

TOWARDS A CULTURE OF PEACE

WHAT KIND OF SECURITY?

Preface by *Federico Mayor*

Introduction by *Moufida Goucha*

Lectures by *Philippe Delmas*
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*This work is dedicated
to the memory of René-Jean Dupuy*

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PREFACE

The end of the Cold War provides a unique opportunity to separate security from the culture of war, which was the context in which it was conceived and organized. A new approach to security is part of the 'new page' we have to write for the post-Cold-War generations. It is again becoming possible to envisage international security in terms other than those of armed aggression, nuclear attack, terrorist threat or attempted destabilization carefully prepared by some adversary.

It becomes possible to separate internal security from obsession with subversion, in the same way that it becomes possible to separate information from the confrontation between different forms of ideological propaganda. Security can thus, it would appear, be demilitarized, reassigned to its primary tasks of protecting citizens, dedicated anew to the public interest and brought back under the control of the law and of democratic debate.

We have no right to let slip this opportunity for defining a new approach to security, in regard to which – as in regard to the economy or to disarmament – the peace dividend must not be squandered, nor must we allow the opportunity for redefining and constructing a new vision for the coming century to pass us by.

The lines that our thinking should follow are those to which the sufferings of previous decades point the way: what is required is democratic security, effective security, both internal and external. We cannot rest content with large and

vastly expensive international alliances whilst our citizens are suffering from insecurity on the streets and in their own neighbourhoods . . . But how are we to achieve that aim, how are we to envisage the transition, the intellectual effort we have to make and organize in order to put across this new vision?

A huge intellectual effort, in the fields of research, expertise and advice alike, has gone into making possible the economic transition accomplished by the countries that have opened themselves up to the market economy, while extraordinary scientific work is also being done in connection with the climate change now affecting our planet. Do peace and security, which are likewise in transition, not deserve comparable efforts?

UNESCO's responsibility is to get these efforts going and show the way for international action by laying the foundations of an *Intellectual Agenda for Security*. At the present stage, where security is only just beginning to be redefined at the international level and reorganized at national level, the important thing is to know what questions to ask, of whom to ask them and how to move on from asking to acting.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Federico Mayor', with a prominent vertical stroke at the beginning.

Federico Mayor

INTRODUCTION

Ms Moufida Goucha
Senior Special Adviser
to the Director-General of UNESCO

Is there a danger that the end of the Cold War, seen a few years ago as marking a crucial turning-point in history or even, in the opinion of some people, as heralding the advent of a new international order, may gradually come to be seen simply as a chronological point of reference? Any mention of peace-building, which should have benefited from the peace dividends of the post-Cold-War situation, today generally refers to the reconstruction of countries that have already been laid waste by war, while all too often the international community manifests its concern to ensure the security of whole populations and individuals only after the event, when intolerable levels of human suffering have been reached and the violence has become irreversible.

Our acknowledgement of this state of affairs, wherein the attitude to peace and security continues to be haunted by the idea of war between states and only very hesitant progress is being made in demilitarizing security policies, does not in any way exempt us – more especially within UNESCO – from continuing to ask ourselves certain questions, as Federico Mayor has emphasized in his preface to this publication.

What kind of peace do we in fact want? What kind of security needs to be promoted?

These questions have lain at the heart of UNESCO's concerns since the Organization first came into being; its

Constitution indeed declares, 'that a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded . . . upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind'.

The same is true for security since, as the Charter of the United Nations demonstrates, peace and security are indissociable.¹

Pierre Hassner has pointed out² the essential contributory role that UNESCO played in the 1950s in the emergence of a sociology of conflicts and international security. It was under UNESCO's auspices and under the leadership of Jessie Bernard that the ground-breaking studies³ were put together, representing a departure from the psychological approach and from clichés about the spirit of the peoples or the harmful role of leaders. These initial studies made it possible to explore more deeply the socio-economic causes of conflicts and to envisage strategies for those who play an active part in creating security or insecurity. Raymond Aron's political theory, Lucien Poirier's essays on theoretical strategy, Gaston Bouthoul's *polémologie* or conflict studies and the work done by the *Journal for Conflict Resolution* were all indebted to this initial impetus.

Although security, in its military aspects, continues to enjoy all its previous prerogatives, it is nevertheless now conceded in international law that, in the new international

1. See below, the lecture on this subject by Hector Gros Espiell.

2. Pierre Hassner. 'Violence, rationalité, incertitude. Tendances apocalyptiques et iréniques dans l'étude des conflits internationaux' in *La violence et la paix*. Paris, *Esprit*, 1995, pp. 83-84.

3. Jessie Bernard, F. H. Pear, R. Aron, R. Angel. *The nature of conflicts*, Paris, UNESCO, 1957.

context, there are many non-military, non-armed aspects that adversely affect peace, the security of states and international security. The concept of security is thus, in terms of the many definitions and adjectives applied to it, now the subject of a relatively new approach. It is rising to new challenges that hitherto held a secondary place in states' concerns.

We now need to grasp the full significance of the transition from a strictly military conception of security to a global conception of the security of populations – I would even say of the *democratic security of populations*. This latter conception cannot be other than global and indivisible, inasmuch as certain phenomena, such as extreme poverty, inequalities between and within countries, damage to the environment, pandemics and the emergence of new diseases, various forms of discrimination and violations of human rights, reach far beyond national frontiers. Fear of nuclear war is being replaced by a whole range of uncertainties, many of which imperil human life and the consequences of which no single state is competent to deal with.

It follows that *only a conception of security more closely based on populations' real security needs and on international co-operation can bring about the strengthening of the positive interactions between peace, development and democracy*. It should be added that this conception of security, entailing a redefinition of the roles of all the protagonists in society, including the role of the armed forces, cannot be worked out except with the participation of, and an input from, each of those protagonists, *in the framework of a widening of the security debate to take in the whole of society*.

In the 1994-1995 biennium, the seminar on peace-keeping and peace-building held at the Venice Institute of

Science, Literature and Art (May 1994)¹ and the inter-American symposium on ‘Security for peace: peace-building and peace-keeping’, organized by UNESCO, the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, D.C., (April 1995),² enabled the initial lines of study to be identified.

In order to proceed further with investigation of all the complex, interlocking factors that we need to take into account so as to work out this new conception of security in a consistent manner, UNESCO’s Director-General, Federico Mayor, decided in June 1995 to set up within the Organization an informal group to consider this subject. This approach is in keeping with the spirit of the Organization’s Medium-Term Strategy for 1996–2001, which was approved by the General Conference at its 28th session and which calls on UNESCO to study ‘the new conditions for security’ when implementing its strategies for contributing to the building of peace;³ and it is in keeping also with UNESCO’s Programme and Budget for 1996–1997, which foresaw that the Organization would, under its transdisciplinary project ‘Towards a culture of peace’, ‘contribute to ongoing discussions concerning a new peace research agenda, a new concept of security and the role of the United Nations system in this respect’.⁴

The group had the benefit, in 1995 and 1996, of receiving contributions to its work from a number of eminent

1. *The Venice Deliberations – Transformations in the meaning of ‘security’: practical steps toward a new security culture*. The Venice Papers. 1996. CAB-96/WS/1. UNESCO. 125 pp.

2. *Security for peace – A synopsis of the inter-American symposium on peace-building and peace-keeping*. 1996. CAB-96/WS/2. UNESCO. 32 pp.

3. *UNESCO Medium-Term Strategy for 1996–2001* (28 C/4, para. 189).

4. *UNESCO Programme and Budget for 1996–1997* (28 C/5, para. 05247). See also *UNESCO Programme and Budget for 1998–1999* (29 C/5, paras. 06016, 06019 and 06027).

specialists, the texts of which are to be found in the present publication. As may be seen, these texts, starting out from widely differing viewpoints, deal with the new challenges to be met and suggest new avenues of action, for UNESCO in particular. Our warmest gratitude is hereby expressed to them for sharing their knowledge and experience with everyone and for enabling UNESCO to revive an intellectual tradition that goes back to the early work of Jessie Bernard. I should also like to take this opportunity to thank all those who took part in the group's work for their intellectual inputs; the discussions were all the richer for their enthusiasm, their conviction and their hands-on experience.

UNESCO drew heavily on these contributions when it opened an unprecedented dialogue with institutes of strategic studies, defence institutes and representatives of the armed forces on the occasion of the June 1996 international symposium 'From partial insecurity to global security', organized jointly by UNESCO and the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (France), with the assistance of the Centro di Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD, Italy), the Western European Union's Institute for Security Studies and the Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN, Spain).¹ This dialogue was continued at the Central American Military Forum for a Culture of Peace, which was held in June 1996 in San Salvador, El Salvador,² at the invitation of the Director-General of UNESCO, and which met again in April 1998 in Guatemala with a view to promoting democratic security in Central America. Similarly, UNESCO has participated in various regional and

1. The Proceedings of the international symposium 'From partial insecurity to global security' are available in English and French.

2. The Proceedings of the Forum are available in Spanish: *Foro militar centroamericano para la cultura de paz (San Salvador, 26 y 27 de junio de 1996)*, Programa de cultura de paz de la UNESCO, Oficina de la UNESCO en El Salvador, 1996.

subregional meetings on the new requirements in respect of training for the armed forces in peace, human rights and democracy, a field in which UNESCO intends to step up its co-operation with the United Nations Human Rights Centre.

At a time when a vast reform of the United Nations is under way, one of its aims being to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system as a whole in the area of conflict prevention and peace-building, it is more than ever incumbent on UNESCO to respond, in the coming years, to the new demands in these fields, in close co-operation with the other organizations and agencies of the system, more especially in the context of its transdisciplinary project 'Towards a Culture of Peace', wherein the efforts to promote a new approach to security occupy a most important place.

PIERRE HASSNER

New approaches to international security

21 September 1995

THE NEW DEFINITIONS
OF SECURITY

In the last ten years or so, an important change has been observed in thinking about security, the effect of which has been that the scope of the term is now acknowledged to be much wider than was previously recognized. New dimensions have been attributed to it, with the result that security has become compartmentalized into the military sector, the environmental, the economic, the societal, the political, and so forth. But this raises a fundamental question as to the kind of security at issue – is it that of the country, that of the regime, of life on the planet, of individual lives, or what? In this framework, security is established in the various domains by means of various trade-offs between the immediate interests of the different parties concerned.

Special attention is also paid at present to what has come to be termed *identity security*, which refers to the perceptions of a group of people who feel their identity, in particular their cultural and ethnic identity, to be threatened by external

influences, be they immigration or modernization. Such groups may equally well be on the scale of a whole region, like Europe, which is undergoing a process of destabilization as a result of opening out, and which is therefore tending to withdraw into itself in response to perceived or real threats.

THE DEFINITION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Given that individuals feel the need to be protected by the state, the problem of domestic politics arises, and this at a time when states find themselves increasingly powerless in the face of transnational phenomena of various orders – transnational corporations, financial speculation, organized crime, sects, etc. – which, by virtue of their own dynamics, clash with the states' own interests. States themselves are increasingly inhibited by the difficulty they have in balancing what their own population expects of them against the constraints that international interdependence imposes on them.

This situation leads to growing frictions and discrepancies between security matters that belong within the competence of states and a vast range of transnational processes.

At what level should decisions be taken, in a context in which the problems are global ones and the authorities are local or national? This question is complicated even further by the fact that there is no such thing as a genuine international community, only variable combinations of converging or diverging interests among states, and also by the hesitant emergence, in the gaps in inter-state relations, of an international civil society based upon independent networks and experts, and of an intermittently functioning world solidarity.

THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Following the end of the Cold War, during which international security rested on the balance between the two blocs, and

following the Gulf War, with its promise of a new international order that has failed to materialize, we now find ourselves in a new situation, typified by a complex mix of factors: on the one hand, the processes of demilitarization, of the dismantling of nuclear installations, the conversion of military industries and of the military themselves; and, on the other, the reassertion by states of their prerogatives in military affairs. We are currently seeing the establishment of various systems of international security, in line with the multiple nature of the dimensions of the problems and of the regions concerned.

Different though these systems may be, they have one aspect in common, namely their functional character in relation to specific, regional situations.

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

The international organizations' recent experience with military intervention is hardly encouraging, owing to the nature of the conflicts in which the United Nations has endeavoured to intervene – mostly civil wars or situations of anarchy – and also to the lack of resources and of permanent forces as a result of which the Secretary-General of the United Nations has limited leeway to deal with emergencies.

The incipient return to conflict prevention, negotiation and reconstruction is evidence of a growing awareness that these are areas where the activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies might prove more effective.

In this connection, UNESCO has a role to play – in the non-military, non-state dimensions of security, the growing importance of which has been demonstrated, with particular reference to the psychological and cultural relations among population groups, especially within one and the same state – in preventing the dialectic of fear and hatred from

establishing itself. It is also important to study the causes of war in greater depth, incorporating the value dimension into that study.

CONCLUSION

The time has not yet come to work out a clear definition of security from an analysis of the current discussions, but the fragmentation of the concept of security at present observable could incidentally open up new avenues for action on the part of the specialized agencies.

MARCEL MERLE

**The crisis of values:
a challenge to be taken up by international security**

20 October 1995

I should like to add that the truth is not loved because it is improving or progressive. We hunger and thirst for it – for its own sake.

Saul Bellow

(It All Adds Up – Secker & Warburg, 1994, p. 84)

There has been a slight change of title: as announced a moment ago, it is now 'The crisis of values: a challenge to be taken up by international security'. I agreed to this change so as to connect what I have to say more closely with the overall problem area, that of UNESCO, i.e. education for peace. There is, indeed, no better formula for emphasizing the link between security and values. To quote the Preamble to your Constitution, 'wars begin in the minds of men'; wars are therefore closely linked to the values by which people abide – or the absence of such values.

Before launching into this debate, I should, however, like to make two preliminary remarks that I consider to be of very great importance. The first, about which I am sure all

of us around this table can agree, consists in discarding the single-factor style of analysis, the sort that attributes a single cause to a given series of events. It is abundantly obvious that although wars do often, unfortunately, begin in the minds of men, that is not their sole cause, another well-known cause being conflict of interests. If I were to generalize about present world problems, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, and so on, I should perhaps underscore the following factor: the underlying phenomenon for the coming decades is not so much the 'disappearance of real socialism' as the advent of the 'triumph of capitalism', with all the problems that this expansion of capitalism is going to raise. A century and a half ago, Marx committed a monumental error of forecasting when he hailed world revolution as being imminent. The contradictions inherent in the development of capitalism are already appearing before our very eyes today, and will perhaps become even more apparent in the future. This is a very long-term perspective, and it is perhaps in this direction that we should push analysis forward. Unfortunately, not much research has been done on this subject, and in relation to our present concerns I could say, in the words of Rudyard Kipling, 'that is another story'.

Secondly, the text of your Preamble refers to the minds of men – but what are 'the minds of men'? According to Montesquieu, 'it is not the mind that makes opinions but the heart', and 'it is useless to attack politics by showing how repugnant it is to morality; such talk convinces everyone and solves nothing, for politics will survive for as long as there are passions independent of the yoke of law'.

With backing from these two remarks of Montesquieu's, I will therefore, with your permission, take what UNESCO's Constitution calls the 'mind' as including not only the variable reactions of the reason but also the vagaries of the heart, since the workings of the passions are no less capable

of disturbing international relations than the calculations of rationality and concern for the bottom line.

These two preliminary observations will enable us immediately to broach the argument which I would like to put forward here and which can be very simply expressed. It may be supposed that concord (I prefer this old word to consensus), that is, agreement on fundamental values, is conducive to security and that, on the contrary, discord, disagreement over values, serves to stir up hostility. These are very trite ideas, but what is less trite is to ask whether it is concord that reigns or discord. I would argue that, precisely, it is discord that prevails. I shall endeavour to prove this to you and, secondly, to explain it, which is probably even more important than curing it.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS

In order to show that discord, disagreement on fundamental values, is basic to our society, I shall make use of two examples very regularly cited in this institution, namely human rights and democracy.

To begin with human rights, there is a very wide measure of verbal consensus on this subject in international circles, so much so that one could even speak of a kind of inflation, considering the number of texts – from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights down to more recent instruments – devoted to defining and enumerating those rights. I shall spare you a recapitulation, since you are of course very familiar with these texts. What is important to me – speaking here perhaps more as a political scientist than as a lawyer – is to note that these texts, magnificently inspired as they may be, are more often than not unaccompanied by any monitoring system and, with one exception – the European Convention on Human Rights – unaccompanied by any means of sanctioning violations, whereby the competent authorities could be made to

comply with them. After nearly half a century of experience, we have thus arrived today at an impasse where disagreements over the problem of human rights are being publicly voiced.

Let me give a few examples that do not even require to be dwelt upon. We are well aware that there is a grey area – or dark area – in the world where the very words ‘freedom of expression’ are considered subversive, alongside others where that freedom is maybe too scrupulously respected, i.e. when it is carried to abusive lengths and involves intrusion into the private lives of public figures.

A second area where there is basic disagreement is that of equality of the sexes. Another example of this came up a few weeks ago during the debates in Beijing about women’s rights, in the course of which at least two major concepts were pitted one against the other, the egalitarian concept and the inegalitarian concept. I have in front of me the text of the statement from the Al-Azhar University criticizing the joint document on equality of the sexes. What we have here is obviously a stalemate, one that is insurmountable because it goes back to different societies’ specific religious and cultural characteristics. The list could be added to. We need only think, without even mentioning the application of *shari'a*, of the death penalty, on which the Western countries are not even in agreement among themselves, so much so that in the United States whether a criminal is condemned to death or not depends on the state in which the sentence is handed down. The same applies a fortiori from one Western country to another – whereas the right to life is surely the most fundamental right imaginable.

If there is no agreement as to whether someone can or cannot, whatever the circumstances, be condemned to death, what basis is there for a common stance? This reminds me of a penetrating remark made by Nehru in conversation with André Malraux (in the latter’s *Antimémoires*, III, 2), to the

effect that what the West holds to be truth, the Hindu holds to be appearance, but that the deepest contrast between them is that what is fundamentally obvious for the West, Christian or atheist, is death, whatever meaning it may give to it, whereas for India what is fundamentally obvious is the infinitude of life in the infinitude of time.

Such a very wide gap between civilizations can never be bridged by creating more and more standards relating to 'human rights'.¹

The disagreements are thus now displayed for all to see, they are in the public domain, and the kinds of 'soft consensus' that we have seen in previous decades are no longer enough. I must, however, add that human rights are being disavowed in deeds as well as in words, for in spite of all the declarations we referred to earlier, they are being violated on a massive scale. There is talk of genocide in the former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda, in Liberia, in Cambodia. We live in extremely tough times where there is not much room for kindness but terrible scope for man's inhumanity to man.

That does not mean there has been no progress in this field. I shall quote two examples that seem to me worth mentioning.

The first concerns the progress made on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act, where the trade-off between human rights and sovereignty was in the end advantageous to the West, since the Soviet Union gave way and gradually conceded that human rights should be regarded as taking precedence over

1. Concerning the virtues and the boundaries of ethnocentrism, a good test is our reaction to the supposed reply of the Emperor of the Aztecs, during an imaginary interview, to his interlocutor who was reproaching him for practising human sacrifice: 'Men at all times and in all places torment themselves with a single aim: to hold the world together so that it does not fall apart around them. Only the method differs. In our cities of lakes and gardens, this blood sacrifice was necessary, just as it was necessary to till the ground, to divert the waters of the rivers. In your cities of wheels and cages, the sight of blood is horrible, I know. But how much life do your gears grind down?' (Italo Calvino, *Prima che tu dica 'pronto'*, Milan, Mondadori, 1993.)

national sovereignty; this turned out to be one of the most important instruments of leverage in the emancipation of what was known as 'the other Europe'.

This was no mean success. The other great achievement has obviously been the conversion of South Africa and the end of the apartheid regime. Let us not be one-sidedly critical in our judgements, for human rights have indeed scored some successes; but at the same time, an immense amount still remains to be done, so much so that one wonders if the task will ever be completed.

I would say, however, that the situation is much more complex still as regards the second value, the second pillar of the international order, which is or should be democracy. There are, by the way, a number of differences to be underlined in this respect. The first is that whereas the Charter of the United Nations and subsequent documents refer very extensively and very often to human rights, they do not refer in the same way to democracy, except allusively, in the very vague shape of the right of peoples to self-determination. There are in fact grounds for wondering whether human rights can be dissociated from democracy. I can think of a case for which examples may be found in history, that of the enlightened despot who rules without democratic legitimacy and who nevertheless respects the other human rights. Conversely, there are 'democratic' countries where human rights are openly flouted. There is therefore nothing to be gained, in my opinion, by confusing 'human rights' and 'democracy'; and the question of the application of democracy to international relations raises many questions that are ultimately much harder to settle, much hotter to handle, than that of human rights, for reasons I shall now explain.

There are not *one* but *three* ways of approaching the issue of the relationship between democracy and international relations. The first is to demand, or at all events ask, that democracy be applied within states: in other words, that political

regimes should be democratic regimes; this is one way of expressing the demand for compliance with the democratic norm. A second way (we shall of course return shortly to the first) concerns the democratization of relations between states – and here we come up against the extremely sensitive issue of the sovereign equality of states as proclaimed by the Charter of the United Nations and applied by the international organizations. We shall then come to a third matter, the application of democracy within the international organizations, with the serious problem of legitimacy that now arises from the competition between governments and states on the one hand and, on the other, what is commonly referred to as ‘civil society’.

