NON-MILITARY ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

PEACE AND CONFLICT ISSUES

UNESCO

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Non-military aspects
of international security

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Preface

The present volume in the series entitled 'Peace and Conflict Issues' was prepared in the period when the East–West military confrontation had already become a part of the historical past. In consequence the military threat to international security had diminished drastically. Moreover, it had become clear that genuine security and stability in the world cannot be ensured if problems related to the protection of the environment, to economic and social development, to the prevention of discrimination and violations of human rights, extreme poverty and exclusion are not addressed properly.

For this very reason, and on the recommendation of the Advisory Board concerned with this series,* this volume is devoted to non-military aspects of international security. While realizing that not all aspects of this problem are covered, we do hope, however, that this book, containing as it does reflections on such important issues as ecological security, economic security, the social and cultural origins of violence, the human factor and movements of people, will contribute to the on-going debate concerning the concept of international security. It is of particular importance at this turning-point in world history, when a new system of international relations based not on the balance of power but on the balance of interests and, increasingly, on common interests, is emerging.

* A list of the Board members can be found at the end of this volume.

UNESCO's series on Peace and Conflict Issues seeks to encourage analysis of factors conducive to peace, prevention of violence and constructive conflict-resolution and thus, in line with the principal goal of universal intergovernmental organizations and UNESCO in particular, tries to answer the crucial questions on how to replace patterns of thinking and behaviour leading to violence, discrimination and intolerance by a culture of peace, tolerance and mutual respect and how to construct the defences of peace not only in inter-state, but also in intra-state and inter-group relations as well as in the minds of human beings; in other words, how to build a new multi-dimensional system of security which promotes stability, co-operation and confidence at all levels, thereby ensuring human security. We hope that the issue will contribute to the meaningful debate on this new system of security at international, regional and national levels, compatible with the aspirations for a better and more secure world in which ideals of democracy, human rights and development will be realized. This volume should also encourage reflection on practical ways and means to realize the aims of the United Nations Year for Tolerance (1995), proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly on the initiative of UNESCO.

For suggestions and comments concerning the series on Peace and Conflict Issues, readers are invited to write to:

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Contents

Concept and new dimensions of security: introductory remarks

Janusz Symonides and Vladimir Volodin*

The fundamental changes in the world situation and in international relations marked by the end of East–West confrontation have brought about a need for profound reflection on the concept of security, on sources and types of potential conflicts and on changes in threat perception.

PART ONE

The end of the Cold War and of ideological confrontation removed one of the greatest threats to peace: the danger of a global nuclear war appears to have been eliminated and the same may be said about the danger of a worldwide conventional conflict. As a result the way is paved to further progress in the disarmament process.

Indeed, the Second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), signed on 3 January 1993, reduces United States and Russian strategic nuclear warhead stockpiles to their lowest levels in decades. This drastic reduction concerns weapon systems which had provoked the greatest anxiety (such as SLBM – Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles). The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction (the CWC) was finally signed in Paris on

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13 January 1993 after more than twenty years of negotiations: thus the process of 'chemical disarmament' has been started. Furthermore, a number of important disarmament treaties concerning conventional weapons, like the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in 1990, are being implemented and the practising of confidence-building measures has reached new heights, in particular within the mechanism of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).*

Among positive developments in recent years, the disappearance of a number of long-standing enemy images, in particular in East–West relations, as well as the changes in military doctrines, can also be noted. Several concepts which were considered in the past as purely academic, theoretical or even utopian, such as 'non-offensive, non-provocative defence', 'civilian defence', 'military sufficiency', etc., are seen now as being practical.

All this leads to the thesis that the military factor loses to some extent its traditional importance and place in the concept of international security. Though this thesis can hardly be denied, especially in a global context, military threats to security cannot be ignored and the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons has not diminished. The process of developing sophisticated and technologically advanced 'intelligent' conventional weapons continues. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the transfer of military technology, as rightly stressed in the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* (1993), can therefore be considered as the major challenge to international security.[1] Though the volume of the arms trade and the export of arms to the Third World is now much lower than in the 1980s, this has mainly been achieved by the drastic reductions in arms sales by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe or, sometimes, their complete withdrawal from the arms market.[2]

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*   Since this book was written this has become known (since December 1992) as the Organization on Security and Development in Europe (OSCE) – Ed.

1.   *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, Vol. 18, p. 40, New York, United Nations, 1993.

2.   *SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993: Chapter 10, 'Arms Production and Arms Trade', pp. 415–20.

The decrease in military expenditure after the end of the Cold War is substantial. Nevertheless, it is much lower than expected and did not bring about the desired transfer of funds to development. Therefore the expectations concerning the so-called 'peace dividend' have not yet been realized. The military expenditures of the Third World remain at a distressing level and, in many cases, are several times higher than the budget spent on health and education combined.[3] The need for a further reduction in defence budgets is, thus, a priority for both developing and industrial nations.

