial, and the continuing determination of some of them to maintain political influence, does not favour the holding of genuinely free elections.<sup>1</sup>

IFOR is redoubling its efforts to ensure freedom of movement in Bosnian territory (one of the requirements if the elections are to be considered free and fair) and is preparing to provide the OSCE with considerable material support in holding the elections. The nationalist elements, however, reject multi-ethnicity and may try to do all they can to disrupt the process (restricting freedom of movement, demonstrations, disturbances, pressures designed to encourage moderates to resign or preventing multi-ethnic parties from campaigning, etc.).

1. IFOR has no mandate to arrest persons charged with war crimes; its mission is simply to apprehend them if it comes into contact with them.

More generally, there is still much uncertainty about the future. The peace agreement includes a number of provisions aimed at disarming the armies of the former warring parties and creating a climate of trust. The fact remains that two armies will coexist in one state and there is no historical precedent for this. The problems the members of the Muslim-Croat Federation are encountering in creating a unitary federal army should also be remembered.

The North Atlantic Council has as yet made no decisions or plans for the post-IFOR period. Indeed, the Allies are determined not to give any signal that might be misinterpreted by the parties. In Berlin on 3 June 1996 they announced their decision to maintain the present level of forces until the September elections and to keep their overall capability until the end of IFOR's mandate in December. The need for continued military presence is increasingly making itself felt, however, and has been expressed by several countries and some authorities in Bosnia (the Bosnian Serbs of Banja Luka, for example). No discussions will begin before the ministerial meeting to be held in Norway in September.

Apart from action by the international community, which will probably be decisive, only a will to live together on the part of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina will allow the emergence of a unitary country. Such a will seems to be lacking, especially among the majority of Bosnian Serbs. It is of course too soon to know whether the desire to live together might develop under the weight of practical economic realities or pressure from the international community.

## **2.2. Valuable lessons for the future of peacekeeping operations**

Two sets of lessons can be drawn from the implementation of the peace agreement in Bosnia and, before that, peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia.

### **2.2.1. Initial lessons of the implementation of a peace agreement**

The more detailed a peace agreement, the more likely it is to be successfully implemented. The agreement initialled in Dayton and signed in Paris is particularly detailed. It is not detailed enough, however. Thus, for example, the principle of freedom of movement is proclaimed,

but there is no indication as to how it is to be applied. This has allowed some troops to oppose the movement of citizens other than on foot, thus rendering almost meaningless the obligation to allow free movement. Similarly, while the evacuation of certain areas was provided for, notably in the context of exchanges of territory, it was not specified that the territories and buildings concerned were to be transferred in a viable state. Other examples could be cited of application of the letter but not the spirit of the agreement. They are often minor incidents, but restoring peace implies a return to normal life, including the day-to-day details.

The implementation of a peace agreement does not only create problems of political will: there is also the question of practical means. Often, for example, the obligation to withdraw military equipment cannot be fulfilled because of a lack of transport or fuel. Similarly, duties to do or not to do imposed on troops imply that means of communication must be sufficient for orders to be transmitted with the speed necessary for their implementation. In some cases, lack of experience acts as a brake on the application of obligations agreed to and carried out in good faith. The former warring parties in Bosnia undertook to demobilize their forces in particular conditions and within a certain time, but they have no experience of such operations, the complexity and cumbersome logistics of which are beyond their capabilities.

It is essential to include in the basic agreement the mission of the peace force that will be deployed to apply it. The same is true of the constraining actions the force may conduct, which must be accepted in advance by all parties to the conflict.

Planning all the aspects of the implementation of a peace agreement could be useful. While military aspects were the subject of long, detailed planning, the civilian aspects could not be treated in this way, if only because of the lack of a single organization to do so.

### **2.2.2. General lessons for peacekeeping operations**

Preventive action is the best option when it is still possible (the example of Macedonia).

Systematic efforts should be made to divide the work between international organizations according to their 'comparative advantages'.

It is important for the mandatory body to set political objectives so that military commanders can be given clear, precise instructions.

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Political unity and will are irreplaceable.

Involvement in the political and military decision-making process by all countries providing troops favours such political unity.

Military power and the political will to authorize its use are essential.

Unity of command of a peacekeeping operation is a guarantee of its effectiveness.

The military authorities must be guaranteed maximum operational flexibility in the framework of clear political instructions.

Troops must be available in sufficient numbers, be adequately trained and enjoy the required protection and the necessary logistics and means of communication.

Military-civilian co-ordination is essential for the successful implementation of a complex peace plan, especially when military and humanitarian operations are closely interwoven.

One of the keys to the success of a peacekeeping operation is an active policy of information concerning the population and their politicians (including, and above all, the use of force).

Special attention must be paid to the end of a mission. Disarmament, which should normally be completed before the end of the mission, will be accepted by the rival factions only if in compensation there is an effective system of protection and a properly working political system, which presupposes a process of reconciliation. Preparing combatants to return to normal life requires a great deal of external aid.

## **Conclusion**

To conclude, the operations conducted in Bosnia naturally open the way to reflection about the European security structure. The involvement of the United States and Russia in any large-scale operation in Europe is necessary in the present state of affairs. There will, of course, be occasions when these countries will not want, or be able, to intervene. Their political support might, however, prove necessary in the framework of the United Nations or the OSCE, which implies close political co-operation. Logistically, United States (and, in some cases, Russian) backing could prove very useful, at least as long as the European countries lack the means for strategic autonomy. The same conclusion must be drawn concerning information. It must be emphasized here that the decision the Allies took in Berlin on 3 June 1996 to implement the Combined Joint Task Force Groups (which were the subject of negotiations for more than two years) should allow the European states to conduct operations within the framework of the WEU with the resources of NATO. However, it should be remembered that unity of action implies that one country must be able to direct operations, or at least have a strong influence. Such leadership should not necessarily be provided by the same country in every operation, nor even by a single country. Leadership may also come from two or three states, provided, of course, that their mutual understanding is unwavering.

# A CULTURE OF PEACE

*by Leslie Atherley,  
Director, UNESCO Culture of Peace Programme*

## 1. Introduction

I also should like to extend a welcome and good wishes to the participants in this symposium. Today, I am going to speak briefly about the culture of peace, the challenges it faces, and the need for it to include the military as powerful and committed partners in the quest for peace and security. I shall begin with a short description of our programme, of what we see as some of the key issues concerning the conceptual framework of a culture of peace and of the tasks to be performed, in conjunction with our partners.

### 1.1. What is a culture of peace?

A culture of peace can be seen as a meaningful way of reinforcing the necessary relationship between peace, development, justice and democratic practices and of ensuring that as broad a constituency as possible will reap the benefits.

Promoting a culture of peace implies a global movement, one that relies on actors and supporters at all levels. It involves action focused on the prevention of conflict as well as on peace-building after conflict. While action on the ground may vary from region to region, the important thing is that it should be based on a common desire to make peace, democracy and justice part of the daily lives and experience of everyone, all over the world.

### 1.2. Creating a culture of peace: UNESCO's vision

The Culture of Peace Programme (CPP) is a relatively recent initiative, created in 1994 as an organizational response to the United Nations

Secretary-General's *Agenda for Peace*, and to the call by UNESCO's Executive Board for coordinated action to promote, reinforce and create conditions for peace, security and sustainable development in societies which are emerging from violent conflict or which are at risk of plunging into it.

This programme is based on the principles of inclusion, participation and the need to promote and reinforce peace-building and development, as well as consensus-building and dialogue. We believe, to quote Ms Sadako Ogato, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the winner of UNESCO's 1995 Félix Houphouët-Boigny Peace Prize, that: 'Reconciliation and peace cannot be imposed from outside ... justice for the victims and dialogue between those of good will and full respect for the human rights of all should break the spiral of impunity, violence and displacement and lay the foundation for lasting peace and development' (address to the Bujumbura Conference, February 1995).

In keeping with these principles, this programme works to transform violence and post-conflict instability into a more positive atmosphere conducive to peace and development thanks to:

- the planning and execution of national culture of peace programmes. National culture of peace programmes incorporate specific projects which fall within UNESCO's fields of competence and which have a peace-building component. These projects can, for example, provide human rights training for journalists or technical assistance in devising peace education curricula. We have already implemented national culture of peace programmes in El Salvador, Mozambique and Burundi, in association

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with United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building efforts. In addition, UNESCO has provided support to the Philippines for their national culture of peace programme. Initiatives are also under way in a number of other countries, including the Congo, Haiti, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Somalia and the Sudan, which may subsequently develop into national culture of peace programmes;

- the development of a networking and information system. Our networking and information system is a project with global significance. It links the many NGOs, IGOs, government agencies, community groups and individuals promoting a culture of peace throughout the world. The CPP has started setting up an information and networking system that will keep in contact with these various initiatives and promote their goals. Through these links, it seeks to maximize UNESCO's network of partners and supporters, co-ordinate the gathering and sharing of essential information and involve political decision-makers in the peace-building process;
- the co-ordination of peace-building activities within UNESCO and the United Nations system. The importance of interagency co-operation in the United Nations for a culture of peace is gaining increasing recognition. Co-operative projects are being developed with other international organizations, including regional organizations and other United Nations agencies and programmes. In northern Mozambique, for example, UNESCO is working with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to reintegrate returning refugees through the rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic infrastructures. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) are also working closely with us in Burundi on a number of projects. Besides enhanced co-operation in national culture of peace programmes, consideration should also be given to co-operative training, research and conflict-resolution projects that contribute to peace on a subregional or regional basis.

The culture of peace initiative within UNESCO covers a wide range of actions drawing on all of UNESCO's competence in education, science, culture and communication. Since 1996 this programme has expanded into a

transdisciplinary project, in order to maximize the benefit of each sector's special knowledge and skills.

We thus have an integrated approach to peace-building and development projects. This includes projects developed with local, regional or international partners. Some focus on thematic issues, like our upcoming project on violence in urban schools, in association with the Associated Schools Project (ASP), or a project on the retraining of demobilized soldiers.

UNESCO's culture of peace activities have allowed us to facilitate or participate in a variety of programmes. As mentioned, we have been working with demobilized soldiers in Mozambique, El Salvador and Nicaragua in order to ease their reinsertion into their respective communities. We have also worked with parliamentarians in Rwanda, Burundi and El Salvador to explore ways of supporting the development and consolidation of democratic processes and to provide, where necessary, human rights training. In April 1995 we launched a community radio project in El Salvador for disadvantaged Salvadorian women with basic education and information needs. Our activities with the military, both those already carried out and those planned, are fully reflected in the documentation for the meeting. We organized these activities at the request of the parties concerned.

We are frequently asked to participate in or offer support to a number of initiatives that have developed outside UNESCO. The Office of the Peace Process in the Philippines, as mentioned briefly earlier, asked us to provide technical and financial support for its national culture of peace programme, and co-hosted our Second International Forum on the Culture of Peace in Manila in November 1995. We were also asked to act as observer at a municipal consultation to eliminate all forms of violence by the Aguachica municipal authorities in Colombia.

I may have given the impression that we focus more on peace-building after conflict, but the prevention of conflict – the major focus of the work of the sectors – is an integral part of UNESCO's effort to promote a culture of peace.

## **2. Cyclical nature of conflict**

I should like to point out that even within a culture of peace there will always be conflict.

Conflict is an integral part of human relations; it does not, however, have to be violent. The idea of a culture of peace is steadily to move the conflict cycle away from violence and harness its more positive aspects in such a way as to benefit rather than harm society. This is a long-term goal from which immediate benefits are not to be expected. The cessation of war is just the first step in a longer process towards the restoration of peace and development in a community. We must remember this and not allow ourselves to become discouraged.

Peace treaties and political settlements are not ends in themselves, but the beginning of a process. For this reason, peacekeeping operations increasingly involve pre-conflict preventive and post-conflict peace-building elements, one at the beginning and the other at the end of a conflict phase. Peace-building components also need to be included in treaties and settlements so that provision is made for this type of action within the framework of the reconciliation process, and to reduce and eliminate major sources of conflict and instability which might re-emerge.

### **2.1. Original conception of peace-building**

The traditional definition of peace-building is 'post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict'. The difficulty with this approach to peace-building is that if we continue to think of it as coming after a conflict we miss the opportunity of recognizing its value throughout a process of violent conflict.

### **2.2. Radical reformulation of peace-building**

We feel that as peace-building practitioners we should radically review the way we perceive peace-building, especially when it should be used. The CPP challenges the idea that peace-building can only take place after peacekeeping. It should come into operation immediately after the cessation of violent conflict, as well as before and – where conflict could not be avoided – during the conflict. We believe that it is important to understand peace-building as running parallel to all preventive activities on the conflict-to-development continuum. Hence, anyone involved in peacekeeping has to be

conscious of and prepared to work for peace-building.

It is also clearer now that there are no set entry points along the continuum which relief, development and humanitarian agencies should select; these processes are simultaneous and overlapping. In other words, programmes like ours must work hand in hand with relief and development agencies and with governments in action to prevent or mitigate the effects of violent conflict. We cannot wait for them to 'finish' before we begin the healing and reconciliation process.

The aim of peace-building is to establish infrastructures and institutions capable of addressing long-term sociopolitical issues and preventing a relapse into conflict, but given that this is a cyclical process, peace-building can sometimes be put in place before violence erupts.

## **3. Broader scope of peace and security issues**

We need to adopt a broader, more inclusive view of security in our approach to the issues of long-term development and security. Peace is not static. It is a dynamic and fluid process that requires nurturing and support. At the heart of the United Nations system it has long been acknowledged that peace is not simply the absence of war, and that threats to international peace and security should be interpreted more broadly than before, by including among them, for example, the economic or political instability of a particular region or country, or the effects of a natural disaster.

In these cases, peacekeeping, in conjunction with political and humanitarian efforts, can help create the preconditions for a culture of peace, but it cannot provide short- or long-term solutions to the conflict. Why? One of the reasons is because peace and security require sustainable economic and social development since, to cite Olara Otunnu, President of the International Peace Academy in New York, 'Investing in social and economic development is one of the surest ways to build a solid foundation for long-term peace in a society as well as between societies'.

Political insecurity clearly arises, in part, from exclusion and disenfranchisement. The military and former freedom-fighters, together with other key sectors of society such as women, religious leaders and elders, must

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*Can the military as they now exist contribute to a culture of peace? Or do they need to change in order to respond to their new role?*

therefore be incorporated into the reconstruction process to ensure that the political and social climate of a country recovering from violence remains stable.

#### **4. Challenges for the military – a new type of confrontation**

The challenges for the military in the context of promoting a culture of peace are manifold. At home or abroad, the military are faced with new types of victims: women and children rather than soldiers. The game has changed, but the rules – at least for intervention and peace enforcement – have not changed accordingly. This is traumatic for all involved, including the military, who have the difficult task of protecting civilians, who often do not trust them, against a background of chaos and anarchy.

This changing environment of war (non-military battlefields, civilian casualties, etc.) and the need for the military themselves to adapt, causes acute tension during peacekeeping operations involving the military because they are often not seen as part of the solution. In fact, military peacekeepers generally see themselves as active participants in peace enforcement and war-prevention activities, but not in long-term peace-building activities.

The perception and self-perception of the military and freedom-fighters or paramilitary groups often act as an obstacle to their active absorption into the process of reconciliation and reconstruction.

On the cessation of conflict, there is a contradictory drive to maintain discipline and a rigid structure, the backbone of military order, in a climate of dialogue and consensus-building. This problem is primarily that of the senior military command, who are generally not brought into the consultation process and who are thus unable on their own to find ways of adapting the services they offer to the new needs of society.

#### **5. What is the proper response to these new security needs?**

The early recognition of signs of trouble and action taken to remedy it, the management of humanitarian and development aid and the protection of human rights are among the preventive measures needed today to establish and maintain international peace, security and

stability. But co-ordinating such an effort is a mammoth task. It requires collaboration between military and civilian partners who know how to deal with complex processes such as civil strife, humanitarian assistance and election monitoring.

First, some changes in training may be necessary. In particular, some peace-building elements should be part of peacekeeping and military training. There is certainly a need for the military to have some practical knowledge of these and other techniques such as mediation and facilitation when they are in conflict situations. The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center and INCORE, a joint United Nations University and University of Ulster 'Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity', in collaboration with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, have already made much headway in this field.

#### **Conclusion**

Finally, I would like to ask two questions of all present: can the military as they now exist contribute to a culture of peace? Or do they need to change in order to respond to their new role? I would say yes to both. To enlarge on what might seem a simplistic answer to the first question, the military as they now exist have an important role to play today, both nationally and internationally. The security problems we are facing require the support of professional military forces operating responsibly within their own borders, or, with the authorization of intergovernmental bodies, operating as part of a multifaceted peacekeeping effort.

The tactical expertise that the military have to offer is invaluable and can form a basis upon which to create valid military strategies to contain and reduce internal armed conflict caused by political upheaval. This can only come about if the military can rise above political intrigue and refuse to be manipulated by those with counterproductive agendas. Equally, they should not fall into the trap of thinking that they alone can restore peace and order.

As for the second question – do the military need to change or adapt to their newly emerging role – I think it is obvious that they will need to do this. In the future, as in the present, the military have a vital role to play. This time, their role lies in preparing the ground for successful and sustainable peaceful political

processes, and for the rapid resolution of violent conflict if it occurs. The military are integral to the process of reconstruction and to the restoration of order after a protracted conflict. They must never lose sight of their potential and must work to revitalize and reorient their role so that they are as effective and as necessary in practice as we know they can be.

The aim of the culture of peace which UNESCO has in mind is to incorporate the best thought and practice of all sectors of the international community and to use this wealth of knowledge and power to create a world in which peace and security prevail. All present today are urged to take part in this revolution, in this joint action for a safer, less violent world.

## II. SECOND ROUND TABLE

### *The social and cultural roots of insecurity*

*Chairperson: Lieutenant-General Carlo Jean,  
Director of the Centro di Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD)*

Now that the major powers are aware of the need to ensure that peace prevails at international level and have equipped themselves to put pressure on trouble-making states, external pressure is much less often the prime cause of insecurity than it has been in the past.

However, the economic and social situation over whole regions of the globe is a continual source of misery and despair that repeatedly creates insecurity. These dangerous conditions are aggravated when combined with cultural attitudes that encourage violence rather than a peaceful and constructive approach, and this combination can easily become explosive. Efforts to create a climate of security, which is the prerequisite for any development, cannot ignore the need to remedy these underlying circumstances in which the evils we have to combat are rooted.

## DEFENCE AND SECURITY: FACTORS IN DEVELOPMENT

*by Jean-Christophe Rufin,  
Deputy Director of the Institut de Relations  
Internationales et Stratégiques,  
former Vice-President of Médecins sans Frontières*

I should first like to take a look at the relations between security and development and between defence and development from a chronological standpoint. The theme of development is a recent one, which emerged on the international scene at the time when many countries gained their independence, and in particular on the occasion of the Bandung Conference in 1955. At that time, the theme was not closely linked with the problem of security: development was normally expected to stem from independence. In other words, once decolonization was completed, development was expected to begin.

The situation became complicated at the beginning of the 1960s. With the Cuban revolution, the decolonization problems of the former Belgian Congo and the resumption of the war in Viet Nam, development became a strategic and political issue linked to stability and security. Thus, in a bid to counter the destabilization of the South American continent, from 1963 onwards the United States launched the major Alliance for Progress Programme with the creation of bodies like the Peace Corps, in a spirit which President Kennedy presented in his speech at Punta del Este when he said that development would guarantee stability and security. In the 1960s, therefore, we find the first expression of the belief that security would be born of development.

This saw the start of the proliferation of a large number of programmes established within the organizations of the United Nations system, such as UNICEF, for example. This was also the time when there was a sharp increase in the number of important non-governmental organizations (NGOs), notably in Europe – especially in Scandinavia – and in the United States, which embarked on vast development

programmes with the idea that they were working in the long run for the stability and security of the world.

Then a war broke out which nobody had expected and which did not really fit in with the bipolar view of the world: the Biafran war. That war marked the birth of the modern French humanitarian aid effort and organizations like Médecins sans Frontières came into being towards the end of it. The Biafran war suddenly came to remind the world that development did not necessarily guarantee security, in other words some countries, especially newly independent countries such as Nigeria, could be undermined by political, military and stability problems and upheavals. These upheavals were not necessarily of an East-West or ideological nature but may have been deeply rooted in the history of those countries. Lastly, the Biafran war highlighted the risk posed by the fragility of states.

I should like to dwell on this warning signal represented by the Biafran war. At the time, it was thought that we were suddenly about to witness the break-up of the newly independent states almost all over the world. The year after the Biafran war had ended, in 1971, there was a second example of the 'break-up' of a state, with the partition of Pakistan and Bangladesh following a brief conflict. People started to think that this type of event was on the increase. In fact, things did not happen quite like that immediately. The states of the developing world remained intact and all that was seen was a proliferation of long-drawn-out civil wars of low intensity. Between 1975 and 1980, there was a spate of new conflicts. First, there was the decolonization of the former Portuguese colonies in southern Africa and the civil wars that followed, especially in

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Mozambique and Angola. Then came the decolonization of the Western Sahara, the war between Somalia and Ethiopia, the fall of Somoza in Nicaragua, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, the war in Lebanon, the invasion or liberation (depending on one's standpoint) of Cambodia by Viet Nam in 1978, and so on. In the space of five years, we witnessed a greater increase in conflicts than ever before.

This situation lent credence to the view of those who said that there were going to be political problems everywhere and that security problems would become dominant. It is true that there have been many such wars, but at the same time they could almost be called 'stable wars'. In other words, all these small-scale conflicts, which were described as being of low intensity, were serious and had to be taken into consideration, and were full of challenges in the context of the Cold War, but they did not lead to the break-up of the states in which they occurred. For example, Ethiopia did not collapse as a result of the war in Eritrea, nor did Mozambique collapse as a result of the war against the Renamo guerrilla forces.

There was border guerrilla warfare and unrest, but overall stability was not threatened, nor did global security problems arise. Some people describe this strange period as a sort of choice: some countries maintained political stability but not continuity or territorial stability. For example, Myanmar is a country of extreme political continuity, but is surrounded by a range of fragmented areas which are less controlled from the territorial standpoint. On the other hand, a country like Chad has witnessed a very large number of political swings but its territorial continuity has never been called into question. In other words, states 'collapsed' either politically or territorially, but not at the same time.

During the 1980s, there was therefore a kind of stability that made it possible to pursue development programmes. The paradox is that everything changed and worsened with the end of the Cold War. Since 1990, we have been witnessing a series of much more serious crises: it can now be seen that a number of the crises of the 1980s transformed some states and had a far-reaching adverse effect. Cambodia and El Salvador have shown that, even after a conflict has ended, the return to peace is very costly, very difficult and very uncertain.

In addition, there are situations where the end of East-West antagonism has brought

chaos. Take the example of Afghanistan, which was thought to have touched rock bottom in the 1980s: finally, today, now that the Russians have left, this country is in a much more serious situation, with its break-up and the collapse of its internal structure. For seven years, we have seen the emergence of a new phenomenon, that of states which disintegrate both politically and territorially, in other words chaos can set in within the very heart of the state and on its territory. The examples of Liberia or Somalia show that there are cases of implosion, of the complete undermining of states, where nothing is possible any more. In particular, there is no longer any development and we are therefore compelled, in the 1990s, to reverse our initial hypothesis: stability or security will not stem from development – on the contrary, a minimum amount of security will make for development. This security aspect has to come first, since it does not arise naturally from development.

How is it possible to ensure this stability and security which are the essential conditions for development and for work in depth?

We have to begin by acknowledging that the conflicts in the world are not solely linked to ideologies imported from Europe or the North, and that the Cold War was not the one and only factor in crises. That belief led to many errors. A number of movements did not take up arms solely because they were Marxist or pro-Communist or pro-Soviet or of some other leaning, but for reasons that were deeply rooted in the history of these countries. Leaving aside colonization, the Cold War and outside disturbances, there are always many deep-rooted causes of conflict, the risks of which have to be looked at dispassionately. Stability and security are not self-evident or natural; they are achieved by effort, and peacekeeping operations bear witness to this.

In addition, economic issues are not always a factor in peace. It is true that the development of economic activity may in some cases, indeed in many cases, accompany stability, but we have to ask what type of economy and what type of economic development. International institutions have given considerable encouragement to the so-called informal economy, in other words a free, underground economy operating in uncontrolled sectors. However, possible overlapping between the informal economy and the criminal economy can entail considerable dangers. I shall take one example. In South Africa, the buses taking

workers to and from the townships were privatized. To encourage the informal economy, assistance was provided for the purchase of small vehicles, so that small-scale firms could provide the service. This proved very successful at the beginning, but then people wanted to buy up their neighbours' vehicles, so that powerful groups were eventually formed and real taxi wars broke out. These wars led to a heavy loss of life and the informal economy was the scene of extremely serious criminal activity, which led to the formation of parallel mafias. How to control informal economies and prevent them from lapsing into criminal activity are major questions at the moment.

In fact, armed political movements in developing countries have now very largely lost their external support because of the end of the Cold War and, as a consequence, they have often switched to criminal economic activities. For example, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia has launched a series of undertakings involving the export of precious stones, timber, antiques, and so on. The armed movements themselves are feeding the informal economy. Hence, the economic sphere can also encompass movements that have a deeply destabilizing effect on states. It is true that the informal sector of the economy has to be encouraged, but there must be an arbiter capable of making the distinction between the informal and the criminal. As far as I can see, the only possible arbiter is the state.

Too much government intervention and unduly powerful states have been widely criticized. However, it is time to sound the alarm over 'not enough government', which suggests that there may be other crises to come. There are countries where the minimum government infrastructure no longer exists. I shall cite the example, without giving its name, of one African country whose firemen travel by taxi and make the person having called them pay the fare. In a situation of such impoverishment, how can the state ensure even the minimum functions to allow it to arbitrate the way people live and produce optimum conditions of security?

Other examples of the important functions of the state can be seen in border controls. Naturally, there are excesses: in some instances borders have been too rigid, movements of nomad populations have been abruptly interrupted and ethnic groups have been divided, but can anyone conceive of borders that are not controlled at all? I have a memory of

Mozambique: on its vast coast, I was shown the rusty old boats used by the coastguards, who needed more modern equipment. Without coastguards, Mozambican territory is open to everybody and to all forms of traffic into the interior of the continent. Large consignments of weapons smuggled into South Africa are unloaded on this coast. In addition, anybody can fish there and the territorial waters are therefore not harvested by the country. Hence, this poverty of the state machinery, this inadequacy, are extremely prejudicial to security, stability and development.

I should like to make one last point, still on the question of the state: recent crises such as those in Liberia, Somalia and elsewhere, have taught that states cannot be constructed from outside the country and that it is extremely difficult to rebuild a structure that has collapsed. In the countries that have completely exploded, the peacekeeping attempts all came to a halt when the stage of genuine reconstruction should have begun.

The same kind of argument could be addressed to those who claim that expenditure on security is not expenditure on development. I think that it is. There has to be a minimum basis for development – which does not rule out an optimum. Obviously, all the funds available should not be allocated to security, but the state has to be maintained in working order and it is no use waiting until it has collapsed before rushing to its aid. This was particularly clear in Somalia: when the state started to run down, it was harassed by the international institutions; once it had gone under, the American army was sent in to restore it, but without success.

This argument does not justify anything and everything. Of course, it is not an apology for strong, authoritarian or totalitarian states, which in fact are not as powerful as all that. Our comments are obviously quite compatible with a concern for democracy. But, here again, democracy is meaningless without security and stability. I believe that the best service that can be rendered to a country embarking on a democratic process is, on the contrary, to step up efforts to allow it to maintain its stability.

In conclusion, it is of course possible to trade with countries without taking any interest in their internal stability. This can still be done, even in the case of countries that have completely 'broken down'. For example, during the civil war in Mozambique, the Lonrho company continued to make money by employing

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private guards round the sites it was operating. This has nothing to do with development; it is a return to the system of trading posts, places where people come to barter and do business. For those who wish to participate in development, in other words those who take an

interest not only in trade but also in something deeper, which reaches out to the population and allows access to lasting peace, something more has to be done. Efforts to ensure the country's stability and security have to be made.

## PEACE-BUILDING AND RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

*by Oscar Monteiro,  
former Government Minister of Mozambique,  
International consultant*

I invite you to look back to the beginning of the 1960s, when southern Africa was dominated by white colonization, whether Portuguese, Rhodesian or South African.

It was not until ten years after Zambia's independence in 1964 that the independence of Mozambique and Angola and that of the other Portuguese colonies was proclaimed following the struggles for liberation. Then, it was necessary to wait a further six years before Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, then six more years elapsed before Namibia became independent and, finally, three to four years later the situation changed in South Africa.

This period was marked by terrible confrontation and considerable destruction, especially during the last ten years. We should not forget the military stance of 'total strategy against total attack' put forward by the advocates of apartheid. They thought that there was a huge movement supported by international terrorism, or in any event by the communist countries, which aimed to annihilate white power in southern Africa.

The fact is that the confrontation finally ended, but it left lasting after-effects and enormous suffering. Several countries, such as Angola and Mozambique, were destroyed. Mozambique regressed to the extent that it became the world's most backward country, and all kinds of methods were used in the war there. During this period, internal conflicts grew worse, and although there were certainly inherent causes and internal problems in each of these countries, it was above all the presence of external forces which exacerbated the conflicts to such a degree and intensified the process of destruction. South Africa and the context of the Cold War played a significant role by causing a hardening of attitudes.

Moreover, the prospects and possibilities of peaceful development were inhibited by the state of war; the ensuing strengthening of authority in the newly independent countries lapsed all too readily into authoritarianism. The same is true of South Africa, where the regime, which was based on racism, became ultra-militaristic; attitudes grew more rigid on either side and the country found itself on the verge of a conflict that could have overflowed its borders. Fortunately, the era of the Cold War was drawing to a close, and this made it possible to glimpse a solution to the situation. However, it is true that militarism gained in strength throughout the region during this period. In this particular case, I would say that war begets war as well as attitudes of intolerance, both towards neighbouring countries and internally. In the end, it was international developments in general and the feelings of weariness of warfare that led to the signature of the peace agreements and to the internal transformation in South Africa.

The common denominator then adopted was the multiparty system. This may have been for circumstantial reasons, but in Mozambique and South Africa the system has functioned well. Indeed, in both these countries, the regimes are relatively stable or, at least, transition has been possible. On the other hand, this was not the case in Angola.

It must also be said that this first internal transition stage was made easier in the case of Angola and Mozambique by external intervention, especially by the United Nations, which was confined to peacekeeping. I can add, since I collaborated in the work of the United Nations, that on several occasions we tried to go beyond purely peacekeeping operations.

*Should we deal only with peacekeeping or with prevention as well? Post-conflict periods always entail considerable political instability because the authorities emerge weakened from the conflict and because traditional criminal elements take advantage of that weakness and begin to flourish in the context of a return to peace.*

Should we deal only with peacekeeping or with prevention as well? Post-conflict periods always entail considerable political instability because the authorities emerge weakened from the conflict and because traditional criminal elements take advantage of that weakness and begin to flourish in the context of a return to peace. In a way, it is paradoxical that war can make for the elimination of crime. Yet it is a fact, and proof of this can be seen from the situation in South Africa and Mozambique compared with that in Angola. Although in Angola, which has suffered from an extremely long and destructive war that has been exhausting for the government as far as the capacities of the formal state are concerned, the state itself is weaker than in Mozambique and South Africa, the crime rate is lower. In spite of the often considerable funds devoted to them (more than US\$1 billion in the case of Mozambique), peacekeeping operations cannot guarantee the future and a country may well have to contend with other serious crises shortly after a conflict has ended.

In the second stage, the period of transition, countries still suffer from the after-effects of the war. One problem is how to reintegrate those who are demobilized, the hundreds of thousands of former soldiers, who had sometimes been well-organized but had sometimes been commanded by military structures which, because of the kind of war being fought, had been incapable of instilling the principles of discipline and organization (in some cases, these forces were used for looting operations). Leaving them to their own devices creates a real danger, which still exists today. However, situations differ depending on the country: South Africa, for example, has succeeded, since it has a greater capacity than Mozambique for reintegrating former soldiers. The problem of refugees is another consequence of war: some 4 million people are refugees or have been displaced within Mozambique. The economy and, above all, the social fabric have been destroyed. Mention has been made of insecurity in rural and urban areas: while it is true that insecurity is traditionally greater in the countryside, it can also become widespread in towns if the social fabric is developed.

In the context of transition in southern Africa, South Africa is still the dominant factor in relation to both war and peace just as, in the past, it was not the only factor but contributed significantly to the extension of conflict. Now that the fighting has ended, we have seen the

emergence, at a higher level, of other types of conflict which were already present and in some cases have grown, such as the conflict in Natal province. Every day, there are revelations of the role played by the former regime in this type of conflict, which has now become a real problem and is capable of destabilizing the entire region. It is probably the most dangerous type of conflict because of its capacity to spread and affect the region. That is not the only danger, however: this type of conflict and the spread of insecurity can also lead to a reflex reaction by the white community which, while agreeing to play the game, still has some reservations. If the insecurity spreads, possibly from the situation of Kwazulu, Natal, the forces involved could re-emerge and become a factor of instability, as on the eve of independence.

However, the problems are not only situated at this level: everybody agrees that the South African transition has been miraculous, and this morning the Director-General of UNESCO referred to the wisdom of that remarkable figure Nelson Mandela. However, the transition is certainly complex. The social disparities are still very great, the interpretations of the transition by various sectors of public opinion and certain sections of society are different, and expectations are also different. There are still sizeable groups of disadvantaged people hoping for more rapid change, which appears difficult to bring about. This is a factor of internal insecurity, a potential radicalism that could jeopardize the entire transition process in South Africa, with all the repercussions that this could have on the region.

This means that once the main problems have been overcome, other problems of an ethnic or social nature are still present, to which must be added the spread of AIDS and of crime. The transition stage in Mozambique and South Africa encourages the use of those countries for the transit of drugs. Recently, a single drug shipment represented more than the total of Mozambique's annual exports. This gives some idea of the scale of the economic issues, the weakness of states and the way in which they have to equip themselves to withstand such threats. In South Africa the traffic in stolen cars, especially in top-of-the-range and four-wheel-drive models, is the highest in the world. There is an international network which buys stolen cars and sells them throughout southern Africa. The power of these new criminal networks, whether internal or external, far exceeds the capacities of some states.