The first question, the first approach to the issue, concerns democratization within states. We start from the assumption – which perhaps remains to be proved – that, according to Winston Churchill’s famous aphorism, ‘democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time’. It has to be admitted that the democratic countries themselves do not always set a good example at present: look at what is happening not only, sad to say, in France but in all our neighbour countries of the European Community, including Belgium. Hence, it must also be assumed – and we shall accept this as a principle – that democracies are more peaceable than dictatorships; this is a debatable point, but let us accept it for the sake of argument. That being said, one can leaf through all the international literature without finding any clause that makes it obligatory for a state to adopt a democratic system of government, any more than they are obliged to adopt a federal or unitary structure. These are matters that lie within the exclusive competence of states and governments. The best proof of this is the fact that parliamentary democracies, people’s democracies and dictatorships have been living together in the United Nations for half a century; we may not like it but we

have to live with it, since it is the very basis of peaceful coexistence. Any attempt to bring all states into line, even under the banner of democracy, would immediately result in a war of all against all. This is proved by the fact that when an application is made for membership of the United Nations – despite the provisions of the Charter, which are, or could be made to be, fairly strict – nothing is done to check up on the applicant's democratic legitimacy. States that were well known not to be democratic, states known to be tyrannies, have been admitted. Nevertheless, thanks to advances in public awareness, governments are now under a certain amount of external pressure to be more faithful to, more compliant with, the will of the people in their handling of international relations. I shall illustrate my point by reference to two practices: one which has become current and the other which is of more recent origin.

It is, firstly, a fact that referendums are now called more and more frequently when decisions affecting a country's future have to be taken. This is the case, for instance, in Switzerland, where the answer has usually been in the negative. It is the case for entry into the European Community, on the subject of which referendums have produced different results depending on the country and on the timing. It is also the case for the ratification of agreements that are regarded as being fundamental, like the Maastricht Treaty. Public opinion, the electorate, is thus more often than in the past called on to express itself, with all the effects this has on governments' foreign-policy decisions. This is an example of an advance towards democracy.

The other advance, perhaps subtler and more pernicious, that has been made relates to the demand on the part of parliaments that they should reappropriate a certain number of rights in exchange for their ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Insufficient attention has perhaps been paid to the fact that, not only in France but in Germany and elsewhere,

parliaments have traded off their ratification against a pledge on the governments' part to consult them more often than before on decisions to be taken by the European Council of Ministers – which goes to show that here, too, there has been a shift towards democratic control, as a result of an encroachment by parliaments on the foreign-policy competence of governments. But that is about as far as it goes; wherever attempts have been made to go further, it has to be admitted that they have failed. France, for example, has not succeeded in imposing democracy on African regimes, any more than the United States, even by wielding the dollar weapon, has been able to convert certain countries to free elections and a parliamentary system. Democracy as a system does not travel well and is hard to export, a fact that has to be taken into account, whatever we may think about the value of such a system.

The second question concerns relations between states. Here we immediately run up against a principle set forth as dogma in the Charter of the United Nations, namely that of the sovereign equality of states, a principle whereby Andorra, one of the states most recently promoted to sovereignty and independence, carries the same weight as the People's Republic of China in the deliberations of the United Nations, except of course as regards the right of veto. There is no concealing the fact that this sovereign equality between fundamentally unequal entities is a crippling hindrance to the proper functioning of the international organizations. A whole series of measures have been taken to try to correct this *de jure* pseudo-equality by such means as the weighting of seats or of votes, especially in Europe, where those means have been used in the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. This does, indeed, act to some extent as a corrective to the principle of strict equality, but specialists are well aware that such arrangements are only limited in their effects, inasmuch as, when it comes to taking the really

important decisions, organizations usually fall back on unanimity, at least unanimity of the great powers. The result is that it has not been possible to solve – and it seems to me increasingly unlikely, given the present proliferation in the number of states, that it can be solved – this problem of discussing on a realistic basis the interests of the states represented. We are confronted with a legal principle that runs so much counter to reality that we may have to go so far as to reverse the legal principle – but that would mean a revolution, and we do not know on what alternative principle we should base ourselves.

These two situations of stalemate suffice to show the limitations within which we operate in trying to ensure that democracy prevails in international relations.

We should, however, also bear in mind a third case, that relating to the problem of representation within the intergovernmental organizations. For a very long time, the question did not even arise: in brief, until the Charter of the United Nations was drafted, there were, on one side, the states, and on the other ‘the rest’, who had no right to speak. The Charter half-opened a little door with its famous Article 71, which authorized the international non-governmental organizations to enter into consultation with the Economic and Social Council and then with other specialized institutions, on a consultative basis. I am not going to reopen this whole case or involve myself in the controversy as to whether it is really possible to speak of a consultative ‘status’ (my view is that it is not: it is a form of consultation, not a consultative status in the full sense). We can return to that subject, if you wish, during the discussion. But what I have observed – and I am in a good position to observe since I am from time to time called upon *ex officio* to chair the debates of the Union of International Associations – is that the application of this article causes turmoil, since the non-governmental organizations apply enormous pressure to obtain more powerful influence

with the Economic and Social Council and the specialized agencies. In other words, we have moved on from the stage of co-operation, which ought to be beneficial and proactive, to one of confrontation, indeed of conflict. It is a conflict with governments, inasmuch as this demand from the grass roots, or from those who regard themselves as representing the grass roots, constitutes a challenge to the legitimacy of governmental delegates' representativity in the international forums. It is, moreover, a challenge to the representativeness of the states themselves, inasmuch as we see the international organizations authorizing the holding of meetings paralleling intergovernmental conferences (this has been going on since 1972, Beijing being one example) and the creation, on the fringe of the intergovernmental consultations, of forums attended, so we are told, by as many as 35,000 participants representing 2,500 international non-governmental organizations. We have there a situation fraught with potential conflict, since the conclusions reached by states in their deliberations are by no means in line with the demands voiced by the international associations.

In other words, as a result of the desire to democratize the workings of the international organizations by replacing indirect democracy with a direct democracy in which representatives of the various pressure groups and special-interest groups take part, the foundations of international society are being undermined. I am not expressing an opinion as to the rights and wrongs of this situation; I am simply saying that we have now reached a kind of breaking point and are even led to ask that a peoples' assembly be set up, in some sort of dominant position over the assembly of governments. I would merely point out that there is some hoaxing going on here, inasmuch as the private organizations that shout the loudest are not necessarily the most representative; as I wrote in the little book Ms Goucha kindly referred to earlier, it is not hard to imagine that, despite appearances, an assembly of

186 governments would be more representative than a mass of forty-odd thousand representatives of associations that defend only sectoral viewpoints consisting of a certain number of specific demands.

But the question stands, and once again, as you see, there is no agreement among the protagonists. The initiatives that are being launched in increasing numbers in society are like explosives: if we push too hard in the direction of democratizing international relations, we shall blow up the whole system, which is why the democracy debate is so much more virulent and dangerous for the future of international relations than the human rights debate.

LOOKING FOR AN EXPLANATION

We have now come to the stage of looking for an explanation. How is it that this slide has occurred, that in spite of half a century of efforts to improve things we have reached such a degree of blockage and paralysis? There are, in my opinion, two reasons.

The first stems from what might be called, depending on different people's preferences, nominalism or idealism, and which consists in believing that one need only lay down a principle or rule for it to be immediately applied, whereas everything we have said and seen runs counter to that belief, knowing as we do that standards are in general good but are not enforced or are in most cases incapable of being enforced. We thus come face to face with a problem that Tocqueville grasped very well when he wrote that 'there is nothing more painful to overcome than difficulties one believed one had already overcome'. In other words, it was believed that the question of human rights had been resolved by the adoption of the Universal Declaration and subsequent texts, but it is now realized that those problems are not *behind* us but *before* us, and it is the fact of not having overcome them that creates

a new problem. I would like to quote at this point from a report published by that distinguished institution, UNESCO, in 1976 (*Moving towards change*) which I came across among my books. It seems to me absolutely typical of the state of mind of people who lay down rules in the light of misunderstood situations and draw conclusions therefrom that are of necessity incorrect. 'It is essential [for UNESCO] to persuade public opinion that problems are global, that the world in all its diversity is a universe of interdependent factors, that there exists a fundamental solidarity between human beings, and that solutions based on conciliation serve the interests of everyone'. That is all well and good, but the problem is that, in order to convince people of something, they must first be shown that it is true. Just try telling a peasant – and I am not even talking about the Danube but about Benin, in the heart of Africa – that 'the problems are global', try convincing an Egyptian fellah that his situation is interdependent with that of a Wall Street banker . . .

There is some portion of truth in such assertions but a much larger proportion of pious hopes and wishful thinking. How can public opinion be convinced of the validity of formulae that are out of touch with the reality of life as lived by most people? If UNESCO wants to attain its objective in this domain, it must proceed from what ordinary people feel, instead of inflicting on them abstractions that relate at best only to the future.

But let us dig a little deeper: there is a second explanation. I would call it self-intoxication with the achievements of technical progress. Ahead of us lies a gigantic spiral along which we are fated to advance, encountering on the way technological inventions in all fields, especially that of communication, that would have been literally unimaginable only a few years previously. This is the reason for the plethora of references to the concept of 'globalization' that keeps cropping up in all good articles. If you want to be in fashion, you have to start

out from globalization. Forty years ago, we were already conned, to use the colloquial term, into believing in the 'global village', which is still, *pace* Marshall McLuhan, an illusion – thank goodness! Nor do I believe, coming up to date, in the limitless possibilities of the information superhighway, the latest fad that people go on endlessly about, as if it could provide the answer and the solution to all our problems.

To illustrate my point, I should like to quote a sentence by someone of the name of Georges Thil, reporting in a recent issue of the journal *Transnational Association* on a collective consultation by 'UNESCO, the higher education NGO' and referring to higher education in the following terms: 'It is up to higher education and research, in particular, to offer their support for creative management and governance, for an interactive training that gives priority to orientations relating to the world of work, and to the strengthening of regional-level networking, with the aim of supplying effective responses to local demands and at the same time meeting the movements of globalization of the economy and of technology and promoting mutual understanding at the planet-wide level'.

Great stuff, isn't it? It makes higher education out to be a kind of monster, part motorway interchange and part orbiting space station, where communication occurs simultaneously up, down, left, right, across and straight ahead. This reminds one of those avant-garde architects who wanted to build walls consisting entirely of doors and windows (the walls collapsed straight away, of course), or conjures up the image of a country (or as it seems to me of a Utopia much closer to ours) where all that remains are means of communication, motorways as such or information superhighways, but there are no people left anywhere, either to produce anything or to think anything. I have spent 40 years in academia: the edifice whose virtues are being extolled to us is an empty building open to

the four winds. I said 'a monster', but it is also a complete myth, and if the university were to give up its essential function, which is that of passing on established knowledge and improving existing knowledge, I must say that it would not then be worth our spending a second of our time on it.

We are reaching a point where communication and exchange are supplanting substance, where we fondly imagine that by establishing links in all directions we shall resolve the problems, whereas what is actually happening is rather the reverse: we end up with a reinforcement of the inequalities – between those who own and control the media and those who consume their products – and of specific entities which are not amenable to such uniformization and which, searching for their roots and their identity in their history, brandish the right to self-determination in our faces and commit genocide in its name.

To put it another way, we are not advancing at all along the path of co-operation if we act like this, but we are partly responsible for the increasing fragmentation and crises occurring in the world today. It makes one wonder if there is any solution to all this. The most radical solution would of course be to strike UNESCO off the list of international organizations; it would be swift and would put a stop to the discussion, but discussion would inevitably resurface elsewhere, probably in less favourable conditions. The world needs a forum where ideas can be exchanged and the dominant values can be critically examined. The problem lies not in the institution itself but in its immanent philosophy, its prejudices or presuppositions. Maybe the time has come, in this respect, to take up for ourselves the challenge issued by Marx to Hegel, to turn the pyramid back over on to its base.

In other words, instead of starting out from unrealistically grandiose plans, those famous values that we in the West have assimilated and in which we believe, instead of projecting these values on to the outside world, imposing them on it

when it very often does not want them, or thinking that the reason why it does not want them is because it is still at the stage of savagery, I believe we should start again from scratch and try to build together, with inputs from everyone, on a much more modest level, a world of genuine solidarity, not just mechanical but organic, because mechanical solidarity has too readily been confused with organic solidarity. That is what I wanted to say, and that is why my statement has been somewhat provocative . . .

ROBBIN F. LAIRD

**The emergence of an information society in
the United States and its implications for security**

20 December 1995

Forgive me if I stray a moment from the subject – from someone of the '68 generation it's not unusual! – but I would like to mention one thing about Pierre Hassner. When I started in this business a few years ago, the first piece I ever wrote, in a journal we had a relationship with, was on post-industrial society. In many ways we were dealing with some of the same issues that concern us now, but with 20 years of history behind us! Pierre was and will always be the first person in my professional life: he read my piece and said something nice about it; it was the first time I got a good *critique*, and it was from someone whom I respected and continue to respect, so it is good to see Pierre and some other friends here today.

What I thought I would do in talking about this subject, which is both important and difficult, is to raise three basic issues and then provide a set of tentative questions or conclusions. The first thing I want to talk about is the emergence of the new information society in the United States, to discuss what has actually happened in terms of the relationship

between the new information technologies and society. This will take up at least half of what I have to say, since most of the literature on this subject refers to a future that does not exist, or that consists of metaphysical debates about the impact of technologies which have not yet been networked. What actually has happened, what kind of society is the United States becoming in interrelationship to the new information technologies? I want to talk only about facts and developments, without trying to interpret them too much.

I then want to speak about some security dimensions in American society. What are those Americans who think about information society issues saying about the security dimensions of this society, and what are some of the issues involved? Here again I am not aiming to be too coherent; I shall try to say how these questions, these security issues, come up. Thirdly, I want to talk about some global implications from an American perspective – I am not trying to stand and look at the United States from outside – and look at some of the issues, the cross-cutting issues, that affect us in some of our own debates. Lastly, I shall put forward a few conclusions or tentative questions, because I am not going to be so arrogant as to claim to know what the twenty-first century will be like . . . but I will say this: I do have a pretty good sense of some of the changes that have occurred, having worked with a number of companies that have played a key role in the development of the information society.

I shall start with some of the changes that have occurred or some of the things that are happening. One of the difficulties in analysing the role of technology in society is, of course, the question of causation: does new technology create new societies or do new societies create the need for the technology? Although it is an interesting debate, it seems to me to raise the question of correlative causation, parallel causation or whatever one wishes to call it. What is essential in this area is to realize that the emergence of new technologies in the

information age and the changes in American society have happened at about the same time. I do not know which caused which, but the point is that they are closely correlated. In terms of the information society, there are three broad technological changes that are important. The first of these is the building of a first-rate national telecommunications system. The United States, particularly in its urban areas, has a very good telephone system with a lot of capacity. It may seem an obvious point, but the high capacity is important. I myself have nine telephone lines, and that is not so unusual; the impact of this has been that in the Washington D.C. area the telephone company is having to double the number of lines after only five years. Again, the fact of having access to a broad range of channels in telephone communication is an American phenomenon. The primary requirement is simply an infrastructure of a decent telephone system with low noise distortion, so that you can actually receive information over the telephone lines. When I am in Europe and try to call out, even on French lines, which are often very good, I get a lot of noise distortion and have many problems even using good European lines to get information out and in. So I find that, for my normal day-to-day business, for which I spend two hours a day on-line, it would take me five hours to do the same work in France, just because of the problems of the telephone lines.

The first thing, therefore, is just simply the physical existence of a high telecommunication capacity, which is closely correlated with a highly competitive telephone system – meaning that, beyond privatization, there is plenty of capital available, and plenty of competition, to serve this market; but the first thing is simply the existence of the telecommunication system.

The second factor is a society that is very comfortable with working with visual images and with the private use of information, which is to say that the American culture is in many ways a very individualistic culture. People are comfortable

with working by themselves or in small groups, and are highly interactive with one another. There is a stunning cultural difference between French people and Americans in terms of how we work together. I have dealt with French firms who constantly try to use the new information technology to support the power of the patron, the boss. That is not the point: this technology works only if it in fact empowers individuals in a variety of new organizational structures. The second factor, therefore, is a cultural propensity to be comfortable digesting and working with a lot of information, which, again, is not true of many societies.

The third point is that Americans, for whatever reason, are involved in a process of radical innovation in organizational design. It started in various ways. We began discussing it in terms of post-industrial society 20 years ago, but it has become something other than what we imagined because, in a way, Americans are inventing small-group organizations to network themselves. One of the most stunning results of the big communication system, of this cultural propensity to absorb and use information, has been that Americans have started to network through these telecommunication systems in small, activist groups. In political terms, this has meant that a public-interest group will use these facilities to network on a national and international basis. Small firms of two or three people work together today and can compete with any big firm in the United States, but if you as an American tell French people you have a small firm and are a consultant, they think you are unemployed! They do not understand what has happened – and the French of course love big corporations, big companies.

This, then, is the broad infrastructure of change, but what are some of the attributes of change? It is basically a question of networks and networking, and in the next ten years it is in the development of networking that the most significant changes will occur. If I may, I will talk a little about how

I work myself, which will reflect some of these changes, and from there I will go on to ask what changes are happening that I would incorporate. I focus it this way because much analysis deals with the technology, but not about the way many people *use* the technology. People do not use things they don't understand – some people can't programme their VCR. I have attended many conferences on new telecommunication technologies where there were people who had never used a computer.

The big change will be in what the networks can carry, which is usually discussed in terms of the bandwidth of the communication channels. What this really means is that the networks carry not just digital information but visual information and talk. If, for example, Pierre Hassner and I are working together on a piece, in a few years' time all he will need to do will be to call into a network and just give a telephone message, which will then be transmitted through on to the Internet. I will actually receive it as digitally translated sound, but then I can keep it as a file – I can listen to it and I can file it. In a few years, it will be possible to do this with video. To take this conference, for example, we could go into the database and if someone read our book, found it interesting and wanted to see what people said, the interchange, they could not only go into the book but go into the database and call up the conference that we would have recorded. This, I think, creates an immediacy of experience that will be extremely important for learning and change. Some of the social and political implications of this are already clear. One implication is the growing divide between culture and territory. To illustrate what I mean, I have these wonderful charts showing the cultural groups on the Internet – but this is just the beginning – and I take, for example, the first chart, English on the Internet. Which countries participate? The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, India. Or Hispanic culture: the United States is the most active Hispanic culture

on the Internet, then Spain and Latin America. Chinese: the United States first, then South-East Asia and parts of China. All the way down the list the United States comes first, because in fact it has the highest capacity. This will change. But the interesting question is the impact of cultural dissemination through interaction beyond natural territorial boundaries.

I will give you an example of this connection between networking and the cultural aspect. The French are always bemoaning the impact of American culture, and I have had many conversations with French officials who were thinking of subsidizing French competitiveness by denying access to American materials. Now this is a ridiculous way to look at it. The proper way is to use the new technologies to make French products more competitive globally; that's the way the new economics works. It used to be the case that programmes had to be produced for big television networks, which meant the cost of production was enormous, but with the new video technologies small companies can actually build capacity and spread capacity. Only this past week, for example, there was a meeting in New York about a scheme to distribute a new cable channel to the 2 million (or 2.9 million, according to the source of your figures) French speakers in the United States, and of course the French journalists covering this story have no idea what is going on and say it can't be done. In fact, with the new bandwidth capacities in the future, the economic prospects are even better, because it is now possible to network these 2 million people on a very cost-effective basis, providing them with specialized information, so in fact the technology points to enhanced capacity for special-interest groups, including cultural groups, to work with one another.

A second kind of social impact flows from this, linked with the fact that the Internet uses English, and most of what we are describing here is dominated by American English. This state of affairs will continue in one way but not in

another: the English used will less and less be American English. When I go to a conference and hear Japanese bankers talking to German bankers and it is in English (I am not always certain it is!), I haven't a clue . . . English has advantages in that it has no accents and it is easier to transmit material without accents, just because of the technology. English is the international language, or the main international language, but the more it becomes a global language, the less it will be dominated by the American definition of English. At the same time, there are a number of new standards and capacities for transmitting ideogram-based languages, like Chinese, so what will happen is that transmission across this system of networks will increasingly be in languages other than English, and the impact will be a change from an American-dominated system to something different.

The third change, clearly, concerns the way in which elites deal with one another, and the question of new divisions in society.

The first aspect of this is in many ways the least discussed but it is not unimportant how elites are defined and how they talk with one another. What has happened, is happening and will continue to happen even more in the future is a dispersed elite culture. As we saw, for example, on the question of French nuclear testing, Greenpeace took on the French State in a way that would have been unimaginable five or even three years previously, certainly six or seven years previously. Using the Internet and other global communication means to take on the French State on grounds where the latter had every right to do what it did; it was challenged not so much by states – and those that challenged it were not very effective – as by the new interest-group politics, which challenged it very effectively. One of the differences between the United States and France, beyond nuclear and security matters, is in the level of access to the Internet. One of the areas where the Clinton administration has been very innovative – incidentally with the

support of some of the Republicans, particularly Mr Gingrich, who is responsible for a lot of innovation in this area – is in the opening-up of much broader access to government information. Before the Clinton administration, for instance, whenever the Department of Energy wanted to do something it was challenged by special-interest groups and blocked legally; but there has not been a single challenge to the Department of Energy since it adopted its new information policy, because the special-interest groups have completely open access and can challenge the Department at an early stage on the Internet. This is something the French Government will have to do; there is no alternative to this openness policy, partly because we are their dominant ally but also because there is enormous pressure for a more open information structure. But we are not dealing here with masses and elites: this is about elites dealing with one another, which is certainly not an unimportant matter. It is also worth pointing out that this year – next month, in fact – the national regulatory authority is, for the first time, going to redesign some of its rules and invite consultation with anyone who wants to participate on the Web; in other words, they put the legislation up and ask different groups affected by it to give what in fact amounts to testimony on the impact. This again is a very sensible policy, and there are not many societies where it would work. It will work in the United States because of the characteristics I have already described, but we are obviously here going down a new road.