The number of military conflicts in the world is still high. Though the fear that the end of the Cold War would result in increased global disorder has fortunately not been confirmed, none the less the expectation of the speedy construction of a conflict-free world has not been realized. Among more than forty conflicts in the contemporary world, less than half were inherited from the Cold War period. The others emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War, some being linked with the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia. There is also a risk of new conflicts, and their prevention is of no lesser priority than the solution of already existing ones.

The use of military force as an element of multinational efforts aimed at preserving or restoring peace requires profound reflection and redefinition. In some concrete situations, especially in preventing an aggression or in 'punishing' an aggressor, the use of force is still necessary and efficient. However, in the case of intra-state conflicts, which are now dominant, military power can hardly be considered as a means of ensuring a lasting resolution of a conflict or as a substitute for a political solution.

PART TWO

The notion of 'security' is becoming more and more polysemantic. The guarantee of survival, of stability in all its aspects and of preservation of cultural identity, the right to comprehensive and sustainable development, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms can be considered as the key

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3. See Hobart Rowen, 'Cut International Financing of Third World Arms', *International Herald Tribune*, 15 April 1994.

elements of a modern concept of security. If we agree with this thesis, we also have to acknowledge that genuine security cannot be assured by the accumulation of weapons. Moreover, even a high military potential does not itself bring a greater degree of security and stability. If other constituent elements of security are missing, high military expenditures become a destabilizing factor and may in some cases jeopardize the very existence of a state.

The deterioration of the environment now presents a global threat. Ecological problems often have a transboundary effect and even the most sophisticated weapons cannot protect a state from ecological threats. Deforestation, desertification, gradual loss of biodiversity, climate changes, thinning of the ozone layer, water and air pollution, and the growing contamination of the planet all create threats to the very survival of humankind. The environmental problem is proof that, if in the past a threat to the security of a state could be repulsed by the action undertaken by this state, either alone or in conjunction with other states, now such threats, because of their global dimension, can only be dealt with effectively through a planetary effort.

Another element which has to be kept in mind when describing a modern concept of security is the interdependence of all global problems. Thus, for example, uncontrolled demographic growth leads to further deterioration of the environment, impedes the possibility of sustainable development and brings about a number of other negative consequences, such as extreme poverty, marginalization and crime, all of which undermine stability on national, regional and global levels.

PART THREE

Which main trends have a direct or indirect influence on international security? An analysis leads to the conclusion that the evolution of the contemporary world is characterized by four megatrends: *globalization, regionalization, nationalism* and *democratization*. Globalization is generated by the deepening of international economic and political links and interdependencies, as well as by the need to respond together to global problems whose solution is only possible on a planetary scale. Regionalization is stimulated by the need for closer co-operation between neighbouring states in the search for solutions to common regional or

subregional economic, social and political problems. It is articulated through the creation of a number of organizations of regional integration, the most advanced being in Europe. Nationalism is the third megatrend and produces a great impact on the international situation. It has brought about the dissolution of several federal states and the creation of a number of new states, as well as the proliferation of attempts at secession and demands for the recognition and protection of cultural identity of various minority groups, be they national, ethnic, religious or linguistic. The fourth megatrend is democratization, which, after Latin America, is now gaining momentum in Central and Eastern Europe and Africa. All four trends have important implications for international security.

Globalization has an obvious positive influence. It emphasizes that all nations should co-operate closely in solving common environmental, economic and demographic problems. It presumes the recognition of the indivisibility of planetary sustainability and development and also underlines the fact that security cannot be achieved by isolated efforts. Globalization clearly shows that there is definitely a need for a global system of values based on planetary solidarity, embracing North and South, East and West, as well as burden-sharing and the recognition of the dignity of all human beings.

Regionalization strengthens regional security by increasing co-operation, by establishing common regional objectives and interests and by creating precedents concerning limitations of national sovereignty in the search for common goals. In this sense regionalization brings about so-called 'security communities' in which intra-organizational links, a high degree of co-operation and a common interest seriously limit the possibility that a member state acts to the detriment of the security of others. Regionalization, already well integrated in the globalization process, may reinforce it and thus bring about additional positive consequences for international security. However, one cannot exclude a potential danger linked to the temptation to ensure the interests of egoistic groups at the expense of other regions or even to the detriment of global environmental and economic security.

Growing *nationalism* is a most controversial trend. In some cases it may be seen as a phenomenon contributing to the consolidation and stability of states. However, nationalism creates serious problems in a world where most states are

bi- or multi-ethnic and many ethnic groups are divided by state boundaries. It encourages the tendency to 'unlimited' fragmentation of states and provokes tension and intra-state conflicts, as well as a danger of the involvement of third states. Moreover, in its extreme form, namely ethno-nationalism, it leads inevitably to discrimination, exclusion and violation of the human rights of persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. The analysis of the present situation seems to support the thesis that ethno-nationalism has become one of the most dangerous threats to internal as well as international security.