The search for a new security model is incumbent on all of us and it is based on recognition of the fact that prosperity cannot be achieved easily and in the short term.

What are the obstacles? First, the different economies are not complementary: southern Africa is a region in which all the countries manufacture and export similar products. Expansion and the development of economies of scale in the case of one country always take place at the expense of another.

Next, it is true that South Africa plays a decisive role in the region, but this means that economic and military power are not equally shared. For short-term solutions, reliance on a regional power is a positive factor, but this situation is not viable in the long term as it generates feelings of rejection by neighbouring countries.

A final factor, which may be a support and an asset but can also have adverse effects, is that of migratory labour throughout the region. For years, workers from neighbouring countries have emigrated to South Africa. Now, however, the country needs to employ its own workers and is systematically putting up barriers against the recruitment of workers from its neighbours.

A stability policy in this difficult context implies that there should be no immediate move to the supranational level: some problems have to be solved at the national level. First, national governments have to be stabilized, so that they will be able to guarantee the security of all citizens, to recognize diversity to a greater extent than in the past, and to prevent

regional, ethnic or other factors of diversity from working against stability. This is contingent upon a broadening of the pluralist thinking of the state.

Other sectors of society also have to be developed to a greater degree than in the past. We have to build on what exists, in order to serve the cause of peace. There is a regional organization, the South African Development Community, which, on the basis of the individual projects that it implemented in the past, is now trying to formulate a general strategy. It is often suggested that this organization should be provided with more effective mechanisms for guaranteeing security. I think that, on the contrary, it is necessary to proceed slowly, since simply to set up an official organization will not make it possible to resolve the type of complex problem which requires a strengthening of national capacities. Furthermore, if the opposite view prevails, there is a risk of strengthening South African hegemony, which would create another pole of conflict in southern Africa. In fact, at the most recent economic meetings, all the countries involved were already raising objections to South Africa because of its dominant role, its power and its economic practices. This does not make the transitions any easier.

Official institutions should not be left to deal with these problems by themselves: those who study such problems and the forces of society must prevail if a culture of peace is to be established. After almost a century of conflict in southern Africa, we have a right, a hope and a duty: to bring about that culture of peace.

*A stability policy in this difficult context implies that there should be no immediate move to the supranational level: some problems have to be solved at the national level...*

*This is contingent upon a broadening of the pluralist thinking of the state.*

# THE LESSONS OF THE BALKANS WAR

## The human and civilian dimension

*by Anna-Maria Corrazza,  
Attachée to the Special Envoy of the Commission  
of the European Communities to Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina*

Among such eminent figures, I dare not venture into an anthropological analysis of the cultural and social factors of insecurity. Instead, I shall take a more practical approach and hence share with you something of what we have lived through in the former Yugoslavia over the past four years.

It is time to begin analysing the social and cultural aspects of this conflict. In fact, whether it be in the perception of policies or in the decision-making process, certainly under the influence of the media and because of the speed of events, these fundamental aspects have not been taken sufficiently into account. If we really want to remove from Europe's side the thorn represented by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, we must tackle the social and cultural causes.

I shall confine myself to identifying some of the aspects we have noted, the way in which they are now perceived, and how they could be envisaged in the future.

The first of these aspects, which is very marked, is that all the parties to the conflict are completely focused on the past. For them, the Second World War happened only yesterday. This denotes an absolute inability to have a vision of the future. Everything seems to be caught up in a vicious circle of revenge, through perceptions in which people all feel that they are victims and think that they are right. The outcome is a definitive over-simplification, which leads to such reasoning as 'I am good and you are bad; I am right and you are wrong; I treated you as a brother and you have betrayed me, hence I have the right to take my revenge'. This dramatically fatalistic attitude is true of all the belligerents.

Equally striking is what might be called the 'Kalashnikov syndrome'. The peoples of the

former Yugoslavia seem to have little confidence in the legal and judicial structures to ensure their security. This mistrust also applies to the legal framework guaranteed by the international community. They think that only the Kalashnikov hidden in their cellar or the tank stationed in the village square will protect them. This concept of collective security, where even children are accustomed to using weapons, has had a considerable influence on the demilitarization process. In fact, it was genuine fear rather than any pressure exerted by the authorities which led to spontaneous opposition to the withdrawal of weapons.

Fear is actually stronger than hatred and this is a fear of genocide, a fear which has its roots going back over the centuries, fuelled not only by history but also by the identity crisis caused by the break-up of Yugoslavia. It affects everybody. At the present moment, we are confronted by a society that is collectively traumatized. It is difficult to gauge the effect this trauma will have on the establishment of a lasting peace and its consequences for establishing democracy, for the development of civil society and for the restoration of moderate components. ... I mention here only some of the factors which warrant in-depth reflection if we wish to establish efficient policies.

A second aspect which should be tackled is that of borders. Why was it so important for Krajina or the Serb Republic to establish frontiers with their neighbours? Because the demarcation line was perceived as a shield, a real line of defence, the only way of ensuring security. While we Europeans reason in terms of the protection of our cultural identity – or at least we should do so – these peoples, in a context of integration, consider that the only way of preserving their identity is to establish physical

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national borders defended by armed force. These barriers have made for isolation which has been aggravated by the effect of economic sanctions and whose psychological consequences have been dramatic, particularly in the context of Eastern Slavonia and the Serb Republic. Understanding the implications of this retrenchment and seeking ways of breaking out of it would certainly make it possible to offer more effective answers.

A third fundamental problem is the disintegration of a civil society whose institutions have virtually disappeared. After five years of war, all that remain are the army, the police and the dominant parties, controlled by the most radical nationalists who remained in power after the Dayton agreements. The present problem is how to build up peace and democracy in a country where there are no valid negotiating partners or civil institutions, where there are no more than a handful of intellectuals or members of the liberal professions. So far, the support provided by the international community has not made it possible to bring about the renaissance of a genuine civil society, which would be an essential condition for stability in the region.

The local authorities continue to work for partition or nation-states and control the media, the army and the police force, which are more instruments of intimidation than of security, especially the latter. The population is accordingly deprived of any freedom of speech and of any representation in institutions at the very time when there are clear signs of war-weariness. The people want a return to normal and, if they could express themselves freely, they would form the maelstrom of a lasting peace.

To come to the main challenge facing the international community, the aim is to tackle the deep-seated causes of nationalism, to break out of the vicious circle of annihilation of the cultural heritage and to combat a systematic 'scorched earth' policy. It is too easy to claim that these acts stem from feudal savagery. In reality, they have much deeper roots. The challenge therefore can only be met by co-operating with civil society and not accepting as the sole negotiating partners the government or authorities which owe their only legitimacy to the war.

My aim is not to put forward subversive views in so delicate a situation. I do not mean that it is necessary to call a halt to dialogue with the decision-makers, since this is essential. We are dealing with completely centralized

societies in which it will be difficult to produce results by breaking free of the official circuits. This is a point that warrants reflection, namely how to reach out to and support the vital forces of society (intellectuals, members of the professions, non-governmental organizations, trade unions, citizens' associations, women, etc.) if we want to make our decentralized approach systematic to some degree. This is, in fact, the only way of restoring confidence in the action of the international community.

The fourth aspect, which is just as essential, is the role of the media. A significant lesson can be drawn from the action of UNPROFOR in this area, even though it was too late. I refer in particular to the idea of rapidly setting up a television and radio network, managed independently of the national authorities, in the areas of conflict. I think that the impact of the bellicose rhetoric used by the local media was underestimated: all efforts to restore confidence came to nothing because of the systematic daily barrage of propaganda which the lack of independent media made it impossible to counteract. Here again, without my wishing to appear subversive, substantial financial resources and a concerted strategy have to be envisaged.

I shall now broach what represents an essential concept which has yet to be developed: this is the use of economic resources in the service of the consolidation of peace. This morning, our colleagues spoke of the peace-building approach, which I fully endorse. One of the lessons learned in the former Yugoslavia is that it is unrealistic not to combine wartime peacekeeping operations with an operation for planning post-war reconstruction and economic and social recovery. The aim is to ensure continuity and to be ready on the day a ceasefire is signed to implement a rehabilitation plan which tackles such urgent problems as the employment of demobilized soldiers and the reintegration of refugees. The delay in implementing the 'Employed Generation and Reintegration of Refugees' programme is an important reason why confidence in the peace process in Bosnia has withered away. It is obvious that soldiers are not going to abandon their units if they are not assured of being able to provide for their families by other means – our military colleagues are much better placed than me to refute this. This is perfectly logical, but unfortunately there is delay in providing the tools for dealing with the problem. It would be useful to learn from the experience of the United Nations operation for the restoration of

essential services in Sarajevo and to develop suitable tools for managing the 'grey area', the critical period between the establishment of a ceasefire and the conclusion of a peace agreement. It is important that a series of measures aimed at creating the necessary confidence to support the ongoing negotiations be launched very quickly.

In addition, it is essential for economic tools to be closely linked with the policy pursued by the international community. The 'carrot and stick' approach should not apply to all aspects of the peace process. For example, priority could be given to those municipalities of Sarajevo recently integrated into the federation which accept Serbian representatives on their municipal councils, as opposed to those which would have entirely Muslim councils. It is of course difficult at the micro-economic level to put such a 'stop-go' approach into practice in the planning of large-scale construction budgets. Yet it is fundamental to ensure that the donors adopt a common front on this subject and to safeguard the principle of conditionality. Unless there is an executive mandate, it is pointless to want to exercise any political pressure without making coherent use of economic tools.

The time aspect is also decisive. This may seem a very cynical remark, but the former Yugoslavia is an exceptional laboratory for testing the crisis-management tools which it had

not been possible to introduce since 1989. This experience made it possible to learn by doing, to react, and to provide responses to crises as they emerged under our eyes. It is to be hoped that the tools will be ready and already tested to consolidate peace and deal with fresh crises and that the mechanisms of a political consensus will already be in place.

In other words, we should now be in a position, for example, to commit ourselves to a plan of economic revival, which for obvious reasons is clearly not the case.

Lastly, when it comes to the organizational consequences of peace missions, all the benefits of civilian and military co-operation have been subject to review. They will have to be systematized. Mechanisms such as the CIMIC, the political military analysis group, the humanitarian crisis cells and the human rights action teams, which needed three indispensable years of preparation during the UNPROFOR period, should now become tools for use in all peace missions. In this context, the training of civilian and military personnel has to be adapted and strengthened to meet this new challenge and learn to operate together. In particular, civilians and military alike have to be made responsive to the cultural and social aspects of conflicts.

This would lead to greater efficiency, less wasted resources and more satisfactory results in the long term.

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## UNITED NATIONS AND UNESCO INITIATIVES IN AFRICA

*by Henri Lopes,  
Deputy Director-General for Africa, UNESCO*

I should like to start by reminding you of how our Organization and the United Nations are situated in relation to the issue of peace.

The Preamble to UNESCO's Constitution begins as follows: 'The Governments of the States Parties to this Constitution on behalf of their peoples declare that since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed; that ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war.'

In other words, the primary aim of UNESCO, as laid down by its founders in the aftermath of the war, was to maintain peace and security. Then, and only then, did it list the means of achieving this, 'by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture ...'. The message is therefore clear: UNESCO was not created to construct schools or build laboratories, but to use existing schools, teachers and all teaching personnel, in order to construct peace in the minds of men.

The problem with which we are confronted today is that the United Nations, which was likewise established in the aftermath of the war, provides in its Charter for various ways of preventing wars between nations, but no mechanism for wars within countries. A glance at a map of Africa shows that this continent is prey to many conflicts, the vast majority of which are taking place inside national borders.

I shall not go into details of the causes of these internal wars, but I shall mention some of them. The causes can all be qualified by the frequently used term 'a struggle for power'.

There was a struggle for power when various movements engaged in the combat for freedom remained divided. In such cases, there were clashes during the liberation struggles and, once independence was achieved, if one of the parties felt excluded from power, it disputed the legitimacy of the central authority and rebelled. This was what happened in Angola and Mozambique.

A second example of a struggle for power is, in my opinion, the situation created by the emergence of multiparty systems which, in many countries, drew on regional or ethnic differences. Parties made their appearance without having any particular programme other than that of gathering around them people belonging to the same region or tribe. Confrontation became inevitable and more blatant when there were only two such groups, as in the case of Rwanda and Burundi.

A third example of a struggle for power emerges when elections are badly prepared. In such cases, the results are often disputed and trouble breaks out. One realistic policy for preventing armed conflict would be to take into account the period preceding elections, which can be a significant source of discord: all the candidates must have equal access to the media and be able to visit all parts of the country in complete safety.

Internal wars have many consequences of which, again, I shall mention only a few. Of all the continents, Africa is currently the one where the largest number of refugees have been recorded. According to United Nations statistics, Africa has 8 million refugees and 18 million displaced persons still within their countries' borders.

Another consequence of these internal wars is that they lead to fragmentation of national

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armies. The divisions between politicians have an impact on armies and the situation can be further complicated when militia are established in some cases.

The growth of arms trafficking, on which I will not dwell since it was mentioned earlier, is another corollary of this situation. Populations find themselves not only without the presence of the state but without any means of recourse. In a so-called normal country, when individuals feel threatened, they call on someone in uniform, such as a fireman or a police officer or, in some cases, a member of the armed forces. However, in situations of utter helplessness such as those currently to be seen in Africa, civilians who appeal to someone in uniform do not know what the reply will be: might the person not take advantage of the opportunity to terrorize or blackmail them? There is no need to labour the point that these conditions prevent any form of development.

What, then, should be the place of an army in Africa? Some high-ranking officers who have been ordered to suppress demonstrations or disturbances have had problems with their consciences. They considered that they had been trained to fight and defend their country, but had no experience of dealing with internal disorder in situations where the interests of the state were not clear. We need, therefore, to try to define the responsibilities of armies and to explain within what limits and to what degree an army can be the guarantor of an emerging and still fragile republican order.

As far as African armies are concerned, without repeating what Jean-Christophe Rufin has said, a balance has to be struck between too much army and no army at all. Armies must become aware that their role as the guardians of frontiers will shrink, especially with the prospect of development. The worldwide tendency for countries to come together in regional economic units is clear. This was initially true of the industrialized countries, even those of them which have the largest markets, as can be seen from an analysis of the American continent, from the United States to South America, also including Canada. It is also true of Europe, which is organizing itself. There may be difficulties here or there, but a European market is somehow being formed. Admittedly, there is no official economic entity in Asia but, on the one hand, this continent consists of countries with a demographic impact much larger than that of the African

countries and, on the other, it is informed by a desire not so much for unity as for harmonization between the different partners. I do not see how Africa will succeed in developing if it does not emerge from the framework of its little countries whose markets cannot intrinsically generate much income.

On the other hand, with the internal conflicts that have arisen in Africa, I think that armies have an important inter-African role to play as an arbitration force. Armies should form a reliable means of recourse and be turned into a sort of international police force. It is also important for them to take part in international operations, if only to demonstrate that Africa is committed to maintaining peace in the world.

In this connection, I agree that thought should be given to the transition period, mentioned earlier, between an emergency situation created in particular by a conflict and a situation of development.

I would have liked to conclude by illustrating the role that UNESCO is playing in the context which has just been described. Time allows me only to touch very rapidly on some cases, for example, that of Mozambique where we are training the various community leaders in respect of human rights and governance. We are also tackling the problem of the demobilization of former soldiers who completely lose their bearings when peace comes.

Examples of another type of operation are those we are conducting in Somalia and Sudan, where the aim is to provide an intellectual setting in which leading figures representing the different tendencies can meet and prepare for political negotiations, so that other more specialized organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the United Nations, can pursue their diplomatic and political action. With the OAU, we are discussing ways of working together on conflict-alert and prevention mechanisms. In areas at risk such as Rwanda and Burundi, we have set up permanent offices in order to help the authorities promote a real culture of peace or, in other words, to engage in a dialogue making it possible for people to live together. For example, one area where we are taking practical and visible action is that of communication, since radios have been one of the vectors of hatred and exclusion in both these countries. Our aim is to engage in the opposite action with this same vector. The Congo, which has been the victim of armed internal wars, is another country where we

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are conducting an interesting experiment and where UNESCO has chaired a forum which made it possible for the different protagonists to meet.

All these activities are being carried out in the context of the transdisciplinary project 'Towards a Culture of Peace', to which my colleague Leslie Atherley has already referred.

### III. THIRD ROUND TABLE

#### *The conditions for development security*

*Chairperson: Mr Ahmed Sayyad,  
Assistant Director-General for External Relations at UNESCO*

Insecurity is rooted in underdevelopment, which it in turn aggravates. This destructive two-way relationship between security and development makes it essential that efforts to initiate and support economic, cultural and social development include work on the security aspects of the situation.

The most urgent need is obviously pacification by the forces of public order, but this clearly requires a legal framework, the operation of democratic institutions and a sound economic basis, which are thus seen to form the real basis for security and development, or rather for the security of development.

## DEMOCRATIC SECURITY

*by Denis Winckler,  
Technical adviser on the SIGMA Programme at the OECD*

Improving security has always been one of the priorities of international relations, especially in peacetime. This is the justification for the game of military alliances. However, it became clear, particularly to those who framed the treaties which marked the end of the two great world wars, that the most effective means of ensuring long-term security also include the establishment of appropriate political structures, and that political stability is best ensured by democracy and development. During the last fifty years, the history of Western Europe and, in particular, that of the European Union has confirmed this hypothesis. Accordingly, the organizers of this symposium considered that it would be useful if we were invited briefly to focus our thoughts on the direction in which democracy is developing in Eastern Europe and its implications for security.

From this viewpoint, democracy can be defined as a political system which makes it possible to settle disputes through the operation of freely accepted consultation machinery. Both in the domestic context and in international relations, the existing democratic institutions play a role of conciliation and mediation which should not be underestimated as a means of strengthening security.

Organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe promote the establishment and operation of democratic institutions. Some assist with the improvement of market mechanisms. Others help to perfect the machinery of democracy. All provide opportunities for fruitful exchanges among experts from their member countries. It is in this connection that I have been invited to address you.

My contribution to today's debate will be modest, programmatic and specific. I shall

examine, *ex post facto*, a limited aspect of the co-operation which, over the last few years, has been developing with the countries of Eastern Europe in order to see what lessons there are to be learned as far as security is concerned. My remarks will be based chiefly on the work done under the joint programme of the European Commission and the OECD set up to promote the reform of public administration in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

I should then like to turn to a question which underlies the work being done under the SIGMA Programme: although it is true that the establishment of democratic institutions favours the development of democracy and hence security, it is not in itself sufficient to bring them about. The political systems which succeeded the old regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe are not necessarily evolving in the direction of democracy, at least as it was defined by Montesquieu or Toqueville.

Accordingly, we should consider the relations that exist between the institutions which have been set up and the political workings of these countries in transition, to see what they have to teach us about security.

I hope you will forgive me for doing no more than touch on these aspects of my topic, in order to suggest some lines of thought.

### **1. Development of the public institutions in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe**

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are currently making considerable efforts to reform their public institutions. These reforms

are a consequence of their choice of society, but are also being imposed on them by the requirements of the market economy which they have adopted and, indeed, by the international context in which even domestic political decisions are made.

For the most part, the reforms are based on two main principles which favour the establishment of democratic institutions.

### **1.1. Reform of the decision-making centre**

Whatever the form assigned to it by the constitution in the various countries concerned, the government's 'political decision-making centre' is generally identified with the office of the prime minister. *Primus inter pares*, as in Poland or Lithuania, or genuine head of government, as in Hungary or the Czech Republic, the prime minister is now obliged to collaborate in complex projects with the other members of the government and then negotiate their adoption, before supervising their implementation. These new demands require the radical transformation of a government office which until recently was merely responsible for implementing the decisions of the single party.

Thus, prime ministers are now expected to co-ordinate the activities of all the government institutions. They have become the point of convergence and the centre for dissemination of the information which governments need in order to function. They also create the necessary conditions for the horizontal ministries, in particular the Ministry of Finance, to play their part in the implementation of reform programmes.

If a prime minister is to succeed in this task, the necessary interministerial negotiation and adjustment machinery must be set up. Moreover, the decision-making centre must provide the skills and ideas which the government needs for its work.

SIGMA's aim is accordingly to assist the governments which have replaced the former socialist systems with the reorganizing of their central decision-making institutions. Seminars attended by representatives of the government secretariat or the prime minister's legal department of the country concerned, and by their Western counterparts, are gradually wearing away at the bastions built by the individual ministries in many governments, with a view to developing a spirit of teamwork.

Poland offers a striking example of reform of the prime minister's office, leading, on the one hand, to greater efficiency and transparency and, on the other, to improved service. In the light of the vital political imperative to support the national economy with a coherent and efficient governmental and administrative structure at the lowest possible cost, the prime minister gave full powers to an official responsible for the economic activities of the state to reform his own services by separating the political functions of his cabinet from the administrative functions of the government secretariat, by setting up a Ministry of the Civil Service and the Interior, from which the intelligence services have now been hived off, and by reorganizing not only the structure of the government but also the ministerial establishments. An overhaul of the civil service and a radical improvement in the drafting of laws and regulations within the context of European law complete this programme of reforms.

Reforms of this type involving the establishment of democratic institutions in the context of a long-term political project intended to reinforce the structures of the state could be illustrated with other examples taken from any of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They are being applied – no doubt with varying degrees of success – to most sectors of government.

Here it should be pointed out that, spontaneously and by osmosis, without directly affecting such central institutions of democracy as parliament and the balance of power, the machinery of co-ordination, political compromise, dispute settlement and hence peace is being installed with the tools of good government management.

### **1.2. Monitoring the activities of the state**

The administrative reforms in progress are being supplemented by arrangements designed to increase the transparency of the state, establish channels of appeal against administrative decisions and introduce watchdog systems, particularly where public expenditure is concerned. The ethics of public administration and the efforts to combat corruption are strengthening the confidence of the people in the public services. Here again the new relationship between the state and the citizen is a factor of social stability and hence security.

Many Central European countries have recently been led to develop 'reform strategies' for their public administration. This has allowed them to give clear expression to the political principles which underpin the reforms they have undertaken.

Although it may not be possible to draw up a comparative table of the measures taken in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to monitor the activities of the state, because of the gaps still very often encountered in the systems which the various states have set up, it is nevertheless true that there is a general intention to introduce 'checks and balances' systems at both central and local government levels. A few examples will serve to illustrate this point.

Since 1994, Lithuania has had a ministry for the reform of the public sector and local government. This ministry has prepared – and has presented in an interesting context of international co-operation, more particularly in Poland – a summary analysis of the choices on which Lithuania's reform policy is based. The intention to set up monitoring and arbitration machinery and allow the public to express its wishes is clear.

A conference in Turin organized in collaboration with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) will make available to all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe a handbook on the rules of public procurement, prepared in close collaboration with countries such as Poland and Slovenia, which already have excellent legislation in this field. One of the anticipated results of this conference is the organization of training courses in the countries that send delegations to it. The adoption of legislation on the awarding of public contracts followed by the establishment of bodies responsible for its implementation will make an important contribution to the struggle against corruption.

In a more controversial context, it is very interesting to note that in Hungary where, according to the media, the government is better equipped than most to eavesdrop on private telephone conversations, it is widely known that the judiciary has powers to defend civil liberties and uses them with courage and independence.

These two examples are only partially reassuring. They also remind us that democracy can survive only if the public institutions organize and defend it.

## **2. The transition to democracy is not, however, a linear process. It is taking place within a complex historical context and under conditions of receptivity strongly influenced by post-communism**

Although the establishment of effective institutions plays an important role in the peaceful settlement of disputes, it does not necessarily go hand in hand with the development of democracy.

### **2.1. The continuity of human resources is a factor that encourages resistance to change**

The establishment of democratic institutions in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has had only a very marginal effect on those responsible for the management of the economy and public administration, national education and the army. Furthermore, most of the economic institutions have retained the structure inherited from the last few decades of communism.

Apart from the fact that this state of affairs is affecting the actual results of the reforms undertaken, it is also well known that the old habits and methods of the managers often conflict directly with the new democratic principles.

In a number of Central and Eastern European countries, the effectiveness of the government is being diluted by the acquired rights of the Ministry of Finance or of the Interior or some other large ministry *vis-à-vis* the centre of government. The minister appoints and removes officials under conditions which considerably restrict the autonomy of the public service with respect to the dominant political party.

In very many cases it is also clear that, in the performance of its functions as defined by the constitution and the law, the government is obliged to make deals with powerful pressure groups. These groups, often with their source in the former institutions, are well known to all and have a far-reaching influence on the domestic and foreign policies of the countries concerned.

In the countries of Central Europe which are most advanced from the standpoint of democratic institutions, it is not unusual to find that the introduction of civil service legislation has

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*Democracy can survive only if the public institutions organize and defend it.*

*The transition period cannot be dragged out too long without putting at risk the security, economic health and social cohesion of the countries concerned, which are very keenly aware of the need to stabilize their new situation quickly.*

resulted in the supporters of the party in power finding niches for themselves at the decision-making level and then making sure that they keep their jobs even if the majority changes.

## **2.2. The rejected ideology has not been replaced by a new social contract**

One phenomenon, doubtless not confined to, but particularly conspicuous in, the countries of Central Europe, is the disaffection of the public from politics and the development of individualism at the expense of civic consciousness and solidarity.

Public disaffection finds expression in abstentionism and indecisiveness at election time. It can also be discerned in the general passivity and lack of interest in government policies. One surprising example of the absence of political dialogue cannot but be a cause for concern: all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have applied for membership of the European Union, but the countries whose citizens have expressed misgivings about the repercussions of this choice are the exception, despite the fact that the consequences of joining are bound to be serious.

A few days ago, when a professor from the University of Budapest pointed out that the political programmes, electoral platforms and even awareness campaigns were interesting fewer and fewer people, I asked him whether the isolation of those responsible for the affairs of state from the general public might not eventually pose a threat to internal security. The reply was 'not in the short term'. No speaker carries conviction any more. There is no ideology capable of stirring the crowds. Individual citizens, he told us, are interested only in their own goals. They will do anything the state asks, short of paying taxes or deviating from their chosen path.

Nevertheless, citizens' lack of interest in questions which concern their country and, to an even greater extent, in international affairs does not mean that the authorities have been left to feel their way in the dark, since the internationalization of political life is placing governments in a position in which their freedom of action is increasingly restricted.

## **2.3. The internationalization of political life**

The problems associated with internationalization are especially acute for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Paradoxically, it is just as these countries have achieved genuine sovereignty that they are having to agree to accept certain restrictions. The problems with which they are faced are both numerous and novel and call urgently for solution.

The problems are numerous, the question of admission to the European Union – to which, moreover, the various countries do not all take the same approach – being only one of them. In particular, they include the opening up of the economy to international trade and relations with the new World Trade Organization (WTO), strategic questions and relations with NATO, and relations with the developed countries in general, through the OECD, the Council of Europe, and so on.

To a large extent, these problems are new. The context of the international relations of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has been totally transformed. Their governments are creating new communities of interest and new working environments.

Finally, these problems need to be solved without delay. The transition period cannot be dragged out too long without putting at risk the security, economic health and social cohesion of the countries concerned, which are very keenly aware of the need to stabilize their new situation quickly.

## **Conclusion**

The establishment of effective democratic institutions in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is not automatically creating the conditions for democracy.

The new rules of the game remain to be defined, as do the new conditions in which citizens exercise their right to control their own future. This is a new issue, and UNESCO undoubtedly has a central role to play in defining the new social contract under which citizens will retain their cultural identity, but in a context of regional and world solidarity.

# WAYS AND MEANS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

*by Patrice Dufour,  
Senior External Relations Adviser  
at the European Office of the World Bank*

I have ventured to give this title to my talk because creating conditions for sustainable development is no easy task, even in economies at peace. We are now beginning to know the 'ingredients' which make this development sustainable, and the fact that some countries are actually making considerable progress tends to validate the approaches proposed.

We know that it is necessary to invest in human resources and that it is necessary to create the conditions which allow initiative to flourish. We also know that an open economy has more prospects of success than a closed economy, and that a measure of macro-economic stability is essential for economic and social progress.

At the present time, however, many countries do not fulfil these conditions and their stagnation has created an explosive situation. It is urgent for them to take a grip on themselves, for it is striking to see how far war and poverty go hand in hand. If we consider the fifty conflicts recorded over the past fifteen years, fifteen of the poorest twenty countries have been affected by instances of major turmoil. Half of the low-income countries have suffered from conflicts in one form or another.

The conflicts which have affected these fifty countries have often reduced their economies to nothing. For ten of these countries, the conflicts have lasted over twenty years; for twenty of them, they have lasted over ten years. Consequently, international development aid is being transferred to humanitarian assistance because it is necessary to relieve the poverty of the population, even at the expense of development.

An institution like the World Bank is concerned by this upsurge in conflicts.

In Bosnia, for example, 90 per cent of the population depends on food and humanitarian

aid for its survival. In Gaza, a substantial portion of international aid is devoted to the creation of makeshift jobs, to allow the population affected by unemployment to earn something.

The World Bank, which was created as an 'International Bank for Reconstruction and Development', certainly has its place in the efforts to bring about a return to peace. When we move from a situation of conflict to peace intended to last, a series of timely and well-targeted technical operations have to be conducted. The aim of these operations is to facilitate the peace process by reducing the obstacles that inhibit reconstruction and by laying the foundations for development that it is hoped will be sustainable. In this effort, the development institutions can provide a long-term view of things and massive financial resources, which are not always available to the humanitarian organizations. I shall therefore try to tackle four subjects briefly with you.

In the first place, it has to be recalled that the economies affected by disturbances and conflicts are usually in a pitiful state. The second point is that the process of reconstruction comprises a number of stages, which should be looked at more closely. We shall then consider cases where the Bank has intervened and the lessons which it has drawn from them. My last point is that these lessons are instrumental in formulating recommendations to the international community on possible ways of improving matters in the future.

## **1. Assessment of the situation**

The situation is extremely distressing. A conflict can reduce years of cultural, productive and human heritage to nothing and the figures are



*In the first place, the process of transition from war to peace has to be consolidated before the foundations for sustainable development can be laid.*

*For this purpose, too, landmines have to be cleared.*

quite astonishing. If we take the case of Bosnia, in human terms it is reckoned that 250,000 people have been killed, 200,000 have been wounded – including 40,000 to 50,000 children – there are 2 million refugees inside the Federation and 1 million outside, and 90 per cent of the population is living on humanitarian aid. As for material damage, production capacity has been reduced to 5 per cent, 80 per cent of the energy capacity has been destroyed, 30 per cent of the hospital capacity and 50 per cent of the educational capacity have been affected; 60 per cent of all accommodation is uninhabitable, and several million landmines will have to be cleared at considerable cost. ... In short, the consequences of a conflict are usually tragic. This can also be seen in Cambodia and Mozambique, where the situations are just as dramatic.

Again in human terms, the refugee problem has taken on considerable proportions. Over the past ten years, 70 million people have been displaced. In regions like Central and East Africa, there are now 22 million people who have been obliged to leave their homes.

Lastly, there is another problem. The conflicts have mobilized men who have forgotten their own skills but have learned to use weapons. They have lost contact with the civilian population. The demobilization of military personnel is crucial. We have spoken of the problem of landmines and of the several million in Bosnia, but over the world as a whole, 100 million landmines have been laid, not to mention the 100 million that are still in stock, all ready to be used.

## **2. The process of reconstruction**

It is clear that embarking on reconstruction in these conditions is not an easy task. Reconstruction has two aims. In the first place, the process of transition from war to peace has to be consolidated before the foundations for sustainable development can be laid. To do this, it is necessary to repair the social fabric and give the economic operators fresh confidence. Due account also has to be taken of the fact that there is very little time available. The window of opportunity, the period during which this effort can be made, is limited. It is therefore necessary to act very fast, for otherwise a situation of conflict will re-emerge very quickly.

What are the stages in a reconstruction strategy? First, it is necessary to prime the national economy by injecting resources that will make it possible to engage in economic activity. This is true for the economy as a whole, since the funds granted will make it possible to import and purchase construction materials in order to rebuild the infrastructure, and these resources therefore have to be provided very quickly.

This is also true in terms of individuals and households because if there is no work people no longer have incomes. Without incomes, they can no longer consume. Here again, therefore, programmes for creating employment are necessary, even if this is somewhat artificial. I am thinking, for example, of Gaza, where we have just approved a US \$23 million credit to finance urban employment in jobs whose usefulness may not be phenomenal but which will give the population purchasing power.

It is then necessary to rebuild communications and transport infrastructures, since they are at the root of development. For this purpose, too, landmines have to be cleared. I still recall the comments of one of my colleagues back from Sarajevo, who described the work of the mine-clearance squads checking the tram lines so that trams could operate again after the lines had been repaired.

Then it is necessary to organize programmes for demobilizing and training military personnel, as in the case of Uganda, where the objective was to reduce the army from 80,000 to 43,000 in the space of a few years. This entails a considerable logistical and training effort, which has to culminate in the creation of a large number of enterprises.

Lastly, the displaced population has to be reintegrated. Hence, there are a whole series of actions whose sequences may be different but which can be organized and managed as a whole. What is striking, when we consider the efforts that have been made, is how very difficult it is to bring together coherent conditions. And the Bank is heavily involved in these situations.

## **3. The role of the World Bank**

It is sometimes forgotten that one quarter of the credits granted by the International Development Association, the Bank's arm which lends to the poorest countries, is intended for countries which are recovering from a variety of conflicts. It is clear that the Bank has

to learn more from past experience and to listen more closely to those who are already on the spot. It also has to intervene more quickly because the task of reconstruction has to be prepared even before the end of a conflict.

When the World Bank was created at Bretton Woods in 1944, the Second World War was not yet over. We have to draw the lesson from this today, and realize that reconstruction is prepared even before peace agreements are signed. We have seen this, for example, in the case of Gaza and the West Bank, where the World Bank sent missions well before the signature of the agreements. The Bank has to adapt its internal way of operating so as to respond rapidly to conflict situations. However, it cannot do this unless a decision to take concerted action has been made by the international community. I would say that we have learned to react more and more quickly. Whereas a project traditionally requires one to two years' preparation before being submitted to the Board of Directors, in the case of the current operations in Bosnia, they are sent to the Board within a few weeks.