A third aspect of change is in how news is delivered. It is now delivered on a special-interest basis: you design your own news-distribution system. It is amusing to watch the Chinese Government legislate about what they are going to do with the Internet; I find it amusing coming from people who have obviously never done any of this. They are going to allow access but at the same time control it, to let good information in but keep bad information out. Good luck to them! It will be very interesting . . . There is an ‘all or nothing’

quality to this, and the societies that block access to it will block their own development. That is another part of the problem that I will talk about in a minute.

Those, then, are some broad changes, and this brings me to about half-way through what I want to say. There is one final change, the one affecting divisions within society. This technology further aggravates two social problems: firstly, the collapse of a consensual culture, which is both a good and a bad thing; and secondly, the accentuation of certain socio-economic divisions. Almost 99 per cent of the literature deals with the second issue, not the first. The first, in many ways more problematical, brings us back to my cultural/territorial relationship. One of the questions that modern society faces is, how are post-modern societies governed? How are consensuses put together so that in some way there is responsibility in decision-making? Responsibility in decision-making is crucial for accountability; it is certainly crucial in democratic cultures. The problem is simply that, without a consensus, it is going to be very hard to define a nation-state. I will give you an example, a trivial example but one that brings us to the second point, social divisions. When I grew up in the 1950s, there was only network television, and there were some shows that you had to go home and see. In retrospect, if you have a chance to watch some of these shows again, the level of English is something you would never find in today's network TV – the old Perry Mason series, for example, used words you could not possibly use on today's network TV. Yet there were also some common cultural symbols: whether you were Black or White or whatever, you just knew 'I love Lucy' and that kind of thing. In today's society, what has happened is that the top 20 per cent of society and the bottom 20 per cent have nothing in common in terms of the use of information. The top 20 per cent don't watch network television, or only selectively, they watch cable, satellite, videos, they design their own information systems. The bottom 20 per cent

watch network TV, by and large, and by and large you see the result: it has become increasingly ethnic, Black in part, and the language is not an upper-class Black – it is a lower-class Black culture that is reflected on network TV. The news content has changed dramatically: it now consists of bursts of headlines, without any analysis whatsoever. What this reflects is a division in the sources from which different people get information, and this creates a problem. I would argue that, in an urban American society, the only real consensus is around football and baseball teams! I mean this literally: if you live in Washington, D.C., you are a Redskins fan; it crosses social, ethnic and economic frontiers. But this creates a huge problem when it comes to politics and you try to rebuild a consensus; you have more divisions. And then you come to the subsidiary question of how the bottom 20 per cent of society competes in the world. This is a serious problem, because this is the part of society that is also most affected by immigration, by loss of jobs outside the United States; it is the part of society that is hurt most in a competitive culture, and it is being redesigned. At the same time, in terms of the top 20 per cent, the elite structure is changing, with my age-group suffering most – we are fired. Increasingly, people in their mid-forties to mid-fifties are being fired from their jobs because they cost too much, and interchangeable parts are being built in society – it is in fact pretty easy to slot in new components in today's society. This is why the pensions crisis in the United States is very important, and it also raises the question of how to build a more flexible society.

Turning now to two or three security dimensions, there are several ways of looking at this issue from a security point of view. One concerns the security of the individual, the privacy debate. The more information about you is digitized, the more information can be stolen from your databanks or obtained about you. It is not just a matter of stealing credit cards, but of credit card fraud. There is also the question of the FBI, in

particular, having access to your records and tax records, in ways they should not have. The FBI recently asked for authority to do this . . . now President Clinton is not at all a libertarian democrat on these issues: he wants to grant the FBI extraordinary authority to eavesdrop on the American public, in ways that Mr. Gingrich wants to protect us against, so the right/left distinctions are almost being abolished by this type of debate. But behind this question of privacy of the individual lurks a second question, namely, that of the groups which are organizing to tap information. Terrorist groups operate differently in this kind of area of broad access to information, hackers, inter-secure networks, small groups of people.

A third dimension, increasingly discussed by the Pentagon, concerns information warfare problems, by which, by and large, the Pentagon means battlefield intelligence, putting information together, crossing a transparent battlefield. But there is also the question of the vulnerabilities of Western forces that go into a coalition to operate, vulnerabilities due to the social level of the operation: the more we are engaged in trying to protect common interests, the greater the risk of our information channels being used by outside forces. CNN is just an example of this, but it will be increasingly easy for Third World dictators who are afraid of an intervention to use our communication channels to try to suggest that the risks are great, that our side does not know what it is doing, skilfully using these channels to shape public opinion before the government actually forges public opinion or forges a consensus. This is a factor of vulnerability, and the way in which the United States deploys its forces is another.

In terms of global implications, there are basically three big issues on the American side. One is the spread of the new technologies: over time, there will be more privatization, there will be a global telecommunications network in spite of all the problems of standardization, and one of the real issues is whether the standards will be regional or global, a very

important problem from the networks' viewpoint. From the United States' point of view, it is seen as a matter of building a capacity for American firms – the most competitive in the world – to go into countries and build a global telecommunications system. These American companies will enter into strategic alliances with local firms, this being the way US multinationals work today, so it will end up not being American: just because they happen to be American or supposedly American firms, that does not make it an American telecommunications network. The debate is thus, at one level, about access, privatization, and so on. On the United States' side, 99 per cent of the discussion about the global impact is focused on that issue.

The second major issue is content: what goes into the system, what do people see, what do they communicate, how do they work, what will be the relationship between culture and the system of communication itself? Going back to my previous point, I think the system will not be as American as Americans think it will be, by which I mean that one of the key characteristics of this global telecommunications capacity will be more diversity for special-interest groups, cultures, subcultural groups, and so forth. One of the clear challenges to us will therefore be one we have always found difficult, the relationship between American and non-American culture, and the way deals can be struck in such a way that there will not be a global telecommunications infrastructure unless agreement is first reached in the content debates, about the limits of American culture or exchanges or openness.

The third point is that a lot of the negotiations about access will involve the question of content more than that of infrastructure. This is in fact the only interesting analysis, as regards a potential role for UNESCO in this matter. I am going to spread the good news that someone has discovered UNESCO's role in this field! There are also the questions of

intellectual property rights, access to government information, the negotiation of a cultural access, exchanges, global information, cultures, and so forth.

There is a very interesting discussion here of how an organization like UNESCO or some other United Nations organization could be useful in promoting this kind of discussion and dialogue. The problem is that it brings us back to the question of societies and elites and global implications.

I want to make another point, this time about economic development. It is clear that the economic development model associated with the global information technology is very different from the former model. I will give you two examples of how radically different it becomes. If you want to design products for this global market, you do it globally, you don't do it just in the United States any more. If, for example, the Ford Motor company is building a world-class car, it works round the clock, with a 24-hour-a-day design team working around the world and the designs being shipped on from one time zone to another to the next design team. This design capacity is very innovative and is also a challenge to traditional industrial-design policy. To take another example, the US Navy is defending the capacity of the electric boat, but a global design team could be put together that would cost less than an electric boat and save the taxpayer billions of dollars. You could save money this way, but you could also build in a cultural understanding of the fact that the different kinds of cars you would need globally would make a difference to the way you produce the car. Another way is networking in research and development (R&D). With the global information system, there is no need for the classic brain-drain problem, whereby elites have to leave the country to be part of something bigger than themselves. If you look at how the United States has used Russian scientists, you will see that by and large the software engineers stayed in Russia . . . where we networked by using Sun Telecommunications. Sun has

designed a number of semaphore programs by using mobile communications which connect software engineers in Russia with the west coast of America. In this way you can start to put together scientific and technical elites with the people involved remaining in their own countries. India is another country where relations with US firms have changed enormously. This has, however, created a problem in the United States because it is reducing the jobs available for US scientists and engineers. It is a global phenomenon, not necessarily just an American one, but it does, potentially, create a different kind of economic infrastructure. It could also create much more efficiency and effectiveness and permit downsizing. We are here in a country right now that does not want to cut down on redundant jobs, but in fact it has no choice; if you are going to be competitive in this environment it is a worldwide requirement.

I would, however, argue in conclusion that although this phenomenon started in the United States and has made most headway in the United States, in 20 years' time or so it will become less and less American. Although the Americans certainly derive certain benefits from this system, I think part of the problem will be that over time those benefits will become less and less obvious . . . You see the beginnings of this debate already . . . I find it amusing that the US Congress is debating controlling the Internet: it does not want pornography on the Internet, but the problem is that the Internet is global, and the US Congress does not legislate for any other country. To take another example, it is illegal to print Nazi literature in Germany, but it can be broadcast on the Internet, and there is in fact a major producer of neo-Nazi literature in Iowa whose bulletin board is used by the German neo-Nazis. Technically speaking, it is not illegal for them to download it but it is, I guess, illegal for them to print it after downloading it. The point is, how do you regulate something like this? It brings us back to the problem of terrorism and social activism: where

is the line to be drawn in regard to freedom of speech? I mention this because it is difficult for a number of members of Congress to understand that they can't legislate on this matter; what is really needed is some kind of international regime that they would hate.

Part of the difficulty, on our side, is finding the proper relationship between a national dynamism which we value and international rules; we will probably resent it somewhat, but it will be necessary in order to facilitate a really global telecommunications revolution. It is inherent in this technology, and we can already begin to see the cultural zone. Most of what is written about the implications is way in advance of the reality, so we have this tremendous debate about the national information infrastructure, the highway; but when you go to these meetings and ask what it all means – ask for a specific example – nine times out of ten you get no answer. It is not a highway, it is a network, which is very different. It is an interactive network and, like interdependence, interactivity sounds good, but there are negative aspects as well, in the shape of social dynamics, which also means social degradation and conflict, the difficulty of putting together common cultures. In conclusion, however, I disagree with Samuel Huntington on many things, but particularly in this area. Everything I have described to you is about a cultural renovation, where cultures are interacting with one another, competing with one another and also, interestingly, becoming more global and overlapping. There is an element of competitiveness to this, but it may be the very opposite of a culture clash; it may be something quite different, leading to a cultural enrichment and competitiveness. It is often forgotten in France that many Americans are worried about a certain American mass culture, about violence, about a number of the things portrayed by the US media, so that the United States is itself rather concerned about the reputation of its information and consumption policies.

HECTOR GROS ESPIELL

Universal international security and regional security

25 January 1996

I am greatly honoured to be able to address this group on the relationship between general international security and regional security. I already had the great pleasure of speaking on the subject of 'International security, democracy and politics' at the meeting in Washington, D.C., last April.¹ There is, of course, a close connection between the ideas I developed in Washington and the main ideas I wish to expound today.

I believe that, in the real world of today, it is absolutely essential to see security from a global, multidisciplinary perspective. We must move on from certain ideas deriving from a purely legal or political conception of security. Security is a complex, interdisciplinary and global concept that must embrace all aspects of reality.

The law is, to my mind, an essential part of reality. It is impossible to study or describe a given national society without understanding that society's law; that is to say, law must

1. Organized jointly by the Organization of American States (OAS), UNESCO and the Inter-American Defense College, 3-4 April 1995, on the subject of 'Security for peace'.

not be studied as a mere standard-setting system external to reality but, on the contrary, as a system of standards without which it is impossible to understand reality. The same may be said of ethical standards and social customs. This overall set of standards helps us to understand reality as a whole.

Legal security, both domestic and international, should today be studied in the same way, but it should also be realized that concepts such as economic, social and even cultural security are all part of the global conception that is required for an understanding of present reality and a vision of future development. Security should in fact be regarded as a necessary feature of development, its aim being to arrive in the future at a situation of balance, well-being and satisfaction of all human needs.

An analysis of the word shows that the very essence of 'security' is the fact of being 'safe', i.e. protected from any danger or risk. This idea of security as safety or protection is valid not only for internal but also for international security, but, as is often the case in political science, it also implies awareness of being safe.

A great Swiss jurist, Maurice Bourquin, is quoted in Jules Basdevant's *Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international* as saying the following, which I regard as being essential to an understanding of security: *In its most general sense, the word security may be defined as the state of a person who feels or believes himself or herself to be protected from a danger* – in other words, the awareness that there is no danger. There can be no security without an awareness that the danger can be overcome, given suitable means.

Security, legal security in particular, applies both within states and within the international community. It depends on security whether people can live in freedom and order within states and whether states can do the same within the international community.

The idea of security in domestic law was expressed for the first time, very clearly in my opinion, in Article 2 of the 1789

Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which stipulates that: *The aim of every political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression.* Without this conceptual and historical reference to Article 2 of the 1789 Declaration, it is impossible to understand the concept of security as applied in domestic law and modern constitutional law.

Many years later, in 1948, Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights took up this concept from the French Declaration of 1789, proclaiming that: *Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.*

It may be said that, in the nineteenth century, comparative constitutional law and European and Latin-American law treated this concept of security as a human right. It is very important that security appears in comparative constitutional law as a human right. Hundreds of texts point in this direction, but let me quote as an example – out of patriotism – Article 7 of the Uruguayan Constitution of 1830, which is still in force and which stipulates that: *Everyone has the right to protection in the enjoyment of security.*

The idea of security as a human right is associated with that of democracy. I developed this point at the Washington conference, so I will not dwell upon it now, but it is important to reassert the absolutely essential relationship between human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Human rights can have no real existence without democracy, and there is no democracy without human rights. The present concept of the rule of law, a law-based state, implies not only a state where there is law but a state that acknowledges the existence of human rights and is limited by all the consequences of accepting democracy.

The very clear and very precise view of security as a human right and the basis of democracy was forgotten by the anti-democratic and totalitarian regimes. In all the totalitarian

experiments carried out in Europe, whether fascism or Stalinist communism, the notion of security of person was of course eliminated and ceased to exist. In Latin America, with its wealth of legal experience, there was the terrible decade of military government, between 1960 and 1970, and the end of the 1980s, when the totally unacceptable concept of 'national security' arose. National security meant the security of the state against individuals, viz. not a human right but a right of the state, and a non-democratic state. The totalitarian concept of national security has now been completely eliminated from politics in Latin America, not only as a doctrine and a theory but also as a reality. I think this is a very important point to be borne in mind in order to have a clearer understanding of the incompatibility of the concept of domestic security with that of national security.

But what is international security?

The legal concept of international security came into being mainly after the First World War. The corresponding theory was developed as a consequence of the Convention of the League of Nations and the whole process of European post-war legal and political construction.

Eduard Beneš, one of the great statesmen of the inter-war period, defined international security in terms that seem to me very apt: *The idea of international security reflects the inherent desire of any people, any state, to be safe from the risk of aggression, and is based upon the certainty, on the part of the state, of not being attacked, or, in the case of attack, of receiving immediate and effective aid from other states.* This conception of international security, which was the one prevalent in international law between the wars and is still applied today, derives, however, from an idea that appeared much earlier, in the seventeenth century. It is an idea that began to develop with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and which was based, until 1914, on the principle of the balance of power. The concept of international security originated from the balance of power.

Everything changed with the beginning of the legal organization of the international community, shifting from the idea of the balance of power to that of security based on legal and political guarantees linked with the legal organization of the international community. This idea of a legal security organized and guaranteed by the international community goes back to the Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 16 of which equates international security with collective security. This is the same concept as that set out in the definition by Eduard Beneš which I quoted. There is no need to point out that the system of collective security established by the Covenant failed completely. It was precisely the failure of this conception of collective security, the non-enforcement of the Covenant and the absence of solidarity in the face of aggression that brought about the Second World War.

General or universal international security is today based on the Charter of the United Nations. It is very important to point out that in the Charter the concept of peace is always linked with that of security. In all the articles relating to peace, in particular Articles 1, 11, 12, 24, 33, 34, 39 and 42, the two words 'peace' and 'security' are found together. There is never any mention of peace without security or the reverse.

This is something that needs to be repeated if there is to be a clear understanding of the concept of international security in contemporary international law. Peace is not possible without international security and there can be no international security without peace. It follows from the necessary relationship between peace and security that, without security, it is impossible to achieve a real international order and of course, if there is no international order in the world today, peace cannot be attained.

The truth of the present situation is, in my estimation, that even if we have grasped the importance of the generous ideas behind the United Nations Charter, no genuine international order exists at the present time. We live in a system of

international disorder. It may be that we are turning, for the future, towards a desirable international order, but the reality of the situation today is the absence of a genuine international order and of global, universal security.

From 1945 to 1989–1990, real international security, as expressed not in the Charter but in the actual international situation, was based on the balance between the two superpowers, the balance of terror: global security, without any wars of a worldwide character, but a lack of overall security due to hundreds of peripheral wars and colonial-type conflicts. Perhaps we then enjoyed *de facto* universal international security, with no actual warfare between the two superpowers, but it was an unjust, incomplete and discriminatory international security.

The end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union brought into being a different world, no longer bipolar but with one side holding a monopoly of power. Credence was given to the illusion of a new international order, assigning a different role to the Security Council, which would have revolutionized international law. In fact, although the international situation has changed, although monopoly has taken the place of bipolarity, we are not seeing a situation of stability in genuine international security. We are, as I have said, living in international disorder and in the anxiety of insecurity, with warlike conflicts of all kinds, even if, for the moment, they are not generalized conflicts.

There is another feature that also needs to be taken into account: we are now witnessing the blurring of the traditional distinction between international and domestic conflicts. International conflicts are having increasingly serious consequences at the domestic level, and domestic conflicts are having greater repercussions at the international level. The borderline between internal and international security is gradually disappearing. We are now witnessing a new phenomenon: the risk of conflicts between civilizations. This

has been very clearly put by Professor Samuel Huntington, who has studied this prospect of conflicts between civilizations in the early twenty-first century.

To wind up these remarks on general international security, I believe the concept of security must today be linked to the affirmation of the existence of a right to peace, a right to peace that is both an individual and a collective right, a right of human beings and a right of peoples and states.

Without an acknowledgement of the right to peace, with all the theoretical and practical effects that flow from it, it is at present impossible to work out an integrated conception of international security. In connection with this question of the right to peace and of international security, it is essential to understand that a culture of peace must replace the culture of violence and aggression against the very foundations of international security. The latter is not merely a juridical concept or a problem of states' international policies; it is based upon the postulate of a culture of peace, present in the consciousness of each individual and in the international policy of each state of the international community.

Universal international security is, however, bound up with regional international security. There can be no general international security without regional security and, conversely, regional security is inconceivable outside of the universal, general framework of international security. General international security and regional international security are conditional each upon the other. It is impossible to make a self-contained framework of regional security since, in the absence of universal security, full regional security cannot exist, and if there is no regional security in the various regions of the world, it is impossible to construct general international security.

A number of regional security systems are in existence today. These regional systems are foreseen in the Charter of the United Nations, and they are therefore compatible in

principle with the Charter's international security system, which rests basically on action by the Security Council. This follows very clearly from Article 52 of the Charter, the first paragraph of which stipulates: *Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.* It is on the basis of this paragraph of Article 52 that all the regional security systems compatible with the United Nations Charter have been built. It is, of course, difficult to review all the regional security systems in the space of a few minutes. I shall first of all mention the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which, as originally conceived in the Washington Treaty of 1949, was a response to the possibility of aggression by the communist countries. This system has changed but still survives, even after the collapse of the Soviet system. We are all aware of the important part NATO plays, in the Yugoslav conflict, for instance, and in the present problems with the Eastern countries, those of the former Soviet Union especially. The Warsaw Pact, which was set up in response to NATO, has however disappeared since the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are other regional systems, such as the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, and so on; but I should like to say a few words about the inter-American security system, which is based on two instruments: the Charter of the Organization of American States, and the Rio de Janeiro Treaty.

The Charter of the Organization of American States regards regional security as a necessary element of peace. This emerges from the preamble, from Article 4 (a), which concerns the fundamental principles of the Organization's work for peace and security, from Article 5, which lays down

the principle of the solidarity of the American States in response to aggression as an essential element of the concept of collective security, and from Chapter 5 of the Charter of the Organization. The principles of regional security were developed in the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of 1947.

The very notion of international security is now a multi-disciplinary concept, which should comprise not only security against political and military aggression but also the clearly defined concepts of economic, social and cultural security. Failing such a global conception of security, we shall remain within a narrow framework that is incompatible with present-day realities.

I feel I should say a few words about the relationship between the idea of security and arms control. The dreadful assertion *Si vis pacem, para bellum* is by no means borne out by experience: on the contrary. Developing armaments in each country is the surest way towards war and, similarly, the arms trade is the prologue to war and to armed conflicts.

Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations should be put into practice instead of just being there for the benefit of lawyers. It states: *In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating . . . plans . . . for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.* This article has remained entirely a dead letter, its virginity undefiled by ever being put into effect. When Jean-Pierre Cot and Alain Pellet were preparing the article-by-article comments on the Charter, they asked me to write the commentary on Article 26. I began by saying that I was the first jurist to write about an article that was absolutely virginal in this way; and indeed Article 26 remains inviolate, a standard that has not been applied; but we must struggle for the principle embodied in it to be put into effect in international life.

We must go forward. Some regions have set an example in this respect. The first treaty totally banning nuclear weapons in an inhabited region was the Tlatelolco Treaty, which has created and developed a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. We have now reached a situation where all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, without exception, have become parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty, with the guarantee of the nuclear powers (Protocol II) and of the non-Latin-American powers that possess territories in Latin America (Protocol I). There have also been the Rarotonga Treaty, for the denuclearization of the South Pacific, and, very recently, the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. For the rest of the world, the principle in force is that of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which bans the spread of these weapons beyond the frontiers of the major powers that have developed them. It is a treaty that violates the principle of the equality of states before the law and divides the countries of the world in two, those with nuclear weapons and those without. It has been claimed that this was a concession made to realism for the sake of peace, but the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains the ideal. A very important instrument totally banning nuclear tests was signed in March 1997. This is perhaps the first stage in the process that will one day culminate in the total prohibition of nuclear weapons. Another very important instrument, the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, was signed in Paris in January 1993.

I wish only to repeat that, without disarmament, without arms control, without negotiations conducted in good faith – I emphasize ‘in good faith’ – with a view to arms control, it will be impossible to make progress along the path of security and hence along the path of peace.

What role should UNESCO play in the area of international security, both universal and regional? If UNESCO is indeed the intellectual conscience of the United Nations

system, one is forced to the conclusion that the question of security is not merely a political question for the United Nations, a question of economic or social development: it is a question that is of necessity bound up with the whole of humanity's cultural development. UNESCO is the only organization in the United Nations system capable of producing and offering to states and to the other international organizations a complete, global conception of security. If its panels of counsellors can come up with intellectual contributions to the construction of a universal, complete and global theory of security, that will be a gift on our part to the international community, to progress and development. It is our duty, the duty of UNESCO, the only organization of the United Nations system in a position to work for a culture of peace, which is itself the only lasting and reliable basis for genuine security.

RENÉ-JEAN DUPUY

**Security in the twenty-first century
and the culture of peace**

22 February 1996

Mr Director-General, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, I am quite overwhelmed to have heard such complimentary remarks showered upon me – remarks that also leave me in something of a quandary. I cannot help wondering to what extent I shall be able to justify, even remotely, all the so very cordial things that have been said about me. I should like to say how deeply and sincerely honoured I feel to find myself next to Federico Mayor, who has been so good as to make the journey to be with us here today, despite all his many commitments. I am greatly touched by this honour, not only on account of the post which he occupies but also because of the calibre of the man himself, who has thus come in person to share in our discussions and reflections. The fact is that I feel for Federico Mayor an admiration that is of long standing: I had the honour to get to know him when he first came to work at UNESCO, and I have always appreciated the remarkable combination of the scientist that he is, a man who, throughout his life, has practised biology, molecular biology – of the most advanced, specialized kind – and who, at the same time,

has always remained a man of research, a searcher and a discoverer. You have referred to the poet; I believe that Federico Mayor is a true poet and, as such, is able, precisely, to go beyond the thinking of the scientist and the administrator, of the individual obliged to grapple with the practical problems of daily life, and to allow his thought to escape to new horizons, to break new ground. It is the old tradition of the explorer who sets off thirsting for discovery; it is typically in the Spanish, the Catalan tradition, the tradition of those who are impatient to race beyond the last wave and who are never satisfied unless and until they are convinced of having stepped out beyond it. So UNESCO is extremely fortunate, I feel I may say, to have at its head someone who is at once a man of science and a man of inspiration.

I cannot begin my lecture without thanking Jérôme Bindé¹ for the kind things he has said about me. I have had the pleasure of knowing him, too, for a long time, and have always admired his writings, ever imbued with that distinctive clarity that any graduate of the *École Normale Supérieure* brings to the expression of his thoughts.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is my task to speak to you about the culture of peace in a world which is at the meeting point of two centuries. However, I must preface my remarks by citing a fact well known to you: security is not what it used to be. Until recently, security was something we sought in terms of, or vis-à-vis, the enemy, an enemy who might be hereditary or newly acquired. Today, however, security is also a generalized concept. We have moved from the territory to the planet, and from the nation to humankind. It is humankind that is in jeopardy. Security is thus a diffuse concept precisely because we are at the core of a process of development of which we are acutely aware within the United Nations. At

1. See the list of participants.

the time of the adoption of the Charter, in 1945, the United Nations was fixated on the war; the United Nations was set up in order to rule out war, and what people then had in mind was the war of aggression, the war from which the world had just emerged. Twenty years later, the spirit of the United Nations was focused on development. The key word was no longer war; it was believed that the balance of terror had removed its spectre, at least in the world arena; by the 1970s, the key word had become development. Today, what is the new enemy? The concern is to protect humankind against itself, for the enemy is akin to that *quinta columna*, the fifth column denounced by General Miaja at the siege of Madrid. That enemy lies deep within us; humankind has no worse enemy than itself, riven as we are by those contradictions that assail us from all sides, threatening our very survival. You are all familiar with the apophthegm of Paul Valéry, who wrote in 1919: 'We civilizations now know that we are mortal'. Civilizations died, but humankind marched on, straddling the mortal remains of dead civilizations, heaped one atop the other. Humankind endured, and its longevity was without limit. Whereas today we know – and this is a relatively recent discovery – that it can itself die, and may die *of itself* if it does not react against all that threatens it: not only the weapons of mass destruction but also economic disparities, environmental blight, population imbalances, the massive spread of certain diseases. In short, it is paying the price for the lack of organization that currently affects our increasingly complex world. Now, as things become ever more complex, organization becomes increasingly essential. In other words, in 1945 it was necessary to tolerate and negotiate with the enemy if war was to be avoided. After 1970, developing and industrialized nations had to strive to cooperate in order to banish the enemy represented by underdevelopment and poverty. Today, although neither of these two enemies has been vanquished, all the dangers threatening

humankind add up to the grand total of those that came before *plus* all the new ones that have since emerged. When we hear it said that today, since the end of the Cold War, the enemy has disappeared, we are able to get some inkling of just how thoughtless many people's reactions remain. In the face of all the dangers which threaten humankind, there can be no place for the *sauve-qui-peut*, the 'every-man-for-himself' attitude. No man, no woman, can save him or herself alone; we shall be saved together, or we shall all perish. In saying that, I was wishing first of all to highlight this broadening of the concept of security that gives to the culture of peace, to which Federico Mayor is so properly attached, such exceptionally wide-ranging objectives. We must fight the good fight on all fronts. This globalization of security leads us to project our thinking beyond the purely legal field. International law cannot, in isolation, bring about peace. I have only to cast a glance in the direction of my old and dear friend Marcel Merle; like two ancient Greek oracles, we cannot look at each other without laughing when we discuss the likelihood of international law saving peace. International law will play its part in giving shape to peace once peace has been assured. It is peace that justifies law. No doubt if the rule of law is systematically violated, peace itself will be jeopardized. But in order to appreciate its role, we must place ourselves as it were upstream from law. As Paul Valéry also said, law is fiducial in origin, is born of and based on trust. From this trust there arises an edifice of enchantment in the form of an agreement concluded between interests, between cultures that opt to abandon confrontation, that decide to stop tearing one another apart and agree, at least at a practical level and for specific purposes, to work together. Then it becomes possible to formulate law, good law that enshrines the encounter between consenting parties. Otherwise we shall have to agree that Charles Péguy was right when he wrote, at the time of The Hague conferences

in 1907: 'People speak of peace through law, that amuses me enormously. As soon as a legal issue arises anywhere on earth, it brings not peace but war. Law doesn't make for peace, it makes for war'. To be sure, whenever we invoke the law, a particular right, we run up against somebody else who invokes one radically opposed thereto, or who puts a wholly different construction upon the law or right invoked. The issue then is to decide whether to resort to weapons or to call in the diplomats, arbitrators or judges in order to settle the dispute. This is why (as was argued lately by an author who will shortly be addressing you), war is in reality the natural state of history, or in any case the most frequently occurring state. In 1909 an American author, O. Lee, published a curious work: he had calculated that, over a period of 2,400 years, there had been only 236 years of peace. I have the greatest doubts about the validity of these figures. On the other hand he pointed out, not without reason, that, if humankind had not destroyed itself, this was because it had lived in ignorance of weapons of mass destruction. But such ignorance has now been overcome.

There then remains, you will tell me, the process of complexification which calls for organization. And it is certainly true that international organization possesses very considerable merits, which I shall not enumerate here. But it has the virtue of unifying, because it institutes rites which it predicates upon certain key concepts, or myths in the loftiest sense of the term, on myths charged with potential for the future. Claude Lévi-Strauss has shown that, contrary to game-playing, the rite has a unifying function. Games divide because they establish a winner – a victor – and a loser. Whereas rites bring people closer together, games separate them. When the concept of humankind's common heritage was first formulated in the United Nations, we had the feeling that we were engaging in a wholly novel operation, one that held great interest because, at least in the realm of general goods, those

who regarded themselves as pure and those who were seen as impure stood shoulder to shoulder for the purpose of sharing. They were sharing out a common heritage. Mr Director-General, in an admirable speech delivered last year in London on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, you celebrated the virtue of sharing. Allow me to recall a personal memory: one day when I happened to find myself in a small Spanish church, in the town of Jaca in Aragon, an old priest spoke to his flock in the following terms: 'Here is the prayer I offer you: "My God, give me bread to eat, work whereby to win it, and love whereby to share it".' This virtue of sharing is one that the international agencies, and more particularly the universal family of the United Nations, oblige all their members to exercise, and thereby transcend the divisions and prejudices which they harbour against one another. It is the distinctive feature of sociocultural systems that they regard one another first and foremost in a spirit of antagonism, rather than discovering themselves in one of fraternity. It is precisely UNESCO's role to show that we are brothers and sisters in humanity. We do not say it so concisely, but in reality this idea underlies the entire philosophy on which co-operation within each institution is based. We are brothers and sisters in the humanity that unites us. It is this indeed that, in the final analysis, constitutes our common dimension. So much so that the nations of the world must strive to share not only a heritage but also their endeavours to accomplish tasks of common interest. One of the great means of bringing men and women closer together is to associate them in concrete, practical projects. When people find themselves on a ship that's threatening to sink, when all the lifeboats have been launched and they are struggling together to make a raft to escape on, they don't wonder about the cultural identity of their companions, their political opinions or their religion. The needs of the moment prompt them to work as one man and woman to

accomplish an urgent practical task. It is by focusing peoples' energies upon precise, specific objectives that antinomies can be successfully transcended.

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At this stage in our thinking it is, I believe, possible to pursue matters in two directions. On the one hand, we can demonstrate the importance of the phenomenon of globalization, about which we hear so much, and on the other, using the globalization concept as our starting point, we may look for ways and means of attaining the reality of our common humanity.

On the subject of globalization, I do not have a great deal to say. You are fully familiar with it. You know that globalization, which has been going on for a very long time, has in recent years developed on a considerable scale, first and foremost in the spheres of communications and trade, thanks to a combination of unbridled liberalism and the spread of hitherto unknown media of communication. The effect of this has been not only to bring human beings ever closer together, in material terms, on an ever shrinking planet. It has also developed in us a sense of ubiquity: ubiquity which, in former times, was an attribute of divinity. Today, the Internet allows us universal, instant ubiquity. We have reached the point of believing that, in reality, the world has split in two, has become dual: there is today the world to which we are accustomed, the world of states, of monarchs, of traditional protagonists, the world of legality; and there is a second world animated by players who are not states, who are dynamic transnational agencies or operators. The other day I happened to be at UNESCO, where I heard a scientist making the point: 'At this moment, without leaving my office, I'm taking part in three congresses: one is being held in Sophia-Antipolis, the second in Hamburg, the third in Boston'. I was extremely

impressed, and even began wondering why meetings continue to be organized at all if anyone can take part in them via the Internet while remaining at home. IT enthusiasts are heralding the imminent demise of books, benightedly ignorant of all the joys to be had from handling books, breathing in their odour. From this standpoint, the radical transition from the print media to the screen would be a disaster.

We are confronted by two worlds comprising scientists, traffickers, members of religious orders, sects, missionaries, humanitarian organizations and mafias. Everything is there, the best and the worst. Why? Because it is a world without borders, and a world without law. It is without borders since, as a result of present-day media of communication, the national territory no longer has any meaning, has been wholly superseded. The state has been submerged, and trade and exchanges are also being conducted through systems and networks. The multinationals have become decentralized and diluted in the form of multiple subsidiary companies. And, likewise, it is a lawless world. When we speak of information superhighways, we forget that, on all highways, there have always been robbers. As depicted in the works of Stendhal, these highwaymen stopped stagecoaches, robbed the travellers, tumbled the prettier travellers, but in the end the customs officers always arrived. Late. But they did get there, and they strung up the highwaymen. On the electronic highways, there are no constables, no patrolmen. Technically, it is impossible to police these highways. A judge may ban a book in France yet any Tom, Dick or Harry can transmit it on the Internet, with the result that a Chinese living in Singapore can retransmit the book back to France, or disseminate it worldwide. Now, trade is also being conducted in a lawless world. You are well aware that a large fraction of world capital is handled via invisible transactions which escape all state control. Some of these are lawful and above board; others on the contrary involve unmentionable trafficking. The question then

arises in these terms: how can the United Nations, an organization set up by states for states, gain some purchase on this second world, a world which to be sure is a metaphor, and that I am presenting solely for its instructive value, but which does reflect real phenomena? The United Nations is doing its utmost to grapple with them. In particular by holding major conferences on population problems, the environment, the social situation, women, the human habitat: conferences which all aim to make an impact upon world society as a whole. The work carried out by UNESCO in this regard is indeed remarkable, straddling as it does both worlds, operating at the interface between the two. UNESCO is working specifically with the best representatives of the second world, that is, with those actively involved in scientific research, in philosophical dialogue and in cultural exchanges, precisely those who are turning to account this globalization of communications.

It is important to note that we thus find ourselves in a world that is challenged by a vision of history as something unplanned. Many since the last century have believed in history as the promise of things to come, the history of Hegel and Marx. Then, when people no longer believe in the future and the future is dead, they tend to turn towards the past. The future is then conjugated in the past tense. It is an attitude that leads to fundamentalism, through its anchoring in a tradition regarded as sacrosanct. It is history as heritage, in which people are seeking a refuge. But a third approach to history demands our attention. This is history as adventure, history that has not been programmed and that refers us back to ourselves, to our freedom, to our conscience and our sense of responsibility. Such history is perilous indeed, and in no way reassuring as are the other two visions of history, since it is open to a future which it is our task to construct. It is a history for us, a history for UNESCO, it is history for purposes of research, enabling us constantly to reinvent ourselves, and

to reduce the gap between project and reality. There are two types of Utopia: that of the ends and that of the means. The bad Utopia is the type that becomes fixated upon a particular means and seeks to turn that means into an end in itself. That was indeed the mistake made by the Soviets, who had built the Utopia of ends and then transformed it into a Utopia of means. Means must be regarded only as interim models, which will be abandoned once they have been put to the test, or improved, or replaced by others. As Gaston Bachelard wrote: 'Scientific progress is a continuous process of correcting knowledge'. The hypothesis which you formulate in your laboratory is a product of the creative imagination. You are close to the poet when you build a theory before engaging in experiment. This approach derives from history-as-adventure. Many people are afraid of facing up to the reappraisal that it presupposes, but it is the approach that leads to freedom, the one that best corresponds to our deepest needs.

Globalization has unusual consequences. Firstly, it is a process that globalizes and fragments at one and the same time. As regards globalization as such, we may quote Chateaubriand, who imagined, at the end of his *Mémoires d'outre-tombe*, that there might one day come into existence a universal society that would consist of no single nation, no particular country. Such a society, he wrote, would have to create its own language, or at least a working idiom. Now, electronics has indeed created such an idiom: it is digitized or digital language. Chateaubriand ponders the question: 'How is man to find his place in a world that has grown larger through the gift of ubiquity and smaller by virtue of the fact that its every part will be probed, explored?' This was written in 1841, yet it is perfectly valid for the world we are living in today. However, this unification, this uniformization of the world and its ways brings with it a reaction: withdrawal into oneself, prompted by fear of losing one's identity. This,

in my view, is the dialectic of the satellite and the village pump. Fascinated by the satellite, which evokes the global dimension, we react by clinging to the local, the strictly parochial dimension. Hence the subnationalisms to which Boutros Boutros-Ghali refers: the village pump, the church tower or the minaret, regarded as an aid to self-awareness, to regaining a sense of selfhood. Such is the first effect of globalization.

Its second effect is to trigger competitiveness. At present, globalization is based upon a rivalry or competition whose by-product is waste. It manufactures fringe groups within societies, individual outcasts, too, but it also does this at the level of nation-states, in what I call the first world. It manufactures waste-states, states that are abandoned in a critical situation: the LDCs or least-developed countries. The most fragile states tend to break up under the impact of the clash between the conflicting drives to assert religious or ethnic identities. Globalization brings us face to face with one another, brings us ever closer together in a contracting space. However, proximity has the effect of distancing our neighbours. We discover ourselves and one another not in terms of solidarity but in terms of difference, of resistance and bias. In any society, difference can be perceived in two opposite ways: for some, it is a reason for exclusion; for others, on the contrary, it expresses pluralism and the conjunction of complementarities.

In this second model, we all live reflected in one another's mirror. This is no longer only a matter of being in tangential contact in our interpersonal relations; we contemplate one another. It is an objective phenomenon of reciprocal influences. And it is the culture of peace that must transform this phenomenon of reciprocal influences as something that is suffered into a phenomenon that is accepted, nourished, enriched. When I find myself in the presence of another culture, three possibilities are open to me. I can adopt an attitude

of disdain, of exclusion. I can, on the contrary, convert to that culture, and adopt it from then on as my own. That is to lose one's identity. But there is a third attitude, namely, to live consciously in the other's mirror, that is, to observe the other and to watch him or her live, in a spirit of curiosity, an openness of mind that is aimed at better understanding one's fellow creature, at grasping how that person lives and why, what are the historical, sociological and religious factors that enable him or her thereby to assume the mystery of their existence. It is an entire lifetime's experience that allows us to approach this mystery, hence the respect which I owe to the dignity of the other, who undertakes the same moral work that I do. To be in the other's mirror is not to have a distorted image in that mirror but rather an image that we wish to be as real as possible, and thereby to attain to what is called the cohabitation of differences. The dialogue of people's differences is, precisely, not the calling into question of one or other of the cultures but rather an attitude of mutual acceptance.

In truth, there are five attitudes which in my view must be investigated if we are to get to the core of the culture of peace:

- the attitude of takeover: one group considers that it constitutes the best and indeed the only representation of humankind, and hence excludes all those that are unlike it. This has happened in history, and will probably happen again;
- the attitude of condescension or tolerance in the bad sense of the word tolerance, that is, when we put up with the other without accepting him or her. We consider that the other belongs to humankind, of course, but at a lower level. It does not seem that we can expect this attitude to be transformed;
- the attitude of assimilation: that of the Roman Empire, of colonialism, sometimes in particular that of certain French colonizers like Jules Ferry, who invoked the civilizing work to be accomplished. In order to produce

replicas of ourselves. This policy, which has indeed never been fully implemented, runs up in the end against the major objection that others wish to remain themselves. A normal protestation of one's identity, which is at the very basis of decolonization;

- the attitude of refusal, in which a group locks itself into its difference and regards it as sacrosanct. This is also a form of racism in reverse. It refuses others, all others. It glories in its particularism and denies the existence of the human species, of humankind, of natural law, all those unifying visions to which it disdains to refer. It shuts itself in, on the contrary, preferring to live 'in camera'. Hell is other people. An attitude whose logic consists in dividing up humankind into citadels;
- the attitude of openness: it expresses that difference is not a breaking off, that it must not entail exclusion but on the contrary bring into a dialectic communion identity and kinship, which are the two inseparable dimensions of humankind. Humankind is at the heart of this dual allegiance. Human beings can realize themselves fully only by relating to their fellows. They are not a ready-made whole, but a constantly self-creating reality.

However, it must be borne in mind that these five attitudes do not represent an evolution over time. It should not be thought that in earlier times there were wicked people whose attitude was one of exclusion, and that, little by little, we attained an attitude of openness representing the 'happy ending'. These five attitudes are synchronous. They are focused at one and the same time, on this very day, on each individual. We have these five attitudes focused on us simultaneously, and this is what makes for the dramatic complexity that determines our fate as human beings. If each human being is not a ready-made, finite whole, but a reality in the process of both creating itself and disintegrating – since men and women are at once free and unpredictable – it follows that we can grasp

the deeper meaning of the truth that all human beings are equal. Biologists have shown that no two individuals are identical. If morality, philosophy and law have all enshrined the principle of equality, it is precisely because we are different, but equal in dignity. In other words, biological diversity must find its summation, its consecration in legal discourse, which itself takes account of and assumes that diversity in a spirit of equality.

In this regard, Champollion's observation, formulated when he was endeavouring to decipher small hieroglyphics, is a highly remarkable one. To his companions, in whose eyes his work was futile, for the hieroglyphics meant nothing, Champollion replied: 'If these signs are man-made, it must be possible to decipher them'. For he knew that human beings are strangers for one another, but that they remain fellow humans.