Democratization marks the transition from totalitarian and authoritarian regimes to a democratic civil society. This global trend has, without doubt, an important influence on international security. It is generally agreed that democracies do not declare war on one another and that, by their very nature, they are pacific. In a democracy, power stems from the will and consent of the people and not from military force. The latter therefore plays a less important role in democratic states than in dictatorial regimes, where military strength serves as a means both of internal coercion and of external prestige. Owing to the accountability of governments, which is one of the basic principles of democracy, questions of security are not taboo in democratic states. A greater level of transparency is thus ensured, which contributes to confidence-building in international relations. However, it may happen that the process of democratization increases instability.

This is particularly true in situations where democratization is related to the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, with the related high social costs, such as mass unemployment, decline of standards of living, etc. In cases where a crisis of identity and/or destabilization become dominant factors, the danger of internal conflicts increases and the emergence of an authoritarian or even a 'mafioso' regime cannot be excluded. However, in spite of the possible negative short- and medium-term consequences, the long-term impact of the democratization process on security is undoubtedly positive.

PART FOUR

Taking into account the various aspects of international security, mostly of a non-military character, one may ask whether the present security structures and mechanisms, inherited to a great extent from the Cold War era, are effective in the new situation and can provide an adequate response to the new challenges.

The collective security system envisaged in the United Nations Charter (Articles 43 and 45) foresaw that 'all members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security', make available to the Security Council 'armed forces, including national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement actions as well as assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security'. In order to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the creation of a Military Staff Committee, composed of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives, was envisaged (Article 47). Owing to differences between the permanent members of the Security Council during the Cold War, these provisions never were put into practice. Furthermore, any military action by the Security Council was in fact blocked by the right of veto.

In the new situation following the end of the Cold War, a relatively high degree of co-operation between the permanent members of the Security Council emerged. This is proved by the fact that, after 1990, the use of the veto ceased to be a common practice and therefore the question of the realization of all provisions of the Charter concerning the military components of collective security is again on the table. However, the solution is not that obvious.

The creation of United Nations military forces with air contingents and the establishment of a Military Staff Committee does not seem to be practicable in the near future. Does this mean that the United Nations, without its own military forces, is not capable of undertaking action regarding threats to and breaches of the peace and acts of aggression? The response of the United Nations to the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait points to the contrary.

The other question is related to the United Nations' capability to restore and maintain peace. A proposed analysis of this question was given by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in *An Agenda for Peace*. Boutros Boutros-Ghali mentioned four possible areas of action for the United Nations:

Preventive diplomacy: action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

Peace-making: action to bring hostile parties to agreement through means foreseen in Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Peace-keeping: action linked with the deployment of United Nations military and/or police personnel in areas of instability, with the consent of all the parties concerned.

Post-conflict peace-building: action to identify and support structures tending to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.[4]

An Agenda for Peace rightly emphasizes that action for peace cannot be limited to the use of military personnel or military means. It also stresses that United Nations involvement should not be limited to situations of existing or potential conflict, but its aim should be also 'to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression'.[5]

Thus *An Agenda for Peace* clearly indicates the importance of the non-military aspects of security and peace. Is the United Nations properly equipped and structured to address all military and non-military aspects of international security? In the ongoing discussions concerning restructuring of the United Nations a number of proposals and suggestions have been formulated. There is a high degree of agreement that in order to reflect better the changes in the political, military and economic situation, the Security Council should be given a higher degree of representativity, and its capacity to act on behalf of the international community as a whole should be strengthened. The number of its permanent members should be increased to include major economic (Germany

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4.   *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace-keeping,* New York, United Nations, 1992. (Document A/47/277.)
5.   Ibid.

and Japan) and regional powers (like Brazil, India and Nigeria) and its capacity to undertake preventive actions should be reinforced.

If we agree that the sources of present and potential conflicts are linked to underdevelopment, social injustice, exclusion, discrimination, violations of human rights, and environmental or other threats of a non-military character, we should also in consequence accept that the structure of the United Nations should be adjusted to permit adequate reactions to new challenges. In particular, the place and the role within the United Nations of such important areas as development and the environment should be further strengthened, both structurally and functionally. The role and the mandate of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as the principal United Nations organ in the economic and social fields also deserves further reflection. The significance of the human rights and democracy aspects of international security necessitates that each area should be effectively dealt with by the United Nations, which means the possible establishment of a new principal organ or body. Thus, for example, the creation of the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Resolution 48/141 of 20 December 1993) can be considered as a first step in this direction. A new, more effective role in all these areas should be also played by the United Nations Specialized Agencies.