#### **4. A coherent effort**

An enormous amount of energy is also spent on co-ordinating assistance. There are so many agencies involved in the case of Gaza and the West Bank, or in the case of Bosnia, that a considerable effort is needed to collect the contributions which countries have pledged by way of their participation in the effort of reconstruction and peace. It would perhaps be necessary to create a sort of 'common kitty' which would be jointly managed. As in the case of the Global Environmental Facility, the resources of all the contributors could be pooled and then managed collectively, to avoid the start-up delays that occur all too often in reconstruction efforts.

I should like to end my statement by putting forward for your consideration one major idea. I believe that we should set up a Common Reconstruction Facility, since it is clear that no time can be lost when it comes to engaging in the effort of economic revival. Energetic action in the start-up phase is essential if that phase is to lead on to sustainable development.

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## CONFLICT SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS AND APPROACHES

*by H.E. Mr Mohamed Sahnoun, Ambassador,  
Special adviser to the Director-General of UNESCO*

I should particularly like to lay stress on the deterioration of the environment. I trust that you will excuse me if I paint a rather gloomy picture of the future, but it is with the aim of better mobilizing people to become more aware.

It has repeatedly been said that the world population is probably going to exceed 9 billion over the next fifty years and that population increase is taking place chiefly in the developing countries. Over the same period of time, economic production is likely to increase fivefold.

Whatever the positive contributions of technology, whose effects are often localized, the strain and pressure of these two ecological and economic trends on natural resources will be such as to exhaust, or at any rate seriously deplete, certain non-renewable resources. Even certain renewable resources such as drinking water are going to become very scarce, as recently pointed out by a World Bank report. The harmful effects on the various ecosystems, the ensuing disturbances in the ecological balance, as, for instance, deforestation (some 25 million acres are deforested every year) or soil erosion (another 15 million acres lost every year), may assume even greater proportions, and thus threaten the economic base not only of countries, but of whole regions.

It goes without saying that the political and social consequences of these developments can be particularly serious, and their first fruits can be seen. I believe that the current debate clearly underscores the frequency of these internal crises. It became obvious to me when I was in Somalia, as Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and witnessed a civil war and an institutional and sociological crisis the

origins of which were as much ecological as political. It has to be borne in mind that in the Horn of Africa, in Somalia and Ethiopia in particular, almost half of the land has been affected by soil erosion in the course of this century and this has led inevitably to the displacement of populations, and also to precarious sociological and economic conditions. Bad governance – I use this term in the sense of system and methods of government – can aggravate such a situation.

It was difficult to see early indications of a rift in Somali society, owing to its apparent ethnic, cultural and linguistic homogeneity. Insecurity, however, is a factor that can conjure up the demons lurking in the depths of a culture's fantasy world. Individuals thus sought in the clan, the subclan, or even the family, a refuge that would afford them safety and survival, even if this meant the dysfunctioning of the state system and the destruction of the social fabric itself.

Good governance on the part of those in power, and also the leaders of the opposition, means therefore the capacity to foresee such ecological breakdowns, especially in a situation of underdevelopment, and to devise ways and means of attenuating the shocks and, over and above that, turning to better account the potential of our societies.

Environment and governance are therefore in my view the two fundamental parameters in the latent and open crises that have arisen more especially, but not solely, in the developing countries. Having emphasized the importance of these parameters, attention should be drawn to certain historical, cultural and systemic factors which foster political uncertainty and cripple economic development. Although these factors are not in my

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opinion at the root of the outbreak or development of conflicts, they generally contribute to them.

One of these factors is the integration process – a process on which the founding of a nation-state depends. There are of course in our countries perceptible differences of ethnic, tribal or linguistic origin which, while representing a certain cultural potential that could be turned to account in other circumstances, tend to retard the integration process.

Decolonization is another factor. The consequences of a badly started or, worse, badly finalized decolonization process can constitute a major handicap in the founding of a nation-state. We have seen what fate held in store for the formerly colonized lands: the fixing of the boundaries, the political mimetism, the hastily constructed constitutions, have often fomented or aroused latent antagonisms and indeed made the process of integration and stabilization still more complex.

The aftermath of the Cold War is yet another major factor. What is chiefly involved here is the diversion of liberation struggles, or merely of social struggles, taken hostage, as it were, by the protagonists of the Cold War, and thus infected by the virus of ideological warfare. This has resulted in complex conflicts which the abundance of weapons has made interminable.

There is also the dimension of religious antagonism. The extent to which religions exist side by side is a measure of the degree of tolerance in these societies. It depends, too, on a feeling of security, as I have already stressed, but also on the role of the religious and political élites, which have in some cases wrongly assimilated the religious message themselves. For political ends, or through Messianic zeal, such élites have exploited formal differences and thus exacerbate apprehensions, suspicions and a feeling of marginalization.

Lastly, there are what I call the *Jacqueries* of modern times. These social uprisings, whether of rural- or of city-dwellers, are obviously caused by the failure of the political and economic system and a sense of injustice. Religious fundamentalism often gives them an ideological dimension which adds fuel to the flames.

These therefore are some of the main factors which are conducive to the outbreak of the conflicts we see. They are to be found in association in this or that conflict; they are seldom found singly.

It is therefore worthwhile to draw up a sort of guide listing the premonitory signs of the different types of internal conflict, latent or open, and to follow their development more closely. Account must be taken of the roles played by internal and external forces and the intrusion of arms dealing. The blind ambition of certain military or political leaders, the inadequacies of the administrative infrastructure, the paralysis of the traditional mechanisms for conciliation and mediation, are so many aggravating circumstances, and we have to be able to appreciate them and attenuate their effects.

Conflict prevention and conflict resolution are delicate and often long and exacting exercises and the belief that convincing results can be achieved without a certain clarity, without a certain firmness and celerity in the management of the aggravating circumstances, is illusory. The formulas concocted in ivory towers remote from the international agencies – formulas only partially incorporating the facts of the situation – in some cases under pressure from the media, may prove sterile, if not disastrous.

It would be advisable to review current structures and methods with the aim of decentralizing the prevention and management of conflicts. This would mean the promotion, establishment or strengthening of regional, subregional or national structures for conciliation and mediation. Finally, it would mean promoting within civil society new ways and means of intervention. Diffident steps were taken in this direction recently by the regional organizations with the setting up of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) machinery for conflict resolution, the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the Cambodian conflict and the setting up of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

I was personally associated with a think tank to examine ways and means of increasing the effectiveness of the OAU machinery. It has to be admitted that, despite the presence or availability of human resources quite adequate to the tasks of mediation, conciliation or peacekeeping, the OAU, and, one might say, most of the regional organizations in the so-called developing world, are for the time being not in possession of adequate logistical means, or even the structures for the formulation of strategic plans. I witnessed these inadequacies when the OAU asked me to offer my good offices to the different parties to the conflict in the Congo in 1993–1994. Our efforts at

mediation were successful, but we were paralysed when it came to transforming this result into practical measures for the supervision of elections, arbitration, and so on. It was then that we sought the co-operation of the European Union. Thus, for the first time, two regional organizations, one from the North and one from the South, established particularly significant interregional co-operation.

One could, in my opinion, give general effect to this precedent and, with the blessing of the United Nations itself, permanent systemic relations between the regional and the subregional organizations could be promoted, with the help of international organizations such as UNESCO, with its Culture of Peace project, and the Bretton Woods institutions. With a decentralized approach, an extended consultative framework could become the mainspring of a sincerely supportive international community. Traditional diplomatic action might, for instance, gain in effectiveness if it were better synchronized. The kind of disastrous confusion that surrounded the Rwanda tragedy, when the concertation process launched at Arusha could not be turned to account, could then be averted. Lack of communication, suspicion and, in some cases, incompetence lead to a climate of intrigue, the clash of arms, and finally tragedy.

In so far as methodology is concerned, I can never lay enough stress on the importance of prompt intervention, of good timing. Delays, procrastination, are always particularly costly, often in terms of human lives. I have had to deal in turn with Somalia, the Congo and, recently, the South Sudanese question, and I have reached the deep conviction that tardy intervention in Somalia and elsewhere is largely to blame for the anarchy that has gradually pervaded those countries.

Again, in so far as methodology is concerned, situations must not be allowed to deteriorate on the humanitarian and institutional planes. Nothing should impede or delay emergency humanitarian assistance, for large-scale deterioration of the situation necessarily entails a rapid loss of moral values, civic spirit, and the disappearance of a number of institutional and sociological landmarks. As a result, citizens lose their bearings and chaos ensues.

Finally, there has to be just the right amount of armed intervention, and not massive recourse to it as there was in Somalia. Armed intervention is a noble and delicate weapon, which should neither be generalized nor discredited. It is too often referred to as shock

treatment. On the contrary, it is more like microsurgery. In a sense, too, it involves the starting up of a process of rehabilitation of humanitarian faculties or structures. Here, without wishing to overpraise the French contingent which was deployed in Baidoa in Somalia, what it accomplished might more fittingly serve as a model than the sledgehammer strategy put into effect in Mogadishu.

Then again, priority must of course be given to political solutions. This demands laborious and tedious negotiations with all the parties to the conflict and the setting up of a whole arsenal of resources and potentialities – those of the country, the region and the international community. This is where civil society comes in. This of course is a very complex concept which should not be idealized either.

Civil society, in most of the developing countries, is perhaps not as yet fully organized or structured. Nevertheless, there are forces that can be detected and guided. Institutions and personalities in the world of religion, the traditional chieftainry, teaching staff and the medical profession, commercial and women's organizations and human rights associations usually represent the main forces to be welded together, strengthened and encouraged. These forces must be helped to obtain information and documentation, examples from history, to allow them to distance themselves to some extent and to work out peace strategies in a situation that provokes anxiety and irrational drives.

A very great effort should be directed towards management of the collective memory of previous conflicts. Bad management of that memory, the failure to break down and assimilate the traumatic experiences that occurred during the crisis, is a major cause of the prolonging of the crisis. This is where a programme such as UNESCO's 'Towards a Culture of Peace' has a role to play. This promotion of the main forces in the local civil society is often better managed by partners speaking the same language, who are also representatives of international civil society. As with humanitarian action, contacts and co-operation have to be facilitated, a transfer of information, knowledge and know-how thus authorized, and a sense of security restored. This will encourage the search for alternatives to violence.

In the Congo, on the occasion of the symposium on the culture of peace organized by UNESCO, to which Mr Henri Lopes referred earlier, we witnessed a tremendous mobiliza-

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tion of civil society, which exerted such pressure on the political actors that a consensus emerged, and even a government of national unity. So, whether it is a question of intergovernmental structures or the role of civil society, we must move closer to the populations and regions concerned.

A UNESCO statement on the culture of peace, which I will quote in conclusion, says

that: 'The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the two blocs that dominated the world have altered the role played by the United Nations and its specialized agents in the course of their missions to preserve or maintain peace. Now, more than ever, new peace-building structures are required to make possible the transition from a culture of war to a culture of peace.'

## IV. FOURTH ROUND TABLE

*Defence and security policies for peace*

*Chairperson: Mr Christian Decharrière, Prefect,  
Deputy Director of the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN)*

Democratic institutions, productive economic systems and a stable society need the support of the forces of public order if their continuity is to be guaranteed.

The experience of the more advanced countries makes it clear that, far from being a tool of aggression or repression, the army can, in the framework of an international balance of forces, play a key role in assisting peace, or even reconstruction, efforts. Whether deployed outside a nation's frontiers, in very complex co-operative peacekeeping or peace-building operations, or used within its frontiers as a factor in social cohesion, organized action and support for progress, the army has proved itself capable in today's world, under certain conditions, of making a very useful contribution to development and peace. It is therefore vitally important to define these conditions and ensure that they are met.

# WHAT ROLE FOR AFRICAN ARMIES ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?

*by Dominique Bangoura,  
Education supervisor and President of the Observatoire  
Politique et Stratégique de l'Afrique  
(University of Paris I)*

At a time when there is an upsurge of conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, it is my task to assess the role of African armies on the threshold of the twenty-first century. Assessment first involves identifying the nature of the conflicts so as to have a better understanding of potential and actual threats to states and populations.

Those threats, many of which have evolved or changed since the end of the Cold War, make it necessary to rethink, at least partially, the missions and roles of the armed forces with a degree of co-operation from security forces.

Furthermore, as well as internal and external threats and dangers, the security needs of populations and their ways of protecting themselves must be re-examined.

After examining the 'why' – armed forces with what missions and roles, what objectives and what purpose in a new sociopolitical environment? – we must rethink the 'how'.

Identifying the role of African armed forces also means being able to confront real needs and priorities as opposed to the possibilities, human and material limitations of states, the authorities and societies.

Analysis immediately reveals the existence of a crisis in the armed forces:

- internal, institutional, generational crisis;
- professional and operational crisis, crisis of capability;
- crisis in their relations with government;
- crisis in their relations with society.

In other words, like state and society, the armed forces are not free of contradictions, while at the same time they are expected to be efficient and competent in defence and security terms, in these days of restricted resources and political transition.

Is this a huge undertaking or an immense challenge? No doubt both, in view of the developing challenges on the continent.

## **1. New vulnerabilities and changing missions**

### **1.1. Identifying threats**

More than in the past, conflicts are coming to dominate the domestic sociopolitical scene and subsequently to have much wider repercussions.

#### *1.1.1. The nature of internal conflicts*

Since the end of the Cold War and the strategic East-West withdrawal, Africa has experienced a proliferation of internal conflicts linked, it is true, to the reduction in external pressures, but also and above all to increasing political and social demands for better living conditions, political pluralism, respect for human rights and changeover of political power.

Such internal conflict derives in part from the state's inability to fulfil its roles as regards sovereignty and the welfare state – hence the post-colonial states' shortcomings in matters of defence, public security, justice and social and economic security, which are themselves sources of unemployment, exclusion and poverty.

To this type of crisis caused in particular by the crisis of the 'imported state',<sup>1</sup> has been

1. Bertrand Badie, *L'État importé*, Paris, Fayard, 1992, 334 pp.



*In such a context of instability and uncertainty, the loss of social and cultural references accelerates and becomes more serious, leading to a general internal crisis.*

*Today's threats are therefore eminently civil, rarely strictly military in character, sometimes complex, and require socio-economic measures if they are to be settled. They are not confined within national borders but spill over them.*

added over the last three decades the crisis of political power, for long illegal, often illegitimate, using force and violence<sup>1</sup> to ensure its longevity.<sup>2</sup>

In such a context of instability and uncertainty, the loss of social and cultural references accelerates and becomes more serious, leading to a general internal crisis. State violence and violence against the state then confront each other,<sup>3</sup> carrying along with them the weakest and most vulnerable forces in society.<sup>4</sup> This is how riots, repression, rebellions, massacres and civil wars come about.

The major threats to Africa today are therefore internal, multifaceted, permanent threats whose origins are to be found in the shortcomings of the state and the state/society conflict.

However, such conflict does not stop at frontiers. It is a spiralling form of conflict which spreads from local to national and subregional levels. Thus from West to East and North to South, the continent of Africa has zones of tension and conflict.

### **1.1.2. The nature of subregional and transnational conflict**

Two extensions of internal conflicts frequently appear. Rebellions, which take refuge or organize their war economy at least in part from sanctuaries established in neighbouring countries, act either with the support of, or unknown to, the latter. Refugees, who in their millions find themselves on the roads of exodus, weaken the host countries which are already prey to all sorts of problems. With the militarization of the Rwandese refugee camps in Zaire, violence reached a new level, both against the victims and against subregional security.

Furthermore, because of the inability of many states clearly to identify and police their borders, scourges such as trafficking in arms, drugs and precious stones are rampant or even on the increase, facilitated by local, subregional and international networks which are often powerful. Moreover, the possibility cannot be excluded that governments and individual leaders are involved in such transactions. To a lesser extent, illegal economic immigration sometimes leads to criminality.

Other threats that are difficult to control affect people's minds, individually or collectively, since, like the various forms of sectarianism and fundamentalism, they are more diffuse and scattered, but highly pernicious.

### **1.1.3. The nature of interstate conflict**

Interstate conflict has thus fallen into the background but has not disappeared altogether, as evidenced by the conflict between Senegal and Mauritania in 1989, the present conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria and that between Eritrea and Yemen.

These are essentially economic conflicts in a period of shortage and budgetary restrictions: the states, or more directly ruling groups, are seeking to protect exploitable resources.

Today's threats are therefore eminently civil, rarely strictly military in character, sometimes complex, and require socio-economic measures if they are to be settled. They are not confined within national borders but spill over them.<sup>5</sup>

Consequently, the armed forces must reassess and redefine their missions and roles in order to know to what extent they must or will have to intervene.

## **1.2. Missions**

### **1.2.1. The missions of the armed forces**

How are the missions of the armed forces to be rethought in the midst of such conflict? This is very difficult in many respects:

- first, in the light of the past thirty-five years of the African armed forces and particularly their relationship with government and society;
- next, with respect to current needs, which are above all internal security needs and not specifically part of the missions of an army;
- lastly, bearing in mind that defence and security missions cannot be improvised, that they require thought and preparation,

1. Dominique Bangoura, 'État et sécurité en Afrique', *Politique africaine*, No. 61, March 1996, pp. 39-53.

2. Stephen Ellis (ed.), *L'Afrique maintenant*. Cf. T. Drame, *La crise de l'État*, Paris, Karthala, 1995, pp. 333-46.

3. Dominique Bangoura, op. cit., pp. 40-7.

4. Stephen Ellis, op. cit. Cf. Amo El-Kenz, *Les jeunes et la violence*, pp. 87-109.

5. Bertrand Badie, *La fin des territoires*, Paris, Fayard, 1995, 276 pp.

all the more so since the transition to democracy is a delicate matter with steps forward and steps back.<sup>1</sup>

Theoretically, the vocation of African armed forces is to defend territorial integrity, play a part in subregional security as in West Africa with the Non-Aggression and Defence Assistance Agreement (ANAD) and the Mutual Assistance Protocol (PAM), signed respectively by the Communauté Économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) and Togo in 1977, and the Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO) in 1981, or again to play a part in international security beside troops with a United Nations mandate.

In practice, there have been relatively few interstate conflicts in the past three decades since most were regionalized or internationalized as a result of the Cold War (Chad/Libya, Ethiopia/Somalia, southern Africa) and therefore led to the involvement of foreign allies or contingents. The Mali/Burkina Faso conflict in December 1985 was not fuelled by external forces and demonstrated the limitations of both camps.

Subregional military co-operation is little developed or institutionalized even in West Africa because of policies of non-interference in states' internal affairs. The United Nations has been increasing its efforts in this direction in Central Africa over the last few years. There is an acute need to adapt defence and security institutions to the prevention and resolution of internal conflicts, but there is still reluctance to do so for the above-mentioned reasons.

The OAU Peace Force deployed in Chad in 1981 was used only on this one occasion.

As for peacekeeping operations, they are extremely difficult for African states to organize. A few Senegalese, Ghanaian and Nigerian contingents distinguished themselves in the past by their contribution to UNIFIL in Lebanon. In a different context, the Gulf War mobilized competent African troops. However, ECOMOG's involvement in the Liberian conflict shows that there are still great political, logistic and financial problems that require outside support.

The extreme cases of Somalia and Liberia underline the need for Africa to come to the aid of victims of multiple aggressions when a state disintegrates. How is this sort of conflict to be prevented in future? By what means? But also, how is peace to be restored when all the usual political and diplomatic means have

failed and human lives have to be saved or spared? Much remains to be done in this respect on a continent where many states are becoming weaker and the armed forces incontestably have a role to play. It is for Member States, the OAU, its Secretary-General and the international community to give all the necessary impact to an appropriate commitment yet to be defined.<sup>2</sup> The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution adopted by the OAU in Cairo in June 1993 and the idea of the African Intervention Force are a step in the right direction but do not go far enough.

### 1.2.2. *The missions of security forces*

The nature of the predominant type of conflict also leads us to examine the missions of security forces, generally regarded as being closer to the people.

As their name indicates, the mission of security forces is to protect people and property, the smooth running of institutions and respect for the law throughout the territory. The mission of these forces – the constabulary and police – is to see that public security is respected and order maintained.

In fact, however, African security forces obey politicians and are still typified by their severity towards political militants and demonstrators, especially since the beginning of periods of transition.

The security role of such forces is therefore very great as regards populations, but is in fact still underestimated. Furthermore, the armed forces frequently intervene in internal crisis situations, although not trained or equipped to do so, and laws provide for their use only when police and constabulary are unable to control the situation. Consequently, the missions of the respective forces need to be redefined, taking account of political and social change.

In addition, like civilians, all forces need education in the rights and duties of all citizens in a democratic state.

*The security role of such forces is therefore very great as regards populations, but is in fact still underestimated.*

1. Laënnec Hurbon (ed.), *Les transitions démocratiques*, Paris, Syros, 1996. Cf. Dominique Bangoura, *Armées et défis démocratiques en Afrique*, pp. 91–102.

2. Dominique Bangoura, 'Afrique: quelle force d'intervention?', *Le Monde*, 4 February 1993, p. 2.

*On the other hand, there is one field in which the armed forces may legitimately make themselves useful – the security of development.*

### **1.3. The roles of the armed forces**

Following the breakdown of the political, social and economic roles of the armed forces in Africa, thought must be given to what their role should be, and what it should not be in any circumstances. African societies must clarify these roles and decide to make them part of a comprehensive project. The possible contribution of the researcher or observer is limited to analysing past experiences and opening up a few lines of thought.

#### **1.3.1. The political role**

After the wave of coups d'état in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the political role of armies can be seen to be a failure. Few soldiers in government have not repeated the mistakes of the civilians they have overthrown. The myth of the 'redeeming soldier' must therefore be treated with caution, if not distrust.

More recently, the overthrow on 27 January 1996 of democratically elected President Mahamane Ousmane of Niger by Colonel I. Baré Mainassara raises a new problem, namely the paralysis of institutions born of transition and the failure of power-sharing. Hence the questions: at what point does a legal and legitimate government become illegitimate? How can the situation be peacefully remedied and how, according to what criteria, can this renewed intrusion of the armed forces in political life be understood?

More generally, the idea of a political role for armies brings back the spectre of authoritarianism, whether civilian or military. Many armed forces are, whether they like it or not, performing a security mission close to the ruling group – often in competition with other paramilitary forces, presidential guards or militias.

Armed forces on the threshold of the twenty-first century should avoid such deviations, but it is hardly possible to exclude them for the moment. This major risk for young democracies persists because of the weight of the past, and present resistance to change.

#### **1.3.2. The social role**

The social integration role of the armed forces has not been successful in Africa. In the French-speaking countries that opted for conscription in the 1960s, integration has not taken place for political and economic reasons. In

some cases the government has preferred to recruit its troops from, and officer its troops with, politically reliable elements which it has selected itself; in others, the financial resources for housing, feeding, training and equipping young men of military age each year have been lacking.

#### **1.3.3. The economic role**

The economic role of armies leaves much to be desired in most countries, even though it exists here and there (transport, engineering, etc.). Experiments with civic services have not produced the desired results, although the original idea, based on national integration and solidarity, was innovative and generous. Flexible and cumbersome versions of foreign inspiration have all been deflected from their purpose by politicians.

The principle of making economic use of the armed forces in peacetime by sending them to the fields or having them build roads and schools is far from recent. It is all the more understandable in countries where every contribution or, conversely, every counterweight to development, counts. However, entrusting civilian tasks to the armed forces is not without risk. On the one hand, they may lose their defence capability; on the other, they may feel indispensable and be tempted by the exercise of power.

Nowadays, when the idea of the army as an actor in development comes up regularly, it is important to assess this possible role and weigh up its advantages and disadvantages. The armed forces may carry out many tasks, including producing food and some of the equipment they need, but they must not lose sight of their defence mission.

This question is particularly relevant now, when whole sectors of economies formerly described as national are gradually being privatized. There therefore seems less prospect of seeing the armed forces take over civilian economic sectors.

On the other hand, there is one field in which the armed forces may legitimately make themselves useful – the security of development – as much remains to be done in the African countries where local security and the security of the whole territory outside the big cities and places of economic-strategic production (oil, mining, export resources), are seriously deficient, to the detriment of populations in particular.

While there is no doubt that the armed forces can and must contribute to security, it is much more difficult to establish on what bases or according to what criteria this should occur.

In view of the confusion in many African armed forces between defence and security missions, it is important to avoid further pitfalls. On the threshold of the twenty-first century it is probably desirable to change concepts of the missions and roles of armies in order to better protect the population. Attention should doubtless also be given to a complementary, not only institutional but also functional, approach to security, that is, to direct participation by populations. In short, the civilian and military factors of a genuine momentum of peace must be identified.

It is here that the question asked by the organizers of this symposium takes on its full meaning: how can defence and security policies for peace be promoted?

## **2. Reform and partnership**

External and internal peace, like multifaceted security, can only be achieved by combining and harmonizing the political, military and social dimensions. If one of these parameters is lacking, peace and security will be threatened. How can a new role for the armed forces be conceived in this context? By setting out on the road of reform and partnership.

### **2.1. Adopting and applying democratic principles**

The question of the role of the armed forces was not clearly articulated at the time of the national conferences and major public debates. Attention was focused more on the past, on criticizing the former regimes, than on a constructive debate about the future.

Soldiers were sometimes invited to these forums but very soon walked out, feeling themselves called into question. This shows how great the gulf tends to be between army and society, depending on the country.

Because of this, in the absence of dialogue, democratic transition remains uncertain as it cannot succeed in the presence of all these actors. The armed forces are an underestimated key factor in this process. In Benin and Mali, original ways out of the impasse have been found, but in many other cases transition is difficult and painful.

In principle, the army should be part of the rule of law and the product of a vision of society. The problem for African countries is therefore how to provide themselves with the armed forces they need. This is the heart of the problem, with mutual incomprehension in both camps, the fact being that civilians have often suffered from the repression and exactions of the military.

Politicians are another obstacle when former leaders with force at their disposal refuse or resist change.

A defence and security policy for peace must aim not only for peace at the borders, but also for civil peace and social peace. An essential stage in achieving this is restoring confidence between the armed forces and the people and separating the military and political in senior government posts.

The success of such a policy, and of the processes of transition, therefore depends on an innovatory approach to the relationship between army and society and army and government.

### **2.2. Institutional reform of the armed forces**

There must be prior assessment of threats, needs and available resources in order to reform the armed forces so as to obtain consistent, credible, efficient, modern institutions.

In view of the diversity and divergences between the armies<sup>1</sup> of different countries and the differences from one military corps to another within states, reform cannot be uniform.

Indeed, there are physical disparities between these forces as regards the number of men mobilized or mobilizable, the state of equipment and weapons, and operational capacities. Some troops are integrated and paid, while others are more or less left to themselves or abandoned.

Similarly, there are political disparities between armed forces according to whether they are in countries with a civilian or a military regime.

Furthermore, there are differences in status between forces that have enjoyed a degree of continuity (Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon) and

1. Dominique Bangoura, *Les armées africaines: 1960-1990*, Paris, CHEAM, 1992, 190 p.

others which, after peace agreements, have recruited former rebel troops (Angola, Mozambique, Mali, Niger).

Geopolitical disparities persist between armies in subregions, as is shown by the position of South Africa, Nigeria and Zaire in their respective zones. However, these capacities are steadily decreasing with the internal weakening of these states.

Nevertheless, there are points of convergence between the armed forces of sub-Saharan Africa. All are going through internal crises of varying degrees of intensity: ideological or generation crises between young and older officers; material crisis between those who live opulently and the rank-and-file who live in poverty, between those who are close to the government and those who remain anonymous; a crisis of identity or moral crisis for soldiers seeking a meaning in their enlistment.

### **2.3. Implementing partnership between civilians and military**

Security is everyone's concern and no one can afford to ignore it. This is why the idea of a partnership involving all citizens corresponds more closely to needs and realities.

On the one hand, the armed and security forces cannot do everything; on the other, civil society is insufficiently autonomous to meet all its security needs.

In addition, populations and states are subject to both civil and military threats.

The role of African armies on the threshold of the twenty-first century is therefore part of this large picture, both beside and reinforcing civilian populations, and as the outpost of states and governments for the defence of the territory, the common heritage and the institutions freely chosen by the people.

## **Conclusion**

While it is not possible to reach conclusions on such a subject, some lines of research can nevertheless be suggested.

In the next decade, emphasis should be placed on scientific analysis in order to carry out such a project successfully. The identification of respective missions and the sharing out of defence and security responsibilities still need to be analysed further and in more detail.

At the same time, and complementary to the above, it is essential for the success of defence and security policies to disseminate an internal and external culture of peace among civilians and soldiers. The education of citizens is also desirable.

Above all, it is important that any solutions found should be firmly rooted in habits, customs and cultures, in the black African social heritage. Those providing external back-up and support, and urging respect for universal principles and values, should never lose sight of this essential aspect of security and the actors responsible for it.

# DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMIES IN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

## Part I

*by Rudolf Joo,  
former Hungarian State Secretary of Defence,  
Professor at the George C. Marshall  
European Center for Security Studies*

Yesterday's debate clearly showed that the profound change in the international environment has prompted more or less radical adaptations on the part of the various international players: the developed and less developed countries, their respective armies and a variety of international organizations.

In this context the case of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is quite specific. In this region of Europe, not only have events drastically modified the international context of the countries; they have also simultaneously compelled states to alter their internal regimes. In other words, these countries faced a twofold challenge making any reform, in particular where the armed forces were concerned, still more complex and difficult.

Furthermore, we should not underestimate the impact of such events as the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact; the growing number of national sovereignties throughout the region; the outbreak of military conflicts in the former Yugoslavia – to mention only those that have had the biggest repercussions on the region's recent history.

I should like to illustrate these developments by referring to the case of a country like Hungary. In the early 1990s, in the space of two or three years, Hungary saw the departure of Soviet troops from its territory and the restoration of its full sovereignty, including its sovereignty in defence matters. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union increased the number of Hungary's neighbouring states from five to eight. More importantly, five of its neighbours are new states. Mention must further be made of the war in the former Yugoslavia, a real enough war in the immediate vicinity of Hungary, and of many other countries of the region.

Such an upheaval of geopolitical realities calls for a complete reassessment of the security concepts and structures of the countries concerned. It explains the heightened interest in new methods of preventive diplomacy and crisis management, including new peacekeeping requirements. The present situation justifies the deliberate quest for real guarantees, which can be provided primarily through co-operation and integration. With the kind of decomposing that is under way, therefore, major efforts are needed in this region to find ways of recomposing, sometimes in new institutional settings.

It is a huge challenge. Yet for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe it is only part of the story. The other part, a by no means negligible part, is the internal dimension of change: the transformation of the previous antidemocratic and inefficient system.

Lack of time rules out any detailed examination of the role of the armies under the communist system. Essentially, the armed forces in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were, before 1990, extremely politicized and looked on as one of the pillars of the so-called socialist system both nationally and internationally (through the Warsaw Pact).

The army had no independent political role in communist society. In this respect, too, there is a considerable difference with the experience of many African countries, which has just been presented to us. It was more of a symbiosis that existed between the single party in power and the armed forces. The party exerted strict control over the armed forces by means of its cells, its political officers and ongoing political education. A secure mechanism had been put in place to guarantee the army's unconditional loyalty to the party. It was indeed real,

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*In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the establishment of civilian control of armies is not an aim in itself; it essentially serves to fortify the nascent democratic order in these states.*

even effective, political control but of course not democratic control.

The mutation of the system – what with the introduction of the rule of law, a multiparty system and the market economy – required a redefining of relations between civilians and the military, including relations between the political authority and the military high command. The declared purpose was to establish a defence structure and culture essentially along Western lines.

At present, however, there is still a gaping chasm in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe between the statements of intent and the reality of civilian control over the armed forces. The countries have made considerable progress in the depoliticizing of armies: the monopoly and privileges of the old single party were seen off relatively fast and smoothly. Mention must further be made of defence legislation with the establishment of a legal and constitutional framework in keeping with democratic norms, which has also progressed rather encouragingly.

In contrast with these results, the institutional and personal changes making political realities of legal stipulations are all too often way behind. In many cases, even today, there is a degree of ambivalence when it comes to sharing out powers between the Ministry of Defence and the military high command. Sometimes we still see ‘government versus president’ feuds for the control of the army. Obviously, the vagueness of the respective remits makes it difficult for the various institutions to function normally and also prevents civilian-military relations from moving towards more harmony than is now the case.

In this respect, it must also be noted that in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe there are still very few civilians working in the Ministry of Defence as officials, experts or advisers. Today the totalitarian past is still largely to blame for this situation. There is often a reluctance to take on more civilians in the ministerial machinery. Significantly, too, most countries of the region still lack institutions comparable to the French Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN), where civilians are trained as non-military defence experts.

Such practices as instruction and education in general may also help to restore the prestige of the military in the ‘democratizing’ societies. Their armies, which are undergoing profound changes, deserve to have public opinion ‘swung round in their favour’. Yet it seems to me that restoring the prestige of the armed forces is at times a neglected aspect of the current reforms.

In conclusion, yesterday’s debate highlighted the close interdependence that exists between international security, on the one hand, and the stability of internal democratic institutions on the other. In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the establishment of civilian control of armies is not an aim in itself; it essentially serves to fortify the nascent democratic order in these states.

Democratic processes and greater transparency can in turn be expected to build up confidence between states. There are several means of hastening these developments, such as education and integration, about which my colleague Réka Szemerkenyi, to whom I hand over the floor, will tell you in greater detail.

# DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMIES IN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Part II

by Réka Szemerkenyi,  
*Researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)*

Dr Joo gave an excellent summary of the manifold challenges facing the military, politicians and civilian society alike if they are to initiate a reform of the military in the new post-Cold-War spirit. He also promised you that I would come up with proposals on how to accelerate this process as related to the military. Indeed, the time is ripe to take stock of the reforms that have been undertaken in the last six years – since the end of the Cold War – in order to analyse successes and failures, draw conclusions for the future and see how to proceed. This is what I should like to do.

Civilian-military relations are the hidden aspect of strategy, and strategic thinking has undergone a momentous transformation in the recent past in Central and Eastern Europe. From previously primarily aggressive force structures, the armed forces of the newly independent Central and Eastern European countries have had to acquire the characteristics of national defence forces and develop the capability to co-operate with their former enemies. In addition, they have had to adjust to new international thinking on the use of military force, with heavy emphasis on peacekeeping operations and the maintenance of stability. These two new functions are of prime interest at our debate today.

There are six aspects that I should like to consider briefly with reference to the reform of the armed forces of Central Europe. I believe that much of the experience of this region is relevant to your work as well.