If we pick up the thread of these reflections and replace them in the context of humankind, the culture of peace makes us duty bound to become aware of our identity and of our kinship as members of the human species. It is vital that we develop the habit of feeling ourselves to be in humankind, just as humankind is in us. And it is because it will develop increasingly in us that we shall be ever more in it. By the very fact of our being members of humankind, we cannot tolerate exclusion, for all forms of exclusion and discrimination, all acts of genocide, constitute so many amputations perpetrated upon the body of humankind. But it must also be borne in mind that those who will follow in our footsteps are already members of humankind. Federico Mayor has said that we must love the world with the eyes of the generations to come. But that clearly proves that the future is not already written, that it is still to be built, and that to think of ourselves as members of the human race also means thinking about the coming generations, because humankind extends in thought beyond the living. It is made up of all our contemporaries,

and already carries within it the seed of those to come. You recall the celebrated formula: we do not inherit the planet from our forebears, we borrow it from our children. The jurists debate the pros and cons: do our (unborn) children have rights, or do they not? I consider that they do. The fact that they have not yet been born cannot deprive them of those rights. When the French Civil Code defines the rights of spouses, those who are still single are not concerned; but they have only to marry in order for that statute to apply to them also. We are perfectly familiar with the distinction established by Léon Duguit¹ between legal provisions that are regulations and those that take the form of conditions.

At another level, we have no assurance that future generations will be more generous than ourselves. They may well, thanks to the jurists, have better peacekeeping structures, more sophisticated and effective international organizations, but what will be the good of such structures if they are not nourished by a culture of peace? What I am thereby suggesting is that we have the duty to ensure that these future generations are better than we are. It is here that UNESCO comes into its own, thanks to its extraordinary mission to promote education and training, a mission to which there is no visible limit in time, and which should endure as long as humankind itself endures. For future generations will always be the present generations of a certain epoch, and UNESCO's mission will in consequence go on and on, like the arrow of advancing time, just as do those probes sent out into space which penetrate to the very heart of the galaxies.

1. Léon Duguit (1859–1928), one of the great theorists of French public law and founder of the 'Bordeaux School'. His work is focused mainly on constitutional law and the general theory of law. He also exerted a profound influence upon public law as a whole.

PHILIPPE DELMAS

Can there be a policy of peace?

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The standpoint from which I shall present my thesis is not that of an historian, any more than it is that of a theorist of strategic issues. I am a modest practitioner in such matters, and shall therefore take as my starting point the world as it is, and human beings as they are. When we are dealing with the real world, there in fact comes a time when, however beautiful the ideas as such, we must, in order to put them into practice, start from where we happen to find ourselves.

The world in which we are living today has given rise in recent years, above all since the end of the Cold War, to a number of major hopes in regard to what might serve as a foundation for peace. Two of these hopes – and the most important, for they are major forces in today's world – have been, on the one hand, prosperity, and hence economic integration, the economic globalization that is gradually being established, and, on the other, the slow development of the great principles of law, which are becoming generalized both in geographical terms and in all the spheres covered by law, above all by international law.

Economic integration is probably the most spectacular instance. In Europe, we have a Union that has pioneered integration in so far as its Western half is concerned and is today opening its doors to its Eastern half, and that is currently reflecting on the manner in which this process will, a few years hence, lead to the unification of the entire continent. On the other side of the Atlantic, but a few years ago, there was nothing; today, however, we are witnessing an extraordinary flowering of common markets, some of which are quite close to the model developed by Europe. In the North there is NAFTA, which is simply a free trade area but which today groups together the United States, Canada and Mexico, whereas until recently the power of the United States operated alone – and appeared to be doing excellently as a result. In the South there is the MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) project, which is fairly close to the European Community project, at least in its ambitions. Between these two there are several markets: a Caribbean market, a Central American market, with areas of overlap which suggest that, within the next 10 to 15 years, there will probably be a single common market extending from the north of Canada to Tierra del Fuego. The same process, still more spectacular albeit less formal, is to be observed in South-East Asia. In this regard, the meeting which took place recently in Bangkok between the European Union and the South-East Asian nations is an interesting development, for it shows that, in so far as the economy is concerned, the integration of South-East Asia, even if it is not undertaken in a formal context, has today reached a highly advanced stage. The proportion of trade and investment carried on among themselves by the countries of this region is the same as that of the European countries in the 1970s, that is, approximately 40 to 45 per cent. Today they are approaching a state of genuine integration which, as may be seen from such meetings, as well as from the development of APEC and the ASEAN forum, is also seeking to establish a political frame-

work for itself. We are also witnessing several far more modest attempts to set up common markets in Africa.

More discreet, but in my view at least as important, and in political terms even more significant, is the legal integration which the world is undergoing. Dictated in some cases by economic necessity, it is reflected in a harmonization of business law, of tax legislation and, increasingly, of environmental regulations. The possibility is even being mooted – and was in fact discussed in Bangkok – of introducing a minimum level of common social legislation. We are therefore witnessing an extension, a gradual universalization of law, which has gone hand in hand, particularly since the end of the Cold War, with a far grander ambition, namely, to extend human rights law also.¹ Since 1990, this branch of law has sought to move on from the stage of legislation to that of regulations, and to acquire a certain universal coercive force, in order in particular to promote a number of values deemed to be truly universal, and which concern the elementary rights pertaining to the human person. Here again, then, we are witnessing a process of integration which, combined with the first, creates the impression that the planet as a whole is on the way to establishing, through a still somewhat chaotic and painful struggle, a method of social, legal, and institutional organization that might be universal: doubtless with local colour added, but none the less universal in ambition and scope.

This process of integration is today truly driven by necessity. Economic necessity, functional, legal necessity, or political ambition? The question which interests me personally, looking beyond this issue of necessity, is to know whether such integration has a political meaning, in other words,

1. 'The law of nations' (*jus gentium*) – public international law, in conventional legal terminology. Hence the suggestion that this expression be here replaced by 'human rights law' – since it is indeed this branch of law that appears to be involved – in order to avoid all risk of confusion.

whether it is creating a common order and will help us to live together. It might be imagined – and there are many ready to argue along these lines – that the institution of global prosperity, this formulation of a universal system of law, will be key elements that will make it possible for there to exist at last, for the first time in history, a genuine policy of peace. With this in view, a number of people in Europe, prompted by the same concern to promote progress in the legal sphere, have in recent times worked out several highly ambitious concepts, notably the right of intervention. For my part, I am convinced that economic integration and legal integration are not, and will not in future become, factors of peace. It is not that we are going about it in the wrong way: simply, we are aiming at the wrong target. The reason for my conviction is a very simple one: prosperity and law are by-products, they are the effects, not the causes, of a certain political order. The reverse is *never* the case.

In any human community, the primary issue is that of being together, not of following the same rules or of recognizing that we share the same interests. As Montesquieu wrote, it is not the intellect but the heart that provides our reasons. And therein, in my view, lies the essential reality of what we are. This difference between a political order and what can be achieved through such economic and legal integration is essential, in the etymological sense of the term. Integration and order are not of the same nature. That is why we are today witnessing a phenomenon that unsettles many people, namely, the simultaneous rise of both integration – the Internet world is on its way, it will happen – *and* disorder. There is no contradiction between these two realities, if we fully understand that they differ in their very nature. Interests, even the most self-evident, and rules, however solemnly promulgated, have never guaranteed peace or prevented war. As Sun Tze pointed out 25 centuries ago, war is the province of life and death. I am enormously taken by this remark, which in its simplicity

perfectly expresses the essence of war and peace. War and peace represent, in the truly political sense of the terms, the impossibility or the possibility of living together. And that is, first and foremost, the issue at stake. Recent history, the history that is within our scope, including European history, endlessly illustrates – for this is no less true of today's world than of the world of 30 centuries ago – the difference between integration and order, between the underlying nature of war and peace and the essential nature of law and of prosperity.

War and peace are not linked to a mere coincidence of interests, or to the simple determination to acquire common rules. To convince ourselves of this, we need only consider two cases in Europe that I find most striking. The first is that of Yugoslavia, which only ten years ago was – a fact now completely forgotten – the most prosperous country of Central and Eastern Europe, so much so indeed that the issue had already arisen of the proper procedures for negotiating a treaty of association between it and the European Community. Yugoslavia had devised a very clever system of flexible rules – notably the principle of a revolving presidency – designed to take account of the fact that the populations making up that state each wished, in the final analysis, to settle its own affairs. However, the considerable economic success enjoyed by Yugoslavia, whose economy, unlike that of its neighbours, had not been Sovietized, the shrewdness and legal skill informing these arrangements, which assigned an equal share to each and everyone, proved insufficient, after a certain lapse of time, to hold those peoples together. Nor did the promise of prosperity, the closeness of the rapprochement with the European Union, prove any more sufficient. Nor, indeed, did these factors suffice in the case of the Slovaks and the Czechs, despite the fact that the Czechoslovak Republic was probably, after Yugoslavia, or at the same time as it but in a somewhat different respect, the Central European country most immediately destined to become a part of the European

Union – particularly inasmuch as there existed between Czechoslovakia and Germany a very strong bond that would probably have facilitated the process. The most striking factor is that the process of separation was initiated by the Slovaks. To be sure, their vision of how things would turn out was different, and the reality threw them off course. The fact nevertheless remains that it was they who took the risk of breaking up what they had built together with the Czechs. Disregarding the shrewd solutions put to them, somewhat belatedly, by the Czechs, they preferred to take the risk of poverty – which is the fate currently befalling them – rather than remain united with the Czechs. At the time, this amicable divorce settlement was applauded, on the pretext that it had not led to the outbreak of war. I find it somewhat sad, for, while it is true that mutual consent is the least serious form of divorce, it none the less remains a divorce. But, here again, the example of Czechoslovakia, above all of Slovakia, demonstrates that, despite common interests, despite the legal solutions available, the impossibility of being together can prevail over all other factors. And this reality occurs everywhere without distinction; it is not peculiar to Europe, or to the developed countries in general.

If then prosperity, if the institutions of law, are powerless to do so, what could, what might constitute a policy for peace? A third idea is currently gaining ground in the world: what in fact is lacking, even when prosperity and the rule of law are present, is democracy. If democracy is added, all will be well. At the risk of dismaying you still further, I must say that I do not believe this either. I do not believe that democracy is a factor which can today be claimed to be a guarantee of peace. First, because recent history does not support such a contention: do we need to be reminded that Hitler was democratically elected? that it was a democratic country, France, which waged the Algerian war? that another democratic country, the United States, waged the terrible war with Viet Nam? that

India and Pakistan, both true democracies, have been locked into confrontation for 40 years in Kashmir? and that the complete absence of any control by half a dozen American presidents over their country's nuclear arsenal gives us reason to believe that the political authorities' control over the military, in a great democracy, is sometimes open to question, including in key and particularly sensitive spheres? I am therefore not particularly reassured by the democracies' *curriculum vitae* on behalf of peace.

Next, and at a deeper level, I quite simply consider that, in historical terms, democracy is a too recent experiment. When François Mitterrand asked Deng Xiaoping whether he thought that the French Revolution had truly changed the world, the latter replied: it is too soon to say. I believe that the same is true of the democratic experiment. What does democracy amount to today? In the best of cases, a handful of countries since the beginning of the century – and it must then be acknowledged that it was with democracies that the First and Second World Wars both took place – or at the very most for the past 50 years. This democracy is limited not only in time but also in space, embracing very few countries. And what, in my view, removes any value from the demonstration, and all exemplarity from these 50 years, is the fact that these countries have remained at peace not so much because they have wished to but rather because they have had no choice. What has maintained this part of the world in peace for 50 years is neither political alliances, nor democracy, nor the institutions of law, nor prosperity, but simply the fear of death. We all knew that, were a nuclear conflict to break out between the two superpowers, it would be the end of History for us all, the end of the journey. That counted more than anything else, was indeed all that counted. Our rationales, our political analyses, our arguments or the values that are vested in the construction of the European Community, in the rule of law, in democracy, accordingly count for nothing when

weighed against the logic of MAD, the doctrine of mutual assured destruction and death which has dominated the world for 50 years. What, then, is democracy worth as a factor of peace? I do not know. It may one day become something extraordinary and irreplaceable, but nothing today entitles us to claim, despite our longing for it and the respect in which we hold it, that democracy as such, or the process of democratization, is a factor of guaranteed peace. At best, I believe the reply must be: not for a very long time to come. Present-day democracy – and here, precisely, is the rub – consists, as has been observed in the promotion at all costs of the democratic model, first and foremost in institutions, in ways of organizing ourselves, in *modi operandi*, and not in ways of being. However, once again, the issue of war and peace is that of the inability or ability to live together. If it were merely a matter of regulation and of institutions, the generalization of the rule of law would suffice. The problem is, precisely, that it does not suffice. To my mind, it is the failure to remember this truly human dimension of war that today exposes us to the greatest risks. The title of my book, *Le bel avenir de la guerre* [‘War’s fine future’], is not predicated on any particular pessimism but rather on my fear that we are mistaken about what leads nations to wage war, and mistaken in our belief that, on the pretext that we now have the Internet world, on the pretext that a growing number of countries are pursuing development, and on the pretext that the rule of law is spreading, that all this will be enough, by a process of accumulation, to bring about peace. That I do not believe. A Rwandan priest remarked one day to Bernard Kouchner: ‘When they tell you that all that [he was speaking about the massacres which had occurred in his country] was the result of self-interest, of politics, don’t forget hatred’. I believe that to be the nub of the matter: this impossibility of being together, which is a far more important factor than self-interest, than politics. My true anxiety is that we may be

mistaken about ourselves. I fear the trust which we place in the capacity of economics and law, that is, in rules and interests, to bring people together. We are something other than that, and much more than that. And that an author (I dare not say a historian) can write that we are heading towards the end of History, on the pretext of the general spread of a model allying parliamentary democracy and the market economy, fails to make me laugh. The success of that work is chilling, for I consider such an idea, and such a claim, to be alarming in its stupidity. There is no end of History, quite simply because there is no end of Humankind, and because History is the unending list of our attempts – to date somewhat fruitless, it must be acknowledged – to learn to live together.

Such smug optimism, such inanity, regarding the end of History supposedly brought about by democratization, by market forces, by law, chill us all the more in that they delude us as to the true causes of the wars to come. They delude us because they make us believe that there are conditions sufficient to ensure peace – prosperity, the rule of law, democracy – and because they prevent us from seeing that the causes of war are probably also in the process of changing, a development that has very serious implications for us, not least for agencies such as the United Nations. To my mind, wars in the coming years will be less and less linked to the power of states. The risk of imperialist wars, of large-scale wars, still exists latently – I have no notion what Russia will be in 20 years', or even in 10 years' time – but, in the present-day world, such risks appear to me to be relatively minor. The true danger today is not imperialism but the lack of legitimacy from which states suffer. And this ailment spares no one. The gulf between the state and the nation, between those who govern and those who are governed, exists everywhere: at the heart of the European Union, prosperous and democratic though it is, no less than in Central Asia, abandoned and undermined by 70 years of Soviet presence. It affects both the wealthy countries of South-East

Asia and the most deprived countries of sub-Saharan Africa. And it is this same gulf which, in my view, currently exposes us to the gravest risk of all. It is vital to understand it fully, for several reasons: first, because all the collective security systems that exist today are designed to cope with types of conflict that are now obsolete. This is a major problem. The security framework available to us was set up at the end of the Second World War: the greatest war of imperialism, and the struggle to overthrow imperialism, that the planet has ever known. No security framework was created to deal with the Cold War because, as Hannah Arendt put it so superbly, nuclear weapons and the nuclear holocaust transcend the moral categories of politics. We have thus retained the institutions created in 1945 in order to combat Nazi imperialism. And we have nothing else. Today's pale imitations of the United Nations, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), are based on the same concept according to which Europe could once again be threatened by conflicts similar to the one that ravaged it in the 1940s. No political organization today is in a position to deal with conflicts originating in the weakness of states. But it is this weakness of states that represents the greatest danger for our collective security, and we find ourselves confronted by a political and institutional void that is all the more stupefying in that we are, in fact, hemmed in by such threats.

What, then, can we devise in response to this situation? And, in conclusion to this initial analysis – which may well appear totally depressing – is it possible to formulate, if only in modestly concrete terms, and hence without necessarily nourishing vast ambitions, the basic ingredients of a policy for peace? I shall attempt to answer this question, starting from the point remotest to us in time in order to return to the closest point.

As I have already indicated, I do not believe that the generalization of democratic institutions is a means of guaranteeing

peace; at this level, I stick unwaveringly to my belief. On the other hand, I consider that the spread of a democratic culture will in the long term undoubtedly serve to reduce the risks of conflict, quite simply because a democratic culture means that all individuals carry within them, in the manner in which they deal with conflicts – conflicts with neighbours, no less than the local conflicts of their country – the possibility of arbitration, of the balance of power, of recourse to third parties. In other words, they thereby associate with the conflict a procedural concept which enables it to be defused. It must be acknowledged that we have not reached this point, far from it indeed. But it may be imagined, it may be hoped, that the spread of democratic culture will indeed in the long run lead those countries that have tried it out long enough completely to transform their attitudes in so far as recourse to war is concerned, and finally to quit the world of Clausewitz, for whom war was nothing but a continuation of politics by other means. I was discussing matters recently with a very eminent East European specialist in connection with the Yugoslav conflict. I suggested to him that, ultimately, it was the dream of all of us that Yugoslavia would become another Switzerland, a sort of confederation of cantons, entirely autonomous and each quite different, but capable of living together. He came up with the extraordinary reply, which is absolutely in line with what I am trying to make you understand: ‘Yes, that’s true; all that’s missing is six centuries of peace’. That is, indeed, precisely it. I am certain that Serbs, Croats and Bosnians would, after six centuries of peace, have achieved true mutual understanding, while remaining as different from one another as they may still be today. One has only to travel from Geneva to Zurich in order to realize that Switzerland is not a homogeneous country: it does not appear to be any the worse for it. Hence there could indeed, ultimately, be a factor of lasting peace here. But democratic culture, considered in this spirit, is another world altogether: it is a result towards

which one can hope to progress only in the course of successive generations. It is therefore, in my view, difficult to found, here and now, a policy whose sole identified objective is to bring about the generalization of democratic culture; but perhaps, by projecting ourselves closer in time, it may be possible to identify the intermediary stages. I shall suggest three.

In the first place, we have the impression of living today in a world so utterly different from that of the Cold War that none of the political concepts which came into being at that time, and which were associated with it, has remained of the slightest use. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, we discarded outright, as one discards old, outdated archives, the whole body of political representations that had been sketched out during those years and that had all, it is true, been formulated by default because we found ourselves in a world hemmed in by absolutely rigid constraints. Borders were totally inviolable, and all conflicts had to be brought under control for fear that any slip-up might bring the two superpowers into a face-to-face confrontation. It was thus an extraordinarily cautious and, it now seems to us, looking back, an extraordinarily artificial world. To take account of such difficulties, we had then invented a concept which was completely buried beneath the rubble of the Berlin Wall, but which has a very promising future if it is intelligently rethought: that of the right of minorities. When one brings up minority rights today with professional diplomats, they tend to throw up their arms, considering the concept to have lost all currency a decade ago, as though it had become totally devalued. The problem is that minorities themselves are still very much current. Not only are they still current; there remains no other solution for them, in so far as this obsolete right is today no longer granted them, than to transform themselves into nations. Now, once one becomes a nation, one wishes to be recognized as a state; and as the international community is unable to handle such issues, it mass-produces states. Since 1975, some 50 states

have been created, all very small ones. Two-thirds of them are poor states, according to World Bank criteria – and a state really has to be extremely poor in order to be declared such by the World Bank! The future of such states, small and poor as they are, in this economically integrated world is non-existent. For this economically integrated world sets economic forces flowing around the planet, like great winds, whose power exceeds even that of our major European states. What European state can today withstand speculation against its currency? Not one. We may therefore readily imagine what, in an integrated world, will be the economic future of Uzbekistan or Tajikistan: shaky, very shaky. And, a fortiori, that of an independent Quebec: very, very shaky also. However, we have today no other solution to offer. When human groups no longer feel able to live together – always this crucial issue! – to live with the state in which they find themselves and with their fellow citizens, they split up. And, in order to split up, they today have no means open to them other than to proclaim themselves nations and to secure recognition as states. This process is a recipe for disaster. First, because it will lead to the mass production of states, and because we shall not take responsibility for the consequences; we shall be unable to ensure the prosperity of such states, or their security. Secondly, because these states are born of resentment, by the very nature of the process which leads to their construction, and which is a divorce, an act of rejection. Consequently, such states, born as they are in hostility, will remain in a state of hostility – hostility towards neighbours that are destined for all eternity to remain such. Clearly, the next stage in such a process is war, and war in its worst form, that is, war for purposes of ethnic cleansing, or total war, in which the neighbour's very existence is regarded as a threat. It is not a matter simply of harbouring grievances against one's neighbours; their very existence constitutes a threat. Such wars are of a wholly different and far more terrible

nature; in their sheer intensity, and in the determination utterly to wipe out the adversary, they are closer to civil war than to the traditional military wars we have known in Europe for centuries. The only genuine means of stopping this, of preventing this mechanism for manufacturing terrible wars from being triggered, is to put a true system of minority rights back on the rails. That is indeed a difficult concept.