However, the effectiveness of United Nations actions depends not only on the structure and the membership of its principal organs, but is primarily determined by the will of Member States to agree with the need for such a new role, including the creation of the relevant legal and financial conditions. This inevitably brings about the question of acceptance of the limitation of state sovereignty. Further reflection on the concept of domestic jurisdiction and the acceptance of the supremacy of international law, as well as a new interpretation of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, including the reinforcement of procedures of verification and control, together with those based on individual and collective petitions and communications, are needed to increase the possibility of effective United Nations action in cases of gross and massive violations of human rights, non-compliance with the emerging principle of democratic legitimacy, inter-group conflicts and internal strife.

The thesis concerning the further limitation of state sovereignty should not be interpreted as a call for the elimination of states as the principal actors in

international relations. The weakening of states, their erosion and, in some cases, even their 'implosion', as well as their incapacity to ensure public order and to fulfil other functions, in particular in the social and cultural fields, may be seen as an additional source of instability and as a threat to security.

The question of the elimination of non-military sources of conflict and threats to security is by no means limited to the United Nations. A specific role must be played by regional organizations, as the international system of security will be more efficient if it is complemented by regional systems. However, experience shows that the possibility of a regional organization undertaking military action against an aggressor is either limited or non-existent. Regional organizations can therefore complement the international system of security mainly by actions aimed at the prevention, mitigation or control of internal conflicts, by peace-keeping activities and by the reduction or elimination of non-military threats to security.

In the European framework, the most recent example of actions in this direction is the creation of a CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities with the competence to provide 'early warning' and, when appropriate, 'early action' with regard to tensions involving national minority issues that have the potential to develop into a conflict.

Similarly, the initiative undertaken by the European Union with the adoption of a Pact on Stability in Europe. In a document adopted by the Inaugural Conference (Paris, May 1994) the participating states declared that the time had come to provide a new impetus to overcoming any of the remaining divisive tendencies that history has bequeathed to the European continent by means of preventive measures, and to create a climate of confidence favourable to the strengthening of democracy, to respect for human rights and to economic progress and peace, while at the same time acknowledging the identities of peoples. The conference decided to organize round tables with a view to creating favourable conditions for the establishment and the improvement of good neighbourly relations, including questions related to minorities and borders.

PART FIVE

The analysis of the present world situation shows that a security system capable of coping effectively with threats and challenges, of both a military and non-military character, should be *common (collective), co-operative* and *multi-dimensional.*

Common security means that all members of the international community participate in the system, thus making it collective. It also means that this system is not directed against any state or group of states and that it reacts to violations of international law and security both non-selectively and objectively.

To be truly a common system, it should be based upon universal values and generally recognized norms and fundamental principles. The end of ideological rivalry between East and West created a historical opportunity to adopt such a universal system of values, including not only the fundamental norms of international law such as the prohibition of the use of force, the respect for territorial integrity, the inviolability of frontiers and peaceful resolution of conflicts, etc., but also human rights standards and democratic principles, as demonstrated by the adoption by consensus of the final documents of the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, Austria, 14–25 June 1993). This system of values should also include such ethical principles as solidarity and burden-sharing, without which it seems impossible to attain the ideal proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that 'everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized' (Article 28).

Co-operative security presumes active and close co-operation among states in all fields, including the military one, which will permit joint action aimed at solving problems and eliminating sources of conflict at global, regional and national levels. The existing megatrends, in particular globalization and regionalization, pave the way for the development of co-operative security.

In comparison with the concept of peaceful co-existence, which, in fact, is mainly limited to the recognition of the legitimacy of the other side and the non-use of force, co-operative security assumes active interaction and transparency, thus generating confidence-building and mutual understanding. The degree of co-operation foreseen by integration leads to the creation of a

'security community' within which military conflicts are unthinkable, owing to the preponderance of common interests.

In order to guarantee security and stability, the system should be *multi-dimensional*. This means that it should deal with inter-state conflicts of a global, regional, multilateral or bilateral character, as well as with intra-state conflicts, inasmuch as internal conflicts often have international implications. All levels of security are intimately linked and are interdependent. The solution of problems on an internal level helps to deal more effectively with them on other levels. A positive regional experience may also contribute to finding solutions on both national and global levels. The comprehensive character of international security presumes that it should deal with military aspects and with all non-military dimensions of security, such as environmental, developmental, social, cultural and legal.

The only international organization capable of implementing such a multi-dimensional system of security is the United Nations family, including its Specialized Agencies. Proposals to create a new universal organization to deal with security issues are not only unrealistic but conceptually unsound as nowadays security is linked with almost all spheres of human activity. Therefore the United Nations would remain the core of a multi-dimensional system of international security where the role of the emerging international civil society, representing the interests of individuals and groups through their non-governmental organizations, cannot be overlooked.

Though some global problems intimately linked with international security, like environment and development, have recently received wide coverage in specialized literature, partially as a result of the United Nations conferences on these subjects, other aspects of international security should be given more attention in the research agenda. This applies in particular to reflection on the notion of 'human security', recently introduced in the *Human Development Report 1994*, presented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Indeed, the human being has to be considered as the central subject and ultimate beneficiary of efforts aimed at the creation of a common (collective), co-operative and multi-dimensional system of security, for nowadays the creation of such a system without due account of human rights standards and democratic principles cannot be realized.