These six aspects of new ways of thinking about the military are political, financial, bureaucratic, educational, public relations and structural-functional. I shall start with the political aspect.

Central European armed forces were accustomed for forty years to accept political influence, and their individual political commitment, as a basis for promotion and general attitudes. Reforming this mentality is a most challenging task. Although legal and constitutional reforms have ended the formal ties between the officer corps and the political parties, close analysis shows that six years after the changes, the informal ties and sympathies of the military with the former communist parties still persist. There is a division within the military between the older and the younger generation. These informal ties remain characteristic of the older generation of officers. Nevertheless, this is enough to create a kind of passive resistance to many of the reforms within the military which sometimes becomes 'behind-the-scenes obstructionism' to reform.

The second aspect is financial. The decline in the defence budget is generally referred to as one of the most serious overall problems in reforming the military. I should like to make two points in this connection. First, the decrease of the military budget as a proportion of GNP in Central Europe did not start in 1990 but in the mid-1980s. This is true of practically all countries. So what we are seeing now is the cumulative effect of almost a decade. Second, there is an exception to this trend which is worth keeping in mind. Poland was the only country to achieve positive economic growth in the region and although growth followed very quickly in the Czech Republic and in Hungary as well this did not have the same impact on defence spending. For 1995 military spending in Poland was set at 2.6 per cent of the budget. For 1996 it was raised to 3 per cent but if we note also that the Polish economy is expected to grow by 5 to 10 per cent in 1996, we can see

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*...a shift from reforming training alone to reforming military education as well. New strategic thinking about the military involves not only technical co-operation but also their new role as builders of democratic stability.*

that this is not the same trend as in other countries of the region. In the Czech Republic, defence spending fell by 33 per cent in the space of one year, from 1989 to 1990. Whereas in 1985 it represented 4.7 per cent of GNP, by 1995 it had gone down to 2.36 per cent. In Hungary, similarly, if we take 1988 as a base year when defence spending represented 100, by 1990 – two years later – it had gone down to 79. In successive years the figures were 64, 57, 54 and 49, and by 1995 it had gone down to 37. This is practically a two-thirds decrease.

Third, the bureaucratic aspect. Despite the declared goal of civilian supervision, the military alone have the basic know-how on the running of ministries of defence, in fact involving their own administrative and financial management. There is a chronic lack of civilian expertise in military and security matters, including the new role of the armed forces as upholders of stability and peace, our topic at this conference.

Aspect four is education. Many projects, bilateral and multilateral, have been undertaken since 1990 to reform the military. However, I believe that most of these are primarily conceived by the military for the military, or designed by NATO countries for Central or Eastern European countries, and they involve training more often than education. There are very few programmes designed by civilians for civilians as a counterpart to military to military co-operation. In fact the programmes that are open in principle to both the civilian and military sectors are in practice skewed in favour of the military. It is important to focus on training the civilian side as well, to encourage civilians to reflect on the new role of the military.

Aspect five concerns public relations or the public image of the military. I think that there is a wide variety of perceptions of the military within Central Europe. Sometimes public opinion about the armed forces is very favourable. Sometimes, as in the Czech Republic, military matters almost constitute a no man's land in domestic politics. Declining interest is, I

believe, a region-wide tendency. On one point there is clear public support as far as attitudes to the military are concerned, and that is exactly what we are discussing here, the new use of the armed forces to build stability, contributing to peace worldwide. This is why there is support for the participation of national forces in international operations.

The last point I should like to raise is the structural-functional aspect of the reforms. A two-track process has been undertaken in Central Europe: downsizing the military and at the same time restructuring them after the end of the Warsaw Pact. There is however a third twist to the story, which is the result of the new international trend of peacekeeping and a new role for the military. Although for many years they have had opportunities to play this role all over the world, the armed forces continue to see it more as an exception than a new trend in their role. This puts even more pressure on the Central European military.

What does all this reveal about the possibility of speeding up the reform process? I should like to take this opportunity to propose a three-track approach, or a three-track policy, for transforming the military into a force for peace and stability.

One track would be directed towards the armed forces themselves and include a shift from reforming training alone to reforming military education as well. New strategic thinking about the military involves not only technical co-operation but also their new role as builders of democratic stability.

Another track would involve the political and civilian side. New strategic thinking must focus strongly on the military role in international operations and this must be reflected both in the defence budget and in professional bureaucratic thinking.

The third track should focus on the public and the shapers of public opinion. The image of the military as a financial burden in the transformation process must be rectified by emphasis on their new role in Central Europe in maintaining stability.

# USE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGICAL, SCIENTIFIC AND LOGISTICAL POTENTIAL BY THE CIVILIAN SECTOR

*by Luciano Caglioti,  
Director of Strategic Projects  
at the Italian National Centre for Scientific Research*

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the world has been changing very quickly. Many states have been disrupted from within by independence movements, such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Others, like Canada, have been on the point of splitting in two. Yet others are experiencing trouble, such as France with Corsica, Spain with Catalonia, Belgium because of the division between Flemish- and French-speakers, and Italy, which has an increasing problem in its northern regions. At the same time, the conglomerate of the 200 largest industries and banks in the world, which Ignacio Ramonet in *Le Monde Diplomatique* calls the Club of 200, has seen its share of world GNP rise from 16 per cent in 1965 to 29 per cent in 1989; and the privatization of groups, mergers between large companies, the expansion of Western companies in Russia, China, Viet Nam and the Far East, brings this share to still higher levels, perhaps exceeding 30 or 35 per cent.

Technology is the starting-point for most of these companies. That means that the development and expansion of technology is changing not only the world of production but also the political and economic spheres. The globalization of the economy, immigration from the South and East to European countries, and changing military approaches, raise new problems and perhaps open up new opportunities. We are suddenly faced with new situations and we must find new ways of solving new and unexpected problems, together with new strategies and opportunities.

At the same time, the military world is adopting new strategies of interaction with civilian society. The major change proposed by President Chirac is possibly the first step

towards analogous decisions in the rest of Europe.

Moreover, we are witnessing the emergence of new aspects of society which are important for both the military and the civilian world. I refer to instability and terrorism in Japan, France and Italy, for example. Surfing the Internet, you can find summaries of yesterday's speeches, but you can also find intriguing documents like one called 'The terrorist handbook' – forty pages of instructions on how to make a bomb with easily purchased ingredients, or 'How to blow up things', another instruction manual for a highly specialized readership.

The Mediterranean zone is of special interest to us all. We remember what happened in South-East Asia when the wars in Korea and Viet Nam finally came to an end. A major technological centre like Japan and a labour force of millions of people were the starting-point of a huge pole of production. Something similar could happen in the Mediterranean area. In Israel and in southern Europe there are large technological concentrations. We have the labour force and we also have raw materials, ranging from phosphate in Morocco to oil and methane gas in North Africa and the Middle East.

This being the case, science and technology are one way, if not the only way, to face the new problems confronting us, whether growing urban populations, environmental problems, or new diseases linked in some way to the considerable changes in the size and localization of the world population, not to mention all the natural hazards long known to us, such as earthquakes and floods.

Collaboration between the civilian and military worlds is a complex task for both parties,

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involving difficulties of interaction and technological spin-off; technologies developed in the military field have many applications in our daily lives, such as the microwave ovens and non-stick frying pans in our kitchens, or in society, such as nuclear energy. In reviews on spin-off from the military to the civilian sector, four types of technology are usually mentioned: transistors and integrated circuits, automatically programmed machinery, the ultra-high-speed integrated circuits, and strategic computing programs.

Our meeting today has among its hopes that of activating large-scale international collaboration, promoted by UNESCO on both sides of the Mediterranean, as proposed by its Director-General, Mr Federico Mayor, on subjects that are important and useful for humanity while lending themselves to greater co-operation between the armed forces of the Mediterranean countries and the populations of the same area. A first and obvious field is that of telemedicine. The word 'telemedicine' encompasses different activities. The most common meanings are 'tele-diagnosis' and tele-assistance. Tele-diagnosis consists of the transmission of images derived from x-rays, nuclear magnetic resonance, electrocardiographic measurements, and so on, from a peripheric laboratory to a well-organized diagnostic and therapeutic hospital. Military field equipment can be indispensable to this kind of approach, making it possible to avoid the unnecessary gravitation of the population from the periphery to the towns. Tele-diagnosis informs us which patients need hospitalization and which can be cared for at home.

Telemedicine also makes it possible to take care of elderly people at home, simply using telematic monitoring instruments to provide data on their heart condition, blood pressure and other essential parameters.

In the event of natural disaster, or when mass vaccination is necessary, the military can provide the population with efficient equipment. Monitoring of environmental pollution or of desertification is another field in which collaboration between the civilian and military worlds is essential.

There is another domain in which this collaboration can be of great value: that of cultural goods.

Our cultural heritage bears witness to our common roots. We have a duty to preserve for new generations this patrimony that we received from our ancestors. Environmental factors, especially in towns, are destroying architectural materials: marble, metals and stone are being corrupted by nitric oxides, sulphur dioxide, ozone and light. Seismic movements are another problem for the stability of churches, palaces and ancient walls.

Furthermore, many objects have not yet been found, and we need georadar, submarine instrumentation and satellite observation to find, under the ground or under the sea, ancient walls and villas from the Roman or Greek civilizations, or metal-detectors to find metallic objects.

As regards protection against seismic movements, products have been made available for the restoration, consolidation and preservation of cultural property.

Collaboration between civilian and military experts for the training of specialists at the national and international level is furthermore an important factor in the modernization of our countries.

The proposals we are discussing at this meeting are very important. They are an answer to change, on the basis of technological arguments and considerations which link rather than divide people: arguments such as health, safety, protection of the environment and culture.

## THE NEW ROLE OF THE ARMY IN PEACE-BUILDING

*by Janusz Symonides,  
Director of the Division of Human Rights,  
Democracy and Peace at UNESCO*

I have to confess that as a person of a very low military grade, I feel a little uneasy in the presence of so many generals and colonels. Since I am the last speaker at this session, a number of points that I wanted to make have already been presented; I shall therefore be brief.

Before entering the debate on the new roles of the armed forces in peace-building, we should first say a few words about their 'traditional' roles. What are the traditional roles and missions which the armed forces perform? Of course, they defend states against external attack and aggression. They protect national frontiers. They maintain internal stability and, when necessary, restore constitutional order. Quite often, military power determines the position of a state in the international community. The idea of a 'super-power' is based on the possession of strategic nuclear weapons. All the permanent members of the Security Council are nuclear powers. Military force has been used for centuries as an instrument of foreign policy. Through pressure, threat and the use of military force, certain foreign-policy objectives have been achieved.

Are all these traditional functions still valid in a new international context, a new international situation? True, the end of the Cold War, the end of ideological confrontation, have eliminated to a great extent the danger of global nuclear or conventional conflict. Many images of 'the enemy' have changed or been eliminated. Many security threats have vanished. New military doctrines are discussed, such as military sufficiency and non-offensive defence.

Which of the traditional functions of armies are still valid? Eventually we may agree that

the defence of the state against external aggression and attack is probably less important than it was before. As was said yesterday, this may be true of some regions, such as North America and Europe, but it is less so of the Middle East or Asia. Perhaps military power is now less important in determining the position of states. In the current discussion concerning the changes in the Security Council, military considerations count for less than economic and political factors. We may also say that today military power is a less efficient instrument of foreign policy than it used to be.

Does this mean that the military factor is unimportant nowadays? My answer to this is no. Although some traditional functions of the armed forces are dwindling, others are expanding. The proliferation of internal conflicts creates the need to preserve internal stability and constitutional order. The protection of borders thus acquires a new dimension. After enormous changes in the law of the sea, the protection of the 200-mile economic zone is a serious problem for many countries.

Armed forces may operate at the international as well as the national level. We should therefore also mention the international roles and missions of the army. What changes can we see here? Specialists in international law are familiar with the situation in which armies act on behalf of the international community. Warships under whatever flag are entitled to stop and search any boat and to arrest its crew in the event of piracy or slavery. The Montego Bay Convention (1982) which entered into force last year even widened these powers by authorizing warships to intervene in the struggle against illicit drug trafficking.

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Another dimension is the use of military force and armies in collective self-defence as a part of military sanction or actions against aggression. The United Nations Charter made provision for a system of collective security using the armed forces of the United Nations and the Military Staff Committee. This system could not be put in place during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, the question arose whether it was necessary to create a United Nations army. For various reasons, the creation of such an army is a fairly remote possibility.

The international function which is in full expansion is that of peacekeeping. Clearly, the role of the military here is extremely important. One need only consider a few figures. In 1987, 10,000 soldiers participated in peacekeeping operations. In 1993, that number had increased sevenfold to 70,000. What are the tasks performed by these soldiers? There are a number of military activities, such as the separation of forces, implementation of embargoes, mine-clearing and disarmament. But there are also civilian functions, such as monitoring peace accords, protection of victims and refugees, the organization and supervision of elections, and so forth.

Peacekeeping operations raise two questions. The first is: should military personnel be used to fulfil a civilian or police function? Doubts have been expressed on the subject. The other question concerns the nature of military operations: should these operations be limited only to peacekeeping, or should another function, the imposition of peace, be added? The imposition of peace was mentioned by the Secretary-General in his report in 1994 to the General Assembly, but the answer of the United Nations was rather negative. The United Nations is not prepared to carry out or organize such a task. This should rather be done in co-operation with regional military structures such as NATO. We should not forget that peacekeeping is an operation based on Chapter VI and not on Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. New developments in this area are standby arrangements whereby some countries agree to identify in advance forces that will be dedicated to peacekeeping. Such obligations have been entered into by Jordan, Denmark and Ghana.

By peacekeeping operations, the military are contributing substantially to consolidation of peace among the parties. But there is another important element of peacekeeping

which is sometimes forgotten, namely, that peacekeeping is also a confidence-building measure. Some operations have involved military personnel from more than forty-six countries and representing various regions, cultures and religions, and this is a vital factor in creating trust among the troops and armies involved.

Allow me now to say a few words about armies, human rights, humanitarian law, cultural pluralism and dialogue. The list of sources of conflict in the world is enormously long. It includes massive violations of human rights and discrimination against various minorities – ethnic, national, religious and linguistic – and indigenous populations. Perhaps we should also add extreme nationalism and religious extremism. Can armies help to eliminate such sources of conflict? Yes, armies can do much to promote respect and observance of human rights. Let us remember, also, that the question of the observance of human rights has two dimensions: within the army, and in relations between the army and the population. In totalitarian armies, human dignity was violated. In countries in the transition to democracy, therefore, the restoration of human dignity in the army is of the utmost importance.

Also important is the promotion of humanitarian law. In new situations, with the proliferation of civil conflicts, the rights of civilian populations are being violated on a massive scale. The protection of the civilian population is therefore of extreme importance. The Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols for the protection of victims of international and non-international armed conflicts do not fully guarantee the necessary protection. Armies are used in various situations which do not technically qualify as armed conflicts, such as public emergencies, disturbances and crises. The question of the minimum humanitarian standards which should be observed in such situations is therefore of the utmost importance.

The rise of extreme nationalism carries the risk that the state is seen as the property of one ethnic, national or religious group. The situation is even more dangerous when the army is seen as the defender of one group, one religion or one ideology. Therefore access to the army, its 'opening up' to various groups and sectors of society, and their representation in the army, are very important. The armed forces should protect the interests of society as a whole. From this point of view,

peace accords which provide, in a context of general reconciliation, for the absorption of 'rebel' forces into government forces may be considered a step in the right direction.

During this symposium, the question was raised several times whether UNESCO was co-operating with the armed forces. Allow me to say briefly that as far as the promotion of human rights and humanitarian law is concerned, UNESCO created an entire network of Chairs that co-operate with the armed forces. In this biennium, 1996–1997, we have a special pilot project on the promotion of humanitarian law in Central and Eastern Europe. For the next biennium, 1998–1999, a project is scheduled for Africa. UNESCO is organizing a number of conferences in which representatives of armies and military academies are participating. For example, in 1994 we held a seminar in Poland on education for human rights at university level, and a special round table on human rights in military academies. In April 1995, we held a conference in Moscow on education for democracy and humanitarian law, with a very impressive representation of various military academies and the Ministry of Defence. In September 1995 we organized a meeting in Shimla (India), with the participation of high commanders who presented interesting programmes on the promotion of human rights and humanitarian law in the Indian Army.

Let me conclude with a few short remarks. There is no doubt that we are living in a time

of profound change and transformation. It is no surprise that change and transformation bring instability and insecurity. The armed forces are confronted with new challenges. They can promote stability and strengthen peace, provided that they accept their new roles and functions on various levels – national, regional and global. As the Director-General has repeatedly said, it is always more costly and less effective to have recourse to repression or the imposition of peace than it is to prevent and to eliminate the root causes of conflict. The armed forces can help to eliminate various sources of conflict, in particular those arising from discrimination affecting vulnerable groups and the violation of human rights and democratic principles.

The use of military force is still legitimate, but it should be used only in a limited manner, in extreme cases, because as a rule weapons create more problems than they solve. It is true that so-called intelligent weapons now exist, which offer greater precision than before and which probably limit the number of victims. They are nevertheless designed for destruction. Democratic opinion cannot accept mass losses of human lives. The right to life is a fundamental human right.

I should like to end on an encouraging note: in discussions on the use of military force, army representatives are often more cautious, more prudent – in short, more responsible in their attitude – than many politicians.

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**V.**  
**SUMMARY OF THE ROUND TABLES**

## SUMMARY OF THE ROUND TABLES

*by Philippe Rattu,*

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### 1. Two conclusions and three rejections

The round-table discussions to which the first part of our symposium was devoted made very valuable contributions to the subject we are here to debate: how to move from partial insecurity to global security. It is difficult to do justice to them by considering them together, in a summary. Each one was so rich and made so many relevant points that any attempt to gather the gist of them in the form of an initial assessment is bound to fail. The attempt, however presumptuous, must be made, so that we can make progress based on a reminder of the salient features of the reality which emerged, as if in successive layers, from the different interpretations which the various speakers suggested to us, just as the superimposing of fragments of a coded message suddenly makes it possible to guess at the meaning concealed in each of them.

We can begin by drawing three fundamental conclusions from all the talks:

(a) The first of these is that the problem of peace is, in essence, both a civilian and a military problem. Military force alone cannot solve it, but no other solution can dispense with the military aspect. The forum in which we are meeting here and the matrix for our work, represented by defence institutes many of which are open to civilians and military personnel alike, are a very favourable asset when dealing with such a theme. This encourages us in our mission and strengthens our resolve, and above all it helps us to reach the heart of the matter: peace is not a stable condition that is maintained (or disrupted?) by soldiers for the good (or misfortune) of civilians. It is a

dynamic condition that has to be constantly restored by an imaginative combination of force and thoughtfulness, action and prevention, intervention and management. Peace exists only as the outcome of appropriate civilian and military action in which, in some instances, one of the two forces may momentarily tend towards zero, but must never reach it or even come too close to it at the risk of triggering off dreadful calamities.

(b) The second conclusion is that our debate is taking place at a particular moment in time. It is not a theological or philosophical debate on security. It entails discussing today, in a way which may be superseded tomorrow, a situation that exists more or less ten years after the end of the Cold War and perhaps ten or twenty years before something else which is currently beyond our imagination and will perhaps change the way in which the cards are dealt. The time factor means that this debate must be focused on action and not on theory. Theory is eternal but action is momentary. This remark may seem trivial but it has a philosophical and practical impact: it limits the horizon of our reasoning to what is practicable and relegates philosophical speculation to the more distant background. It calls for effective action now, even if this means meditating on the reasons for action at a later stage. In short, it sets out problems in the political and the ethical sphere, as far removed from metaphysics ('Where is the first cause?') as from resignation ('Yes, but what can we do about it?'). We have elected to say 'yes' to responsible action in the present-day world, with the means this requires and the capacities this involves.



(c) The third conclusion is that we have refused to accept a certain number of ideas and have therefore adopted a common position on a number of subjects.

- In the first place, we consider that the idea of a clash of civilizations is mistaken and harmful.

The *raison d'être* of the institution welcoming us here is, in fact, to contest this idea and to refute it every day. This was said right from the beginning with admirable force by Mr Mayor himself and was developed by Mr Lopes in his talk.

However, our rejection of this idea has been strengthened by convictions that have been forged amongst us: we considered that this view of history drew too heavily on an outdated reference: that of the great planet-wide confrontation. Now that opposition between East and West or North and South is becoming fainter or more obscure and revealing a myriad of problems, in the same way as at the close of the day one can see the stars – which were always there but which had been concealed by the dazzling light of the closest star – far from seeing an increase in head-on clashes, we perceive a host of unforeseen, improbable and unhelped-for arrangements. The problems which we discover in this twilight of false oppositions are practical ones and are arising here and now. They do not stem from a Toynbee-like powerful global destiny but form a multitude of contingent situations which have fragile links with each other. Moreover, as our Algerian colleague reminded us, these situations fraught with hitherto unexplored problems are found not only in the countries purportedly 'at risk'; they are found everywhere, even in the heart of countries that are regarded as being the most peaceful. Consequently, rather than allowing our fears to feed on the myth of a clash of civilizations, we should be clear-sighted enough to endeavour to identify and eliminate the sacs of venom that are capable of poisoning each civilization from the inside. In this perspective, all cross-views and everyone's critical acumen are invaluable in the service of civilization as a whole, the term civilization being understood in Guizot's sense of the process by which humanity as a whole endeavours to do better.

- The second idea we have rejected is related to the fear of exclusion. We are emerging from a period when, basically, the dynamic for any state consisted of ruling out undue inclusions and of trying to avoid being too

involved in an empire or system. Leaving the responsibility for structuring the world to the superpowers, each state sought to show that it was different while accepting the world as it was.

Matters are now quite different: there are no longer any empires from which countries can escape by a gesture of independence sufficient to create a structured relationship with the rest of the world. On the contrary, it has never been easier for peoples, nations or ethnic groups to grasp their autonomy and find themselves unequivocally recognized up to the point of independence. However, this incredible advantage has to be assessed in the light of the new path taken by the world, which is increasingly clearly composed of a single system to which all peoples belong. Within this system, the vital prize to be won is no longer independence – which is so liberally recognized – but participation and interdependence. The worst thing that can happen is to be abandoned to a separate independence and not to share the constraints of the world system which can now manage without almost any component part unable to follow its pace and rules.

The world in which we now live is moving ahead on the basis of global integration. Power consists in taking advantage of this and no longer in growing stronger separately. Even the largest powers are submitting to this law, sometimes at the price of the most radical backtracking. In this context, the tragedy is not to be assimilated but to be neglected. The fear of being excluded, or actual exclusion, is a source of part of the troubles we wished to examine. Hence, we say 'no' to exclusion, without overlooking the fact that it is by no means easy to bring back into the global movement of history countries, societies and human groups which have wanted to stand aside from it or have not been able to share in it. Yet the task must be undertaken, since insecurity is the direct outcome of this exclusion, whether it is imposed or deliberate.

- Our third rejection responds to this need to do away with the sources of insecurity, especially those generated by the reality or anguish of exclusion, since it also consists of saying 'no' to inaction.

As we said earlier, peace is not a condition with different trends or an unchanging reference. It is unending action. It is not the opposite of war, but something positive that has to be built up. When he opened this symposium, General Norlain compared peace to a coin,

which must have two faces; otherwise it is merely the idea of a coin. There is the security face and the humanist face, but the important point is to realize that neither face exists without the other. We have to be very conscious of this twofold idea: like Penelope's weaving, peace has to be tirelessly constructed even as it is being unravelled, and it can only be visualized as two-sided, security on one side and humanism on the other. In other words, inaction virtually destroys peace by depriving it of the positive movement which is absolutely necessary for it to be established and lasting. We have to reject inaction as perhaps the most serious cause of insecurity, that which leads to situations of exclusion and, through them, to confrontations which have the appearance of clashes between so-called 'civilizations' artificially distinguished within the global process of civilization at work on Earth. Acting by all appropriate means is a duty which each of us must assume to prevent this harmful sequence of events from gaining the upper hand.

## 2. A matrix for a more detailed analysis

These three rejections, together with the two earlier conclusions, constitute the foundation for the work now awaiting us. It is no doubt possible to derive much more from the four round-table discussions which led to this formulation; presenting them in the form of a matrix is merely a convenient way of singling out the main points.

The round tables – on the crises of insecurity, the sources of insecurity, the conditions for emerging from insecurity and the policies for succeeding in doing so – may be divided into two sets. The first two called on us to examine what it is happening at the present time, what the crises are, and what their sources are. The other two set out to determine what can be done in future, under what conditions and with what policy. These two sets, of two round tables each, form the four lines of the matrix. A number of factors referred to by the participants can be shown in columns, for example the world in its economic, ecological and geopolitical whole, from the complex to the specific, the role of societies and the roles of cultures, governments, circumstances, and so on.

At the point where the four lines and these columns cross, there are 'boxes' and the talks

we listened to make it possible to attach a particular value to each.

It may be seen, for example, that in the crises themselves, the world cannot be held to account as a determining factor. It is not because the world is what it is that a crisis breaks out in one place or another. Crises arise from local geopolitical or cultural contexts, as Ambassador Sahnoun reminded us. Societies in general submit to crises and cannot do much about them. Cultures can be either an exacerbating or a pacifying factor, as can governments, depending on the way in which they behave and their degree of influence. Circumstances exert their full impact.

On the other hand, if the sources of insecurity are sought, it will be seen that the world cannot be exempted from its responsibilities (the way in which the world functions has an impact on security and on the sources of insecurity), even though the context remains a major factor and society, culture and governments bear their share of responsibility, while circumstances account for very little.

If we turn towards the future, we can see that the conditions required for greater security depend very much on collective action by the world, and that the context is not a factor which can change itself and it must therefore be acted upon – this is why it counts as a factor zero – that societies, cultures and governments play an important role, and that circumstances can be regarded as of negligible, even infinitesimal, importance.

Lastly, as far as policies are concerned, it became clear from many of the talks that societies had a fundamental role to play – taking advantage of their contexts in some cases or of the capacities which the world can place at their disposal. It was also clear that cultures and governments also play relatively important roles.

Some ideas may be drawn from observation of the grid formed in this way, based on the various statements made during the round tables.

(a) It may be seen, in particular, that there is a contrast between the geographical location of crises and the location of the intervention capacities available to relieve them. The influence of a society in generating insecurity is decisive, and the cultural component of that society is important. Government action, in close correlation with these prime variables, is their interpreter. When, on the other hand, the means of acting against

insecurity are envisaged, the weighting highlights the importance of contextual factors (economic, ecological, geopolitical) combined, here again, with a cultural dimension. These two levers relate back, as far as the main operator is concerned, to the 'world' as an actor, which can at one and the same time significantly influence the short- and long-term context and could cause the ambient culture to evolve by giving rise, as Patrice Dufour on behalf of the World Bank suggested, to a proactive approach to security.

- (b) We therefore find ourselves with two distinct terms, for the production of insecurity and that of security respectively, with the 'culture' variable occupying a central challenging and supporting position; on the one hand, we have a gradation of factors which makes society and governments the decisive actors in the production of insecurity; on the other we have a different gradation which confers on the international community a prime responsibility for influencing contexts which form the key to a return to security. At the linking point between the two, we find culture as an attribute (which may sometimes make things worse in terms of insecurity) of all societies, but also as a factor creating security, to be created for all societies.

### **3. The transition from partial insecurity to global security**

This interpretation of the facts assembled during the round tables is obviously of a partial and summary nature. At the very least, it tends to show that the transition from partial insecurity to global security can never take place in a unity of time, place and action: the sources of insecurity are not at the same level, in the negative sense, as the sources of security. Hence insecurity is not combated solely by reversing, offsetting or cancelling the identified factors of a crisis (for example, by disarming a criminal government or by relieving a society in the throes of distress). In order to establish security, it is necessary to engage, independently of any circumstantial response to a particular case of insecurity, in long-term in-depth action on a large scale, yet without committing the opposite error of failing to take action in the event of crises occurring.

This arbitration between the appropriate forms of support for security and response to insecurity depends on a number of actors which have to be placed in ranking order.

- (a) The first of these actors is the government. A government's first duty, before any action in which it is likely to engage, is to be non-oppressive. An oppressive government does not fulfil its prime function of being a friend of the people. If it can be acknowledged that the concept of democracy is not fixed, since not all countries see it in the same way, the concept of being a friend of the people, in other words the regard which a government displays towards its people, can be generally accepted as an indisputable duty of any government.

Nor should governments lose confidence. There has been much talk of the crisis of the state, of the breakdown and inadequacy of central government, generating insecurity within countries and sometimes outside them.

Governments have to be co-operative: at the present moment no government is powerful enough in any sphere to carry through decisions by itself. The assistance of others and their assent are fundamental to its capacity to act, and the more coherent the action, the easier it will be to develop that capacity in a co-operative framework. The word 'coherent' recurred constantly in our discussions.

A government also has to be active, not so much instantaneously as in continuity: it must show itself capable of conducting a large-scale operation over a long period. It has to reform. Transforming historically evolving situations and piloting reforms are the most difficult tasks in the world and involve patience and time. A government may need to be flexible but it has to be durable, which demands a certain level of ability on its part. Lastly, in order to provide a framework for this activity, co-operation and reform, a government has to be legitimate and obey the rule of law: it has to be legal, even legalistic, in the sense that it has to respect its own laws and ensure that they are scrupulously enforced: this is always necessary.

We are now moving from a period in which governments could stand on their rights or, in other words, were capable of imposing on others what they considered to be their rights, to a period where governments must derive their strength from laws, which are forged with others and are recognized by all. However, the word 'strength' is still important. We are not speaking here of governments which vacillate:

for a government to be coherent, consistent, capable, patient and durable, a certain degree of strength is required.

(b) Among the major factors affecting action, time must also be reckoned with, in addition to governments. We all agreed with Major-General Skik that it was not only necessary to think but also necessary to act in the here and now, in the present. However, time has two components other than the present, and a great deal would be lost if their importance were neglected. We have to anticipate, as has often been repeated, and this means not reacting but pre-acting, acting in advance and building the future. This implies building up a new culture in which we all consider that our development depends on that of others, and we have to prepare at once for crises that may arise elsewhere, perhaps tomorrow. In other words, this implies that from now on we should all incorporate in our development and vision of the world the intelligence, concerns and cultures of others and should feel responsibility for them.

It is clear that this capacity to pre-act and anticipate can only be achieved by a far-reaching transformation of mental attitudes and behaviour patterns of all governments. If we are to act tomorrow, we must change at once.

However, in order to change at once, to be capable of acting before the event, we have to act on the past, in other words on our own memories: after the present and the future, the past has to be taken into account. Some of the, often very ancient, traces left by history are positive, some are neutral and some are traumatic. Ms Corrazza has reminded us that one of the major handicaps confronting the men and women of goodwill working in Bosnia lies in the frightful memories still present in the bodies and minds of people. Hence, acting on memory means acting on the future, acting on the present for the future. We have to know how to understand the past in order to embark on the future.

We must escape from the transitory nature of the media. I want to dwell on this point, since it has been widely shown that the media can be levers of crisis by providing instantaneous perceptions, by feeding a taste for blood or disasters, by showing armies at work and ignoring the fact that the problems are not momentary and do not lie in the mere sight of certain tragic scenes. Reality is still situated in the long term. There should consequently be a

reversal, and the notion of the long term should enter people's minds. This would be brought about more easily if it were possible to mobilize the media to that end. It was proposed that all crisis-management processes should include a radio or television programme as an intellectual and media accompaniment to the efforts undertaken in an area of intervention. This would be very useful. The media can be the best of things, after having been denounced as the worst. In any event, their impact is so important and their intervention so inevitable that failure to act in this area would be unforgivable.

From this point of view, our experience of mishandling of news and of the impassioned way in which it is handled calls for the strengthening of any counterweight to this way of experiencing the world in terms of 'news' (or, worse still, in terms of 'headlines'). The culture of defence can assist significantly with this.

Defence, in fact, is a long-term process. Consequently, in any society, the need to act over time and in continuity feeds on the experience of defence. In an administrative structure, a public system, it is defence that often requires the longest preparations, the longest investments, the longest continuity. Quite independently of all the reasons that may be mentioned elsewhere, we may be certain that defence has one valuable aspect: to teach us about the duration of time.

(c) The third major factor governing action may stem from the fact that certain references are needed as long-term guidelines.

These references were made during our discussions, in the context of the culture of development, highlighted by Patrice Dufour, who was with us yesterday. I should like to symbolize the culture of development in a way which will be meaningful to all. For a long time it was based on the principle of equality, in the arithmetical sense, meaning that a given part of the world should have the same attributes and the same capacities as any other. Experience has shown that such equality was not only difficult to achieve, but was often reversed: in other words instead of moving towards equality, we moved towards greater inequality. Perhaps this should lead to a perception of the problem in the light of two other criteria. Instead of starting with equality and thinking that it would generate all the rest – the belief that prevailed when President Kennedy launched his major programmes, as Patrice Dufour reminded us – we could emphasize the two other values,

liberty and fraternity, which France has always associated with the idea of equality.

The initial acquisition of liberty brings with it independence, a certain freedom of action, certain responsibilities and a certain level of democracy. These make it possible to gain the type of liberty which Mr Mayor calls personal sovereignty, namely the capacity for all citizens to behave in any way that makes an active contribution to social life and the life of the community.

And when we speak of fraternity, we do not mean well-intentioned feelings but fraternity in practice. Nations have to display a form of fraternity with each other, if only out of self-interest; otherwise, the hard knocks taken by other nations which have not had the benefit of their assistance will inevitably rebound. Being fraternal is a form of wisdom and even if the word is only used in a cynical spirit, it still keeps some power: behaving in a 'brotherly' way actually induces a greater sense of well-being and greater security.

Because it can incorporate all three of these concepts, the idea of the culture of development has considerable force in relation to both security and development.

#### **4. Populations, the armed forces and political authorities**

What have the armed forces got to do with all this? Perhaps some of us came into the meetings with a picture of armies as a source of power and control and a source of conflict with others. However, throughout these proceedings, a very different perception has emerged, with a clear distinction between three groups of major protagonists in everything that concerns us: populations, the armed forces and the political authorities.

(a) Populations must be the beneficiaries of security. Security is made to prevail for the people and for no one else. When we speak of 'the people', we are naturally not referring to the inhabitants of a particular district or to a particular ethnic group; we mean the population of the world as a whole. The slightest encroachment on the smallest group of people is an attack on all peoples everywhere. Populations are therefore the prime element.