Let us move still closer in time. What can be done in order to try to ensure a true right of minorities? To my way of thinking, two things. First of all, our great multilateral institutions concerned with security must ponder how best they can handle conflicts born of the proven inability of certain groups to live together. This is a highly complex problem, since a system such as the United Nations is today totally binary: either you are within a state and, by virtue of the doctrine of non-intervention, virtually nothing can be done; or else you are created as a state, and from then on you are recognized as possessing an identity as such. Between the two, however, there is nothing, unless it be the Utopian and rather absurd concept of the right of intervention. The concept is absurd because the right of intervention is based on the possibility of a balance of power between the international community and a third state, and because such a concept, as history has proved, not only does not work well – the demonstration of the right of intervention in Somalia was not a great success – but, above all, is applicable only to small states. What does the right of intervention mean in the case of India or Nigeria? It is meaningless. Whatever the Indians or the Nigerians do, no one will intervene. We are not going to send 5 million soldiers or 5 million United Nations peacekeeping troops to India or to Brazil: the idea is quite grotesque. So, what we lack, and what seems to be a fundamental objective, is doubtless an amendment to the United Nations Charter designed to foster the international handling of minority issues within the framework of existing borders.

To sum up the foregoing, as we come closer to the present day, we arrive at this inevitable conclusion: if we wish minority rights to prevail, if we wish to establish and implement international procedures enabling these minority issues to be successfully handled, one precondition must be fulfilled. We need strong states. One of the major problems posed today by the recognition of minorities is that, in a weak state, a state which feels that its legitimacy is being challenged, which senses that nation and state are coming unstuck, any acknowledgement of a difference constitutes a threat. This is a very serious problem because it gives rise to a system in which, in the name of a higher interest that becomes increasingly abstract inasmuch as it is that of the state alone, and no longer that of the nation, all expression of differences is rejected. And such rejection hardens the expression of differences, knits more tightly together the minorities and communities that feel themselves to be rejected, and increases the risk of fragmentation. This is all the more serious in that the problems of legitimacy besetting states are on the increase. Cases of divorce, where states and nations split up or even tear apart from one another, are to be observed throughout the world, and are frequently the direct product of economic and legal integration. The two phenomena are interlinked, quite simply because the states, the elites and rulers, wish to become integrated, to modernize, and consider this to be their responsibility, while the nations for their part want to preserve their integrity: for the sake of tradition, through prudence, and because all too often the first manifestations of modernization are extremely painful. And also, and at a yet deeper level, because people do not see how what makes them peculiarly themselves, and different from everyone else, will be respected in these processes of modernization, which are also processes of levelling down.

I am very struck by the fact that this distrust of modernization, which leads to states and nations coming unstuck, this

apparent conservatism of populations vis-à-vis enlightened elites, is occurring in all countries. If you consider the European Union, a grouping of prosperous, affluent democracies, you may observe today, on the eve of the Intergovernmental Conference, a considerable disquiet among the smaller countries. Public opinion in these countries is terrorized by the idea that, on functional, reasonable grounds, the larger countries are imposing decision-making systems that will gradually create a situation in which to be Danish, to be Irish, to be Greek or to be Portuguese will give one local colour, but no longer an identity as such. This results in a hardening of positions which is already creating serious problems at European Union level, and which in less democratic societies, where the divorce between state and nation has fewer means of finding expression, are liable to give rise to far graver crises of legitimacy. And it is for this very reason that there is such a need for strong states. If differences are to be recognized, such recognition must not mean any weakening of authority. Recognizing differences must indeed serve – and we see just how much political maturity this requires – to strengthen the state, and not to undermine it. For that purpose, the state – and the nation with it – must have the conviction that it truly bears within it the future, and the identity, of each and every one. If, on the contrary, the state, and the nation with it, has the feeling that it carries within it the identity and the interests of only some of its citizens, it will then reject out of hand all claims put forward by minorities, and all support that might be granted them through a process devised for the purpose. One has only to consider the intransigence with which, in a number of countries, all minority demands are rejected. In the dispute between the European Union and Turkey, for example, it is apparent that the Turkish leaders are acutely aware of the problem presented by the Kurds, and of the vicious circle they are entering when they refuse, ever more intransigently, to recognize Kurdish

identity, thereby hardening the Kurds' position and aggravating a process of divorce which they find it increasingly hard to resist. At the same time, they are tormented by the fear that recognition of a difference will lead to a fragmentation of the Turkish state, which has been built – somewhat on the French model, but over a much shorter period of time – on a voluntary basis. The fear that this nation, created by the state, may again disintegrate into a plurality of nations is doubtless what most deters the Turkish leaders at present from yielding to the demands, and to requests from the European Union and the Council of Europe. Likewise, if we observe the swings in the attitude of the Chinese authorities to China's larger minorities – the Tibetans, the Uigurs – we note that these swings are closely determined by whether or not Beijing has the sense that it is controlling the country.

It is for this reason that, in my view, the first stage in any peace policy must surely be to help bring about the stabilization of states. We cannot play with destabilizing states – as some are doing, in a highly dangerous way, in the name of an artificial right of peoples to self-determination – because the splintering of nations, their fragmentation into small states possessing nothing but an aggressive identity, necessarily ends in war, and war is the end of all rights. It must not be forgotten, indeed, when we speak of human rights, that the very first of all such rights is the right to live in peace. It is not the right to parliamentary democracy, to the market economy; it is the right to live in peace because, the day when war breaks out, there is nothing else. There is no longer any right to medical care, any right to be defended by a lawyer, any right to retirement or a pension, any right to have children and to send them to school, any right to food, any right to move about freely, there is no longer any right to anything. That is why I consider that, before all else, we must search for ways and means of combining, on the one hand, respect for differences and, on the other, the need to have stable,

strong and legitimate states. I truly believe, in fact, that, if we foster strong states, incorporating therein true minority rights – including a body of international law governing minorities – we shall probably open the door to the possibility for people to live together in peace, because they will be able to recognize one another as being different.

GENERAL CARLO JEAN

The army's missions in the new international security context

25 April 1996

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The end of the Cold War has brought about a radical change in international relations. We have witnessed not only the transformation of geopolitics but also that of the very nature of the meaning of security and the criteria governing the use of military force. The military's tasks have grown in both number and scope, peacekeeping operations having for their part become far more frequent. The armed forces are becoming increasingly involved in providing assistance to the authorities in the field of civil protection, in the event of natural and technologically created disasters, as well as in matters of environmental protection, through interventions in the ecological sphere.

Some take the view that this has led to radical changes in the profession, and in military ethics, as well as in the structures, training and equipment of the armed forces. We must reflect on these matters in a realistic spirit, without allowing ourselves to be sidetracked into ideological approaches. In short, the culture of peace, which UNESCO is supporting so

effectively throughout the world, calls for a realistic assessment of the concrete situation, without resorting to arbitrary simplifications or futile, and indeed counterproductive, Utopias. In my own view, we are dealing with an adaptation rather than a radical transformation of the internal substance of the military profession and the organization of the armed forces.

The international situation is evolving very rapidly. What we have witnessed has not been a single, one-off 'post-Cold War' phenomenon: in a very short period of time, at least three such phenomena have occurred.

The first was that of the euphoria of the 'End of History',¹ of universal peace, of general disarmament, of the global village, of world government by the United Nations. It came to an abrupt end with the Gulf War.

The second was that of the 'New World Order', in which Washington and Moscow, united in a sort of holy alliance, were to have guaranteed respect for order and international law. It came to an end as a result, on the one hand, of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which transformed a factor of order into one of uncertainty, even of disorder, and, on the other, of the refusal of the United States to take on the role of the world's policeman on the basis of universal principles, and not of principles bound up solely with that country's national interests.

The third phenomenon is the one that we are currently witnessing. It is marked by disorder and international anarchy, by the outbreak of domestic, ethnic and identity-related conflicts, by the revival of nationalisms, by the recent wave of regional conflicts in the Far East, in South-East Asia, in Southern Asia and in the Gulf, by the collapse of several

1. Francis Fukuyama: *The End of History and the Last Man*, Free Press, New York, 1992, 418 pp.

countries' structures under the impact of various forms of localism, tribalism and religious fundamentalism, and by a growing awareness of the existence of problems that cannot be solved in the short term, such as those triggered by demographic and economic imbalances, the expansion of organized crime, the spectre of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and domestic and international terrorism.

A far more realistic, not to say pessimistic, vision of the possibility of bringing about order, stability and peace in the world has taken shape within the United Nations. It is reflected for example in the supplement to the Agenda for Peace of June 1992, and the concepts set forth in the *Agenda for Development* published in November 1994.

Even though the hopes vested in a new world order must not be abandoned – above all because, without Utopias, there can be no meaning, no direction, and hence no action – the functions performed by the military in the system of present-day international relations should be soberly assessed and examined in their very essence, and not according to some purely abstract conception.

Superimposing itself upon phenomena of globalization, interdependence and internationalization is the current trend to fragmentation, even and indeed above all in the nation-states on which the international system has been based since the Peace of Westphalia. On them is also based the *jus publicum europeum*, in regard both to the *jus ad bellum* and to the humanitarian norms of the *jus in bello*. However, there is an observed trend to replace the principles of *jus publicum europeum* by those underlying the doctrine of the just war – this not only because of the recognized illegitimacy, for states, of using force as an instrument of policy-making, except in cases of self-defence, but also because most conflicts are not between states but are domestic in nature. Interdependence results in an objective diminution of sovereignty, a fact well demonstrated by the heated debate on the right/duty of

humanitarian intervention on the part of the international community. One response to globalization is provided by the organization of a multipolar world, dominated by political, strategic and economic poles acting at one and the same time in co-operation and in competition with one another. However, if macroregionalism eliminates certain conflicts in one respect, it also triggers others, not only between world poles but also, and above all, in the grey areas which separate them.

The new role of military force, the characteristics and internal content of the military profession, must be assessed in this context. The Bosnian experience has much to teach us on this subject. We have come to realize that military might could not guarantee justice, but only a certain order. Order is nevertheless crucial to policy-making, enabling it to pursue objectives of justice, stability, development and peace. Order and justice are not in conflict with one another; only justice can guarantee a stable order, but no justice is possible without a minimum of order. Just as the exercise of force in a political vacuum is irresponsible, and results only in violence, so politics and policy-making without force produce mere chatter, or futile declarations of good intentions. Public opinion is increasingly conscious that it frequently provides a mediocre moral alibi, designed to tranquillize politicians who do not have the courage to shoulder their responsibilities or the risks and costs entailed by the maintenance of world peace.

The dialogue between the politicians, the diplomats and the military must be given a new lease of life, as must the complementarity and subsidiarity which have characterized our entire history – although it is true that these three factors underwent profound changes and fell somewhat into disfavour during the Cold War. At the time, the essentially technological dimension of the nuclear deterrent dominated all others. Security had been militarized; today, it has become a

political matter once again. The 'discourse on war' has resumed the place that 'the discourse of war' – to use André Glucksmann's phrase – had snatched from it.

THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF SECURITY

In the bipolar world, peace is not only the absence of war, it is also the establishment of peaceful international and domestic relations constituting the premises of a process of co-operation between states. Thus security has changed in both its significance and its nature. In the case of the Cold War, the meaning and nature of the term 'security' were clear: at stake was a sort of insurance against potential acts of aggression, in which American and Soviet nuclear weapons played a key role. A nuclear war between the two blocs would have been catastrophic for both. It was therefore irrational, and consequently regarded as impossible. There remained the possibility of limited conventional wars. In order to render even these impossible, the impossible (nuclear) war had been associated with the possible (conventional) war. For the purpose of ensuring that deterrence was not transformed into self-deterrence and thus become neutralized, it proved necessary, paradoxically, in a certain sense to make the impossible war less impossible through the sophisticated mechanisms of the flexible response. The somewhat surrealistic nature of the discussions on nuclear strategy exactly reflects this paradox.

Nevertheless, war had remained remote from Europe, shunted off into the Third World. But, there too, it was limited by the global nature of the confrontation between the two blocs. Even outside Europe, security was linked to the core balances which existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. That served to limit each war and prevented its expansion – at the global level, of course – not for the populations which were caught up in it.

Today, the connection has been broken, and conflicts have broken out again in Europe. Regional balances take on a new importance in relation to the global conflicts. Security acquires another significance. There is no longer any direct threat to vital interests such as the integrity of our territories. Security as a system of insurance – that is to say, the function which it performed during the Cold War – has become a marginal issue. It refers in any case to long-term contingencies which cannot be ruled out on account of the dynamism and unpredictability of the evolution of the international situation. Indeed, we cannot envisage, in the short or medium term, the emergence of global threats, even though the proliferation of missiles and of weapons of mass destruction, and the spread of terrorism – reflected for example in the use of chemical substances in the Tokyo subway – have become more dangerous and more imminent.

Regional and domestic conflicts are also impacting with maximum force upon the global economy and on the rationale of integration, and may lead to an escalation of violence as well as to large-scale migrations. The true challenges are those of development, made yet more dramatic by a population explosion which can be surmounted only by substantial private investment flows. In its turn, the activation of investments requires the existence of adequate conditions of domestic and international stability. Security has been transformed from an insurance policy into a sort of investment on behalf of stability and the establishment of a stable international order and global market. It has become adapted to global interdependence between states, which can no longer concern the economic sphere alone but must also embrace domestic political stability and, indeed, the affirmation of democracy and the free exercise of human rights.

Until recently 'unidirectional and one-dimensional', security has now become 'multidirectional, multidimensional and multipurpose'; it has become holistic. Governments are today

called upon to assess the new conditions governing security, as well as the risks and challenges involved and the means of tackling them. They shoulder responsibilities that are proportionate not only to their economic weight and their intangible interests – such as their prestige and their presence on the international stage – but also to the principles and values dictated by their civilizations, and which influence their conduct at the international level.

The armed forces, which continue to represent for governments the main, and most flexible, operational tools, are required to adjust to their new roles and to prepare to assume them in the most appropriate manner. It happens ever more frequently that soldiers are entrusted with functions that are not those traditionally devolving upon the military. They are in fact alone in being able to accomplish them with the necessary speed, since they alone possess the means and are appropriately organized to cope with emergencies and contingencies at short notice. Speed of intervention increasingly constitutes one of the crucial aspects of their force. The army is called in not only in conflicts but also during the preventive stages as well as during the periods of reconstruction that follow conflicts.

THE ROLES OF MODERN ARMED FORCES

The principal role of the armed forces still consists in protecting the national territory and the territories of allied countries against direct aggression. Their very presence and their effectiveness in the event of war act as a deterrent to the emergence of threats.

Nevertheless, the situation today enables us to set up security systems that are reciprocal and co-operative, and no longer unilateral. In defining its own security needs, each state must take account of the security requirements of other states. Security is no longer a goal to be pursued unilaterally, but is

increasingly often striven for through co-operative agreements. Defence systems such as NATO are tending ever more frequently to take on the additional functions of security systems, so as to be able to transform themselves into what specialists in international relations define as 'peace regimes'. Ensuring control over armaments is becoming an increasingly integral part of security and defence strategies, both in their structural aspects – and even in the matter of arms reduction – and in their operational aspects, even those relating to confidence- and security-building measures. Prevention is always a matter of major concern in relation to action. OSCE is one such example; its logic should be extended to the other regions of the world. That process is currently being carried out in the Mediterranean, with the projection of NATO and the European Union, in particular through the 'Partnership for the Mediterranean' initiative proposed by Italy at the Williamsburg Atlantic Council meeting held in October 1995.

The armed forces nevertheless continue to perform their customary tasks such as, for example, peace-enforcing, which is none other than the traditional use of military force – with the single difference that it is legitimized not by decisions and interests at national level but by mandates issued by the United Nations and OSCE, representing the interests of the international community.

The change in the terms of comparison – from national to international – has far-reaching repercussions, for example, on the command and control systems of the international forces of intervention. The present-day mechanisms are not wholly satisfactory. Tensions may arise between the contingents provided by the different countries. Everyone agrees that the United Nations bodies currently in charge of the planning and management of peacekeeping operations must be improved. The inadequacies are all the more patent in that the intensity of these operations is less extreme, and the duration of interventions longer. The absence of a general military

staff, as provided for by the United Nations Charter, is particularly acutely felt. Delegating the direction of operations to a particular country, as was the case for the United States in Korea and in the Gulf, or to a regional organization, as is currently the case for NATO in Bosnia, is by no means a wholly satisfactory solution, even if it is the only one that can be applied in the present situation.

In point of fact, the bases for a sound and reliable international commanding unit at the political and strategic levels are still wanting. However, there are no essential differences, from the strictly technical and military standpoints, between national operations and international operations. The aim is always to impose upon the aggressor the will of a particular country or of the international community, by means of an intervention on behalf of the community or country which is the victim of the aggression. A similar situation is observed in the case of an intervention in a domestic conflict following a request for assistance on the part of the legitimate government authority, or when the international community decides to intervene on behalf of one of the parties in order to help it to prevail over the others. The low-intensity operations conducted in such circumstances are, technically, quite similar to those which were conducted in the past on the occasion of colonization or decolonization campaigns.

Also similar, in their substance, to those conducted in the past are the interventions of the armed forces in the operations and actions defined by the United Nations Secretary-General as being of a diplomatic nature, or of a preventive, peace-keeping kind. The task assigned to the forces deployed is that of deterring aggression, or an expansion of the conflict, as is the case for UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force). What essentially is involved here is an action similar to what in the nineteenth century was known as 'gunboat diplomacy', even if it is aimed at attaining a goal of deterrence rather than one of coercion. The effectiveness of preventive

diplomacy is bound up with, on the one hand, speed of intervention and, on the other, the credibility of the assertion that the deployment of limited groups of armed forces is a prelude to large-scale interventions, should such limited deployment not suffice to deter aggression outright.

In this type of intervention, military force no longer performs the role of a 'means of last resort' that it performed during the Cold War. Moreover, the effectiveness of each preventive intervention is linked to what is technically defined as 'escalation dominance'. It is essential to possess not only the forces needed to repulse an attack, or to carry the day in the event of a possible aggression, but also the clear and firm political will to resort thereto when an aggression is actually committed.

Other tasks are today assigned to the military, tasks which are extremely different from those undertaken in the past. They are the product of globalization and of various forms of worldwide interdependence, but they also stem from the fact that, under the impact of the media, the world has become politically and, hence, strategically, smaller. Even 'remote' conflicts become 'close to home' and, consequently, politically important, under the impact of the emotions triggered in public opinion and governments by suffering.

Mention must also be made of the actions scheduled in the *Agenda for Peace* relating to the armed forces, which include support for humanitarian interventions, or their execution, as well as first- and second-generation peacekeeping actions and assistance provided by the armed forces in the reconstruction phase that follows armed conflict. A number of forms of collaboration also deserve to be mentioned, such as those that concern the sectors of civil protection, ecology and confidence-building, which are now an integral part of preventive diplomacy, that is, of international action designed to prevent conflicts. Prevention is taking on increasing importance, just as preventive medicine is gaining in effectiveness in relation

to curative medicine. Humanitarian action, preventive peace-keeping and collaboration between the armed forces of different countries in sectors that are not strictly military constitute a key element in crisis and conflict prevention. Prevention is indeed proving to be far more effective than conflict resolution and management, which frequently result in mere 'chaos management', and always entail the risk of triggering an expansion rather than a reduction of such conflicts. Indeed, any inappropriate initiative always carries with it the danger of sparking off a potentially uncontrollable explosion of actions and reactions.

With regard to the strictly military sphere, it is precisely on such actions that UNESCO's Culture of Peace Programme should concentrate its thinking. From the political standpoint, every day brings further proof of the need to ensure that conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction be conceived in unitary terms. These must indeed be mutually consistent, that is, they must comply with rationales and strategies that are unitary, or at least compatible. By stimulating collaboration in sectors other than the military sector, such as civilian protection, the protection of cultural property and the environment, we encourage action to promote mutual trust and transparency that in itself constitutes true confidence-building measures.

In operations other than war, the armed forces do not act as stakeholding parties but assume a *superpartes* role as arbitrators, collaborating in the restoration of normal living conditions and the proper functioning of the administrative structures – even as administrators, judges and educators. In conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, the armed forces intervene in areas quite remote from their traditional sectors: mine clearance, the restoration of transport infrastructures, telecommunications, power and water supplies, health and education, the monitoring of elections, food transport and distribution, etc.

We have a number of examples of conflict prevention: Italy's successful intervention in Albania, in 1991–1993, undoubtedly prevented civil war from breaking out in that country. With regard to post-conflict action, the work carried out by IFOR in Bosnia, which exceeds what constitutes its main task, is making it possible to ensure that hostilities are not resumed in that conflict-riven country.

In such circumstances, officers perform the role of policemen, guardians, administrators, educators, communicators, diplomats and judges in settling disputes between the parties. They work in close collaboration with the civil organizations, such as the United Nations agencies and the NGOs, which operate in accordance with a logic and motives quite different from those of the military. In general, they are required to act in consensus with the parties – these having, despite their disputes, reached an agreement of principle – in order to render such an agreement definitive and to establish a peace which the country will subsequently be able to defend on its own. They are therefore duty-bound to be impartial, which does not mean neutral.

Impartiality is different from neutrality. Impartiality refers in the first place to the mandate assigned. Sometimes, in order to carry out a mission, it is necessary to resort to force, for example against irregular troops or bandits, but always in such a way as to maintain the political consensus of the leaders of the parties in conflict.