'Human security' in particular implies the right to live in dignity. This cannot be achieved simply through the implementation of political and civil rights but also by that of economic, social and cultural rights.

As the United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated fifty years ago: '. . . a new world order should be based on four freedoms: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship God in his own way, freedom from want and freedom from fear'.

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The present volume is devoted to the presentation of several non-military aspects of international security. It contains seven articles dealing with: the role of the human rights factor in international security (Michael Banton); the contribution of international organizations to the collective security system (Hans Günter Brauch); movements of people as a consequence of instability and conflicts (Bimal Ghosh); economic security (László Lang); the relationship between ecology, peace and security (Patricia M. Mische); environmental security (Keith D. Suter); and the social and cultural origins of violence (Håkan Wiberg).

Though these articles do not cover all questions linked with the non-military aspects of security, nevertheless they contribute, in our opinion, to ongoing reflection on the concept of international security and the role of the United Nations and other international organizations in its implementation.

We hope that readers interested in the issue of security will find this book useful.

The contribution of the United Nations and regional organizations to the collective security system: the European case

Hans Günter Brauch *

INTRODUCTION

Three global transformations (1917–20, 1944–48 and since 1989) and two efforts to establish a collective security system leading to the League of Nations and the United Nations can be distinguished in this century. While the first two global transformations emerged from the two world wars, the third resulted from a unique learning process ('new thinking') in the former USSR, which facilitated a non-violent and peaceful global change.

The first effort to establish a collective security system in the framework of the League of Nations failed for several reasons: the non-participation of the United States, the isolation of the Soviet Union, the revisionist aggressive efforts of Japan, Italy and Germany and the lack of a political will in its members to counter the violations of its Charter by collective force. The second effort to establish a collective security system, combined with elements of a concert of power, was paralysed from the outset by the emerging Cold War, which undercut the required unanimity (veto power) of the five permanent

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** See page 88 for list of abbreviations used in this article.

members of the Security Council.[1] A third effort has evolved from the 'velvet revolutions' since 1989.

In 1945, the United Nations Charter distinguished among three security systems:

(a) a universal system of collective security contained in Chapter VI on pacific settlement of disputes (Articles 33 to 38) and in Chapter VII on 'Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches to the peace and acts of aggression' (Articles 39 to 50);

(b) 'regional arrangements or agencies for dealing' with regional security issues in Chapter VIII (Articles 52 to 54); and

(c) a provision referring to the 'inherent right of individual or collective self-defence' contained in Article 51 appended to Chapter VII.

While the first two systems were to deal primarily with threats from within Member States, the third system was specifically oriented against an outside threat. These two systems were to perform two functions: peaceful settlement of disputes and peace enforcement and, in the 1950s, a third was added dealing with peace-keeping operations.

During the East–West conflict (1946–89), the old security architecture was based on the exception to the rule: on a system of collective self-defence. Owing to the prevailing conflict the global collective security system envisaged under Chapter VII and the regional arrangements under Chapter VIII were blocked. Bipolarity as the dominant structure of the Cold War international system, military alliances as the prevailing security system, and nuclear deterrence and arms control as the major means of containing the danger of a nuclear war and building blocks of the 'long peace' (Gaddis, 1987) have resulted in a 'militarization' of foreign policy considerations, the evolution of national security states, domestic processes of armaments dynamics and the most costly arms competition and arms transfers in world history. Now the

1.   In his report *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping* (New York, United Nations, 1992, A/47/277, S/24111), the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, observed: '14. . . . The United Nations was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes – 279 of them – cast in the Security Council, which were a vivid expression of the divisions of that period' (p. 4).

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bipolar system of collective self-defence through alliances is being replaced by a new multipolarity and a renaissance of universal and regional approaches to collective security.

Since 1990, the Security Council has based its peace-keeping and enforcement measures on Chapter VII. The institutional adaptations of the components of the old security architecture from 1990 to 1994 reflect an increasing emphasis on both the global and regional collective security systems, while maintaining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU) as insurance against the uncertainties of a turbulent, partly violent and often unpredictable transition process. Both alliances have lost their major *raison d'être* with the disappearance of 'threat'. However, given the multitude of old and new conflicts, the Security Council can only deal with those crises perceived as most urgent. To avoid a problem overload, the existing regional 'arrangements' under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, i.e. the Organization of American States (OAS), Organization of African Unity (OAU), Arab League and, since July 1992, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) or subregional organizations – European Union, CIS, ASEAN, ECOWAS – may develop instruments for solving political disputes and military conflicts.