It is the responsibility of populations to give messages and possibly mandates to political institutions, and the more mandates there are,

the better. For the holders of political office to assume the responsibilities we have mentioned above, they have to be 'masters of time', as Philippe Delmas puts it in the imaginative title of his book *Le Maître des Horloges*. They have to manage time and reality.

(b) Political institutions exercise authority over military forces, which must keep in step with the population, emanate from it and act in concert with it. The benign trinity thus constituted is the best way of ensuring that none of the three parts stray from the right path.

(c) All of this suggests that the role of the armed forces needs to be completely recast, and not merely tinkered with. The idea is to go back to the roots of the army's mission, which is to ensure external security, in conjunction with all the protagonists responsible; to contribute to democratic security, the sort of 'neighbourhood security', forcefully stressed by Ms Bangoura, so that all citizens can freely exercise their personal sovereignty; lastly and if necessary, to assist with the means at its disposal – either by force or as suggested by Mr Caglioti this morning – all those who do not have the same resources. These three types of mission offer vast scope for action.

#### **5. Confidence and security**

The word 'confidence' recurred very often during our debates. It is vital for armies to have confidence in themselves and in each other, and for nations and political institutions to be worthy of confidence.

This is not a easy idea to grasp or to put into practical terms, since confidence can be born instantaneously or disintegrate just as suddenly, in the same way as it can be very slow to establish and very difficult to restore when it has been lost. Yet the fact that confidence combines self-affirmation with fair and open relationships means that it is really the only ground on which humanity's capacity for progress, and the security which is the essential condition for that progress, can flourish.

Confidence creates security, which in turn creates confidence. But this encouraging spiral movement has to be built up over a period of time and needs the support which governments worthy of that name are capable of providing by thought, action or omission. Governments which show themselves capable

of adopting a reasonable and respected defence policy make a useful contribution to both confidence and security, and thereby serve development generally. By situating defence concerns at the heart of our thinking on security, and by making a contribution to mutual confidence through the quality of our discussions and the sharing of our ideas, we have all placed ourselves at the service of the ideals of development and global security which inspire the authorities we represent.

## 6. By way of conclusion

As we reach not so much a conclusion, since this is not a synthesis or a summary, as an attempt to take stock of a situation, I am tempted to correct a widespread error of translation in the Scriptures. This is certainly rash, and impudent, but the Biblical phrase '*Pax in terris hominibus bonae voluntatis*' does not mean 'Peace on earth to men of goodwill'. To be correct, it should be translated as 'Peace on earth by men of goodwill'. We may be sure that there will be no peace on earth if the dative is not replaced by the ablative, thus introducing a measure of personal responsibility for each and every one of us. Men of goodwill do not have peace offered to them: they are needed in order to manufacture peace, to be the entrepreneurs and workers producing peace.

In conclusion, in order to symbolize this personal responsibility borne by each of us and above all by those of us present here, I should like to read to you a passage which deserves to be quoted constantly because there is no better text for explaining how to set about things. It is from the *Memoirs* of Jean Monnet: 'Building Europe began with a political stand, but even more with a moral stand.' Any major venture undertaken, must of necessity have an ethical and moral content. Political, technical, military and strategic reasons do not suffice; something more is needed, but no single person has the key to that 'something more'. Some lines later, speaking of the six founder countries of Europe, Jean Monnet notes: 'When I think that they will observe common rules and, in doing so, will consider their common problems in the same light, thus fundamentally changing their attitudes to one another, I say to myself that

definitive progress will have been made in relations between the countries and peoples of Europe.' This statement should be examined in detail: '...will observe common rules'. The idea is to work them out together so that they will be common. Why are common rules necessary? Not simply for the pleasure of having rules, but to learn to 'consider common problems together'. It is this which is important and which leads on to the third stage, where 'their attitudes to one another will be fundamentally changed'.

This type of meeting is needed to achieve the progress which we hope for in international relations and which will depend on the ability of the armed forces to play their role fully in the context of a culture of peace (the two go together, as we said at the outset).

It is true that we are simply sitting here engaging in reflection, but this reflection gives us practice in building up a common way of seeing things and in modifying the attitudes which determine action. We are all, to some degree or other, people in command, officers, dispensing instruction or education. The future will be played out in the way we guide, direct and suggest ways of thinking about problems, and that is how solutions will be found. Our common personal responsibility is enormous, since we have the power of guiding minds and, through them, the course of events. It is our duty to think soundly and to put forward ideas that encourage favourable changes. History is full of baleful ideas which have demonstrated their power through the enormous crimes they have inspired. It is up to us to demonstrate that beneficial ideas can have the same power.

The President of a very famous Japanese company is reported as saying: 'I have a very easy job: I ask two questions a year and wait for the answers. But they are the right questions.'

It is our role too to ask questions in order to pilot the future. We have just done so to the best of our ability. In the workshops which will bring the participants together this afternoon, they are going to try to find the answers to these questions. The important part of our work is just beginning: you are the ones who will be speaking and I hope you feel better equipped to tackle 'common problems in a common way'.

**VI.  
WORKSHOPS**

**A.**  
**FIRST WORKSHOP:**  
**DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS**  
**OF SECURITY AND INSECURITY**

*Chairperson: Ms Anaisabel Prera Flores,  
Senior special adviser to the Director-General of UNESCO*

The twin concepts of security and insecurity can be understood in very different ways depending on place, circumstances and the dimensions they assume.

Differences in cultural background and historical experience lead peoples to attribute different meanings to these terms, associating with them their own distinct complexes of memories, attitudes and hopes.

Anyone who wishes partial insecurity to be replaced by global security must start by clearly identifying conflicting approaches, partly in order to see if any underlying similarities exist, where this is possible, and partly to ensure that legitimate differences in approach are scrupulously respected.

Discussions between institutes of defence and security in the various world regions to bring out these differences and similarities are a methodological preliminary to any programme of action in this area.



## FIRST WORKSHOP

### *Different perceptions of security and insecurity*

#### **Chairperson:**

**Ms Anaisabel Prera Flores**  
*Senior special adviser to the  
Director-General of UNESCO*

We are now entering the decisive phase of our work. Taking into account all that has been said, our task now is to outline the programmes of common interest which form one of the main objectives of this symposium. Within these first workshops concentrating on different perceptions of security and insecurity, one main theme will be to clearly identify the contrasting approaches to the two, but we should also try to draw up a common reference framework on the basis of the points which you are going to identify in each of the six working groups. In addition, we must not yield to the temptation of cultural or any other form of relativism in this area or, above all, accept that the insecurity experienced in very different forms by the peoples of many societies in their everyday lives should not form part of preventive action in favour of peace-building. Needless to say, this common reference framework is essential, so that we can subsequently identify means of acting effectively against insecurity. It is for this reason that we ask you to be as specific as possible in your work, and particularly in your attempts to identify those areas where it will be useful to have indicators available in respect of both security and insecurity.

During your work, Mr Larry Seaquist, the co-ordinator of the workshops, and I will be following your progress in the different meeting rooms. You will find details on the information sheets which have been distributed to you.

I now give the floor to Mr Tom Forstenzer, Executive Officer in the Executive Office of the Director-General of UNESCO, who will provide you with additional guidance.

#### **Mr Thomas Forstenzer**

*Executive officer in the Executive  
Office of the Director-General  
of UNESCO*

We are now entering a stage of our meeting where we can say that we have reached the end of theory. The time has come for us to be very practical and to be very specific. Julian Huxley, UNESCO's first Director-General, once said that one of the great dramas in the life of the mind is when a hypothesis meets a fact. I think that we now have to face the facts. To quote an example – I shall only mention one, because I have very little time – we were talking here about the need to separate the functions of soldiers and politicians and the first names that came to my mind were two soldiers who were very effective politicians, General de Gaulle and General Eisenhower, and two politicians who were very effective masters of war, President Lincoln and Prime Minister Clemenceau. Hence, there are extraordinary contradictions when we try to categorize things too clearly.

All of us here are first and foremost human beings. We are not totally identified by the fact that some of us are in uniform, some of us are university lecturers and some of us are UNESCO officials. We all belong to different cultures and to a broader culture. We are all people, and in that sense, you are the experts on security questions and we are here to learn from you.

These workshops, which are expected to last about one and a half hours each, are designed to give you the chance to express what you think the issues of security are in very practical terms. What are the insecurities that you face or have faced or you think you will face? Can you classify them in terms of whether they are domestic or regional or international? Can you describe them briefly in terms of time? Are there early warning signs that should pinpoint forms of insecurity that are developing? Are some of them chronic and others intense? The floor is yours. You are the people who have to deal with these kinds of questions. What we should like is for each group to draw up a list of, say, ten to twelve instances of insecurity that you regard as particularly important, considering that everyone here is an expert and that what everyone says here is likely to enlighten us, because it is the reality you have lived through and we should like to learn from it. It would also be interesting in the list you compile if you could indicate possible paths that might lead from the domestic to the global level, in terms of the way in which insecurities might develop within a country and then spread to the region or the whole world, and also the ways in which insecurity is transferred from the global to the domestic situation.

Those of us who have worked with the Director-General of UNESCO are well placed to know that as a scientist he is very concerned with what is called instability theory. In contrast to Newtonian mechanics, instability theory argues that, in all processes including human processes, it is possible to reach a point of no return, a point beyond which it is not possible to draw back, where war is inevitable and will lapse into chaos and violence. What we at UNESCO are particularly interested in – and this is only a suggestion, but it is a suggestion I take seriously – is where the point of no return is located, where insecurity conquers security, where violence overcomes peaceful civic processes within society. This is why the issue of early warnings or forerunner symptoms is so important to us.

I should now like to introduce Larry Seaquist, who will be working with us to make sure that your workshops progress as efficiently as possible, since they have been allocated only 90 minutes. Larry Seaquist was captain of the battleship *Iowa* and was then

called upon to place his experience as the captain of a warship at the service of the strategic planning staff of the Pentagon under Andy Marshall. He has now become what I would call a 'Mr Peace'. I should like Larry to tell you in a few words how he feels we should proceed.

**Mr Larry Seaquist**  
*Special adviser to the  
Director-General of UNESCO*

I should like to put a few thoughts to you: your ideas are very important and there are more ideas than will fit into the 90 minutes you will have at the first session. You have more ideas than time. I hope, therefore, that you will not only be thinking about ideas but about the people who are with you today and with whom you would like to continue talking not just today and tomorrow but in the future, when we may be able to continue this kind of discussion. You may find it useful to focus on a few ideas and, without necessarily seeking to reach agreement on a single idea, recognize that on a given topic there may be two or three different ways of looking at that idea. We want to be specific and move out of the realm of the theoretical to the practical. You might think about problems that are currently not featuring on television. There are many Bosnias, many urgencies – we are following the situation in Burundi, minute by minute. Are there other problems likely to rise in the months ahead, in the year or two ahead, that we ought to be thinking about now? Do we know why we should be worrying about these, why these could be sources of insecurity? Can you explain why we should worry at all about these sorts of problems? We are a group that is largely political and military; there are many military people, military analysts among us. However, as we said right from the outset, we want to continue to discuss the cultural sources of instability in education, culture, literacy and all the other subjects with which we propose to deal.

I should like to conclude, if I may, on a personal note of encouragement. We have occasionally heard during this day and a half about divisions opposing the industrial and developing worlds, or North and South. I do not think these have their place in this conference room. We are all professionals –

military personnel or professionals on military and security matters – and I do not think that these terms really have any relevance any more. They are terms that belong to the Cold War. In dealing with the issues of security and stability, our strength comes from professionalism, from the mind and the heart, and they do not really have much to do with national budgets for military affairs. We have among us here some extraordinarily competent, caring, richly human professionals, and we are impatient to listen to their ideas.

### **Ms Anaisabel Prera Flores**

*Senior special adviser to the  
Director-General of UNESCO*

I now give the floor to Mr René Zapata, senior programme planning specialist at UNESCO, who will provide some information on the organization of the proceedings of the workshops.

### **Mr René Zapata**

*Senior programme  
planning specialist at UNESCO*

The workshops are going to start at once. Group 1 of the 10th African and Malagasy International Session (SIAM) of IHEDN, under the responsibility of Colonel Philippe Charrier, will meet in room V. Group 2, the SIAM Committee 2, under Colonel Guy Duplessis, will meet in room VI. The SIAM Group 3, under Mr Jöel Arnold, will meet in room VII. Group 4 – ‘the Mediterranean’ – under Admiral d’Oléon, will meet in room VIII. Group 5 – ‘Latin America’ – for which I shall be responsible, will meet in room IX. Lastly, Group 6 – ‘other regions’ – under the responsibility of Ms Moufida Goucha in collaboration with Mr Philippe Ratte, will meet here in room X.

Before you begin your discussions, it would be useful to appoint a rapporteur for each group. At the end of the first hour and a half’s discussions, each rapporteur will submit an annotated list of the factors making for insecurity, as far as possible in order of priority, and another list of the factors making for security, likewise in order of priority. Comparing the lists will be of great importance to the second workshop which will discuss traditional or other means of acting against insecurity.

## **REPORTS**

### *Rapporteur of Group 1 (Africa)*

Group 1 started by asking itself the question: what is insecurity? Everybody thinks they know the answer. Our discussions focused on factors which create divisions both domestically and at external levels, and on the political, socio-economic and military levels. At the domestic level, we identified the problems inherent in political institutions, political parties and the state. There are also ethnic problems, which have recently assumed considerable importance. We did not go into the question of relations between majorities and minorities, but this was posed implicitly.

Next, there are external problems, which include the questions of frontiers, refugees and hegemony, and economic and social problems such as the allocation of resources, demographic factors, unemployment, etc.

We also wished to draw attention to the important effects of economic migrations and the deterioration of the environment in a context of worsening poverty in Africa.

On the subject of relations between civilians and the military, we underscored the need for permanent dialogue in the context of a redefinition of the role of the armed forces, now being called upon to contribute to development and the strengthening of democracy.

The ineffectiveness of existing institutions in forestalling and managing conflicts was also stressed. In this regard, closer collaboration with the United Nations is essential, on the basis of the experience gained in recent years.

Finally, we considered that more thought should be given to the links between political stability, respect for human rights and the security of local populations, families and individuals, in order to identify new forms of action for consolidating these links.

### *Rapporteur of Group 2 (Africa)*

Group 2’s discussions concentrated on three main subjects: firstly frontiers; then populations; and lastly the state, while naturally identifying factors of security and insecurity.

On the subject of frontiers, we asked ourselves: what are the factors of security? The

answers were: the intangibility of frontiers as defined by the OAU Charter, the need for trans-frontier co-operation, and, lastly, education of populations. In contrast, factors of insecurity were violations of frontiers, the lack of precisely drawn boundary lines, and population movements.

We then turned to the subject of populations and, here again, the intellectual approach taken was to identify the factors of security which, we felt, included the siting and settlement of populations. The factors leading to insecurity included uncontrolled trans-border migrations, exclusion and the failure by certain countries to respect established seasonal migration patterns.

The third subject was naturally the state which has control over economic and socio-cultural development. Of course, we identified the idea of national legitimacy in a context of law, of a state based on the rule of law, as a factor of security. By the same token, we identified bad management of the economic situation, poor control of population numbers and, of course, the non-legitimacy of political power as insecurity factors.

### *Rapporteur of Group 3 (Africa)*

Five headings were chosen: politics, economics, social factors, cultural factors and environmental factors.

On the subject of political factors, we discussed struggles for power within countries, the political role played by armies and the lack of democracy. On the last point, it was noted that in some countries after elections have taken place, those who have been beaten begin to contest the people's verdict. This is a factor of insecurity, as can be nostalgia for past systems when former political leaders do not agree to new teams taking over power and cause unrest.

With regard to economic factors, Africa in particular lacks a soundly based industrial fabric. On the question of information, the role which certain media may play in fuelling conflicts was also noted.

The social factors are physical poverty as an everyday reality, illiteracy and the problem of refugees.

Other factors of domestic insecurity include cultural factors and extremism. We noted various kinds of fundamentalism that have emerged in recent times and in a context of cultural confusion.

Among environmental factors, the desertification of the Sahelian countries is a cause of serious concern. The same can be said of accelerated urban growth, which is liable to step up in years to come. On the problem of waste products, it was noted that quite a large number of developing countries are being flooded by toxic waste from factories in the developed countries whose populations refuse to store this waste, the owners of which go from country to country in an attempt to dump it. This too is a subject of considerable concern.

We then turned to factors of external insecurity, in particular the arbitrary manner in which populations have been divided by borders. Members of the same ethnic group have been separated by frontiers. Lastly, some of the interventions by leading powers in developing countries have been seen as interference in both foreign and domestic affairs.

With regard to economic problems, you certainly know that the devaluation of the CFA franc two years ago had significant consequences for many countries and, in some instances, a negative impact on the populations concerned.

We are also affected by international crime such as drug trafficking, terrorism and money-laundering, as well as by large-scale migrations. The countries of the North are not the only ones to be subjected to migrations of peoples who leave their own countries for others where they feel safer and more at ease in material terms. We too are affected by these movements.

I shall end with the factors making for security. We did not want to draw up a list, but we note that the current trend in favour of democracy is a good thing for our countries, with the progressive establishment of states governed by the rule of law, and the integration of populations and economies. The emergence of national consciousness and international awareness is also regarded as an important factor making for security. National consciousness means that every person living within the frontiers of a given country feels that he or she is a citizen of that country and belongs to that country. This is therefore a positive factor which encourages people to live together. With regard to international awareness on the political and linguistic levels, reference to a common political heritage and a common linguistic heritage, as in the case of the French-speaking countries, can also be a positive factor.

#### *Rapporteur of Group 4 (Mediterranean)*

In Group 4, we started by attempting to define the concept of security since, in the Mediterranean region, security cannot be considered in military terms alone: it is necessary to take other factors of a political, socio-economic and cultural nature into account.

On the main – and closely related – issues of security and insecurity, the group was unanimous in considering the different levels of economic and social development one of the most important factors affecting security and insecurity. It is here that we find the problem of economic and social inequalities, the problem of the stagnation of economies in both North and South, the problem of indebtedness, and the problem of inadequate support for the transition processes leading to the market economy and democracy.

As solutions to these problems, it is proposed that economic groupings be developed through economic integration, that the living and educational standards of the population be raised, that economic growth be fostered and that support be given to the transition processes but, above all, that a new vision of intra-Mediterranean co-operation be developed.

On the second point, that of communication problems, we consider that this is an important point because of the misunderstandings and incomprehension on both sides of the Mediterranean.

One of the most important aspects raised in this connection is that governments find it very difficult to convince their peoples of the benefits of peace, especially with regard to the peace process in the Middle East, as one participant stressed. The group also rejected the idea that conflicts between civilizations could be a factor of insecurity in the Mediterranean. The aim, therefore, is to clear up the misunderstandings and to work at creating and developing the concept of 'Mediterraneanness'.

The third point is that of tolerance. The idea is to combat extremists from wherever they come, North or South. Dialogue must be developed between civilizations, religions and cultures, especially dialogue between Islam and the West.

The fourth point concerns the relationship between armament and disarmament. Unfortunately, we found that in the Mediterranean, in spite of the end of the Cold

War, disarmament has not advanced very far; on the contrary, this remains one of the most militarized regions in the world. It is therefore necessary to sign international conventions on the subject, develop confidence-building measures and, above all, emphasize the absence of threat from the South. Work also has to be done on the creation of crisis-prevention mechanisms.

The last point concerns population movements. The aim is to stop clandestine emigration, but also to stabilize populations by appropriate development policies and to ensure freedom of circulation in the various countries of the Mediterranean.

#### *Rapporteur of Group 5 (Latin America)*

A number of points concerning crisis-generating factors were defined and it was decided to engage in an analysis on several levels, starting from the world view and moving to the local level.

Much of our discussion centred on the actual concept of security. How can security be defined? How can it be perceived? In the end, we all agreed that, given the large number of definitions and perceptions in Latin America, it is extremely difficult to reach any definite conclusions. The representative of Brazil voiced his fears about the internal insecurity in his country, in the light of the centrifugal forces at work. By contrast, other South American countries such as Peru and Ecuador have a more traditional perception of external encroachments on their national security. Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that for a number of participants the conventional definition of security as applying to a country's political interests was the one most commonly adopted.

Even so, starting from these basic findings, the first source of a feeling of insecurity which was noted stems from the effect of worldwide economic globalization which undermines national sovereignty and maintains identity crises in the countries concerned.

The second main global source of insecurity is naturally the competition for marine resources. This is bound up with the inadequacy of international law and the growing competition between the rich maritime nations which have resources needed to take action, and the other coastal nations.

In addition to these initial worldwide crisis-generating factors, there are more

specifically regional factors. In this connection, the definition of frontiers and respect for these frontiers is a specific problem in South America and is perceived as such. Obviously, competition for energy sources is also felt to be a crisis-generating factor, and this is reflected at the national level by the emergence of a number of vicious circles. Poverty was stressed by virtually all the participants as being the essential factor in domestic instability, with its accompanying adverse effects on the environment and its tendency to engender or strengthen the forces working against certain fragile democracies and to make for the instability of governments.

Naturally, all these crisis-generating factors within societies combine to increase the gaps between social classes, which are widening at breathtaking speed. The problem of education is being increasingly raised, with its train of violence in the form of terrorism, mentioned by one of the representatives, as well as trafficking of all kinds, including drug trafficking.

How can an attempt be made to remedy this situation? Here again, a stratified approach was tried, starting from the regional level and moving to the domestic level of countries. There was virtually complete agreement on one thing: the key to security lies above all in a sense of confidence. This means that a global economic policy must be implemented at the regional level. In the first place, it is necessary to avoid the pitfalls of protectionism and hence to promote free-trade areas as far as possible. The second regional remedy that could produce tangible results in the short or medium term lies in all kinds of confidence-building measures, especially military. It is interesting to note that, in response to a precise question about the importance attached by the countries of the region to maintaining, supporting and developing nuclear-free zones, the answer was that the project was an interesting diplomatic exercise, but was currently not perceived as having absolute priority.

Of course, it is necessary for countries to try to work bilaterally for a better understanding of each others' viewpoints and perceptions, and it is absolutely imperative to accept international law in order to facilitate closer bilateral ties and dialogue.

Lastly, reference was naturally made to development programmes and the improvement of the living conditions of the population, particularly in terms of education, public health and – I was about to say – mere survival.

### *Rapporteur of Group 6 (other regions)*

I think that it would be unduly ambitious to try to summarize the wishes expressed by the extremely high-level experts who took part in the workshop. All I should like to do is to list the factors of insecurity indicated by the members of our group in decreasing order of priority.

It is interesting to note that almost all the experts, when speaking of the problems of security and insecurity, referred neither to war nor to the threat of war. On the other hand, they referred more to insecurity than to security. Thirdly, they referred more to domestic insecurity than to external insecurity.

The economy was generally mentioned as a factor of destabilization and hence of insecurity. Reference was made to all aspects of the economic situation, including economic decline, stagnation and dependence on other powers, and there was seen to be a link with the problem of economic justice between different countries and different regions. The other factor, quite diversified and mentioned several times, is the demographic problem. It was discussed in a wide variety of ways. Participants spoke of migratory flows as destabilizing factors and of refugees, but reference was also made to family instability, the deterioration of the family environment, and so on.

The workshop then went on to pinpoint the problem of young people as a factor of insecurity. The problems of the environment, pollution and crime were likewise very frequently raised.

All the other factors of insecurity, some of them very important, were sometimes mentioned only once – there was, for example, a most interesting and philosophical view expressed on the problem of the lack of hope among peoples. The deterioration of the state was mentioned as a destabilizing factor by some participants. The problem of terrorism was raised in one instance.

With regard to factors making for security, the points most generally raised were economic ones. Thus, when reference was made to security, economic problems were raised – and vice versa – as well as problems of education, the education of young people, but also that of the armed forces, civic education and vocational education.

Among the stabilizing factors, reference was made to the efficiency of government

institutions responsible for security, such as ministries of home affairs and the police. However, some factors were singled out exclusively by the experts of Central and Eastern Europe, such as the need for the countries to be integrated into international security systems. The existence of nuclear

weapons was referred to only once as a factor of insecurity in international relations.

I think that perhaps our most interesting finding was the convergence of the views expressed by the experts representing quite different regions, such as Western Europe, Asia, Eastern Europe and Russia.

**B.**  
**SECOND WORKSHOP:**  
**ACTION AGAINST INSECURITY**

*Chairperson: Ms Moufida Goucha,  
Senior special adviser to the Director-General of UNESCO*

The purpose of this meeting is to reflect together on ways of dealing effectively with insecurity in our time. Obviously, no initiative in this area can be taken without detailed knowledge of the situation on the ground, but a discriminating awareness of the sensibilities of the different peoples involved is also needed.

The key to the skills required for action in this area is thus essentially cultural.

The correct definition of collective lines of conduct is, of course, a political matter, but it must be informed by a cultural awareness.

Neither can any action be taken without a keen sensitivity to the cultural environment and a moral framework, which must also be culturally grounded.

Institutes in which the élites concerned receive their moral, intellectual and doctrinal grounding thus have a specific role to play in respect of our collective ability to build security.



## SECOND WORKSHOP

### *Action against insecurity*

#### **Chairperson:**

**Ms Moufida Goucha**

*Senior special adviser to the  
Director-General of UNESCO*

The results of the first workshop have made it possible for us to list and identify two sets of factors, those making for security and those making for insecurity. For this second workshop, we shall use the same methods as were used for the first. The same groups will therefore continue to work together, but they will focus on highlighting the actions needed to fight against the insecurity which have just been set out by the different rapporteurs of the first workshop.

#### **Mr René Zapata**

*Senior programme  
planning specialist at UNESCO*

The raw material for this second workshop is obviously formed of the reports on the factors of insecurity which you drew up during the first workshop. We have about one hour in which to define, in as imaginative and innovative a way as possible, the methods or measures that could be envisaged to find a remedy for some of these factors of insecurity.

There are obviously some problems that can only be solved in the long term and others which can be tackled more immediately. There are accordingly tasks and actions to be undertaken immediately and others to be considered in a medium- and long-term perspective. However, in the light of the wealth and precision of the definitions of the factors of insecurity, I think that we shall be able at least to lay down very clear parameters for action. These

parameters for action are very important for the remainder of the symposium, when we shall be making practical proposals about projects and actions we can undertake jointly with you.

## REPORTS

### *Rapporteur of Group 1 (Africa)*

We aimed to define short-, medium- and long-term remedies. Here is the indicative list of the proposals of Group 1, in order of priority:

1. consolidate and harmonize political institutions;
2. encourage the control of population growth;
3. promote closer regional military co-operation;
4. foster exchanges in the sectors of communications and trade;
5. foster the production of goods and services;
6. promote education for peace; our colleagues urge UNESCO to pursue its efforts in this field;
7. establish confidence-building systems between neighbouring states, in order to avoid aggression and marginalization;
8. foster the culture of development (as UNESCO has already done for the culture of peace, the time has come to foster the culture of development);
9. involve the armed forces in the development process, which would require changes in military training;
10. support regional organizations;
11. cultivate the spirit of public management;
12. make élites aware of their responsibilities;
13. democratize political systems;

14. encourage dialogue between African states;
15. respect political and economic self-determination based on genuine and positive co-operation between our countries;
16. encourage NGOs to study the relationship between security and development more closely;
17. limit the brain drain;
18. combat the drift from the land by policies for developing marginalized rural areas.

*Rapporteur of Group 2  
(Africa)*

Group 2, still abiding by the guiding principle behind its thinking, started its discussions with the first point, the problem of frontiers.

The group considers that international and regional legal instruments have to be respected and, secondly, that fresh impetus should be given to regional and subregional co-operation.

On its second point, Group 2 considers that it is necessary to strengthen trans-border co-operation in all sectors of activity and foster policies of integration and social justice for all peoples.

Lastly, on its third theme, Group 2 underscores the need to draw up and implement credible defence and security policies adapted to promoting the rule of law, which should continue to be a major concern of all states, as well as coherent and appropriate economic, social and cultural development policies within a context of regional economic co-operation.

*Rapporteur of Group 3  
(Africa)*

In the light of the list of all the factors of insecurity which we considered earlier, Group 3, which I represent, had some difficulty in complying with the instructions of Mr Zapata, the Director-General's representative, namely that our recommendations should make it possible to lay down guidelines which are applicable – in other words to allow practical recommendations to be made outside this forum. We realized that as far as the factors of security which we listed earlier are concerned, recommendations have already been made in the past in earlier forums. It would suffice to refer to reports of previous conferences to be aware of this. We have therefore confined ourselves to proposing three measures.

The first would be to promote, strengthen and enhance the subregional organizations within the OAU. These organizations exist. I am thinking particularly of ANAD (the Non-Aggression and Defence Assistance Agreement). In the past, ANAD has been called upon to resolve problems of frontiers and conflicts between neighbouring countries in West Africa. In Central Africa, a permanent consultative committee is currently being established for the countries concerned. It is being set up gradually and has the moral support of the United Nations. We know that similar organizations exist in East, Southern and North Africa.

Our second suggestion would be to promote decentralized co-operation. By this the group understands co-operation that would draw to a greater degree on bilateral or multilateral relations at the regional level, because so far co-operation has usually been conducted bilaterally on a state-by-state basis, between a developed country and a developing country. We realized that, over the past four decades, this co-operation has often been diverted to other ends. A more promising approach to co-operation has been initiated at the level of local communities, such as in the case of twinned towns and schools, and it has really benefited those in need. It is time to start reflecting along these lines, so as to institute co-operation between peoples.

Lastly, with regard to the definition of a role for the army, we know that all countries' armies already have the clearly defined role of defending the national territory at its borders and also defending domestic security. We realized that perhaps as the result of the apprenticeship of democracy, an army has often had to stand alone before demonstrators, and we know that demonstrators are often in the right. Armies have been led to perform missions which do not concern them and have nothing to do with national defence. Hence, we think that international organizations like the United Nations and UNESCO should encourage countries to redefine the role of their armies in the framework of democracy, in the same way as thought should be given to the problem of landmines and other dangers incurred by the population.

*Rapporteur of Group 4  
(Mediterranean)*

With regard to the first point, different levels of development, it would be useful to promote partnership, especially in the economic field,

inasmuch as the level of the economies of the South should be improved. Steps should also be taken to ensure that overseas investment, naturally both public and private but above all private, is forthcoming in the region. Steps should likewise be taken to monitor investments in order to avoid corruption and above all to develop the many complementary and interdependent features which are so common in the Mediterranean region, with the ultimate aim of making the Mediterranean a lake of peace.

On the second point, communication problems, the group as a whole agreed on developing all kinds of meetings at all levels – both official and unofficial and at the university and student levels – in order to avoid misunderstandings. Indeed, the aim is to create something at once in order to facilitate such exchanges rapidly, for example, a Mediterranean television channel and a radio channel could be established. However, steps have to be taken to safeguard ethical principles and the quality of the communications exchanged, in order to remove all the susceptibilities and misunderstandings that can exist in particular between North and South.

Our third point was tolerance, and our idea is to foster values common to the countries of the Mediterranean region, as well as to combat all forms of extremism in North and South alike. We propose that a charter combating terrorism be drawn up for this purpose. However, in order to achieve tolerance, it would above all be necessary to develop dialogue between cultures, civilizations and religions. In this connection, the dialogue between Islam and the West can play an important role in bringing the two sides of the Mediterranean closer together.

The fourth point concerned problems of armament and disarmament. The countries of the Mediterranean region should be encouraged to sign the international conventions on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, whether they be chemical, biological or others. Confidence-building measures also have to be developed and misunderstandings cleared up, particularly with regard to the creation of certain forces in the countries of the North, which are liable to be perceived as forces directed against the South.

Lastly, with regard to population movements, the long-term aim is complete freedom of movement in the Mediterranean region. In the immediate future, however, important decisions have to be taken about the freedom of

movement of certain population categories such as university teachers, young people, students and others. For this purpose, the idea is to develop exchanges by facilitating freedom of movement. It is also necessary to create conditions which would stabilize the people of the South, in particular by providing development conditions which would allow these people to continue to live where they already are.

A final idea is to create a civil defence machinery to combat natural disasters which may be caused by pollution, earthquakes or other similar factors.

#### *Rapporteur of Group 5 (Latin America)*

As you will recall, Group 5 had identified a set of factors of insecurity, the first three of which were drug trafficking, the education deficit in South and Central America, and the widening gap between rich and poor. Three measures were proposed in connection with drug trafficking: a crackdown on money-laundering, the signature of international agreements aimed in particular at strengthening national narcotics legislation, and the imperative need to gear education and information policies to young people, which is of particular importance to UNESCO.

With regard to the education deficit, all the participants stressed the need not only to give education priority but also to update and modernize education systems. The aim in particular is to alter the content of history textbooks in Latin America in order to change the perception which each country has of itself in relation to its neighbours. It is this perception that is largely instrumental in creating feelings of hostility towards them.

On the question of the gap between rich and poor, it was stressed that all the regions of Latin America needed social policies centred on the creation of development prospects. All the participants highlighted the very different features of the subregions of the American continent – the Caribbean, Central America, North and South America, the Andean region and the southern cone. From different sub-regional standpoints, perceptions of the continent's problems can differ considerably.

On the question of the fragility of democracy and the instability of governments, the need for strengthening government legitimacy was stressed but also the importance of combating the corruption of civil servants and people in

power, as well as the need to create mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing the constitutional role of the law, so as to be able to set up a system for resolving major political conflicts triggered off by the opposition between the legislative and executive or between the executive and the judiciary.

On the question of poverty, the problem is naturally inseparable from that of the narrowing of the gap between rich and poor. In this connection, the need for endogenous development policies was stressed.

The last point discussed by Group 5 was the question of frontiers which, as you know, is of considerable importance in the region. It gave rise to a very animated discussion on ways and means of resolving frontier disputes. Naturally, stress was laid once again on the need to strengthen bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for settling frontier disputes, and bilateral mechanisms were more particularly deemed to be essential in the region. However, the discussion ended with a quite long and detailed debate on the importance of deterrence – hardly an optimistic conclusion.

It was emphasized that the other issues, such as energy and marine resources, should be discussed in connection with development policies and in conjunction with the protection of the environment.

#### *Rapporteur of Group 6 (other regions)*

Group 6 started by ranking the challenges to security. Accordingly, we have general challenges, followed by regional challenges – the decline of state structures, migratory flows and limited security – and then problems of a local nature. A number of global and regional measures were put forward in response to these challenges.