Recourse to force must be minimal; it is in fact all the more limited as the scale of the forces deployed increases. A large-scale military presence serves to remind the opposing factions that, should the accords be violated, the international community will punish the aggressor. The soldiers do not therefore become either police officers or Good Samaritans, but remain soldiers. As Noberto Bobbio has pointed out, their function is that of 'magistrates of force', or force-exercising magistrates, for without force there can be no order and, consequently, neither law nor rights can be imposed.

Although these tasks appear to be entirely new, and despite the media's frequent tendency to indulge in rhetoric about the so-called 'soldiers of peace', there is no essential difference either in military ethics or in the general strategic and operational logics. The differences are above all of a tactical, technical and organizational nature.

It is essential to understand what is in reality at stake, and to eschew the simplifications and rhetoric produced both by the frequently unconscious instances of disinformation and other-worldiness on the part of the media and by the persistence of a certain confusion as to the true nature of peacekeeping. To this must be added the absence of any definition of the term in the United Nations Charter and the fact that, under the impetus of 'CNN politics', or 'videopolitics', Western leaders have frequently been led to intervene without fully knowing the objectives aimed at. These leaders tend accordingly to believe that peacekeeping is a flexible technique, and that there exists a continuum between operations based on consensus and impartiality and those providing for the use of force in order to impose international order, including recourse to violence. They think they are able to set military targets while operations are actually being carried out; but that is impossible, or at least difficult.

The United Nations peacekeeping force is essentially an arbitrator. Sometimes, as in Beirut, in Mogadiscio and even in Bosnia, as indeed when any action based on the use of force goes beyond the limit of the consensus of the parties, it has become an active player. However, it is possible to be either an arbitrator or a player, but not both at once. Whenever that has occurred, international intervention has turned into a shameful disaster. The fault lay not with the military but with the politicians, who had neglected to set clear and attainable objectives from the outset. There is never a military solution: there can be only a political solution, one that determines the military objectives in accordance with the ultimate political

goals set and the operational capabilities that are actually available. The precision of modern weapons cannot compensate for confusion of political objectives and fuzziness of ideas.

Forces on active service have frequently been asked to undertake operations which they are not technically equipped to carry out. For example, they can separate two warring communities but they cannot force them to live together. Those who set the political objectives must be familiar with the specific nature of the military resources available, and take account of that. The 'culture of peace' is linked, in essence, with an understanding of the logic and grammar of strategy. The two sectors are not opposed to one another; there is, on the contrary, a basic homogeneity between the principles of a just war, such as proportionality between ends and means, and the principles of Clausewitz's strategic rationality.

The ethics of good intentions is less moral than that of the results obtained. Frequently, it is no more than an alibi, a cover. A deeper sense of responsibility on the part of all concerned is absolutely essential.

Humanitarian action cannot replace political action. Even when it is not an alibi on the part of the political class in response to a public opinion concerned to see an end to suffering and massacres, nor a cover designed to conceal other objectives, humanitarian intervention prolongs conflicts. If the international community wishes to put an end to this, it must then add its own violence to that exercised by the warring parties, precisely in order to convince them that they have more to lose than to gain by pursuing the conflict. Such was the case in Bosnia in 1995, when the bombings made possible the Dayton agreements.

From a strategic standpoint, the logic of peacekeeping operations is quite similar to that of conventional wars, for it is bound up with human nature. The sole difference occurs at the level of its syntax and its grammar.

MILITARY FORCE AND HUMAN NATURE

In order to understand the role of military force in present-day international relations, a number of general considerations must be taken into account.

There exists an extraordinary similarity between the thinking of Plato and Aristotle on human nature and Clausewitz's theories on war. This analogy is particularly applicable to what the Prussian general calls the 'paradoxical trinity' of war: political reason, original violence and friction, even chance, and the calculation of probabilities. This 'trinity' is located at the core of his theory of war, but in reality it constitutes the crux of all praxeology, that is, all logic of action.

Plato refers to the threefold nature of the soul. According to his thinking, developed and refined by Aristotle, it is impossible to comprehend human actions unless we take into account at one and the same time the 'logos' (thought and reason), the 'pathos' (passion) and the 'ethos' (the motives underlying action and the ethical conduct that must inspire it, and that differs from reason and passion).

Between the theory informing peace-oriented action and the theory of war-oriented action there are no essential differences. Both originate in human beings and are deeply rooted in human nature.

In war, just as in operations to promote peace, the armed forces are called in to constrain one or other party to yield, of their own accord or under duress, to our will, which is directed at attaining certain objectives. In all types of action, two and even more wills are pitted against one another in the pursuit of divergent – even if not necessarily symmetrical – goals, and in which the logos, the ethos and the pathos, ever present, interact.

All action is thus situated in a three-dimensional space, bounded by the three above-mentioned axes. It lies with the political leader and the military commander to ensure that the

objectives pursued, and the desired situation of peace, are attained with minimal expenditure, of casualties, of risks and of efforts – ultimately resorting to force in its potential state in order to deter the opposing party or to persuade it to do what is expected of it.

The ethic of the United Nations peacekeeping force – and not of it alone – lies precisely in the minimal use of the necessary force. The morality of its use derives, when all is said and done, from the success thereby obtained. The ethic of the politician consists in determining for the troops objectives that can be attained and, even before that, in having the courage to define what sort of peace he wishes to win.

In conclusion, I should stress that the new tasks assigned to the military in this post-Cold-War era, although they are far more closely intermeshed, complex and varied than its traditional missions, alter neither the nature of the military profession, nor the physiognomy of the armed forces, nor indeed the ethical and moral principles with which all soldiers must comply – the first and foremost of these being subordination to the political authority and use of the minimal violence needed in order to obtain the desired outcomes.

Needless to say, these new tasks are far more complex than those which the Cold War soldier was required to perform. They call into play additional skills and a different technical and tactical approach, but not, ultimately, in such a large measure. As Marshal Lyautey wrote, 'a good soldier cannot be *only* a soldier'. The military profession is intrinsically linked to the performance of a social function and to the affirmation of ethical and human principles. The soldier is, by his very nature, the protector of the weakest; it is no accident that the Catholic Church's theological doctrine on the just war is situated in the period of 'Caritas'. It was only during a brief period, at the time of the conquest of the Americas and the conversion under duress of the Indies, that it was situated in the category of 'Justitia'.

No one wages war for war's sake. Violence for the sake of it is a criminal act. As Aristotle stressed, force and its use are but means in the service of peace. The new tasks assigned to the military in peacekeeping operations highlight the 'Caritas' dimension. Scientific and philosophical thinking on the future of peace and of the world must be focused on this dimension, and leave aside the facile rhetoric and simplifications that tend to obscure the importance of the essential factors. It is only in this way that the 'logos' and the 'ethos' are able to prevail over the 'pathos', and that the force used can be no more than the minimal force essential for the restoration of order, hence of law and, if possible, of justice – although it is true that justice is first and foremost the responsibility of the politicians, and not that of the military.

JESÚS GARCÍA RUIZ

**Identity and conflict: the role of the religious dimension
in the new rules governing social restructuring**

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As they approach the end of the century and of the millennium, societies find themselves involved in a process of restructuring and exploration or quest. It would seem that the foundations which, for over two centuries, have underpinned and legitimized the existence of the forms of the democratic state are being called into question. Governments have suffered, on a planetary scale, the impact of the dismembering of the political architecture erected after the Second World War. Admittedly, we have managed to avoid new international confrontations; but it is none the less true that local conflicts – ‘conflicts of identity’, as François Thual¹ has called them – have increased in number, implicitly or explicitly imputed by those engaged in them to a politico-ethnic or religious dimension.

1. François Thual, *Les conflits identitaires*, Ellipses, 1995. Some of these conflicts are caused by ethnic factors, others by religious or again by national factors, thereby impeding the negotiation of a diplomatic solution. F. Thual considers it necessary, for this reason, to establish, with this concept, a new conceptual tool. Pierre Hassner (*Le Monde*, 27 October 1992) writes in this connection of a ‘new Middle Ages’.

Many of these conflicts, which are capable of destabilizing a country or an entire region, are indeed characterized, if we consider them closely, by crises of identity in which the religious dimension articulates, in the final analysis, the justificatory rationales of processes of confrontation and restructuring. The effect is twofold: it disrupts or supports, depending upon the contexts and current circumstances, while remaining ever reversible.

The social sciences, in particular their political branch, have 'neglected' to analyse the possible influence of the religious dimension on the evolution of contemporary societies. Traditionally, the study of such processes is based on two major issues: on the one hand, that of the role of 'instrument' performed by the religious dimension, and, on the other, that of the 'secularization' of society. In the first case, the religious dimension has been regarded as a space to be used ideologically¹ for political purposes, at the local as well as the national and international levels. Its twofold dimension in actual fact has been forgotten: on the one hand, the strategies of the religious institutions; on the other, the specific dynamics into which believers are integrated on the basis of the vision of reality inspired, generated and legitimized by the religious dimension. In the second case, the analyses have taken as their starting point the link between the rationality of societies and modernity, under the impact of Weber's conceptions.² It was

1. This is the case, to a large degree, of many analyses inspired by the Marxist standpoint. Jean-Pierre Vernant (1991: 9) cogently sums up this attitude and its consequences when he refers to the link between religion and nationalism: 'Whereas, in the intellectual convictions I cherished, religion and nationalism seemed destined to disappear – for reasons of the same kind, political, scientific, but also, to my mind at least, for ethical reasons. Believing that history had a sense, a meaning – as did the Communists, but also all progressive intellectuals of my generation – I quite naturally concluded that nationalism and the religious attitude were mere survivals'.

2. Cf. J. Séguy, 'Rationalisation, modernité et avenir de la religion chez Max Weber', in *Archives des sciences sociales des religions*, No. 69, 1, pp. 127–138. Paris, CNRS-EHESS, 1990.

posited that the entrance of social groups into the modern era necessarily went hand in hand with the autonomy of the individual and of society. Secularization, a dominant concept in the West, has for three decades articulated, justified and legitimized both theories and studies; the evolution of religious behaviour patterns has been thought through on the basis of a linear vision of the 'privatization' of religious practices and beliefs, considered as a logical and obligatory process. These theses have moreover been extrapolated – by sociologists, political scientists, historians and even anthropologists – from the planet's socio-political phenomena, thereby giving birth to a series of studies of specific realities and histories. The universalization of the concept of secularization has left aside the real and potential influence of representations (social constructs) – whether historical or the product of contemporary rationales, institutional religious factors, beliefs inscribed in social meanings, social and political mechanisms in which these representations can play a unifying, Utopian and structuring role or their opposite – on the political and social evolution of the individual and/or collective protagonists.

Until the 1960s, analysis of the religious dimension, in Latin America and in other regions, focused on the relations between religion and politics from the standpoint of relations and conflicts between institutions: states and Churches. There then developed new forms of social action and intervention (Acción Católica, liberation theology, basic ecclesiastical communities, participation by the religious sectors in revolutionary processes, etc.), endowed with a true organic capacity, and that served to create ideologies and to generate Utopias and new hopes. We were then far closer to a 'dynamic of social movement transcending the institutional framework',¹ to new

1. Jesús García Ruiz and Michael Löwy, 'Presentation' of the dossier 'Religion et politique en Amérique latine', in *Archives des sciences sociales des religions*, No. 97. Paris, CNRS-EHESS, 1997.

forms of collective action, than to the traditional modes of intervention of religion and the religious dimension. These new referential dynamics have obliged that branch of sociology focused on the religious dimension to formulate, in recent years, new concepts whose explanatory value is proving more relevant: the aim is at present to analyse the relations between the religious and the political dimensions as a 'common matrix', whose logic is articulated around the 'category of believing', and which Danièle Hervieu-Léger¹ defines as 'the complex of individual and collective convictions that do not pertain to the sphere of verification, of experimentation, and, more broadly, of modes of recognition and control, which characterize knowledge, but which find their rationale in the fact that they give meaning and coherence to the subjective experience of those who hold them'. Michel de Certeau² likewise refers to a 'structural pattern' considered to be common to political and religious beliefs. Patrick Michel,³ after disputing the validity of the traditional divide, formulated by Pierre Bourdieu,⁴ between political and religious fields, intelligently develops the thesis of a 'common matrix' constructing rules of permanent transition between the two under the impact of complex mechanisms of mutual influences and reciprocal redefinitions. Such perspectives oblige us to think through and to enunciate

1. Danièle Hervieu-Léger, *La religion pour mémoire*. Paris, Cerf, 1993, p. 105.

2. Michel de Certeau, *L'invention du quotidien*, in the Folio-Essais collection, p. 261. Paris, Gallimard, 1990.

3. Patrick Michel, *Politique et religion. La grande mutation*, p. 27. Paris, Albin Michel, 1994.

4. Pierre Bourdieu, Loïc Wacquant, *Réponses*, Seuil, 1992, specifically Chapter 2, 'La logique des champs', and, on the subject that concerns us here, 'Genèse et structure du champ religieux', in *Revue française de sociologie*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1971, pp. 295-334.

explicitly the sinuous forms of reciprocal relations, complementarities and exclusions, and hence to envisage the religious dimension as a reality that cannot be reduced to the ecclesiastical institutions, just as the political dimension cannot be reduced to governments, to states and to parties.

We then discover internalized rules interacting with one another, in which the religious dimension appears as a component of social relations capable, in certain contexts, of performing central functions of legitimization/disqualification and of causal construction. This dynamic, specific to the religious dimension, may moreover be explained by its own nature, by its capacity to create Utopian visions, to generate 'spaces of memory and legitimacy', 'consecrations'¹ whose power and social efficacy prove decisive, 'elective affinities' in the sense in which Weber understands the expression. In other words, to produce alliances which, by virtue of their emotional and teleological consolidation, largely transcend those resulting from the expression of immediate individual or social interests. The religious

1. This role is undoubtedly crucial. Even if the concept of 'sacred' is broader than that of 'religious', the sacralizing function of the religious dimension is paramount. In *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim – to whom we are indebted for an essential contribution to the analysis of these processes – considers the existence in all social reality of two universes, the sacred and the profane. In his view, the ideal is a natural production of social life: society cannot create or re-create for itself meanings without at the same time creating something ideal, hence the impossibility of opposing real society to ideal society. The joint affirmation of common feelings self-fuelled by rationales of 'recollection' is an indisputable driving-force which generates rationales of belief, action, commitment and militancy. André-François Isambert, criticizing Durkheim's analysis, incorporates in *Le sens du sacré* a new dimension: the sacred, he asserts, is neither an illusion nor an artifice, but the subject of a specific experience. The processes of 'consecration' legitimize an authority and a brotherhood but, above all, they legitimize the submission of the brotherhood of members to a hierarchy. And that, politically speaking, constitutes an undeniable force of interconnection.

dimension, as Jean-Pierre Vernant¹ stresses, ‘permeates all social life’, the intimate places of interpersonal relations, the various types of relationship with children, grandchildren, the forms and contents of socialization and, above all, the system of references that enables individuals to conceive of their existence and to conceive of themselves, to situate themselves in the world and to visualize their continuing personal existence in the next, after death. Hence the close tie between personal identity and social cohesion, between forms of community life and the duty of fidelity, between historical responsibility and self-defence before the possibility – real or imagined – of ceasing to exist as one is, as one thinks and as one believes.

It is in relation to these functions of the religious dimension that my thinking will seek to situate itself, from a twofold standpoint: the potential role of the religious dimension and its possible uses at the social and political levels, levels which impact directly upon the dynamics of security, stability and their opposites, on the one hand, and, on the other, the creation of rationales of voluntarist social incidence.

1. Jean-Pierre Vernant, ‘Quand quelqu’un frappe à la porte . . .’, in *Le genre humain*, No. 23, *Le religieux dans le politique*, pp. 9–18. Paris, Seuil, 1991. This link between ‘belief and culture’ or ‘religion and culture’ is highlighted by different social sciences, but its implications have not been sufficiently clarified. The Catholic Church, for its part, began to take an interest therein at the end of the 1960s, under the influence of Vatican II, but it was above all in the early 1980s that ‘the acculturation of the Gospel and of the faith’ was enunciated. In a letter addressed to the Secretary of State dated 20 May 1992, John Paul II expressly stated: ‘Faith that has not been transformed into culture is a faith that has not been fully received, that has not been fully thought through, that has not been faithfully lived’. From the Catholic Church’s perspective, that means, as the International Theological Commission explains in a document entitled *Le christianisme et les religions*, that ‘religion is at the heart of all culture, as an instance of ultimate meaning and basic structuring force’. This ‘appropriation’ of culture by religion poses, as may well be imagined, an obvious problem for the social sciences in general and for anthropology in particular: that of the rationales underlying the construction of the relations of meaning and the relations of power that articulate, from the Weberian point of view, the social dimension as both process and historical product.

THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION:
A FACTOR OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION?

The stabilizing-destabilizing role of the religious dimension currently features among the subjects of real concern of local, national and regional authorities. It is true that a series of movements observed worldwide is prompting us to reformulate certain lines of inquiry. In this regard, the case of China must be seen as exemplary. The ideologues of the Chinese Communist Party have followed very closely the evolution of the former Soviet Union; they have been particularly attentive, in their analysis, to the impact of the religious and cultural dimensions and the affirmation of identity in the processes leading to the break-up or break-away of certain countries of the former Eastern bloc. These same ideologues are aware of the fact that many religious organizations have their eyes fixed on their country, where they see more than one billion 'potential converts'. For these organizations – the Catholic Church, North American Evangelists, para-religious groups, etc. – China is seen as the great adventure, the 'grand mission', the great missionary challenge of the twenty-first century.¹ According to this analysis, religion is one of the factors possessing a true destabilizing power for political regimes. On the Chinese territory, however, three great religions represent a risk in this regard: the Muslims of Sinkiang, the Christians, who were present in large numbers during the demonstrations on Tien An Men Square,² and the Buddhists

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1. As was Latin America for Protestantism at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. The discredit cast upon the work of the Catholic Church – 'the defective and distorted Christianity transmitted by the Roman Church makes all these peoples the legitimate domain of the Protestant missionary apostolate' – justified the mass dispatch of missionaries bearing the Anglo-Saxon vision of the world and ideology.
 2. Many dissidents who, inside or outside China, are militating for human rights and against the concentration camp system of the *laogai* are also Catholic. They include Harry Wu, whose *Retour au laogai. La vérité sur les camps de la mort dans la Chine d'aujourd'hui* has just been published by Editions Belfond (cf. *Le Parisien*, 30 January 1997).

of Tibet. It is no accident that the Chinese criminal investigation department has decided to step up the surveillance exercised in regard to religions. In a document dating from the spring of 1996, its ideologues clarify China's traditional position vis-à-vis foreign influence, in which they include religions, asserting that such religions, in particular Christianity, have become 'a danger for the Communist Party'.

The conflict-fraught affirmation of a particular faith, or religious adherence, is also to be found in other parts of the Asian continent. In India, the development of Hindu nationalist parties is to be explained by a process of exaltation of Hinduism considered as the foundation of the nation. That religion is presented as the reference model to be constructed, a model of the social and political reality of the country. This process of constructing religion as a reference model, itself born of the need to reconstruct the Hindu identity, fuels potential and real conflicts with other religions such as Islam, which in India numbers 150 million followers. Such tensions, crystallized around the issue of religious adherence, quite patently carry a destabilizing potential at the national and regional levels. The exacerbation of the specific variables of religious adherence and of a particular faith's unique claim to the truth may lead to confrontations of exceptional violence, in particular by reason of the legitimacy which such adherence generates and affirms in people's minds. Justificatory rationales do indeed 'potentialize' this legitimacy by means of Utopian projections of fidelity to 'consecrating' constructions, to ancestors, to a particular vision of the world and to sole ownership of a truth concerning the ultimate purpose of the order of the universe and of society.

This process of redefining national identities – and identifications – and of a convergence of interests between the national authorities and religion is occurring in other regions of the same continent around Buddhism, with the two striking

examples of Burma and Thailand. In the first case, the Burmese dictatorship resorts to the Buddhist priesthood in order to found its legitimacy and to justify the repression of non-Buddhist ethnic minorities such as the Karen, converted to Protestantism under the influence of English missions, and the Arakanese, the majority of whom are Muslims. In Thailand, the movement to redefine and rebuild the national identity on the basis of Buddhism is at the origin of situations leading to conflicts with the Malay minority installed in the south of the country, who for the most part are converts to Islam.

No less significant is the case of the Lebanese war – the longest in the twentieth century – which clearly demonstrates the central role that the religious dimension can play in conflicts of identity, and how this type of conflict may degenerate into fierce local battles. That civil war, which resulted in 230,000 deaths, involved a confrontation between the religious communities established on the national territory, notably the Maronite, Orthodox, Sunnite and Shiite communities. These had lived together, sharing the same history and speaking the same language, Arabic. The country's accession to independence, in 1943, had enabled a political equilibrium to be achieved that was based on the representation – and representativeness – of all religious groups within the apparatus of the Lebanese state, the Presidency being vested in the Maronites, who were then in the majority. In the 1960s, this equilibrium was radically altered by the mass arrival of Palestinians, as well as by the accelerated growth of the Muslim, and particularly the Shiite, population. That twofold process disrupted the existing harmony and triggered a conflict whose purpose was to redistribute power between the different opposing groups. Such, at least, was its apparent cause. However, if we look more closely, we find that it reveals as its axis a mechanism for refashioning community identities. Convinced that the Maronite group in power, which was in a

minority, found itself in a position of weakness vis-à-vis the others, which for demographic reasons had become the majority, the other faiths laid claim to a new place in the state apparatus, and hence in the spheres of power.