Neither the United Nations Charter nor the Secretary-General's *Agenda for Peace*[2] (1992) offers a definition of the term 'region' or of 'regional arrangements and agencies'. Two levels of regionalism may be distinguished: the sub-state (federalism or separatism) and the supra-state regionalism. For the latter, Russett (1967, p. 11) distinguished among five aspects of regionalism: (a) social and cultural homogeneity; (b) similar attitudes or external behaviour; (c) political interdependence; (d) economic interdependence; and (e) geographic proximity. Regions may turn into a security community (Deutsch, 1967) if they have crossed a threshold of internal cultural and

2. '61. The Charter deliberately provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies, . . . Such associations or entities could include treaty-based organizations . . . regional organizations for mutual security and defence, organizations for general regional development or for co-operation on a particular economic topic or function, and groups created to deal with a specific political, economic or social issue or current concern' (S/24111, p. 17).

transactional variables. According to Nye (1977, p. 5) regional organizations are based on: '(1) formal agreement among governments, (2) possession of diplomatic forums, and (3) assistance from an associated international bureaucracy', while a 'regional system' could be defined as 'a regular pattern of interaction among independent political units in a region'. Nye distinguished regional organizations by 'their major official or formal function (military security, political diplomacy, economic development . . .); by the number of their functions (monofunctional versus multifunctional); by the controversiality of their functions ('technical' versus 'political'); by the size of their members (egalitarian or non-egalitarian); by the degree of geographical continuity of the memberships; and by a number of other criteria'.

He focused primarily on the contributions of 'micro-regional' or subregional economic organizations (European Community, EFTA) and 'macroregional' or regional political organizations (OAS, OAU, Arab League) to a peaceful world order. Regionalist peace doctrines developed after the Second World War. According to functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches, subregional economic organizations may 'spill over' into the political realm, thus creating an island of peace in the international system, while regional organizations focus specifically on maintaining peace and security by collective efforts of intra-regional conflict control, thus preventing solvable local issues turning into insoluble global problems and relieving the United Nations Security Council from problem overload. During the East–West conflict, the regional collective security systems according to Chapter VIII were as paralysed as the global system. With the end of global bipolar power and systemic conflict, the major impediment for the low performance of 'regional arrangements and agencies' has been removed. Owing to the old conflict, several economic organizations (for example, the European Community/European Union, ASEAN) have turned into stable subregional peace orders. Wars among its members have become impossible or improbable. Given the recent problem overload of the United Nations Security Council, a new division of labour of the global and of regional systems of collective security is needed. In the view of many sceptics (Wolfers, 1959; Joffe, 1992; Wolf, 1992; Roberts, 1993) the collective security system has failed in the past and is also bound to fail in the future. If so, these sceptics have not proved that systems of

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collective self-defence (alliances) are better suited to cope with the new security challenges.

Since 1990, the possible contributions of international institutions to a new stable order of peace and security have been reconsidered. All major security institutions (the United Nations, CSCE, NATO, WEU and the European Union) have incrementally adapted to these challenges. A parallelism between NATO and WEU and new collective security functions has emerged. While NATO has the infrastructure for collective action, it lacks the legitimacy to act. On the other hand, both the United Nations and the CSCE can offer the legitimacy, while they lack the means to implement the measures envisioned in Chapters VII and VIII.

As at mid 1994, both security systems failed to contain the ethnic-religious strife in the Balkans and in the former USSR and to build a new lasting order of peace and security. So far a new stable security architecture, based on a true security partnership between the West and Russia, has not been constructed. The United States interest in maintaining NATO as the instrument for its presence and influence in Europe has been a major obstacle to a further build-up of the CSCE, while the 'special relationship' with the Russian Federation was a major hindrance in extending NATO membership to the Visegrad states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and the Baltic states. The persistent interest of both the USSR and the Russian Federation has been to develop the CSCE into a regional collective security system in which Russia is both accepted and respected as a great power. In 1991, the Franco-German interest to build up the collective defence functions of the WEU and to gradually transform the European pillar of NATO into an organ of the European Union was blocked primarily by the United Kingdom and Italy. These diverging interests resulted in the creation of 'substitutes' – the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Stability Pact of the European Union, the associated membership in the WEU and the CSCE Forum on Security Co-operation (FSC) – with overlapping security functions, without, however, granting security guarantees. These different institutional preferences and security options are based on several theoretically oriented security perspectives.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND APPROACHES
FOR NEW SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Specialists in international relations have distinguished three major schools of thought which also offer alternative visions and institutional scenarios for a future security architecture based on different models: Hobbesian pessimists, Grotian pragmatists and Kantian optimists or internationalists:[3]

1. The *worst case* model in the Hobbesian or pessimist tradition assumes a violent end to the democratic development in the CIS states, a return to pre-First World War conflicts in the Balkans and traditional power struggles. These events may lead to a strengthening of NATO, a return to Western power politics and to limited military interventions in the East. Some even assume that the disintegration in the East may also lead to a disintegration in the West, a decay of the European Union and to a return to the classical power competition among major industrial powers.[4]