In the first instance, as far as education is concerned, stress was above all laid on the

need for specific education for military personnel, at a time when it can be seen that political circles often make use of cleavages among the military to spark off conflicts and even civil wars in some countries. The international organizations send soldiers in again, in the form of peacekeeping or peace-enforcement units, to put an end to these conflicts. It is necessary to build up a military education system stressing the importance of avoiding all sorts of conflicts, so that there will be a culture which affirms that the army is a guarantor of the state, and which prevents it from being used as an instrument in political conflicts.

Reference was then made to the problem of equality *vis-à-vis* information. I received an interesting proposal from our Iranian colleague, to the effect that it would be a positive step, from the point of view of security, for the Internet to be used in all countries and regions and for it to be accessible to university centres and the local press.

Lastly, the need for a dialogue between élites was suggested, with a view to achieving psychological and cultural transparency in the key areas of security. There was considerable discussion in our group on the problems arising from different concepts of human rights. It is necessary for people to understand the shades of difference and specific features of human rights other than in their own regions. The group then went on to urge the need for greater dialogue among non-governmental organizations on the subject of security.

On the question of regional conflicts and problems, stress was laid on the importance of dialogue between different social groups and above all on dialogue between the military and civilians. In conclusion, it was proposed that the defence institutes work as a network in all regions where efforts at understanding and circulating ideas in the area of security can be supported.

**C.**  
**SUMMARY OF THE WORKSHOPS**

## GENERAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE TWO WORKSHOPS

*by General Sofian Effendi,  
Representative of Indonesia*

Mr Chairman,  
Distinguished participants,

I do agree with you that this gathering is indeed a very strategic and very important one. It is time for me, as the representative not only of Indonesia but also on behalf of my colleagues from the six working groups, to present the conclusions of the working groups of the international symposium 'From Partial Insecurity to Global Security'.

1. The discussion was conducted yesterday afternoon in two very rapid but very useful sessions. The participants were divided into six working groups to study the various perceptions of security and insecurity and then identify lines of conduct appropriate to them. They made a number of common observations which were supplemented by observations particularly highlighted by one or other of the groups, three of which were essentially African and the other three centring respectively on the Mediterranean, the Americas and the rest of the world (Europe and Central and South Asia). My role is to give you our common observations on security and insecurity, and the measures that should be taken or the action that is required to move from insecurity to security.
2. *With regard to insecurity, our common observations can be summarized as follows.* The weakness of the economy is perceived as being one of the main sources of insecurity. On the other hand, the development of the economy can make an effective contribution to absorbing the factors of insecurity, but is not in itself a guarantee of security. Social iniquities reflect flagrant injustices and are

a cause of insecurity because of the reaction they provoke. Whether information is limited or abundant or is, in either case, tainted with disinformation, inequality of access to it is an important source of insecurity because it feeds misunderstanding, apprehension and error. Demographic phenomena, especially large population movements, whether of migrants or refugees, create complex situations of insecurity. International crime in all its forms is regarded as a source of widespread insecurity. Lastly, the deterioration of the quality of water and its decreasing availability is one of the major variables of insecurity.

3. *Let us go on to the common observations on security.* Security is above all linked to respecting international law and to signing conventions which place each country in the community of nations. It is part of a culture of development. It includes sustained efforts to progress towards a culture of peace or at least a balanced way of combining military forces and civilian capabilities in long-term conflict resolution. Peace is an action, not a state.
4. *As far as the action required to move from insecurity to security is concerned,* it is necessary to develop as wide and full a range of partnerships as possible at all levels of society in order to strengthen a network of direct links. Secondly, it is necessary to develop specific regional and subregional co-operation, consolidate common structures and foster this type of co-operation. It is likewise necessary to increase interdependent and complementary relations between nations and between groups and citizens within a

single nation; set up confidence-building measures and foster mutual understanding; and engage in consistent development policies, in particular in the fields of education and information. Lastly, it is necessary to take every possible measure to monitor and facilitate the processes of

transition, based on the concept of the state grounded in the rule of law and democracy.

We now come to the other part of the conclusions, which consists of additional observations or further elaboration from the rapporteurs of the six working groups.

## ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

*by the rapporteurs of the groups*

### **Rapporteur of Group 1 (Africa)**

We mentioned yesterday that we should involve the armed forces as far as possible in the development process. Unfortunately, whatever the analysis made, in African society the army has been excluded from the development process in different ways. We therefore wish to insist that the military should not be excluded from the development process. There can be no development if all the members of society are not involved.

Our second observation is on maintaining border security. What we mean here – and a great deal of work has been done on this subject – is that the borders inherited at independence are a non-negligible factor of security in Africa. The alternatives are either to keep the borders we inherited at independence or to encourage broader regional co-operation. We would like to emphasize this point, and I hope that the Organization of African Unity and the regional organizations will take it into consideration.

Lastly, we also requested – and we made this point very strongly – that dialogue be promoted between civilian society and the military.

The group considers that it is necessary, in Africa, for the public, the ordinary people, the women who run the markets, indeed parliament and hence the government and the people, to exercise democratic control over the army. This does not mean that the African military should not be kept informed, or that African society does not want development, but it has to be stressed as a matter of principle – and the group emphasizes this point – that for the development purposes to which we are

referring here, and hence for the processes involved, there has to be collective control, which is not necessarily limited to control of the military by the democratic process.

### **Rapporteur of Group 2 (Africa)**

The first concern of Group 2 is with the role of governments in controlling the economic and democratic situation. The group is agreed that, in the first place, this control implies macro-economic equilibrium, in other words the equilibrium of public finances through the elaboration of deficit-free budgets geared to investment. In short, it involves an economic policy generating employment and investment initiatives, and encouraging private investment. However, we said in the course of our proceedings that it was important that there should be transparent management of our economies and that corruption in all its forms should be combated. In my capacity as a police officer, I can speak with authority of active corruption and, above all, of passive corruption which is taking on considerable proportions in our economies.

It is clear that failure to control demographic factors, especially by our governments, is a time bomb which will not spare our continent, especially if solutions are not found at the first warning signs.

The second concern of Group 2 is with the elaboration and implementation of a defence and security policy. It is known that defence begins with the awareness of threats and it is important to reaffirm clearly here, although this may appear self-evident, that the defence imperative still exists, especially in our



countries. There is no more pressing duty for a state than to create the material and political conditions for its security. No development action can be undertaken in an environment of instability and insecurity. This is why Group 2 perceived protecting the integrity of our national territories, our identities and our independence against all forms of aggression as a major objective. We said that the second objective of our defence policies should be to create areas of security common to our subregions and capable of expanding to cover the entire continent, on the understanding that this would be predominantly African. It is therefore important for us to dispel any climate of suspicion and fear, by seeking ways to create the environment of peace and stability that is essential to investment. Dialogue and transparency are more than ever necessary for maintaining confidence and security, since this need for security, which everybody feels quite legitimately, should not give rise to the threat of neighbours being destabilized. Lastly, Group 2, going deeper into the discussions, considered that the armed forces, which are the last bastion for the survival of the nations from which they emanate and which they have the duty to serve and protect, represent a major component of the defence and security of our countries. I should like to conclude, Mr Chairman, with the following overall message concerning our armed forces: they should remain, of course, the expression of national cohesion and of the government's freedom of action, and they should endeavour to guarantee at all costs the environment of security and peace that is essential to the economic development of our countries. They must be reconciled with themselves and with the nation.

### **Rapporteur of Group 3 (Africa)**

The first point which Group 3 wished to raise concerns insecurity connected with the anarchical development of cities. Our cities are currently time bombs because of the problems encountered in them, especially as a result of the massive influx of people from rural areas arriving under the effect of the drift from the land. These new arrivals settle haphazardly around the cities, so that these become submerged. There is a chronic shortage of accommodation, hospitals and schools; there are problems of sanitation, and unemployment is

very high. The consequences of the shortcomings of the education system are obviously the perfunctory schooling of young people, worsening crime rates and the use of drugs. Moreover, the sense of cultural helplessness which young people feel is manipulated by all kinds of religious, political and other extremists. Thus, whenever there is a political crisis, the ringleaders usually recruit young people to sow disorder. We therefore ask UNESCO to involve itself to a greater degree in the problems connected with urban development, since they concern young people in particular.

The second point on which Group 3 wished to make observations concerns the need for transparency in the chain of co-operation, especially between North and South. Such transparency is essential. In cases where they do not already exist, it will be necessary to draw up legal instruments covering such transparency, the principle of which is quite simply to ensure that private donors or other sources of funds, whether they be legal entities or persons, can if they wish see directly for themselves, or else through intermediaries or agents, the materialization of the projects for which the financial and material resources were intended from the outset. This is important, since the assistance which developing countries have received from the private or public sector or from international agencies has in most cases been diverted away from its purpose. Visits to the relevant projects show that the population has not benefited from them.

The third point concerns toxic waste. Here, I should like to raise the problem of the environment, and of pollution in particular. By toxic waste, I refer to the radioactive and other residues of the industrialized countries, to food stocks – in particular meat that has not been consumed in Europe – and to stocks of medicines not used in Europe whose sell-by dates have often long expired. When these stocks of meat or medication arrive in interior regions where people cannot read and write, carried there by businessmen from European or other unscrupulous countries, this represents a danger to human health. With regard to radioactive waste in particular, in recent years, international public opinion has sometimes learned from the media of ships carrying toxic waste travelling the high seas all over the world. These ships, which were turned back from one port after another, eventually disappeared from public attention. The fact is that we have sometimes found some of them in our countries, attracted there by

businessmen wishing to conclude lucrative deals with the owners of the waste. We no longer want our countries to become dustbins or public dumping grounds for waste produced in the industrialized countries. There is no moral justification for this. In view of the danger which this represents for health and the environment not only in the countries concerned but in Europe as well – since this waste is simply dumped into the sea, the fish caught from it could be used to feed Europeans – we should like UNESCO to devote particular attention to this problem.

#### **Rapporteur of Group 4 (Mediterranean)**

The first point which Group 4 would like to stress concerns the need to foster dialogue between different cultures, religions and civilizations. This is a necessity, since the aim is to dispel misunderstanding, combat extremism and, above all, reduce the gaps between cultures.

The second point concerns the need to adopt a charter against terrorism and to apply it. I wished this point to feature in the common observations because terrorism has international ramifications and represents a danger for the whole international community. This danger is a consequence of the links between terrorist groups, drug traffickers and arms dealers. These links are too evident not to give rise to international co-operation on the problem.

The third point concerns the need for developing Mediterranean values, in order to create and elaborate the concept of belonging to the 'Mediterranean family' and turn the Mediterranean into a lake of peace.

The fourth point concerns the need to find solutions to the problem of indebtedness which is currently a heavy burden on all development policies. Some countries, including my own, have paid the equivalent of the amount of their debt in three years' debt-servicing, and yet their debt has not fallen to any extent whatsoever. This shows the weight indebtedness brings to bear on development policy.

The fifth point concerns the need to ensure freedom of movement in our region. How is it possible to envisage a free trade area for goods and services without capital and without allowing people to move about? These are the people who ensure the free movement of goods, services and capital. Accordingly, freedom of movement is an essential foundation of the free trade area.

The sixth point concerns the need to set up mechanisms for financing development in our regions.

The seventh point concerns the need to develop a strategic vision of the partnership between Europe and the Mediterranean. The speaker this morning covered American and Japanese policies on the environment very well. It would be desirable for the same sort of vision to prevail in the Mediterranean.

The eighth and last point is the need to abandon the view that the threat has moved from the East to the South.

#### **Rapporteur of Group 5 (Latin America)**

Group 5 considered that worsening poverty, accentuated by a parallel widening of the income gap in Central and Latin America, was one of the most serious common threats to the security and stability of the countries of the region. Consequently, the role of development policies, and of education policies designed to generate development opportunities for the whole of the population, was considered to be a fundamental feature in the consolidation of security and stability. The group also considered that strengthening the rule of law in countries and the stability of democratic institutions was an essential prerequisite for regional stability. Added to that is the need to strengthen confidence-building measures and bilateral and multilateral co-operation arrangements at state level, in order to bring about a lasting solution to border problems in the region, some of which have deep historical roots which may reach back for centuries. In this connection, the group stressed the need to update and redraft history textbooks, in order to exclude negative stereotypes relating to other peoples.

#### **Rapporteur of Group 6 (other regions)**

As you said, Mr Chairman, this group is neither African nor Mediterranean nor American. It consists of the rest of the world, which is a great deal. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, if one point that was heavily stressed in this group is the need to be scrupulous in defining human rights and to note that they are not understood in exactly the same way in all parts of the world. However, although the

terms 'human' and 'rights' are understood differently in different places, they are still strong and deeply rooted reference pointers.

The second important observation by Group 6 is on the need – if security is to come about – for each country, each group, to take steps to fortify itself. When I say 'fortify', I am not speaking in the sense of 'fortifications' like those of medieval castles but of the sense in which pharmacists speak of fortifying tonics, in other words of a number of low-strength products which stimulate the body's energy. The term 'resilience' borrowed from an Indonesian defence concept, seemed to reflect this, and it was therefore strongly voiced. The idea is for every individual, group or nation to be stronger, more capable, more master of themselves, so that they can contribute to the common task. At the same time, in parallel with this effort at inner fortification, there must be concern for other people, the sort of concern for the surrounding security which leads to helping one's neighbours and helping the environment to be in a healthier condition. This dialectic between inner fortification and outer empathy is considered to be an important source of security, whether it concerns Russia, for example, which the rapporteur would have liked to

present more fully, or the ASEAN countries, to take two examples of places where this has been put into practice.

The last point which all the participants felt to be fundamental was the need to provide equal access to information, in four ways which I should like to develop very briefly. The first is by making access to information physically possible, which implies that the media should be equally spread all over the world and that access to writing, in particular the printed word, should be allowed. The second is by diversifying what Mr Xavier Emmanuelli earlier called 'information bubbles'. We must diversify what we watch and not always absorb the same products at the same time. Then, it was strongly emphasized that information should be allowed to be broadcast from all parts of the world. In this connection, there is an extraordinary asymmetry: some parts of the world are super-broadcasters while others are never heard. The balance therefore has to be righted. Perhaps we should stop at the final point which we felt was essential in relation to information: the need to develop a critical cast of mind, through education, through demanding standards, and through training in a critical outlook. This, of course, implies a minimum of personal freedom.

## REMARKS ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOPS

*by Mr Larry Seaquist,  
Special adviser to the Director-General of UNESCO,  
co-ordinator of the workshops*

It was my great pleasure yesterday afternoon to be able to walk round each of the six groups and to listen to them deliberate. There were a great deal of common views, as well as some individual differences. The Mediterranean Group, for example, was very conscious both of the tensions existing in the region and the reasons why uniformity and working together were important. Each of the African Groups had a different set of perspectives and very interesting rich discussions. The Americas Group could have been a small university on the theory of security in the modern era, with very interesting and thoughtful discussions, while Group 6 had a very stimulating set of wide-ranging discussions at each of its sessions. I think that if each of us were given two counters, we would all place one of them in the centre box, where we agreed with everybody on these common ideas about insecurity, security and how to move from insecurity towards security. Then each of us would place an individual counter somewhere else on the board where we situate ourselves. My conclusion is thus that each of us brings to these important questions a particular set of personal views.

In the past, we were used to measuring security by counting things. We counted the other party's tanks, planes, the number of battalions, the number of weapons, and we

measured security by counting. I now think that in the world ahead of us, we shall measure security, we shall determine a sense of security or insecurity, by understanding each other. It is exactly these kinds of meetings which, by allowing us to meet each other and understand our respective ways of thinking, may become the most strategically significant activities.

Our Chairperson mentioned the idea, which we all share, that the first thing which needs to be done is to develop a new set of mutual relationships, working relationships, and to understand each other. I would personally encourage, as a strategically significant step, as a hard, practical, tough-minded approach to security, that we find ways of understanding each other and understanding the other person's point of view, which the Germans call *Weltanschauung*. In that regard, my distinguished neighbour Leslie Atherley, who runs the Culture of Peace Programme, has some important projects that could prove useful. Tom Forstenzer, sitting on the other side of me, is the architect, the inventor of the entire Venice process devoted to that end, and I think that we are all specially indebted to Dr Moufida Goucha, who had the vision to see that we all ought to come together in a room like this and have these kinds of conversation, and who had the energy and determination to actually make it happen.

## PROSPECTS OPENED UP BY THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOPS

*by Ms Moufida Goucha,  
Senior special adviser to the Director-General of UNESCO,  
Chairperson of the second workshop*

In my capacity as Chairperson, I note that we have fulfilled some 80 per cent of our objectives. It is still a good thing to recall that among the general objectives of this symposium, there were the following:

- to lay the basis for a more sustained relationship between institutes of defence studies, the network of which forms a prime set of interfaces between defence problems and questions of development, peace, international security and cultural and social dynamism;
- to envisage specific projects, such as the setting up of new UNESCO Chairs on the problem of peace in defence academies, and action in connection with civil defence and development (especially in rural areas).

Among the interesting results I wish to single out, there is the proposal that we remain united and lay the basis for a more sustained relationship between the institutions concerned, by creating an association. This is a proposal that can be adopted, and the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) may be able to take charge of setting up this association.

Obviously, all these proposals are at your disposal and it is for you to decide on how appropriate, interesting or important they are. I repeat that we are here to listen to you and we are also here to tell you what we are doing. It is for you, therefore, to decide what you are going to do with us. This, in fact, is the essential purpose of our dialogue. You have made a large number of very important and interesting proposals, and it is therefore thanks to you that we shall be able to go further and try to adopt a number of them as the basis for future collaboration. Among them, I single out the idea of a culture of development, which is definitely of interest to UNESCO.

We are all agreed on such general guidelines as participating in the construction of the future, developing the tools of knowledge and reflection and acting against insecurity. I have noted in particular a proposal made this morning, that the participants subscribe to a joint declaration. In order to move forward along these lines, we have prepared a draft declaration which we shall be submitting to you. I am going to ask the people in charge of the meeting room to distribute this draft declaration at once. You are asked to see how far this declaration may be of interest to you and to what extent you can subscribe to it.<sup>1</sup>

With regard to UNESCO's contribution, I should like to refer to the possibility of setting up UNESCO Chairs on the basis of the symposium's work, especially in connection with a new approach to security. These Chairs will be established in close collaboration with the defence institutes, in the framework of their networks or associations.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, one interesting feature of this symposium is the fact that it is present on the Internet. Hence, it is a symposium which starts with you but goes well beyond this gathering.

1. See pages 153 to 155 concerning the proposals for pursuing the dialogue.

2. On the UNESCO Chairs, see Appendix 2, page 185.

## OVERVIEW OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE WORKSHOPS

*by Mr Philippe Ratte,  
Dean of studies of IHEDN, Chief rapporteur*

1. If an attempt were made, for the two workshops, to pick out areas of overlaps and gaps by superimposing the conclusions reached after drawing together the very varied points of view expressed, the resulting map would be extremely surprising.

2. The first salient feature is that there was no instance where insecurity was attributed primarily to aggression; it was always imputed to basic factors, many of them of a long-standing nature.

Secondly, it was never suggested that the remedies lay in crossing swords in order to destroy a source of insecurity; in every case, it was suggested that subtle mechanisms should be brought into play in order to restore conditions bearing the seeds of hope.

However, the factors highlighted varied considerably with the different regions and approaches and were often difficult to put in order of priority. It may be concluded, therefore, that there is no specific, generic or general remedy for insecurity: there are probably as many remedies as there are cases. This means that the heart of the problem cannot be dealt with by solutions but by strengthening the capacity to find them.

This capacity resides in the competence of governments, international determination to respect the rule of law, grass-roots involvement, and mobilization of resources or know-how. It draws on the notion of power, and if power is to be exercised in practice, it has to be possible to deploy it. This involves at least two dimensions: the organized will to do something, which is a political responsibility, and the force necessary to accomplish it.

3. The rather mixed catalogue of examples

leads us straight to one obvious requirement: efforts have to be made to allow nations to act on the basis of:

- legitimacy deriving from the people, so that there can be a rewarding dialogue between governments and individuals or groups;
- legitimacy recognized by all peoples (in the sense of the rule of law), so that international co-operation can produce its full impact of moderation and synergy in action;
- genuine, and not only nominal, competence to act for the long term.

4. This conclusion by anticipation would be merely trite if it did not draw on the thoughtfully expressed perceptions of the qualified representatives of more than forty countries, all of which have experienced insecurity in a variety of forms. It derives its merit from the fact that it is not confined to a particular part of the world, since one of the results of the workshops has been to show that, while the current forms of insecurity take on very different aspects here and there, they all stem from a failure to tackle the fundamental problems of society rather than from any fortuitous interplay of erratic forces. It will probably never be possible to completely eradicate the insecurity prevailing almost unnoticed on the roads of the safest countries, for example, which is much more threatening than the atmosphere of the most dangerous inner city areas, but we can reduce this insecurity to a considerable extent by correcting the most serious endemic evils, in other words by causing societies to develop around respect for people as individuals and in society. The insecurity depicted by the comments made in the workshops is not caused mainly by aggression but by wearing down or fear.

- The fragility of national frontiers creates scarcely any damage in itself, yet it is experienced in Africa, and indeed in Central Europe, as a permanent source of disquiet.
5. The overall lesson emerging from this approach, noted rather than solicited, is that upstream of all the possible policies, a basic long-term effort should be undertaken, aimed at giving prominence to fundamental problems. Furthermore, this attitude can only be promoted by a patient effort of education and training, through which the hierarchies of values can be re-established in people's minds; this, in turn, is contingent upon progress in shared knowledge of the realities of the world. Once this vision is more widely shared, the issues will stand out more clearly and will be the subject of a broader consensus, the authorities will find a better basis for their action and, if necessary, the means of ensuring success can be employed with the assistance of the force required to establish preliminary security.
  6. While economic and social distress appeared as a major cause of everyday insecurity, especially in cases of extreme poverty and of wide discrepancies between countries and within countries, it is interesting to note that several workshops linked this distress to the concern aroused by inordinate population growth. Reducing the rate of increase of the world population, which entails investment in women's education and a change in their status, is a remedy tending towards security. Similarly, it is fairly new to find that damage to the environment, whatever its origin, is consensually perceived as representing a serious threat to everybody. These two phenomena of population growth and the environment suggest that there is an encouraging shift in people's sense of responsibilities. Accusing economic and social conditions amounted to laying the blame on the order of things or on distant responsibilities identified with malevolent operators, such as capitalism, neo-colonialism, multinational corporations, and so on. On the contrary, the issues of population growth and the environment have the twofold effect of giving everyone the feeling of being subject to the same difficulties and of appealing to everyone's personal responsibilities. This represents significant progress in the capacity to tackle the real problems head on.
  7. The progress here deserves to be emphasized for its discretion and effectiveness, because, in contrast, the workshops showed how far people's lack of awareness of the reality of problems and of their responsibility for them was disastrous in terms of security. Everything that impedes awareness of a common interest to be defended ends up by reducing security, and these obstacles may include a lack of information, actual disinformation, the absence of democratic debate, the misuse of power for ethnically inspired or purely dishonest reasons, or the growth of illicit trafficking. In such circumstances, various forces can set about playing their own game. This not only hampers the search for the common good but also introduces elements of rivalry which have an intrinsically destructive effect on security. These forces which pursue their own interests and are identified as major sources of insecurity include all forms of extremism.
  8. In the face of the harm done by interests that are allowed to break away from the standards based on the common good, action by governments, the law and justice becomes urgently necessary. Whether this means cracking down on international traffic in toxic waste or the plundering of public funds by governing cliques, the remedy is the same: promoting a state founded on the rule of law complying with international norms and able to ensure that those norms are respected within the purview of its sovereignty and in a spirit of equity. It was even noted that weakening of the effective sovereignty of states in a context of globalization could be identified as a source of insecurity. Conversely, it seemed that security could stem from everything that would foster a sense of confidence which at the international level would militate against countries retreating into their own identities and self-sufficiency, at the national level would pacify competing interests, and at the local level would benefit people in their everyday lives.
  9. These concerns occupied the minds of the participants so much that one of the workshops had to point out a tendency to forget that the most serious forms of insecurity were all too often war or crime. Their thinking then moved on towards two extremes which were nevertheless connected: these were the need to prevent and monitor crises, in order to contain any drift towards

violence, and the need for the firm use of force against trouble-makers, in the knowledge that monitoring is fruitless without the possibility of action, while action is useless without prior monitoring. Force was perceived by all the participants as a suitable adjunct to any action tending to create situations of peace, prosperity and freedom. Too many trump cards are sometimes stacked against these positive values for it to be possible to hope for their creation without the exercise of military superiority which, in such circumstances, can prove to be a decisive instrument of peace, security and prosperity. As a general rule, force is perceived as such when it is exercised in the framework of co-operation that is as broad-based and pertinent as possible and in accordance with a clear and legitimate mandate. The participants accordingly recommend the development of all forms of international co-operation and reinforcement of the law, together with measures calculated to allow confidence to take root, such as decentralized co-operation, travel by students and research workers, and co-operation on common objectives such as the eradication of drugs and terrorism.

10. In substance, what the participants are calling for in response to insecurity is a genuine culture of development. The virtue of such a culture is that it would embrace the concern for international co-operation, the determination to ensure endogenous development, the demand for legitimacy and respectability in governance, firmness in combating cyclical causes of insecurity, the mobilization of men and women through culture, economic motivations and civic hopes, all with a respect for such external factors as the environment, the cultural heritage and the future.
11. Coming together to hold a debate on security in the most specific sense of the term, which spontaneously calls to mind, deep down, the physical violence which is security's opposite, the participants were very naturally prompted to consider the sources of insecurity immediately and to regard the forms of violence only as epiphenomena. Their message is very clear and positive: such forms have to be combated without hesitation and with the means needed to overcome them. However

epiphenomenal they may be, they are the cruellest expression of insecurity and are the cause of its spread. The most energetic and organized force possible has to be used against them. At the same time, much more time and effort should be devoted to rooting out, even in places where security appears to prevail, the deep-seated reasons for its erosion such as underdevelopment, injustice, isolation and backwardness.

12. This is why the representatives of the defence institutes, who are perfectly familiar with the ins and outs of the professional use of force when it is necessary and who are also receptive to the fundamental reasons for the dysfunctioning of the world, have considered that they can contribute to progress towards security by deciding to remain united, in the form of an association yet to be defined, so as to share their skills and the questions they raise in this area. They felt that, in such an association, they would also be likely to spread UNESCO's own message on these problems. Security is global. Considered thought should be given to this hallowed expression, in the first place because it rules out the concept of aggression except to oppose it; secondly, because it implies a deep-seated connection between civilian action and the importance of defence policy; thirdly, because it leads not merely to protection but also to positive action, since a security and defence policy is first and foremost an action for producing peace, served by a capacity to prevent others from making war on you.
13. Today, acting to establish peace necessarily implies nations acting in concert. This amounts to saying that policies on security and defence have to be fitted into such action, drawing together interests that are more general than those of each nation taken in isolation. Something of the capacity to serve harmful designs is lost and the corresponding gain is that of contributing to projects of collective interest for humanity. It is therefore natural that institutes which serve security and defence policies all over the world, or deal with them, should join together to think about the real contemporary dimension of these policies, which is to contribute to peace and to offer remedies for the true causes of insecurity, which are always rooted in hard historical facts.



**VII.  
PROPOSALS FOR PURSUING  
THE DIALOGUE**

## PROPOSALS FOR PURSUING THE DIALOGUE

### I.

#### The participants in the symposium took note of the following draft Declaration (not adopted)<sup>1</sup>

*The participants in the international symposium entitled 'From Partial Insecurity to Global Security' organized at UNESCO Headquarters from 12 to 14 June 1996 on the joint initiative of the Director-General of UNESCO, Mr Federico Mayor, the Director-General of the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale, Air-Force General Bernard Norlain, the Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, Mr Guido Lenzi, the Director of the Centro di Alti Studi per la Difesa, Lieutenant-General Carlo Jean, and the Director of the Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional, Lieutenant-General Javier Pardo de Santayana,*

1. **thank** the institutions that initiated this meeting, which also allowed numerous institutes that were unable to be present to take part in the proceedings by means of direct dialogue through the Internet, for having thereby stimulated a lively interaction between defence and security institutes from all over the world, within the framework of the Culture of Peace Programme being carried out by UNESCO;
2. unanimously **take note** that current and future security considerations are taking on global proportions, all factors in the security equation interacting on a world scale, in such a way that the need to understand them as one single problem is a perceptual step which increasingly needs to be taken everywhere, based on an intensive sharing of everyone's contributions;

3. aware that defence and security institutes, through their responsiveness both to the defence situation and to civil societies, as well as through their educational role and their function of strategic analysis, have a special responsibility in this respect, **undertake** for their part to increase their co-operation in a common research effort to propose better ways to achieve security, peace, development and the application of democratic principles;
4. Anxious to disseminate their conclusions as widely as possible, and to call for the support of all those who might be inclined to share in their undertaking, **propose** as the basis of their continuing project the following declaration:

**A.** Security is global and indivisible. A general dynamic of equitable and balanced development is its best cornerstone. The growing interaction of societies on a worldwide scale increasingly demonstrates its overall necessity, though it is not yet enough to prevent all forms of violence or conflict. The world's future depends upon a growing need for security.

<sup>1</sup> Declaration by the representatives of the various defence, security and strategic studies institutes meeting in Paris from 12 to 14 June 1996.

**B.** *The armed forces play an important role therein, by ensuring the external security of nations and by providing the international community with the possibility of ending existing situations of insecurity, as well as through a number of other positive contributions.*

**C.** *Awareness of the global and universal nature of security necessary to all forms of progress and the acknowledgement of the appropriate role of the armed forces in this respect call for a considerable evolution in people's minds, which presupposes a profound cultural change.*

**D.** *The representatives of all the various defence and security institutes and strategic studies institutes share an important responsibility in this field, through their capacity to bring into dynamic interaction a realistic analysis of the world in its current state, a clear perception of the changes awaiting it and a constructive vision of the actions to be undertaken in order to provide general progress with the conditions necessary for its security, that is to say the possibility of its being of a lasting nature.*

**E.** *Consequently, the representatives of the various defence and security institutes and strategic studies institutes taking part in the symposium 'From Partial Insecurity to Global Security':*

- *propose to join together to form an association in order to remain united for the purpose of future activities;*
- *welcome the proposal of the Director-General of UNESCO to assign to the network they have thus created a travelling UNESCO Chair known as the 'UNESCO Chair for a new approach to security', whose aim is to promote learning on the culture of peace and security within the different institutes and whose implementation will be ensured by the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) for everyone's benefit;*
- *propose to contribute to the promotion of concrete actions of general interest, ranging from joint efforts to define security indicators to practical development projects, for which they could mobilize civilian and military capacities, and to the promotion of a development culture;*
- *invite similar institutions interested in this project to join them in their association, and to combine forces with them.*

## II.

On the basis of the ensuing discussion, it was decided that IHEDN would be responsible for implementing the proposal to create an international association of defence institutes.

## III.

The *raison d'être* of this association would be to facilitate, for each of its members, the circulation of information of common interest and to foster exchanges and regional co-operation projects which could benefit from assistance, including financial assistance, provided by international institutions dealing with security.

## IV.

As at 12 November 1996, sixteen institutes had informed IHEDN of their interest in becoming members; three of them, not including IHEDN, stated that they were potential founder members: Italy's CASD, Spain's CESEDEN and Portugal's IDN.

## V.

An inaugural meeting of the potential founder members is planned in 1997 to allow the association to take shape officially and to draw up its statutes.

Establishing the association and uniting the members in a modern communication forum will make it easier to foster concerted action and key forms of co-operation on a regional or international scale. As such, the association could function as a virtual institute that would take shape through its different members.

## VI.

At the same time, UNESCO is preparing proposals for the creation of a 'travelling UNESCO Chair for a new approach to security', which would work closely with the International Association of Defence Institutes as soon as the latter has been officially established.

**VIII.**  
**CLOSURE OF THE SYMPOSIUM**

*Chairperson: Air-Force General Bernard Norlain,  
Director of the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN),  
followed by Mr Adnan Badran,  
Deputy Director-General of UNESCO*

## DOES HUMANITARIAN ACTION ENSURE PEACE?

*by Mr Xavier Emmanuelli,  
Secretary of State to the Prime Minister of France,  
with responsibility for emergency humanitarian action*

Today the question of humanitarian action is part of the broader issue of redefining concepts of national and international security.

We have passed from the Cold War view, which reduced the concept of security to its military and strategic aspects, to the emergence of new notions of security. They are based on recognition of the fact that states and their citizens are confronted with a much wider range of dangers, such as environmental pollution, depletion of natural resources, demographic growth, drugs, organized crime, international terrorism, human rights violations, proliferation of portable weapons, migratory movements, economic uncertainty and public health problems, of which current events provide us with striking examples.

The question of the return to peace of societies torn apart by internal conflicts, highlighted by the situations in Bosnia, Cambodia and Angola, cannot be dealt with outside this general analytical framework. This is why I am particularly keen to thank UNESCO and IHEDN for taking the initiative of organizing this three-day symposium on the theme 'From Partial Insecurity to Global Security'.

On this, the closing day of your discussions, I would like to share with you some personal thoughts about a question which is central to my experience of a non-governmental humanitarian organization and then, more recently, in the service of the state.

Can we expect humanitarian action to ensure peace? In the midst of the Yugoslav crisis, some Bosnian civilians were to be heard saying 'Thanks to humanitarian action, we shall be able to die with full stomachs'. This is a cruel analysis of the role of humanitarian aid in crisis situations, of which we might also say that it made it possible to survive, but not necessarily to live, nor to live in peace.

Why is this? The purpose of humanitarian aid, which dictates its relationship to the other, is access to victims. Humanitarian action is concerned with people as victims, suffering physically, psychologically and socially. The Geneva Conventions, which encapsulate humanitarian orthodoxy, assign to humanitarian action the goal of free access to victims.

What are the consequences of this vocation? In my opinion, there are two:

- humanitarian action permanently runs the risk of prolonging war;
- it cannot alone take on the task of peace-building.

Experience in Somalia, Afghanistan and Bosnia shows that humanitarian action sometimes prolongs war. The reason for this is that humanitarian agencies suddenly become involved, sometimes massively, in local contexts with which they are not familiar and have neither the means nor the time to understand.