In the spectrum of potential functions of the religious dimension, mention should also be made of the current forms of interaction in Sri Lanka. This is a context in which the religious dimension takes on different forms according to the parties in conflict. The Tigers justify their combat in the name of 'Tamil identity', while the Buddhist monks see themselves as the spearhead of Sinhalese nationalism.

This dimension, involving interaction among religious factors, must be regarded as polymorphous. In some cases, the social protagonists are bearers of the claims and demands of a living faith and belief, which informs daily practices and behaviour patterns. In others, belief is simply an ideological reference, which is not necessarily attended by specific religious practices but whose contents, in so far as these relate to identity and identification, are used by the leaders and main players as 'loci' of retrenchment and legitimization of the confrontation. Witness in this regard the well-known examples of Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia, the analysis of which has produced a substantial body of literature.

THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION,
AN AREA OF IDENTIFICATION AND 'CULTURAL' CONFLICT

It is essential, in the same perspective, to envisage the consequences of the post-Cold War era in the context of the globalization of social relations. The fact is that the disappearance of one of the poles – that of the Left – which situated and/or articulated identities on a worldwide scale,¹ constitutes an

1. Patrick Michel analyses this dimension in connection with the fall of the Berlin Wall in *Politique et religion. La grande mutation*. Paris, Albin Michel, 1991.

essential variable of any analysis of the processes of recomposition and positioning of social groups. This 'Left-wing polarity', which served to organize meanings, representations, commitments and militancies, having once disappeared, the oppositions between 'peoples' no longer seem to be determined solely by ideologies, by political or economic factors, but also by the cultural dimension and its implications within 'civilizations'. According to a plausible hypothesis put forward by Samuel Huntington,¹ future conflicts will arise from the confrontation of civilizations perceiving their system of values and their respective interests to be antagonistic and mutually exclusive. In such a process, it is clear that religion, or rather the religious dimension, will play a crucial role as a core element of cultural systems. Francis Fukuyama heralded in 1992, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, the 'end of history' and the final triumph of liberal democracy. For his part, Samuel Huntington asserts that it is the opposite that might happen. Far from having reached the 'end of history' for lack of combatants, we are entering rather into a stage of destabilization, and history is in danger of witnessing in the next decades the development of new logics and causes of conflicts, of Utopias carrying new references and new appropriations of historical responsibilities and fidelities. The break-up of the ternary structure (the two blocs and the non-aligned countries) which organized the rationale of the Cold War has opened the way, it would appear, for an at once more complex and more unstable system in which, according to Huntington, eight 'civilizations' confront one another: Western, Latin-American, Muslim, Chinese, Hindu, Orthodox Slav, Buddhist and Japanese.

1. First presented in a polemical article published in July 1993 in the review *Foreign Affairs*, later developed in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 1996, Simon & Schuster.

The 'mechanism' of some of Samuel Huntington's conceptions and his worst-case scenario leave aside numerous imponderables that intervene in the dynamic of social processes; if the 'end of history' has not taken place with the collapse of Communism, the confrontation of civilizations is certainly not inevitable. Nevertheless, his analyses raise key questions regarding the new patterns of social relations.

Another very important factor which must be taken into account is that, on the one hand, there is no indestructible homogeneity or homogeneous culture within these 'civilizations' and, on the other, the different forms of proselytism and conversion strategies impact upon cultural contents. If conversion is, in the final analysis, a process of blotting out history in the individual consciousness in order to inscribe therein 'the history of others', the bearing of such a process upon social relations cannot, self-evidently, be ignored. This is in fact one of the most subtle sources of potential conflicts, being a source of cultural restructuring. It is precisely at this level of reciprocal redefinition that the reality of culture acquires its full significance.

In this sense, analysis of the relations between religion and culture is essential; more than its global aspects, it is crucial to understand the complementarities and interconnections between the 'denominational heritage and cultural codes', the heritage of faith and ways of conceiving reality and conceiving oneself, the heritage of faith and social ties, ways of thinking of oneself as a member of a community, modes of fidelity, etc. Sociologists, historians and anthropologists have all studied these relations; in the present case, however, we shall adopt the traditional standpoint of hermeneutics, analysing culture as a grammatical code, a code at once more complex and more comprehensive than any language and which, independently of its ability to understand and its practical function (as a tool of communication), performs a central role of

individual and social recognition.¹ In this regard, the religious dimension is to be seen as a decisive factor in the elaboration and processing of cultural codes. Religion performs this decisive role in matters of cultural codes, for it is religion that ultimately provides the teleological dimension of identity. This is undoubtedly best seen in societies where social coherence is something to which one and all contribute. In such a context, the religious dimension does indeed serve to inject into the social sphere the density of its significance, as a result of the mechanisms of 'consecration' of the totality of reality (physical and social). In this case, we cannot speak of any 'specialization of the religious dimension'; it forms part of the overall significance of the social dimension, as that 'total social phenomenon' to which Marcel Mauss refers. Its status is indisputably different in societies that have entered the modern age, where the autonomy of the social protagonists generates individual modes of integration or exclusion in relation to religion. What is involved here are individual constructions: in other words, the product of the self-selection of meanings on the basis of the referential symbolic store that is available to individuals, being historically situated. The individualized consciousness selects, extracts and positions itself in relation to contents and institutions that manage and claim to monopolize the tenor of what it is 'necessary to believe'. The religious dimension is then far more fully mediated by individual choices than by single-purpose social processes. Moreover, and contrary to what John Paul II has asserted on many

1. Jean-Pierre Vernant claims, in the same line of thinking, that 'religion is like language. At once a means of conceiving the world and conceiving oneself, of communicating with others and of being beyond these various levels of communication . . . Religion is perhaps, in a certain way, another aspect of language. A means of communicating, of establishing social links, it is like the extreme tip of what I, as an unbeliever, call the symbolic function'.

occasions in connection with Europe and Latin America,¹ the processes involving affirmation of identity in which cultural systems intervene are processes of restructuring and redefinition, in which 'origin' is not guaranteed to possess definitive legitimacy.

As to our account of culture and the role of the religious dimension in the construction of cultural codes, it should be added that, as the bearer of 'salvation', that is, by producing the criteria that underpin the hope of being saved – which is tantamount to transcending personal identity by projecting it beyond death – the religious dimension necessarily involves a conception of the human person whose individual fulfilment requires the recognition and the action of 'divine grace'. This conception of the person itself presupposes a process of building transcendence in this world that entails the existence of organized community structures, within which forms of life and social relations find concrete expression which themselves map out the communities to which individuals belong and their ultimate destination.

The question of truth and its possession is undoubtedly one of the possible areas of conflict. We see this daily in Latin America in the Catholic-Protestant relationship, which is reflected in permanent confrontations that polarize institutional authorities, social groups within rural societies and individual protagonists in their everyday personal exchanges.

1. He speaks of the Catholic faith as the 'cultural matrix of the continent' (Address to the Latin American Episcopal Conference in Puerto Principe cathedral, Haiti, 9 March 1983, 1*i*), from which there is alleged to result a 'hybrid cultural synthesis' (*Mensaje al mundo de la cultura y de los empresarios*, Lima, 15 May 1988, 2). Evoking origins and 'memory faithful to its roots' (*Discurso al mundo de la cultura y a los constructores de la sociedad*, Santiago, 3 April 1987, 6) as guarantees of intemporal legitimacy, his discourse fits into an univocal and linear vision of history and social processes that leaves no room for the sensibilities, perspectives and histories born of the social dynamics and the complex evolution of Latin-American societies.

In this regard, the document published by the International Theological Commission under the title *Le Christianisme et les religions*,¹ which enunciates the rationales that are supposed to organize the links 'between Christianity and religions', is revealing. This document, which begins by recognizing that religions have been and may yet be factors of division and conflict between peoples, continues with an inquiry into the 'issue of truth', acknowledging that religious plurality and cultural relativism relativize the very concept of truth, hence including the Catholic notion of truth, considered as involving a risk: 'The issue of truth carries with it serious problems of a theoretical and practical nature (...). To assert that all are true is equivalent to asserting that all are false. Sacrificing the issue of truth is incompatible with the Christian conception'.

This problem of the possession of truth also occurs, albeit in a different way, in the various forms and institutions born of North American Protestantism or branches of Protestantism. The logics of 'conquest' and conversion developed in accordance with marketing techniques, fundamentalism with its literal interpretation of the Bible, local churches' practices of supervision and organization, methods of organization by family and age groups, etc., are so many factors that determine a certain conception of social relationships, and, subsequently, shape, within local groups and communities, the forms of social life and the systems of representation. These mechanisms for demarcating social allegiances create in their turn boundaries and phenomena of exclusion that are capable, in specific political contexts, of triggering confrontations.

1. Which carries as subtitle 'Vade-mecum pour les confesseurs sur certains sujets de morale liés à la vie conjugale', *La documentation catholique*, No. 2157, 79th year, Vol. XCIV, 6 April 1977, pp. 312-332.

The different religious systems, inasmuch as they seek, by persuasion or by coercion, to transform 'what is thought into lived experience' and 'what is preached into truth', do their utmost to make their subjective choices the objective of social groups. They simultaneously, and unconditionally, lay claim to the right to mould the behaviour and representations of believers and, in presenting these as the sole truth possible, demand and invest themselves with the right to convert society as a whole and to impose systems of values deemed to be alone true and, hence, universal. The religious protagonists deny and condemn, by demonizing them, the validity of others' representations, and substitute 'their own miracles, the true ones, for the local, false, miracles', as Marc Augé has written (1977).

In this confrontation, stemming from the fact or act of appropriating truth and imposing it upon others, there undoubtedly lies a source of conflict and destabilization. To deny others' truth is tantamount to denying their culture, to denying them themselves, by allowing them to exist only as enemies, enemies that represent and embody the evil created and rejected by my truth. The demonization of the other and of the other's system of values involves acquiring an awareness of oneself, of one's history and one's ancestors, one's beliefs and social practices; it generates a process of contradiction and self-enhancement that can produce its own rationales of exclusion and confrontation. As Jean-Pierre Vernant stresses: 'when the very manner in which a community conceives of its existence is called into question, nationalism and the resurgence of the religious dimension frequently go hand in hand'.

*Biographical notes
concerning the lecturers*

PHILIPPE DELMAS

A graduate of ENSAE and ENA (the French National School of Administration), Philippe Delmas also holds doctorates in mathematics and economics. He has occupied numerous posts, in particular in the French civil service: a junior official at the Cour des Comptes and director for industrial affairs at the Centre d'Analyse et de Prévision in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he has also served as representative of the Commissaire Général au Plan and subsequently represented the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for issues of national security. He has also conducted research work, notably for the University of Berkeley and at the École Polytechnique (work on the new technological requirements in matters of national security). Philippe Delmas is also the author of numerous articles and books, including *Le bel avenir de la guerre* (Éditions Gallimard, Paris, 1995), *Le maître des horloges – Modernité de l'action publique* (Éditions Odile Jacob, Paris, 1991) and *La stabilisation du prix des matières premières: un dialogue manqué* (Éditions Economica, Paris, 1983).

RENÉ-JEAN DUPUY

Born in 1918 in Tunis (Tunisia); died in Paris in July 1997. René-Jean Dupuy was a Doctor of Law, a history graduate and *agrégé* in public law. A lecturer in the law faculties in Algiers, in Aix-Marseille and later in Nice, he was in 1979 appointed a professor at the Collège de France (Chair of international law). President, then Honorary President of the Institut européen des hautes études internationales in Nice, he was also Secretary-General of The Hague Academy of International Law and a member of its curatorium from 1985 onwards. René-Jean Dupuy was also President of the International Law Institute and a member of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques and of the European Academy in London. Many times decorated in France and in other countries, René-Jean Dupuy was the author of several works, including *L'humanité dans l'imaginaire des nations* (Éditions Julliard, Paris, 1991), *Le droit international* (Éditions des Presses Universitaires de France, 8th edition, Paris, 1990), and *Cité terrestre* (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1990).

HECTOR GROS ESPIELL

Born in Montevideo (Uruguay) in 1926, a Doctor of Law and Social Science, Hector Gros Espiell is Professor of Constitutional Law in the law faculty of the University of Montevideo and Professor of Public International Law in the law faculty of the Catholic University in Montevideo. An ardent champion of human rights, he has held numerous posts at the United Nations and served in various capacities within its specialized agencies and organizations: as representative of Uruguay at the General Conference of UNESCO, judge on the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, member of the Commission on Human Rights, Chairman of the delegation of Uruguay to UNCTAD, Secretary-General of the Tlatelolco Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, and special United Nations envoy to study the human rights situation in Bolivia and later in Guatemala. Personal representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Western Sahara, Minister of External Relations of Uruguay for three years, Hector Gros Espiell is today Uruguay's Permanent Delegate to UNESCO and the Uruguayan Ambassador in France. Many times decorated, he is also a member of a range of international institutes militating on behalf of human rights. He has also published many books, as well as numerous articles in reviews devoted to international law and constitutional law.

PIERRE HASSNER

Born in 1933 in Bucharest (Romania), a graduate of the École Normale Supérieure, Pierre Hassner is an *agrégé* in philosophy. Since 1957 he has worked as a researcher at the Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, and is today Director of Research at the Centre d'études et de recherches internationales (CERI) and a professor at the Institut d'études politiques. He is the author of *La violence et la paix* (Éditions Esprit, Paris, 1995) and of numerous works on political philosophy, the theory of international relations and European security. He has been the chief editor of publications such as *Vents d'Est. Vers l'Europe des États de droit?* (Éditions des Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1990) and *Totalitarismes* (Éditions Economica, Paris, 1984).

GENERAL CARLO JEAN

Born in 1936 in Mondovi (Italy), Army General Carlo Jean is a graduate of the Military Academy of Modena. He attended the national military academies of Italy and France. Commander of the Susa tactical group, the Italian component of the NATO mobile force, he led the Cadore Alpine Brigade. General Carlo Jean has been an Army and Defence general staff officer. Director of the Italian Military Centre for Strategic Studies, currently President of the Centre for Higher Defence Studies, he has also been a military adviser to the President of the French Republic. A political science graduate, he also lectures at the Free International University for Social Studies in Rome. Carlo Jean is the author or the chief editor of numerous books, articles and essays, including *Guerre, stratégie, sécurité* (Éditions Laterza, 1997), *Géopolitique* (Laterza, 1995), *Mort et redécouverte de l'État-nation* (Éditions Angeli, 1991), *La guerre dans la pensée politique* (Angeli, 1986), *Défense et sécurité* (Angeli, 1986) and *Études stratégiques* (Angeli, 1980).

ROBBIN F. LAIRD

Holder of a Ph.D. in political science, former adviser to Zbigniew Brzezinski for East-West affairs, Robbin F. Laird is today President of International Communication & Strategic Assessments (CSA), a firm of consultants specializing in the analysis of strategic questions and issues relating to the new information and communication society. The author of numerous reports for the White House on issues of industrial and defence policy in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, he has also contributed to the analysis of defence and foreign policy matters at the Center for Naval Analysis and the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). Robbin Laird is the author of some 20 works on political science and economics and works relating to strategic affairs, and has also published numerous articles, the most recent being 'The New Information Society and National Security Policy' and 'The Clinton Administration and Europe'.

MARCEL MERLE

Born in Saumur (France) in 1923, a graduate of the École libre des sciences politiques and an *agrégé* in public law, Marcel Merle has divided his career between Bordeaux, where he was Director of the Institut d'études politiques, and Paris, where he taught at the Sorbonne and at the Institut d'études politiques. He has served as a French Government expert with the United Nations and later as a consultant to UNESCO. Marcel Merle is currently President of the Union of International Associations, whose headquarters is in Brussels. He is also a member of numerous associations, in particular the Association universitaire pour l'entente et la liberté and the Association française de science politique. He is the author of numerous books and articles, most of them devoted to international relations. His most recent publications include: *Bilan des relations internationales contemporaines* (Éditions Economica, Paris, 1996), *La crise du Golfe et le nouvel ordre international* (Economica, 1991) and *Les acteurs dans les relations internationales* (Economica, 1986). Many times decorated, and Professor Emeritus at the University of Paris I, he has also been a columnist for the newspaper *La Croix-L'événement* since 1973.

JESÚS GARCÍA RUIZ

A doctor of anthropology, a research director at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) and a member of the Centre d'études interdisciplinaires des faits religieux at the French School of Higher Studies in Social Sciences (EHESS), Jesús García Ruiz teaches at the EHESS and at the University of Paris VII. A Guatemalan citizen, specializing in the Mayan societies of Guatemala and Mexico, he is currently directing research programmes on 'The identity, cognitive systems and political emergence of Mayan societies' and on 'Conversion, public opinion and the impact of religious factors on the refashioning of identities'. He is the author of *Historia de nuestra Historia. La construcción social de las identificaciones en las sociedades mayas de Guatemala* (1992) and *Entre poder y autoridad: las sociedades mayas a partir de lo local* (1996), and has written numerous articles on the religious dimension in Latin America. His last work is *Hacia una Nación Pluricultural en Guatemala* (1998).

*Participants in the work
of the Informal Group
to consider
a new approach to security*

**PARTICIPANTS¹ IN THE WORK
OF THE INFORMAL GROUP
TO CONSIDER A NEW APPROACH TO SECURITY**

The Informal Group to consider a new approach to security, set up within the UNESCO Secretariat in June 1995 by its Director-General, Federico Mayor, met eight times between late 1995 and 1996. The Group was chaired by the Director-General and its work was directed by Moufida Goucha, Senior Special Adviser to the Director-General, assisted by René Zapata, Senior Programme Planning Specialist, and by Isabelle de Billy, Programme Specialist in the Executive Office of the Director-General.

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1. Names are listed in alphabetical order.

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Mr Christian Daudel

Professor of geopolitics
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H.E. Mr Hector Gros Espiell

Ambassador of Uruguay to France,
Permanent Delegate of Uruguay to UNESCO

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Ms Florence Ssereo

Consultant with the Africa Unit

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Former President of Mali

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Director, Emergency Operations Unit

**The Editorial Committee wishes to apologize for any error
or omission which may have escaped its attention.**

Other publications of interest

OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

- *The New Page*, by Federico Mayor. 1995. Co-published by Dartmouth University Press and UNESCO Publishing. 98 pp.
- *Non-military aspects of international security*. 1995. UNESCO Publishing. 260 pp.
- *Peace!* by the Nobel Peace Prizewinners. 1995. UNESCO Publishing. 570 pp.
- *Peace and war: social and cultural aspects*, by Håkan Wiberg. 1995. Bel Corp. Publishers, Warsaw. 125 pp.
- *Proceedings of the international round table 'Military conversion and science'* (Venice, 27–29 November 1994). UNESCO-ROSTE. 215 pp.
- *UNESCO and a culture of peace. Promoting a global movement*. 1996. CAB-96/WS/1. UNESCO. 206 pp.
- *The Venice Deliberations – Transformations in the meaning of 'security': practical steps toward a new security culture*. The Venice Papers. 1996. CAB-96/WS/1. UNESCO. 125 pp.
- *Security for peace – a synopsis of the inter-American symposium on peace-building and peace-keeping* (organized

- jointly by the Organization of American States and UNESCO). 1996. CAB-96/WS/2. UNESCO. 32 pp.
- *Actes du colloque international sur le droit à l'assistance humanitaire* (Paris, 25–27 January 1995). [Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance]. SHS-96/WS/9. 1996. UNESCO. 218 pp.
 - *From a culture of violence to a culture of peace*. 1996. UNESCO Publishing. 276 pp.
 - *UNESCO: An ideal in action. The continuing relevance of a visionary text*, by Federico Mayor. 1996. UNESCO Publishing. 124 pp.
 - *Proceedings of the International Symposium 'From Partial Insecurity to Global Security'*, organized by the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (France) and UNESCO, with the assistance of the Centro di Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD, Italy), the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union and the Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN, Spain). CAB-97/WS/1. 1997. UNESCO. 216 pp. (The Proceedings are available in English and French.)
 - *Peace, security and conflict prevention*. 1998. SIPRI-UNESCO Handbook. Oxford University Press. 230 pp.

Faithful to its mission as a forum for ideas, UNESCO has sought to initiate a debate on the implications and demands of a new approach to security within the context of its transdisciplinary project 'Towards a culture of peace'. In order to open this debate, a number of renowned specialists, from a wide range of backgrounds, were invited to outline their vision of the challenges facing peace and security at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

This work contains the lectures delivered in 1995-1996 by those specialists within the framework of the proceedings of the Informal Group to consider the new approach to security set up within the Secretariat of UNESCO by its Director-General, Federico Mayor. Much food for thought will be found here concerning the new prospects which the end of the Cold War has opened up for the international community in matters of peace and security, and also concerning the means of overcoming the obstacles which efforts to establish a culture of peace are encountering in the world.

For its part, UNESCO has already drawn considerable inspiration from these lectures in its efforts to promote a new approach to security, in particular through the work of the International Symposium organized in June 1996 on the theme 'From Partial Insecurity to Global Security' and its follow-up, and likewise through the unprecedented dialogue initiated by the Organization with the institutes concerned with military strategy and defence and the representatives of the armed forces in the different regions of the world.