2. The *pragmatic* model in the Grotian tradition assumes a mixture of national power policy and continued integration with an enhanced role for international institutions. After a turbulent transition, gradually a new co-operative pan-European security arrangement may evolve in the CSCE framework.[5]

3. The *optimist* model in the Kantian tradition assumes that a new order of democratic states within a co-operative pan-European order of peace and security may lead to a just and lasting eternal peace.[6]

By summer 1994, the optimist model has become obsolete, at least as a perspective for the near future. The theoretically oriented debate on the assumptions, goals and components of a future security architecture are influenced by two opposite perspectives: the Waltzian theory of structural realism in the Hobbesian pessimist tradition and liberal institutionalism in the Grotian pragmatic

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3. See Bull, 1977; Wight, 1991; Haftendorn, 1991, p. 7. My own thinking inspired Everts and van Staden, 1993.
4. Waltz, 1959, 1979, 1993; Mearsheimer, 1990; Craddock and Harf, 1993; Everts and van Staden, 1993; Malnes, 1993.
5. Bull et al., 1992; Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992.
6. Doyle, 1986, 1991; Sorensen, 1992; Russett, 1993.

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tradition. From the perspective of structural realism, given the anarchy in the international realm, only systems of collective self-defence (alliances and, from the United States perspective only, NATO) are able to respond to the security dilemma. On the other hand, liberal neo-institutionalists have argued that co-operative strategies and security institutions aiming at collective security may be better suited to cope with the new security challenges. While many Hobbesian pessimists have disregarded the security impact of economic integration, many Grotian pragmatists have pointed to the close connection between economic progress and political and military stability. In my view, while the pessimist model diagnoses many features of present instabilities, conflicts and crises in Europe, most of its prescriptions are nevertheless in contradiction both with reality and with the institutional adaptations of the old security architecture. Only the pragmatic Grotian or neo-institutionalist approach has some explanatory and predictive value.

From the perspective of integration theory, two approaches for the creation of international organizations may be distinguished: (a) a federalist (C. J. Friedrich) and (b) a functionalist (David Mitrany) process. From a federalist perspective, international organizations are created by the élites of the participating states on the basis of a contract (treaty) in which they transfer a part of their national sovereignty to the new subject in international law: that is, the political tasks or functions are to be developed within this legal framework (function follows form). Examples for the federalist approach are the United Nations and the European Community or European Union.

From a functionalist perspective, international institutions are established for specific political functions, tasks or issue areas. As a consequence of the expansion of the tasks, the need for co-ordination and thus for the institutionalization of an international process increases (form follows function). Examples for the functionalist approach are the European Political Co-operation, an intergovernmental process of the European Community members that was set up in 1969 and given its legal form in the Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992), and the CSCE, whose institutionalization was started with the Paris Charter for a New Europe in 1990.

With respect to the creation of a new pan-European security architecture, a unique opportunity for a federalist perspective was missed in November 1990

at the Paris Summit. Then most NATO countries were not ready to give up NATO for a new regional collective security system. They entered, rather, into a process of gradual institutionalization of the CSCE process. This process of institutional adaptation followed the functionalist approach. However, functionalist adaptations are insufficient to respond to the new challenges with which the Northern hemisphere is confronted.

What relevance do the three visions of Hobbes, Grotius and Kant and the global and regional systems of collective security referred to in the United Nations Charter, as well as the federalist and functionalist perspectives, have for an interpretation of the changes in the European security architecture which have occurred since 1990?

THE END OF THE PREVAILING COLD WAR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (1949–89)

The United Nations collective security system is the result of a fundamental compromise that combines elements of a hierarchical system of Franklin D. Roosevelt's 'four world policemen' of the Second World War coalition with regional components based on the experience in the Western hemisphere (for example, the Pan American Union) and the regional aspirations of the League of Arab States. Thus, the debate about the specific relationships between the universal organization of the United Nations and its three, and more recently four, 'regional arrangements or agencies' (Article 52 of the United Nations Charter) – the League of Arab States (22 March 1945), the Organization of American States (2 September 1947), the Organization of African Unity (25 May 1963) and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (10 July 1992) – has been a theme for international lawyers and specialists in international relations. Twice the linkages between the universal system of collective security and its 'regional arrangements or agencies' were debated.

The first debate occurred at Chapultepec (21 February to 8 March 1945) and at the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) in San Francisco from 25 April to 26 June 1945. The second debate started after the end of the Cold War with the publication of *An Agenda for Peace*

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by the United Nations Secretary-General and in the Helsinki Declaration (10 July 1992), when the heads of state and governments of fifty-one CSCE countries stated 'that the CSCE is a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations'. Thus Chapultepec and Helsinki stand for both a historical and a topical debate on how security among Member States within a region can best be obtained to contain hostilities, to end violent conflicts and to develop structures, procedures, processes and institutions for co-operation, peaceful settlement of disputes and a lasting peace order (Brauch, 1994).