In ethnic and clan crises it is difficult for aid organizations not to serve the interests of one faction or another. In order to gain access to victims, combat lines have to be crossed and the military take their cut from humanitarian aid. There is a law that humanitarian aid workers have to learn: in order to have any hope of feeding the victims, you have to be prepared to feed the tormentors.

The accusation often made against international assistance is that it reinforces the logic of confrontation by providing by its mere presence the material and political means for continuing the fighting. When a medical team treats war wounded, they know that some of the men they have cared for will return to the fighting.

*Today the question of humanitarian action is part of the broader issue of redefining concepts of national and international security.*

*The search for peace is a political search conducted by diplomatic and military means, not humanitarian means.*

The diversion of aid carried by convoy in the former Yugoslavia, the objective aid given to promoters of ethnic cleansing by evacuating civilian populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the assistance given without discrimination to refugees who have committed serious human rights violations in Rwanda, are all examples of the ambivalence or hijacking of international aid.

The question of the security of humanitarian missions is a further confusing factor. It is all the more acute in internal conflicts, which represent 90 per cent of current conflicts, in which aid agencies are a constant target. The use of protection services and military escorts has fostered the proliferation of local militias drawing a large proportion of their revenues from 'protecting' humanitarian workers.

It has therefore been argued that humanitarian aid actively contributes to financing continued fighting, to say nothing of the paradox of protecting protectors, defending the defenders of victims. This 'metaprotection' can only become part of the logic of local conflicts and pervert them.

I wanted to highlight, quite bluntly, the fact that humanitarian action always runs the risk of prolonging war.

The second conviction I have acquired as regards crisis situations is that humanitarian action alone cannot build peace.

Humanitarian action takes place in a time-frame which dictates its means of action and sets its limits.

Emergency action is immediate action that responds to an exceptional situation and speedy intervention is the condition of its success. This specific time-scale is largely the result of the importance of television, which has placed distant distress before the eyes of public opinion since the Viet Nam war. Crises mould opinion and trigger a demand for immediate action.

A specific mode of action results from this relationship with time. Medical and food aid are the two most important aspects of emergency aid. The result of intervention depends on the quality of usually complex logistics.

Actors in humanitarian aid do not always seek the agreement of governments or partnership with local organizations, the humanitarian initiative being the mainspring of action.

In any emergency aid programme, there is a balance between the rapid deployment of aid and its long-term implications. The more the emphasis is placed on speed and viewing

activities in logistic terms, the less emphasis is placed on preparing projects through discussion and debate with people affected by conflicts.

This mode of action means that humanitarian aid is not responsible for entering into the essentially political contractual process on which peace among the various actors can be built.

The search for peace is a political search conducted by diplomatic and military means, not humanitarian means.

This is the essence of the distinction made in Anglo-Saxon military vocabulary between peace-makers and peacekeepers. Making peace calls for force and is done using offensive weapons, while peace related to a status quo is kept by defensive weapons.

Humanitarian action can be of only secondary assistance in peace-making, whereas it is an integral part of peacekeeping operations.

These remarks are not simply a question of semantics: they demonstrate, on the one hand, that humanitarian action cannot be substituted for political action, and, on the other, that the division of roles between humanitarian action and the use of armed forces for peacekeeping must be very carefully calculated.

Humanitarian action cannot be substituted for political action. When this happens it amounts to a veritable misuse of humanitarian action whereby countries that have the means to put an end to an armed conflict pacify public opinion by substituting a humanitarian initiative for a genuine peacekeeping operation.

Humanitarian concerns dictated by the interests of the populations at risk may enter into political decision-making, but humanitarian action cannot be regarded as an alternative policy.

Of course, the nature of contemporary crises in which political violence is the driving force behind conflicts strengthens the relationship between humanitarian action and the use of force, whether based on a mandate of intervention or on one of peacekeeping. There is reason to criticize the confusion to which this closer relationship has given rise, but it would be naïve to ignore the fact that it is precisely the changing nature of crises that makes such confusion more difficult to avoid.

While war has changed, peace is no longer the same. There are few civil wars from which one side emerges victorious. Peace is almost always built on the basis of a ceasefire imposed by the international community.

*...on the one hand, humanitarian action cannot be substituted for political action, and, on the other, the division of roles between humanitarian action and the use of armed forces for peacekeeping must be very carefully calculated.*

It is for politicians to lay down a clear mission for the armed forces that impose the ceasefire on the embattled territories, without confusing the two types of action:

- military action is based on force in order to restrain;
- humanitarian assistance is provided to victims unconditionally.

Confusing the two areas amounts to neutralizing them instead of exploiting their complementary aspects. The role of international decision-makers, as I understand it, is to give the military a political framework, a clear, structured mandate with objectives limited in time and space, making sure that command structures are appropriate to the mandate.

As I see it, this was the great strength of Operation Turquoise, whose mission clearly laid down duration and place of intervention and objectives and had an international guarantee through Resolution 929 of the United Nations Security Council.

In the absence of such clearly defined objectives regarding a country in crisis, humanitarian action is an impossible substitute for political action. It may be carried out in tandem with political action through diplomatic or military means, but it must not have a hold over the long-term processes on which peace may be built.

More specifically, humanitarian aid affects social, political and economic processes but does not have the means to understand the finer points of the local context of which they are a part.

We ask more of humanitarian aid than it can deliver: the return and reintegration of refugees, rehabilitation and reconstruction of societies emerging from crisis, the disarming of combatants and their reintegration in civilian society, rehabilitation of victims of conflicts, re-establishment of institutions, particularly judicial systems, and a return to respect for human rights. All these are areas in which family, village and community solidarities, local

resources spared by the crisis, and cultural traditions, accompanied by international aid adapted to these mechanisms, must face up to their responsibilities.

Among these areas, there is one that is for me particularly important: the movement to eliminate anti-personnel mines.

I believe this to be one of the major meeting points between 'humanitarian' and military action, as this weapon has for long gone beyond its defensive purpose and become an international scourge.

This scourge is both a humanitarian problem and an obstacle to development. Fighting against these weapons not only means clearing the affected areas: the Cambodian experience suggests that mines can be replaced by the peasants themselves to protect their fields and granaries. The context in which they are used and the nature of the risk they engender in a particular society must be understood.

At the international level, combating their proliferation and use is purely a matter of political decision-making.

This is exactly the position of President Jacques Chirac, whose closing speech at the forty-eighth session of IHEDN last week about the urgent need for the international community to mobilize on this matter I would like to quote: 'France is sparing no effort, and will spare no effort, to this end. Last September it announced a moratorium on the production of all anti-personnel mines, which supplements that already in force regarding their exportation. It has begun to reduce existing stocks by destruction. We must go further along this road so that, when the time comes, countries can unite their efforts with a view to the total, general prohibition of anti-personnel mines.'

Humanitarian aid can act as a catalyst in action to eliminate mines and more generally in the return to peace of societies in crisis, but it cannot be a substitute for political action, which alone can ensure peace.

*We ask more  
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## THE VALUES OF PEACE IN CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION

*by Mr Federico Rampini,  
Editor-in-chief of the newspaper La Repubblica (Milan)*

Today, for a great part of humanity, the two terms war and peace confront each other in the economic field. This is, first of all, because the hope of avoiding war lies in economic development but also because, by a strange paradox, economic development itself is now considered as being a new form of warfare. This brings us to the heart of a question that is fundamental to the very future of peace: the phenomenon of the globalization of the world economy.

Is globalization a factor in development and in reducing inequalities, and hence in peace-building? Why is it that globalization is perceived in the rich countries as a conflict and a threat? In contemporary civilization, man is increasingly a *homo economicus*, an economic subject. People are increasingly conscious of being economic subjects, since public opinion is more and more conversant with economic problems. Never before in the history of humanity has economics so dominated our public debate, the attention of citizens and the view of the governing classes of our countries.

The overwhelming view of things today is that which interprets international economic relations in the form of competition. According to this view, the new contemporary war is to be found in economic competition. In this war, public opinion and the Western governing classes, especially those in Western Europe, feel under attack. They therefore tend to respond by adopting defensive strategies.

According to the geo-economic view which inspires Western governments, competition between the technological and financial systems of nations is replacing military conflicts proper. What is at stake in this competition is the conquest of international market share by each nation, so as to increase its national product and

create jobs, if possible more skilled jobs earning higher wages. We are witnessing, in fact, the redeployment of secret services, which now engage in industrial espionage and counter-espionage, often even between friendly countries – proof that economic competition is supplanting military confrontation. However, I repeat, in the era of globalization, the people of Western Europe perceive this as a threat to their civilization, their living standards, their social benefits, their trade union rights, in short, their security and, in some instances, their identity. This is important and I stress this perception in Western Europe, since we should not forget that the European Union now represents the world's largest market. This view of things is most deceptive and dangerous. It is this insecurity that can give rise to commercial wars that are likely, in their turn, to lead to actual war.

This 'diabolical' view of the globalization of the economy stems from a false and tendentious idea: this is the perception whereby international trade and international economic relations are purported to be a zero-sum game: what I win, you lose; what I lose, you win. In the face of the gradual removal of customs barriers and the increasingly rapid circulation of technologies and capital, European workers are afraid of not being able to measure up to the cheaper labour of the developing countries. They therefore regard this competition as a significant cause of the unemployment afflicting our societies. Thus, the economic take-off of the developing countries is sometimes perceived as being a real catastrophe, by a singular and disquieting subversion of reality.

It is urgent, in the interests of peace and world prosperity, to restore the truth in our awareness and our public opinion, to restore the truth in our policies. Naturally, the progress

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made in transport and telecommunications and the new light-weight technologies of the numerical and digital era have made it possible for the less rich countries or, in any event, for a large number of them, to take part in the global economy.

Naturally, the outstanding success of certain Asian countries has given rise to spectacular instances where they have forged ahead of the field. In 1995, for example, the per capita income of Singapore exceeded that of France and Italy, but this does not mean that France or Italy are any poorer for that. In any event, what we see here is one of the most obvious symptoms of the revolutionary nature of this globalization. Twenty years ago, when the war in Viet Nam was coming to an end, the whole of South-East Asia was an area of appalling poverty and underdevelopment, contrary to what we see today. Globalization has therefore pushed back the frontiers of poverty and marginalization.

When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) came into being in the post-war period, only eleven developing countries were members. Now, ninety countries are members of the World Trade Organization, which succeeded GATT, and some thirty others are preparing to join it. The fifteen most dynamic countries in the world today, in terms of export growth, are developing countries. Their share of all world trade has risen from 5 to 15 per cent. It has therefore tripled.

Globalization is liberating entire peoples from poverty. This concerns a substantial proportion of the planet, whose living standards are taking a tremendous leap forward. Not all the developing countries are concerned, unfortunately. The miracle of development at rapid rates concerns most of the countries of Asia and partly of Latin America, but unfortunately not to the same extent on the African continent. However, it is to be hoped that the beneficial effects of globalization will spread rather than be limited.

International trade is not a war. What others gain, we do not lose. The opening-up of our markets, in Western Europe and the United States, has made it possible for part of humanity to emerge from poverty, but at the same time these countries have become new markets for us and increasingly important outlets for our economies.

To quote a few figures: between 1992 and 1994, the exports of the European Union to Asia increased by 22 per cent. Over the past

four years, the growth of imports by the Asian countries was higher than that of their exports. The new Asian 'tigers' or 'baby tigers', such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, have accumulated a foreign trade deficit of \$8 billion, which shows that these countries purchase more from abroad than they sell. They are large consumers and the last important economic recession which affected Europe was fortunately softened by the explosion of demand from the Asian countries. This is the first time that this has happened since the post-war period.

In the past, the economic cycle of the developed countries was quite unresponsive to the situation of the developing countries. That of the overall economic situation took place and was played out entirely between Europe and the United States. For the first time, Asia has played a very positive role in our economic situation. The development of this part of the world therefore signifies not only a proliferation of new competitors: it is also the beginning of a virtuous circle for world growth, which has to be amplified by bringing in new countries and new continents.

The developing countries need our markets to be opened up to them, and to an increasing degree. We in turn need them to grow rich, since their growth is a guarantee for our prosperity and our employment. We would be seriously weakened ourselves if the development of Asia, for example, were suddenly to grind to a halt.

It is true that in our own countries there are social tensions and conflicts which are bound up with the slimming-down of the welfare state which our governments are applying. This is not the fault of globalization or, in any event, only very partially. The crisis of our social security systems is above all due to population growth and to public finances. We owe the reform of pensions, health systems and unemployment allowances, on which the attention of public opinion in Western Europe is almost obsessively focused, to choices which have to be made for our children and future generations, so as not to leave them a heritage of debt.

In conclusion, the international economy is not the continuation of war by other means. Economic war, the recurrent temptation of resorting to commercial protectionism, can destabilize whole continents and bring about the re-emergence of the spectre of war, real war.

## STATEMENT

*by Mr Adnan Badran,  
Deputy Director-General of UNESCO,  
Chairperson of the closing meeting of the symposium*

I was certainly very responsive to your concept of security globalization. I believe globalization is a concept which we have to tackle from now on. Market forces are very visible and will determine to a large extent the future of this globalization. The sooner we address globalization, the more we shall be ready to enter the next millennium on a firm footing. This is a new concept which is being strengthened by the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as the fall of so many walls and barriers, whether to trade or to other exchanges.

There is a new culture, a culture of globalization. Globalization, which will be determined more and more by global markets, where the multinationals and the economic forces will be on a planet-wide dimension, will move us more and more closely towards the concept which we used to talk about a great deal in this hall, that of the global village. The global village is becoming a realistic concept which is characterized, whether we like it or not, by interdependence. We are moving towards too much interdependence. So many walls will be lowered so that globalization will move ahead more and more. There is a new culture with which we have to deal. I always think of globalization in very varied terms. When we address education, are we ready to enter the era of globalization? Have we done enough in the field of education? Are we ready to study culture, the mosaic of worldwide cultures, with their seven thousand languages? What will be the outcome? The fact is that globalization brings with it a common culture. How can we preserve the identities which you have addressed in your workshops? How can we preserve the languages and values and traditions which are healthy? This does not mean

that every tradition is a dead tradition. There are some traditions which are living traditions, which will give strength to our globalization. It is this mosaic you can see here in Europe, which is becoming one unit, while preserving its languages and the existence side-by-side of its particular features. I think that this is very important here because it has much to do with security, security at the global level.

At present, knowledge is spreading very quickly, within the space of seconds, whether on the Internet or the mass media networks such as CNN and others. A network can now start or stop a war within the hour. We do not hear any more about Somalia because the network ignores it. Yet Somalia still exists, and its problems still exist. We hear nothing. However, we hear a great deal about Bosnia. Hence the ability of the mass media to start or stop a war is a reality which has to be integrated into this concept of globalization, where information and knowledge will reach every corner of the world without any delay, and public opinion and pressures in a democratic society, through parliamentary procedures, will develop and will influence governments to intervene and stop conflicts. This is very, very important.

Then there is ignorance. With this information crossing all the world's frontiers, we expect higher literacy rates and a fall in population growth rates. This is a positive aspect of globalization. Hence, information and access to knowledge will move from place to place and will also have an impact on exclusion. In the world, we see so many 'boxed in' ethnic problems and religious factors because there is not enough dialogue between religions, dialogue between ethnic groups. The outcome is again exclusion, at a time when we have to reach the unreached. Globalization will address this.

*Including the excluded and reaching the unreached are needs that we are going to have to face.*

However, it is extremely important to preserve the identities of those groups which have been excluded for thousands of years, but which should be opened up in order to prevent any further conflicts.

Hence, including the excluded and reaching the unreached are needs that we are going to have to face. More democratization and human rights are the positive factors to be expected of this globalization concept. But when we speak of globalization, the most important factor is the effect it will have on migrations, demographic changes and the twin subjects of environment and sustainable development, which formed the subject of the Rio Conference in 1992. Migration means looking for work, for employment. If globalization goes hand in hand with the idea that multinationals will establish their industries where they are more efficient and, notably, where labour costs are lower, then the whole migration concept will have to be changed.

However, what are the negative aspects of globalization? I have mentioned some of them relating to cultures and identities and some of the values which may be lost, and I have spoken of languages that are being lost as a result of the common language of the Internet and of the networks now governing the world. We shall have some pockets of poverty as a result of globalization because it always brings with it some injustice, social injustice, it creates some unemployment because it moves where it can make money. It does not take into consideration other factors of the human dimension. Poverty is a very important problem which has to be addressed and reduced, because it will generate violence. Poverty will give rise to drug trafficking and will create social insecurity

*... for we hope at least that the rewards of globalization will be dignified human beings wherever they may be on our planet.*

within countries themselves. Thus, when we talk about North and South – the haves and the have-nots – with globalization, we are going to move from this global concept to a sensitive reality within every country. This is bound to give rise to a conflict between the haves and the have-nots: the problem of how these conflicts, the conflicts of poverty, can be prevented will have to be re-addressed. Globalization may bring about a massive resumption in the arms market because, once again, free markets are looking for a quick dollar, and quick dollars are always to be found in the arms trade and the invention of war machines.

Espionage – I speak of economic espionage, since there is now no other kind of espionage – will also become common in the future, since anybody who has access to new technology, new knowledge, the new frontiers of knowledge, will be ahead of the others in this economic war game which we now see emerging.

These are some thoughts about the concept of globalization which we have to take seriously. I have not covered the other advantages and drawbacks, which I would need much more time to address, but I think that we should all pay closer attention to the concept of globalization, whether it concerns culture, poverty, economics or ethnic, religious and other aspects, and we should concern ourselves with developing dialogue, understanding and respect for human dignity everywhere, for we hope at least that the rewards of globalization will be dignified human beings wherever they may be on our planet.

Thank you. I am now going to give the floor to General Norlain, to whom I leave it to deliver the closing address of this symposium.

## CLOSING ADDRESS

*by Air-Force General Bernard Norlain,  
Director of the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale*

Director-General,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

The programme required me to make a closing address, but you will agree that this is an impossible task. You have just adopted a resolution that calls on us to work together for many years to come. You have proposed to form an association of institutes of defence and security to ensure this continuity. By deciding to bestow on the nascent network a UNESCO Chair in security, the Director-General of UNESCO has entrusted us with a mission and responsibility. I therefore have no choice but to deliver an opening address. Furthermore, the word 'opening' sounds exactly right at the end of this symposium.

It has indeed marked the reciprocal opening of the world of the armed forces and what is most civilized in civil society, by which I mean the world of culture symbolized by UNESCO.

It has also, I hope once and for all, put an end to a series of outdated divisions – East-West, North-South, powerful and weak – at the same time demonstrating how insecurity affects or may affect each of our countries, so that there is equality of situation and community of destiny in this respect.

Lastly, and above all, it has illuminated many ways forward for thought and action which were hitherto obscure. Before identifying a few of them, however, I should like to go over a number of obvious points and definitions which I regard as essential and which have, moreover, been mentioned or emphasized during your work.

First, in my opinion, the present-day world is characterized by the dialectic of interdependence and fragmentation.

World interdependence, globalization, together with a weakening of the nation-state and economic and cultural destabilization, is causing identities and communities to turn inward, and the social order to disintegrate. This results in internal relations being subject to violence, and this is confirmed by the fact that almost all of the thirty-four conflicts identified in 1995 were intrastate conflicts.

Furthermore, this is a world without logic or rules, a planetary world in which different processes, to which we no longer possess comprehensive keys, are entangled, a world of chaos and wills to power where international space-time resembles a network of interweaving hierarchies, of complex interactive systems. It is a multipolar, fragmented world in which the accompanying global animosity is the major geopolitical problem.

At a time when our world is becoming universal, it is also fragmenting and becoming chaotic.

As Mr Federico Rampini and the Deputy Director-General of UNESCO have said, globalization has beneficial effects in that it favours development and the universalization of democratic principles, but it also gives rise to the problem of the violence caused by fragmentation.

Whether such violence is situated at the level of human nature, political regimes or the anarchic structure of the international community, it exists, and the fundamental question is whether it will become general or whether our world will disseminate peace. Peace is something that must be built. This is why we are here.

It is unusual for soldiers and specialists in defence issues to come together under the auspices of UNESCO. I salute this bold, original

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*Anyone who wishes to tackle insecurity must first tackle these fundamental evils and this requires means quite different from those of coercion: it is a matter of calling on the courage, aspirations and motivation of peoples, not only of suddenly intervening against a particular manifestation of insecurity caused by more deeply seated factors.*

initiative on the part of UNESCO and its Director-General, who has clearly understood that security is indispensable for economic development and the development of democratic principles, and that the armed forces have an essential role to play in it.

As one speaker at the symposium emphasized, at this stage the terms security and defence need to be clearly defined. In France, the notion of security is very often taken to mean internal security, as opposed to defence, whose field of action is external.

Without denying this essential dimension of internal security which we have seen is now closely linked to external security, I believe that security is everywhere understood in the Anglo-Saxon sense of the term that might be defined as 'a politico-strategic order' established among the elements of a system in such a way that everyone is assured that peace will be maintained.

If we limit ourselves to concepts, there is a contradiction between security and defence. In a security system the agents of the system assign themselves the goal of stability; constructive dialogue is instituted as the principle of interstate relations.

Conversely, while security is based on the notion of co-operation, defence is based on consideration of one or more antagonisms.

While security means transparency and disarmament, defence implies a significant capacity for action which requires resources and a degree of opacity.

I assure you that this contradiction in fact operates only in the theoretical field. In reality, instability in the politico-strategic universe can never be excluded. A disruptive actor who does not accept, or no longer accepts, the rules established in the framework of collective security may appear at any time.

In fact, the two concepts are complementary and closely linked. Because defence is really the domain of armies, the complementary relationship, which is not new, has found considerable scope for action since the end of the bipolar world.

Armed forces have never before been involved in so many collective security operations of every kind as they have since the fall of the Berlin Wall. A more sophisticated contribution to peace-building must now be thought out. This is what we have done.

But before reviewing our work, I believe one essential point needs to be made. It must not be forgotten that the special calling of a

military institution is combat or, if you prefer, the legitimate use of force. This means that armed forces can be asked to do many things, but we must never lose sight of this characteristic.

Hence the importance of the framework of action and obedience to certain rules. The framework consists of democratic principles, and the clear relationship between politicians and the military is the rule of law *cedant arma togae*. The rules, especially rules of engagement, must be appropriate, as we saw in the former Yugoslavia, where peace was won only by IFOR and not by UNPROFOR because of the lack of appropriate rules of engagement.

Thus, the contribution of the armed forces to security and peace is very substantial. Since the classic mission of intervention in the framework of an international resolution like the Gulf War – I make no value judgement – the question is merely one of a range of types of contribution, from implementation or collective security missions (peacekeeping, peace-building, peace-making, etc.) to purely humanitarian missions using the logistic and technical capacities of the armed forces.

But at this point I should like to note a few of the main themes that came out of the round tables and your animated discussions.

First, you unanimously stressed that insecurity is not reality in itself, but the consequence and, as it were, the most tangible symptom of other, more deeply seated ills.

You saw economic underdevelopment, the deterioration of the environment, social inequalities, demographic movements and ignorance as the main sources of insecurity. This observation was very forceful and priorities for action can easily be deduced from it.

Anyone who wishes to tackle insecurity must first tackle these fundamental evils and this requires means quite different from those of coercion: it is a matter of calling on the courage, aspirations and motivation of peoples, not only of suddenly intervening against a particular manifestation of insecurity caused by more deeply seated factors. It is important to understand that there is no comparison between the means needed for acting at this level and what is necessary even for a very large operation to restore security.

You also unanimously agreed with the idea that security consists first in sincere, effective commitment to international law and more generally the rule of law. This statement has as many implications as the previous one: it

shows that for us the idea of basing security on the imposition of power and demonstrations of force has had its day. We all believe that there can be no genuine, lasting security without respect for the rules that the international community has freely given itself.

Lastly, you associated security with the progress of a culture of development, in other words, a positive common ambition. In my opinion, this idea has two major dimensions.

The first is the awareness it involves that insecurity is often created, and always aggravated, by worry about tomorrow, other people, the future. Conversely, for security to be established there must be a positive project, a vision of the future, in which everyone can recognize themselves, a noble ambition full of promise.

In order to work fearlessly for its advent, we must believe in the future. The shrinking of our mental horizons, encouraged by our habit of living for the moment, to which, by their very nature, the media which now play too great a part in moulding our perception of the world, limit themselves, is from this point of view a mutilation and a pernicious source of insecurity.

The second fundamental notion I see in the idea of the culture of development is the term culture. It is highly appropriate in UNESCO, the temple of culture. But it has to be clearly understood. In the definition that concerns us, I do not see it as an inheritance that must be perpetuated, but as co-operative action that must be established.

Development is not a science that experts can apply to systems, but a consequence of life in all its complexity, richness, conflicts and all its disillusion, too. This is why development requires everyone's participation. Forms of development will be more or less positive according to whether such action is co-ordinated or disordered.

Co-ordinating and combining the attitudes, behaviour and commitment of all contributors to the life of societies, losing nothing of the wealth deriving from their diversity and creative freedom, is the major task of development, and this is called a culture – almost in the sense of biological culture, like that used in research laboratories by the geneticists and other biochemists dear to Mr Mayor, who follows their example in his dynamic conception of culture.

In one sense, insecurity is a lack of the sort of culture which should direct all energies

towards progress, the main, very long-term reducer of insecurity. Let us therefore work to give it birth, enrich it and share it. I believe, with Marshal Lyautey, that the immensity of this task, limitless in space, time and depth in the social fabric, far from discouraging us, should lead us to begin straight away, each at his or her own level, provided that we do so together.

True, it is neither spectacular nor moving, but as Mr Xavier Emmanuelli invited us to do this morning, we must tear ourselves from the virtual world of the instant and take on the real world, the day-to-day, long-term world.

From this very broad point of view, I believe our work together has resulted in a very satisfactory and timely momentum. Ten years after the end of the Cold War and as the twenty-first century approaches, the time has come to act in different ways and with a feeling of extreme urgency as regards common security questions. I believe our meeting represents a useful step in this direction. It has clarified our thinking and produced practical proposals.

Peace will not be preserved simply by our proclaiming our love for it. Peace is the product of daily combat and ever-renewed vigilance. Allow the Director of IHEDN to stress the responsibility of institutes of defence and security. In the future, defence will increasingly depend on knowledge, an accurate understanding of the realities of the world. Schools are one of its main responsibilities, which is why the École Militaire was founded.

Therefore, I am fully aware of the importance of the renewal of thought and its general dissemination in the conduct of public affairs: was not Napoleon a pupil of the École Militaire and author of the Civil Code?

To conclude, I should like to thank all those who have contributed to this success. First of all, Mr Mayor, who made the meeting possible. Next, the organizing committee: Mr Guido Lenzi, General Carlo Jean, General Javier Pardo de Santayana, represented by Rear-Admiral Artal. Assisted by Ms Moufida Goucha, Senior special adviser to the Director-General, and her colleague Ms Isabelle de Billy, Mr René Zapata, of the UNESCO Secretariat, Mr Philippe Ratte, Dean of studies of IHEDN, and his colleague Ms Emmanuelle Maréchal. My thanks are also due to the speakers, chairpersons of sessions and all who have contributed to the smooth running of the workshops, and to the Internet

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team, and the reception and logistic support staff.

I should also like to thank you all for your warm and attentive presence. You have made possible this supreme accomplishment of civilizing work. In the words Marguerite Yourcenar put into the Emperor Hadrian's mouth: 'I wanted all these men, when they reloaded their caravans to travel far away, to take with them the ideas exchanged by the light of the cooking fires and carry our ideas, which are more

powerful than marching legions, to the four corners of the earth.' Legions are needed to guarantee the order agreed on by everyone. But, in the final analysis, I believe with the greatest of the Roman Emperors that this order is produced by the alchemy of ordinary exchanges, individual acts and, above all, fruitful ideals, once they circulate.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for contributing to all this in a way that does credit to UNESCO and to everyone here.



**IX.  
AGENDA**

## AGENDA 1994-1997

### 1994

- 12–14 May** Seminar on peacekeeping and peace-building at the Institute of Science, Literature and Art in Venice, Italy.

### 1995

- 25–27 January** International colloquium on the right to humanitarian assistance, organized by UNESCO (Paris, UNESCO Headquarters).<sup>1</sup>
- 3–4 April** Inter-American symposium on ‘Security for Peace: peace-building and peace-keeping’ organized by UNESCO, the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Defense College (Washington, D.C., United States of America).<sup>1</sup>
- 10 June** The Director-General of UNESCO delivered the closing address at the 47th National Session of the French Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) held in Paris in 1995 on the theme ‘A new approach to security’.
- 13 June** African and Malagasy International Session of IHEDN hosted by UNESCO (Paris, UNESCO Headquarters).
- 25–29 September** Regional seminar for the countries of Central Asia on international humanitarian law and the law on protection of cultural property, organized in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Tashkent (Uzbekistan).
- 7 October** European Session of IHEDN hosted by UNESCO.
- October** Establishment in UNESCO of an informal group to consider the new approach to security, whose work, to be completed in May 1996, will be published in 1997.
- 18–19 December** Colloquium on ‘Wars and peace in the twenty-first century’, organized by the French Fondation pour les Études de Défense as part of the UNESCO fiftieth anniversary celebrations. The opening speech by the Director-General of UNESCO was published in April 1996 in the journal *Défense nationale* (Paris, UNESCO Headquarters).

1. See Appendix 7: Other publications of interest.

## 1996

- 10 January** The Director-General of UNESCO gave a lecture at Italy's Centro di Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD) on 'UNESCO and the Culture of Peace'. Signature of a protocol of intent with CASD concerning collaboration between the armed forces of the northern and southern Mediterranean in the fields of telemedicine, civil defence and safeguarding the environment and the cultural heritage (Rome, Italy).
- May** UNESCO participation in three national seminars organized by the ICRC on international humanitarian law and the law on protection of cultural property, in Azerbaijan (6–7 May), Armenia (9–10 May) and Georgia (13–14 May).
- 12–14 June** International symposium on the theme 'From Partial Insecurity to Global Security', organized jointly by UNESCO and IHEDN, in co-operation with CASD, Spain's Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN) and the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union (WEU) (Paris, UNESCO Headquarters).
- 26–27 June** Central American Military Forum (San Salvador, El Salvador). Adoption of a Declaration signed by the Ministers of Defence and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. (The Proceedings of the Forum are in press.)
- 16–27 September** Participation of UNESCO in a seminar organized by the Institute for Security Studies of the WEU and CASD on the theme 'Europe and its neighbours: reflections on a common security policy' (Rome, Italy).
- 28 October  
–1 November** Participation of UNESCO in the first Ibero-American Conference on Peace and Conflict Management (Santa Fé de Bogotá, Colombia).

## 1997

- 4–6 February** Key note speech by the Director-General on 'The armed forces, democracy and human rights on the threshold of the twenty-first century', at the Second Conference on Human Rights, organized jointly by the United States Southern Command and the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IIHR) (Miami, United States of America).
- 14–15 April** Participation of UNESCO at the meeting on 'The Mediterranean, a challenge for Europe' organized jointly by the Centre d'Étude et de Prospective Stratégique (France), the Centre d'Étude de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (Belgium) and the Military Strategic Studies Centre (Italy).
- 24–26 April** Participation of UNESCO in the meeting of Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces of member countries of the Non-Aggression and Defence Assistance Agreement (ANAD), (Niamey, Niger).
- 2–4 July** Participation of UNESCO in the regional seminar organized by GERDDES-Africa on the role of the armed forces in the democratic process (Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso).
- 26–27 September** Participation of UNESCO at the seminar organized by SGDN and IHEDN on 'Defence and the governance of nations' (Paris, France).

## 1998: Scheduled meetings

- 2–3 July** UNESCO-ASEAN regional symposium on 'Co-operative peace in South-East Asia' (Djakarta, Indonesia).

**X.**  
**APPENDICES**

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**The Editorial Committee wishes to apologize for any error or omission which may have escaped its attention.**

## 2. THE UNITWIN/UNESCO CHAIRS PROGRAMME

One of the objectives set for this international symposium is to ‘...consider specific projects such as the establishment of new Chairs devoted to peace in the defence academies...’. In this respect, the participants may find it useful to become acquainted with the experience acquired by UNESCO through its UNITWIN/UNESCO Chairs Programme.

The UNITWIN/UNESCO Chairs Programme is an international plan of action aimed at strengthening inter-university co-operation, with particular emphasis on support to higher education in the developing countries. Launched at the end of 1991, the Programme has been favourably received by the Member States of UNESCO, by the NGOs of higher education and by the higher education institutions themselves. It was quickly acknowledged as a major initiative of UNESCO and became its main thrust of action in the field of higher education, intended to serve as a mechanism for the free flow of persons and ideas and for the rapid transfer of knowledge between higher education and research institutions, in a spirit of genuine academic solidarity.

A wide diversity of projects have already been established within its framework. Equally diverse are the activities associated with these projects, such as development and implementation of joint international curricula at the universities taking part in a project, production of teaching and learning materials, use of distance education technology and methodology, link-up of participating institutions by e-mail. A major objective is to encourage the mobility of staff and students, through visiting professorships, exchanges of teachers and researchers, the award of scholarships to students from developing countries, and so on.

The preferred institutional framework for carrying out these activities is a UNESCO Chair, that is, a basic unit of teaching, training and research, preferably located at a university in a developing country. The staff and students associated with the activities of a Chair (especially the Chair-holders or the visiting professors, who are well-known scholars in their fields) come from different countries, thus conferring an international dimension to its programme. Some Chairs are *itinerant* in that the Chair-holder or visiting professor moves around several universities in a region or sub-region.

Other projects represent complex inter-university networks, varying in size from three to over fifty institutions. Within networks, certain institutions serve as focal points, responsible for initiating activities and securing broad participation in their execution. These focal points are intended to become internationally recognized centres of excellence, where advanced studies and research are carried out through inter-university co-operation.

At 8 January 1997, there were 180 UNESCO Chairs and 36 networks established within the UNITWIN Programme. They are headed by Chair-holders or project co-ordinators, who are assisted by 610 teachers, researchers and other support staff. Over the 1992–1995 period, some 120 courses (mostly at the graduate level) were organized by the UNESCO Chairs in various parts of the world. They were attended by over 3,000 students. Also, 150 seminars, training workshops, symposia and colloquia were attended by over 8,000 participants during the same period. Some 580 academics from developing countries spent periods of time at partner universities in the developed countries to upgrade their training, and 355 scholarships

were granted to students and young academics. Research has been carried out through over 250 joint projects, resulting in the publication of some 55 volumes, over 100 articles and a similar number of monographs and progress reports.

Security, as defined for the purposes of this symposium, is a very broad concept, involving aspects which touch on democracy and peace, conflict resolution and communication, development, the protection of the environment, and so on. These are areas which are also covered by many projects established within the framework of UNITWIN. Most of them would therefore be to some extent relevant to the concerns of the defence institutes and academies assembled here. We have selected below a few examples which, we feel, could be of more direct interest to the participants.

The UNITWIN/UNESCO Chairs Programme has provided fresh impetus for the involvement of universities in teaching and research devoted to peace, human rights, international relations and international law. There are, at present, over thirty UNESCO Chairs in these fields established in various parts of the world: South Africa, Venezuela, Poland, Morocco, the Russian Federation, Namibia, Spain and India, for example. Efforts are now being made to set up a network of these Chairs, with several focal points in various regions. The number of Chairs is expected to increase, particularly to serve the needs of the Culture of Peace Programme, which is one of the priorities of the Organization.

Other UNESCO Chairs are devoted to regional studies (two Africa Chairs, one at the University of Utrecht, the Netherlands, the other at the University of Louvain, Belgium, a Chair on European studies seen from an international perspective at the University of Trier, Germany, etc.), as well as to prospective studies, demography and intercultural relations. It is worth pointing out that UNESCO publishes a *World Directory of Peace Research and Teaching Institutions* and a *World Directory of Human Rights Research and Teaching Institutions* and organizes periodic meetings with the directors of these institutions. Their expertise is highly relevant to any attempt to deepen reflection on the complex issues of peace and security in the world today. UNESCO can facilitate contacts with them.

A particularly relevant programme, with which UNESCO is in the process of establishing a close working relationship, is devoted to

arms control and conflict resolution, implemented by a joint commission of the International Association of University Presidents (IAUP) and the United Nations. The Commission has at present over 200 members and includes leading experts in peace and security studies from throughout the world. It has developed modules or courses which are currently taught at some thirty-four partner institutions in all regions. A more detailed presentation of the programme is available for interested participants.

A UNITWIN Network in Forced Migration Studies has been launched this year. Coordinated by the Refugee Studies Programme of Oxford University, it now includes sixteen institutions in eight countries situated in some of the most sensitive regions: the Middle East, Africa and the Maghreb. A more detailed presentation of this network is available.

In the field of communication, activities were started through a UNESCO Chair established at the University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM), which helped promote studies in communication at various universities in the developing countries. Subsequently, some twelve UNESCO Chairs were established at these institutions and were integrated into a network (ORBICOM), which is particularly vigorous in promoting activities such as the award of scholarships, academic exchanges, organization of seminars and conferences, production of teaching materials, and link-up by e-mail of all participating institutions.

In the area of sustainable development, there are several projects, developed in particular in Latin America, in the aftermath of the Rio Summit. Their experience is noteworthy for the innovative, interdisciplinary approach to the study of the complex issues of environment and its relation to development.

In the field of environment and ecology, the UNITWIN/UNESCO Chairs Programme has also proved very useful, as exemplified by the UNAMAZ project (a network of universities in eight Amazonian countries with which institutions in North America and other regions have associated themselves) and the newly established system of joint UNESCO/Cousteau Chairs in the field of ecotechnology.

The largest number of Chairs and networks is in the area of natural sciences, engineering, agriculture and health. Their research and teaching may also prove relevant for defence-related studies. Examples are the UNESCO Chair on drug abuse at Chulalongkorn

University, Thailand, the UNESCO Chair on water resources at the University of Nice which carries out research in Mauritania and the large number of Chairs established with international support in various Latin-American countries.

## **The UNITWIN Network in Forced Migration Studies**

International tensions have given rise to a considerable increase in the number of refugees. People are compelled to leave their homes, driven out by political, ethnic or religious persecution, war, civil unrest, famine, drought or ecological disasters. In 1970, there were estimated to be 2.5 million refugees in the world. By 1980, this figure had risen to 8 million. Today, 43 million persons have been obliged to leave their own countries or have been displaced on their national territories. This situation is further complicated by the fact that most of the countries hosting displaced populations are among the poorest in the world.

The problem of forced migrations is of acute importance for the international community. The UNITWIN Network in Forced Migration Studies was launched in 1996 to respond to the distress of displaced persons and to the need to allow decision-makers to deliberate in full knowledge of the facts. This interregional network, which currently consists of eight countries and sixteen higher training establishments, is co-ordinated by the Refugees Studies Programme (RSP), established at Oxford University in 1982. The RSP has become a dynamic centre of multidisciplinary research, teaching and public information. Not only practitioners, decision-makers and university teachers, but also the refugees themselves, are associated with its action. It is endeavouring to lay down effective long-term strategies through a programme of research, courses and seminars.

### **Objectives**

The UNITWIN Network in Forced Migration Studies has set itself the following main objectives:

- drawing up twinning agreements and other liaison mechanisms (co-operation programmes) between participating institutions;
- promoting scientific progress in the whole of the network, by implementing a plan of

action defining the needs of the different partners in respect of information, research, publications, education and training;

- establishing co-operation networks between participating institutions at the subregional, regional and interregional levels;
- facilitating, by strengthening institutional capacities, the emergence of centres of excellence for specialized studies at post-graduate level and advanced research, through agreements with participating institutions and with the concerted support of the international community. These centres would help to bridge the gap between needs and potential in respect of training and research at the national and international levels;
- launching field activities that will be perfectly consistent with the specific issue of forced migrations;
- creating subregional UNESCO Chairs in the framework of the UNITWIN network, in accordance with the procedure laid down by UNESCO. These Chairs would form the focal point for the centres of excellence;
- promoting scientific progress through these UNESCO Chairs, by encouraging research in relevant and complementary disciplines and by providing the participating institutions with assistance from a larger number of eminent specialists than are currently available to them;
- engaging at regular intervals in the evaluation of the progress made at the level of the network as a whole, as well as at the subregional and national levels;
- undertaking any other activity consistent with the aims and purposes of the network.

### **Activities**

- Establishing regular exchanges of information and documentation via different media; improving skills in information technology by providing equipment for university and library personnel; transcribing on CD-ROM the holdings of the RSP's documentation centre and the related documentation of its partners.
- Strengthening the infrastructure of universities by developing library services and technical maintenance services, purchasing office equipment, etc.
- Strengthening national, subregional and regional capacities through research, publications, education and training.

### 3. EXTRACT FROM UNESCO'S CONSTITUTION

#### *Convention establishing a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*

*Adopted in London on 16 November 1945 and amended by the General Conference at its second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, twelfth, fifteenth, seventeenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth sessions.*

The Governments of the States Parties to this Constitution on behalf of their peoples declare:

That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed;

That ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war;

That the great and terrible war which has now ended was a war made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races;

That the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern;

That a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.

For these reasons, the States Parties to this Constitution, believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to

employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives;

In consequence whereof they do hereby create the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for the purpose of advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind for which the United Nations Organization was established and which its Charter proclaims.

#### ARTICLE I

#### **Purposes and functions**

1. The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.
2. To realize this purpose the Organization will:
  - (a) Collaborate in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples, through all means of mass communication and to that end recommend such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image;
  - (b) Give fresh impulse to popular education and to the spread of culture:



By collaborating with Members, at their request, in the development of educational activities;

By instituting collaboration among the nations to advance the ideal of equality of educational opportunity without regard to race, sex or any distinctions, economic or social;

By suggesting educational methods best suited to prepare the children of the world for the responsibilities of freedom;

(c) Maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge:

By assuring the conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned the necessary international conventions;

By encouraging co-operation among the nations in all branches of intellectual activity, including the international exchange of persons active in the fields of education, science and culture and the exchange of publications, objects of artistic and scientific interest and other materials of information;

By initiating methods of international co-operation calculated to give the people of all countries access to the printed and published materials produced by any of them.

3. With a view to preserving the independence, integrity and fruitful diversity of the cultures and educational systems of the States Members of the Organization, the Organization is prohibited from intervening in matters which are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction.

## 4. EXTRACT FROM UNESCO'S MEDIUM-TERM STRATEGY FOR 1996–2001

### *Contributing to conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building*

- 187** In addition to the long-term action UNESCO is undertaking for peace, it is increasingly being asked to assist, together with the other United Nations system organizations, funds and programmes, in seeking solutions in the three fields of action referred to by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in *An Agenda for Peace*: conflict prevention, emergency assistance and post-conflict peace-building.
- 188** These are new fields of action for UNESCO, which is in consequence required to explore, with due caution, new roles in order to carry out its specific constitutional mission – constructing peace in the minds of men – by helping to lay the intellectual and moral foundations of reconciliation between parties to conflicts. It goes without saying that in such cases the Organization acts only strictly within its fields of competence and at the request of the Member States concerned or on initiatives taken under the auspices of the United Nations.
- 189** With regard to conflict prevention, UNESCO will strengthen its clearing-house function for the exchange of information on current research and experience concerning the means of ensuring the early detection and peaceful settlement of conflicts. To that end it will co-operate with research centres, institutes and organizations and programmes working on the theme of peace. The emphasis will be on the study of the new conditions for security and on the promotion of innovative methods of conflict management, drawing for instance on the rich store of experience of conflict management to be found in traditional cultures. UNESCO will also assist Member States that so wish to organize the transfer and sharing of experience in the matter, particularly through national or regional culture of peace forums or by establishing 'Culture of Peace Centres' where members of different communities in countries where there is ethnic tension will be able to talk together.
- 190** With regard to emergency assistance, UNESCO has become a strong advocate in the international community of the idea that humanitarian assistance cannot be reduced merely to the supply of food, medicine and blankets; that there must be a close link between the concepts of 'relief', 'rehabilitation' and 'long-term development'; and that emergency operations must include from the beginning a local training component. This idea has gained ground: there is growing recognition of the principle that the victims of conflicts have an equally inalienable right to education as all other human beings. UNESCO's strategy therefore consists in endeavouring to set up temporary educational structures in emergency situations, particularly for displaced persons and refugees. There, too, the Organization's role can only be as a catalyst: it is not so much to build schools or print school textbooks as to assess priority education needs, formulate strategies to meet them in conjunction with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF and the

World Food Programme (WFP) and contribute to the formulation of consolidated appeals for international humanitarian assistance co-ordinated by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA).

- 191** While education is one of the high priorities in emergency situations, assistance to the independent media can prove to be fundamental to the reconciliation process. We are only too well aware of the role played by warmongering propaganda and incitement to hatred in triggering and aggravating conflicts. UNESCO will therefore continue, as it has done in Bosnia and elsewhere, to support, together with the United Nations and professional organizations, local media whose independence of the parties to the conflict is internationally acknowledged, which provide non-partisan information and which defend the values of peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding.
- 192** It is most of all during the reconstruction period following the conclusion of peace agreements, however, that vast fields of action open up to UNESCO: peace-building, especially the building of civil peace, can rest only on genuine national consensus, that is on the widespread desire to plan and construct peace together. That implies a considerable effort to sensitize and educate the main actors in civil society, and here education, science, culture and communication all have their part to play. It does not just mean rebuilding the institutions destroyed during a conflict – even if that is a priority objective; it means doing so in such a way that the foundations of a democratic, pluralist and participatory society are laid at the same time.
- 193** Here again, education – in its broadest sense – has a key role to play, not only in building the bases of democratic citizenship; not only in alleviating the psychological after-effects of conflict for young people; but also in ensuring that all sections of the population who have been excluded because of their age or sex, their ethnic origin or religious beliefs, their political or economic situation or their

geographical position are given a real opportunity to be brought back into social and working life. It is in that context that the concept of 'learning without frontiers' will find its most innovative field of application, the idea being to set up systems of intensive and varied training adapted to the needs of each learner that would allow everyone – and most particularly those who, because of the conflict itself, have 'missed' the education train – to enjoy a second chance of developing their full intellectual and human potential.

- 194** Communication is also an essential tool for reconstructing civil societies torn apart by conflict: freedom of the press, pluralism and independence of the media, development of community newspapers and radio stations are crucial to the restoration of social bonds and to the reconciliation process.
- 195** The national programmes UNESCO has launched in recent years in countries emerging from conflict (in El Salvador and Mozambique), the programmes currently being prepared (in Burundi, Guatemala, Haiti and Rwanda) and those it may initiate during the period covered by the Medium-Term Strategy are intended to support national reconstruction efforts in the Organization's fields of competence. Their originality, though, lies in the fact that they seek to create the necessary climate for the establishment of genuine interaction between all the parties concerned. They involve protagonists from all sides, governmental as well as non-governmental, in the implementation of development projects relating to the Organization's various fields of competence, and in many cases to several at once. The projects all contain an element of training in methods of conflict management and an educational component designed to disseminate the values of human rights and democracy. As such, these national culture of peace programmes are intended to illustrate and put into practice in the field, where the action is, the relation of interdependence between peace, development, human rights and democracy.

## 5. EXTRACTS FROM RESOLUTION 012 ADOPTED BY THE TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF UNESCO ON THE MEDIUM-TERM STRATEGY FOR 1996–2001

*The General Conference,*

### I

*Reaffirming* the determination set out in the Charter of the United Nations, to 'preserve future generations from the scourge of war',

*Recalling* that UNESCO was created 'for the purpose of advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind for which the United Nations Organization was established',

*Recognizing* the specific nature of UNESCO's mission, which is to construct the defences of peace upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind,

*Considering*

- that the construction of peace is more than ever necessary for the preparation of the future,
- that the resolute defence of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men is the most decisive means in the struggle against exclusion, discrimination, intolerance and violence which, in their extreme forms, fuelled by ignorance and prejudice, threaten the cohesion of societies and induce peoples to engage in deadly conflicts,
- that new perils now threaten international security, perils whose names are intolerable inequalities between nations and within societies, ethnic conflicts, poverty, unemployment, social injustice, rural decline and urban decay, mass migrations, environmental

degradation, new pandemics or arms and drug trafficking,

- that the path to international peace and security today is development conceived on a global scale, in which the prosperity of societies would be based on the enhancement of human resources and would serve to promote the blossoming of the abilities of everyone, without distinction of any kind,
- that human dignity therefore requires, today even more than yesterday, education for all, mutual knowledge and understanding among peoples, the free flow of ideas, and access for everyone to the fruits of knowledge and particularly to scientific and technical progress – since education, science, culture and communication today represent the surest means to promote development, prevent conflicts, consolidate democracy and, hence, gradually to establish an authentic culture of peace,

*Convinced* that the major challenge at the close of the twentieth century is to begin the transition from a culture of war to this culture of peace:

- a culture of social interaction and sharing, based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, tolerance and solidarity,
- a culture that rejects violence, endeavours to prevent conflicts by tackling their roots and to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation,
- a culture which guarantees everyone the full exercise of all rights and the means to participate fully in the endogenous development of their society,

## II

*Solemnly renews* its commitment to the principles on which UNESCO is built and to the purposes which sustain it, as set out in its Constitution;

*Reaffirms* the significance and relevance of UNESCO's mandate, which is 'to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion';

*Considers* that UNESCO may take pride in its contribution in the course of its first fifty years of existence towards the construction of peace, in spite of the many obstacles which it has encountered in carrying out its tasks;

*Reaffirms* that the human being is at the centre of the processes of development and peace;

*Considers it indispensable* for UNESCO to continue to fulfil its specifically ethical calling in a world seeking new landmarks and common values, now that greater vigilance is necessary in view of the grave violations of the most fundamental rights in its fields of competence;

*Reaffirms* in this connection the urgent need to strengthen the moral solidarity of mankind in order to safeguard its common heritage – natural and cultural, tangible and intangible, intellectual and genetic;

*Expresses its conviction* that international intellectual co-operation must be strengthened, and *stresses* the key role that UNESCO should continue to play in this regard:

- as an *intellectual forum*, encouraging the efforts of the international community to gain a better grasp of the changes occurring in the world today, in all their complexity, and to devise innovative strategies to meet the emerging challenges in the Organization's fields of competence,
- as a *motivating force*, prompting decision-makers, especially political leaders, to make firm commitments concerning the adoption and implementation of those strategies at both national and international levels,
- as a *standard-setting body*, promoting the adoption and application of international norms and instruments in its fields of competence and assisting Member States in the modernization of their legislation in these fields,
- as a *clearing house*, fostering the worldwide dissemination of specialized information on the state of the art and trends in the Organization's fields of competence,
- as a *catalyst*, promoting research, training and teaching activities contributing to the advancement, transfer and sharing of knowledge,
- as an *adviser*, supporting Member States in their development efforts by providing high quality technical expertise in its fields of competence.

## 6. EXTRACTS FROM UNESCO'S APPROVED PROGRAMME AND BUDGET FOR 1996-1997

### *Transdisciplinary project 'Towards a culture of peace'*

- 05203 The aim of the activities proposed under this transdisciplinary project is to make a direct contribution to the building of a culture of peace based on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rejection of violence and of all forms of discrimination, and attachment to the principles of justice and solidarity, tolerance and understanding among nations, groups and individuals alike.
- 05204 The creation of a comprehensive system of education for peace, human rights and democracy, tolerance, non-violence and international understanding; the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms; the elimination of all forms of discrimination, particularly against women and disadvantaged groups, as well as against persons belonging to minorities and indigenous peoples; the consolidation, all over the world, of democratic processes; the strengthening of cultural pluralism and of intercultural dialogue – these are the main 'stepping stones' towards the building of a culture of peace.
- 05205 UNESCO will encourage its Member States to make progress in this direction through education and training, reflection and research, awareness-raising and mobilization activities. It will also strive to contribute, in close collaboration with the organizations of the United Nations system, to the search for solutions in the three fields referred to by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his *Agenda for Peace*: conflict prevention, emergency situations and post-conflict peace-building, within the framework, in particular, of national culture of peace programmes.
- 05206 As is made clear in the proposed resolution for this project, the Organization's action in this field can only be catalytic. Its aim is to support the efforts made by Member States 'to build peace in the minds of men' in accordance with the commitments they made when they ratified the Constitution of UNESCO.
- 05207 The implementation of this transdisciplinary project will involve all the fields of competence, and hence all the sectors of the Organization, especially education, social and human sciences and culture. It will also require greater co-operation with Member States, institutions and organs of the United Nations system – in particular, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Centre for Human Rights – regional inter-governmental organizations, the relevant non-governmental organizations and the intellectual community.
- Unit 4: Conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building**
- 1. To promote the search for effective methods of conflict prevention**
- 05247 Within the framework of the initiatives taken by the United Nations and in close co-operation with interested

intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, competent peace research institutions, strategy study centres, and the scientific community at large, UNESCO will contribute to ongoing discussions concerning a new peace research agenda, a new concept of security and the role of the United Nations system in this respect. Analysis of social and cultural sources of conflicts and violence will be pursued. Activities will be focused on confidence-building and the search for effective methods of prevention as well as non-violent resolution of conflicts. A meeting of experts on threats to peace and stability and the methods for their elimination will be organized in 1996, the results of which will be published in *UNESCO Peace and Conflict Issues* in 1997. The contribution of international law to the building of a culture of peace will be highlighted. To increase the input of leading peace research and training institutions to this transdisciplinary project, a meeting of directors of such institutions will be organized in 1997. Peace research by the Houphouët-Boigny Foundation will be supported, in particular through the organization of a symposium on 'Peace in the Minds of Men', to be held in Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire.

05248 Activities aimed at confidence-building and long-term prevention of conflicts, such as the organization of training courses on conflict resolution techniques, the setting up of UNESCO houses for a culture of peace or the

convening of meetings on the culture of peace, will be undertaken, upon request of Member States, at the national or sub-regional levels. Following the recommendations of the 145th session of the Executive Board and the first Consultative Meeting of the Culture of Peace Programme, they will be carried out in full co-ordination with other United Nations organizations, with a view to developing a comprehensive approach to long-term peace-building and conflict prevention which could be applied in areas where peace accords have put an end to violent conflict or where such conflict threatens to erupt. An evaluation will be made of these activities.

05249 UNESCO will continue its efforts to mobilize various partners and actors for the promotion of a culture of peace. An information and networking system will be set up in order to link intergovernmental, governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as the various units of UNESCO, engaged in activities which promote a culture of peace. It will include the establishment of a database and the regular publication and dissemination of a newsletter on the culture of peace as well as other written and audiovisual materials. Special materials will be prepared to illustrate the experience of national culture of peace programmes. The Seville Statement on Violence will be widely distributed, as well as the Declaration on the Role of Religions in the Promotion of a Culture of Peace.

## 7. OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

- *The New Page*, by Federico Mayor. 1995. Co-published by Dartmouth University Press and UNESCO Publishing, 180 pp.
- *Non-military aspects of international security*. 1995. UNESCO Publishing. 260 pp.
- *Peace!*, by the Nobel Peace Prize winners. 1995. UNESCO Publishing. 570 pp.
- *Peace and war: social and cultural aspects*, by Håkan Wiberg. 1995. Bel Corp Publishers, Warsaw. 125 pp.
- *Proceedings of the international round table 'Military conversion and science'* (Venice, 27–29 November 1994). UNESCO-ROSTE. 215 pp.
- *UNESCO and a culture of peace. Promoting a global movement*. 1996. CAB-95/WS/1. UNESCO. 206 pp.
- *The Venice Deliberations – Transformations in the meaning of 'security': practical steps toward a new security culture*. The Venice Papers. 1996. CAB-96/WS/1. UNESCO. 125 pp.
- *Security for peace – a synopsis of the inter-American symposium on peace-building and peacekeeping* (organized jointly by the Organization of American States and UNESCO). 1996. CAB-96/WS/2. UNESCO. 32 pp.
- *Actes du colloque international sur le droit à l'assistance humanitaire* (Paris, 25–27 January 1995). SHS-96/WS/9. 1996. UNESCO. 218 pp.
- *From a culture of violence to a culture of peace*. 1996. UNESCO Publishing. 276 pp.
- *UNESCO: an ideal in action*, by Federico Mayor. 1996. UNESCO Publishing. 131 pp.
- *Quelle sécurité ?* 1997. CAB-97/WS/3. UNESCO. 156 pp.



## 8. THE INSTITUT DES HAUTES ÉTUDES DE DÉFENSE NATIONALE (IHEDN, FRANCE) 21, place Joffre, 75007 Paris

Taking its origin from the Collège des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale created by Admiral Castex in 1936, the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale was founded following the Second World War.

The Institute comes under the authority of the Prime Minister who, each year, sets the syllabus and the themes of the various studies to be conducted.

Its mission is to provide senior civil servants, senior officers and senior executives (in business and industry, research, law, culture, trade unions, the media, etc.) with extensive information on national defence in its broader sense.

The Institute organizes three types of sessions attended by participants whose ages range from 35 to 50 years:

- a national session is organized each year in Paris. It allows participants to receive information on the main themes studied and discuss or reflect on these in small committees;
- regional sessions (four each year, including one whose location alternates between Paris and a French overseas territory) are directed at participants outside Paris. They follow the same recruiting and teaching procedures as the national sessions but take place over a shorter time period. Since 1994, IHEDN also welcomes overseas participants for sessions taking place close to neighbouring countries;
- international sessions:
  - the *African and Malagasy session* takes place each year in Paris. It welcomes African and French military officers and

- civil servants to inform them of France's policy towards the countries concerned;
- the *European sessions*. In 1993 and 1994, a European session brought together members from the countries of Central, Eastern and Baltic Europe in Paris. In 1995, it brought together the twenty-seven member countries, associates and associate partners of the Western European Union;
- the *'IHEDN-Youth' session*, since 1996, in Ile-de-France and the provinces, whose participants are students and working people aged from 18 to 25.

The Institute also organizes:

- internships available to graduate students in defence studies;
- seminars addressed to prefects, members of parliament, heads of companies, journalists, etc.

In addition to these sessions, the Institute supports the action of over 6,200 former participants who are grouped in twenty-nine regional associations and continue to share their thoughts on defence matters. Finally, the Institute conducts or proposes studies on defence, endorses teaching efforts and welcomes colleges and institutes from overseas.

The observations of participants are compiled into reports and summarized. The summaries reach the Prime Minister and other interested ministers who may find in this work suggestions and a new approach complementing their own reflections. Some of these reports appear in the publication *Athéna*, first issued in January 1996.

## 9. THE CENTRO DI ALTI STUDI PER LA DIFESA (CASD, ITALY)

Piazza delle Rovere 83, Rome

The Centre for Advanced Military Studies for the preparation of senior officers of the three armed services in military matters and the organization of the defence of the nation was established by Ministerial Decree on 16 August 1949. It became the Centro di Alti Studi per la Difesa by Ministerial Decree on 17 December 1979, because its aims and tasks were broadened to cover all aspects of national defence.

The Centre is directed by a president, a lieutenant-general or officer of equivalent rank, and since its creation the senior management has been responsible to the Chief of the General Staff of the armed forces. The Centre's mission is as follows: 'to update and complete the preparation of high-ranking officers and officials of government departments in the organization of national defence, by encouraging the study and in-depth knowledge of the relevant complex problems in their many different aspects, and in a unitary and global framework'.

With its interarmy and interministerial vocation, the Centre represents a top-level institution in Italian culture and is the leading vocational training institute for senior military officers.

After many transformations, since 1994 the Centre has been composed of three institutes:

- the Institute for Advanced Defence Studies (IASD), which organizes an annual academic

session of studies for generals, colonels and government officials of equivalent grade. Provision is also made for the participation of officers from overseas. The reflections of the participants, compiled in reports, are transmitted to the General Staffs and the Ministries concerned;

- the Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS), which was established in 1987, primarily for the purpose of study and research on political, strategic and military problems within the competence of the Minister of Defence, Chiefs of General Staff and the General Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It publishes work which is transmitted to the General Staffs and institutes with equivalent representation, and is also put on sale. For these activities, it uses personnel from among the armed forces, outside collaborators and participants at the IASD;
- the Higher Institute of Interarmy General Staffs (ISSMI), which was established in 1994. Its mission is to improve the vocational and cultural training of officers from the rank of captain to lieutenant-colonel, in order to prepare them to perform duties in the General Staff of their own branch of the armed forces, in interarmy command, and in international bodies.

## 10. THE CENTRO SUPERIOR DE ESTUDIOS DE LA DEFENSA NACIONAL (CESEDEN, SPAIN)

Paseo de la Castellana, 61 – 28046 Madrid

CESEDEN, which is under the command of a general and comes under the direct orders of the Chief of General Defence Staff, is the country's most important higher military training institution. This Centre acts in accordance with the directives of the military policy in force: this is why it maintains close relations with the General Staffs of the three armed services and, within the Ministry of Defence, with the General Directorate for Defence Policy.

The Centre was created in 1964 to meet the needs of co-ordination between national defence and the external relations service of the armed forces. It plays an essential role in the dissemination of information on national defence and accordingly fosters communication between the armed forces and society. It therefore maintains key relations with universities and the world of business.

CESEDEN co-ordinates the participation of eminent specialists from the civilian and military sectors in respect of strategic studies and is open to all organizations and institutions for specialized study, teaching and research in matters of national defence. Particular attention is devoted to military history.

The Centre is the official correspondent of national and international forums and organizations and a supporting body for organizations responsible for defence matters in the broadest sense of the term, particularly collective security, peacekeeping missions, and protection of the cultural heritage.

In short, CESEDEN may be defined as a meeting place. It fosters relations between the armed forces and society, in particular in respect of reflection and of analysis and dissemination of ideas on the subjects mentioned above.

CESEDEN is organized around three centres: the Joint School for General Staffs (EMACON), the School of Advanced Military Studies (ALEMI) and the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (IEEE).

Its most important activities include:

- the training of national and foreign officers for joint General Staffs;
- the national defence course, attended by high-ranking officers and senior civil servants and professionals from the private sector;
- training in the management of human resources and logistics;
- training for the Master's diploma in security and defence of the programme of the Complutense University in Madrid;
- the study and publication of topical national and international themes, for which the work is the subject of co-operation between the armed forces and the civil sector;
- co-operation with various Spanish universities, including Salamanca, Santiago de Compostela, Madrid, Ibiza, La Laguna, Pontevedra, Santander, Soria, Granada, Barcelona and Navarra;
- annual military history days;
- annual meetings with CHEM (France), CASD (Italy) and IDN (Portugal).

## 11. THE INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU)

43, avenue du Président-Wilson, 75016 Paris

On 13 November 1989, the Ministerial Council (foreign and defence ministers) of the Western European Union (WEU) decided to create an Institute for Security Studies, with the task of contributing to the development of a European security identity. This institute started work on 1 July 1990.

This initiative was intended to assist in the implementation of The Hague Platform on European Security Interests of 27 October 1987, in which the member countries stated their determination both to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and to provide an integrated Europe with a security and defence dimension, without which it would be incomplete. This goal was reaffirmed in the WEU 1991 Maastricht Declaration annexed to the Treaty on European Union, which established for the first time a contractual basis for the relationship between the European Union and the WEU. The strengthening of the WEU's role has been welcomed at successive NATO meetings – in the North Atlantic Council's 1991 Rome Declaration, at the January 1994 Brussels summit and at Berlin in June 1996.

The Institute for Security Studies began work at a time of substantial change in the strategic environment: democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union, German unification, the commitment of the European Union to the goal of political union with a common security dimension and the strengthening of trans-European co-operation within the then CSCE (Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe). The crises in the Gulf and in the former Yugoslavia illustrated the continuing security challenges facing Europe. These events formed the background to the security environment in which the Institute took its place as a contributor to the European strategic debate.

### Tasks

The Institute for Security Studies of the WEU differs from other European research organizations in that, while it is an institute which has a large degree of independence in the research it undertakes in seeking to help create a European security community, it is also answerable to an intergovernmental body, the WEU Council.

The Institute has three interrelated tasks, all derived from the Decision of 13 November 1989:

- Research and analysis, particularly for the WEU Council. The independent and objective nature of this work is laid down in the Ministerial Decision. Such work, all of which is designed to have policy relevance, is undertaken at the request of the Council or on the Institute's own initiative. Where appropriate, studies are published by the Institute.
- Contributing to the wider debate on European security issues. The Institute holds various types of meetings – seminars, task forces and workshops – for dialogue with individuals or institutes from the twenty-eight countries involved in the WEU, but also with North American, Eastern European and Mediterranean countries. The Institute has also contributed to the strategic debate through its publications.
- Stimulating more effective links between institutes. The Institute has co-operated with other relevant institutes and research centres in the WEU countries, and is developing a databank on European specialists on security issues. It has more generally created a network involving the entire

European strategic community – other international organizations, parliaments (in particular the Assembly of the WEU), national administrations, the armed forces, universities, the media and industrial interests.

### **Work programme**

The primary objective given by the WEU Council to the Institute for Security Studies was to assist in the development of a European security and defence identity. The Institute's work programme touches on the interrelated conceptual, political, economic and defence aspects of security, and therefore concentrates in particular on seven areas:

- the security dimension of the European Union and its future enlargement;
- European security and the transatlantic relationship;
- the development of wider European security structures;
- the development of a common European defence policy;
- economic and industrial aspects of European security;
- the Mediterranean dimension of European security;
- regional security in the Baltics, Central Europe, South-Eastern Europe and the Black Sea.

### **Working methods**

The Institute's team is responsible for various research projects which are carried out either internally or in co-operation with a range of partners. Its working methods, which involve all the countries related to the WEU, consist of an appropriate combination of the following approaches:

- the granting of visiting fellowships to young researchers from WEU countries working on certain specific topics for periods of two to three months. The Institute also grants study awards in other research centres in WEU countries to scholars from the WEU's Associate Partner countries;
- the creation of standing task forces and workshops on specific issues, which involve officials and non-governmental specialists;
- the organization of larger seminars, with varying categories of participant;
- contributions and reports to the WEU Permanent Council and its working groups;
- active participation in and contributions to international meetings;
- assistance in the organization and teaching of courses;
- briefings for visitors to the Institute;
- the publication of studies and reports of seminars in various formats, in particular the *Chaillot Papers* (monographs on current security policy), a *Newsletter* and books.

## ORDER FORM

To be returned to the office of Ms M. Goucha/CAB-SA  
UNESCO, 7, place de Fontenoy, F-75352 Paris 07 SP, France

Family name ..... Forename .....

Profession .....

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Address .....

Postal code ..... Town ..... Country .....

Please supply ..... copies of the Proceedings of the International Symposium 'From Partial Insecurity to Global Security' in French  in English .

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Signature .....



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*Accordingly, peace, development and democracy constitute the three sides of an interactive triangle which is a virtuous rather than a vicious circle; the synergies so formed are irresistible and invulnerable. But for them to come into action the critical mass required must be assembled all over the world. No country will any longer be able to 'go it alone'. Ready-made models can no longer be imposed on sovereign peoples. No social category will any longer be privileged or sacrificed. All societies, and every component of each society, must join forces to preserve their common future. Governments, intergovernmental organizations, associations, municipal authorities, interest groups, ecclesiastical authorities, in short, all levels and all orders, all methods of social organization, must be mobilized.*

*In this process of 'general mobilization' for global security, the armed services obviously play a decisive role. As the protagonists in any war scenario, they are also a key factor in restoring, maintaining and building peace, a driving force in the logic of peace, making judicious use of the interactions between security, development and democracy. They can and do act directly, within this interactive triangle, as a lever whose force is still largely underestimated.*

(Extracts from the message by Federico Mayor,  
Director-General of UNESCO)

*Careful consideration of the part that the armed services can play in restoring, maintaining and working towards peace, and in arriving at a better understanding of the interaction between security and development, have now become major issues in the management of world affairs.*

*Institutes of defence and security, meeting for the first time at a symposium to exchange ideas on these issues, have a decisive part to play in this respect. By airing all points of view and expressing them in clearer terms, they will help to make action more equitable, effective and reliable.*

(Extracts from the message  
by Air-Force General Bernard Norlain, Director, IHEDN)

In an attempt to take up these challenges, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) jointly organized, in association with the Centro di Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD, Italy), the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union and the Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN, Spain), an international symposium entitled 'From Partial Insecurity to Global Security'. The symposium, held at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris from 12 to 14 June 1996, brought together over a hundred military and civilian participants from some forty countries (representatives of defence and strategic studies institutes, officers and staff of the armed services, researchers), as well as observers from Member States and from governmental and non-governmental organizations. Their reflections and debates on the various aspects of the new approach to security are published in these Proceedings.

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