During the East–West conflict from 1945/46 to 1989/90, both the universal and the regional systems of collective security were paralysed as a result of the global bipolar system. Since 1945, both United Nations enforcement measures, in Korea in 1950 and in Iraq in 1990, did not follow the provisions of Article 43 to Article 50 of the United Nations Charter. On 3 November 1950, it was the General Assembly that approved the military operation led by the United States in Korea in its 'Uniting for Peace Resolution' and, on 29 November 1990, a few days after the CSCE Summit in Paris, the Security Council approved the ultimatum against Iraq which permitted the use of force by a coalition of countries after 15 January 1991. The cease-fire resolution of the Security Council, establishing the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, for the first time empowered a United Nations group to monitor the destruction of ABC-weapons and their production facilities.

As a major outcome of the global transformation, the system of collective security was given a second chance after 1945 (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Since 1990, this system has moved to the 'centre of international efforts to deal with unresolved problems of the past decades as well as an emerging array of present and future issues'. The United Nations is now confronted with many new complex issues that require a new 'intellectual struggle' and 'the fullest consultation, participation and engagement of all states' as well as 'the empowerment of people in civil society and a hearing for their voices at all levels of international society and institutions' (Boutros-Ghali, 1992/93).

During the East–West conflict the three 'regional arrangements or agencies' of the United Nations were hampered by the conflict itself. In particular, asymmetrical regional agencies (for example, the OAS) were sometimes

instrumentalized as a tool of this very conflict within the region to further national interests. Others, such as the Arab League, were paralysed by conflicts among their members, for instance in August 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Furthermore, the OAU often lacked the consensus and the resources to act. However, this does not imply that regional organizations are bound to fail in the future.

Mr Boutros-Ghali referred to the political potential of regional organizations that could take over major activities from the United Nations and thus prevent a problem overload which already hampers the organization and has led to delays. Both in his *An Agenda for Peace* and in his report to the 47th session of the General Assembly in September 1992, the Secretary-General called for a new division of labour between the global and the regional organizations in which the United Nations should maintain its leading position but be relieved of many of the associated burdens. The modalities of this co-operation have still to be worked out, as both the United Nations and the regional organizations have to redefine their goals, tasks and missions.

While major wars have become obsolete since 1990 (Mueller, 1989), the world has become more insecure owing to new ethnic and nationalist conflicts. A survey by Wallensteen and Axell (1993) and by the Uppsala group (Amer et al., 1993) on major armed conflicts from 1989 to 1992 recorded eighty-two armed conflicts in sixty locations, among them thirty-five wars with at least 1,000 battle-related casualties. Thus globally the number of minor armed conflicts and wars has increased since 1989, while intermediate armed conflicts have slightly decreased. Since 1989 the number of minor and intermediate armed conflicts as well as wars has increased in Europe, the Middle East and Africa and decreased in the Americas. NATO and the WEU were unable to handle these new conflicts because none of them provoked the *casus foederis* of the collective self-defence system; the Security Council was increasingly confronted with problem overload and financial undercommitment, while the CSCE, as the new 'regional arrangement', lacked both the legal framework and the resources of an international organization. What conclusions did the United Nations Secretary-General draw in his analysis and how did the Security Council react to his proposals?

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A VISION: FOUR CENTRAL TASKS
OF THE *AGENDA FOR PEACE*

On 31 January 1992, the Secretary-General was requested by the heads of state and governments of the Security Council to make specific recommendations on strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations, especially on preventive diplomacy and the creation and maintenance of peace, with a special emphasis on the possible contributions of regional organizations to the work of the Security Council in agreement with Chapter VIII. In his *An Agenda for Peace*, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali distinguished between: preventive diplomacy, an action to prevent the arising, escalation and spreading of conflicts; peace-making, an action to settle conflicts peacefully under Chapter VI; peace-keeping, a deployment of a civilian or United Nations military presence in the field; and peace-building to develop structures that will strengthen peace.

On preventive diplomacy, he recommended measures to build confidence, fact-finding missions, early warning activities, preventive deployment of forces and demilitarized zones. With respect to peace-making under Chapter VI, he called on the Security Council to use its new influence and on the General Assembly to intensify its efforts for mediation, negotiation and settlement. The United Nations should ameliorate circumstances through assistance and should help those countries specifically affected by the implementation of sanctions.

On peace-keeping activities, the Secretary-General called upon the states to supply information on forces they could make available to the United Nations on call. He also requested the General Assembly to establish a reserve fund of $50 million for peace-keeping operations. These activities should be paid for by defence ministries rather than foreign ministries. He suggested additional post-conflict peace-building measures, such as the removal of land-mines, repatriation of refugees, reconstruction of water and electricity services and support for the build-up of government facilities. For the implementation of this peace agenda, co-operation with regional arrangements should be intensified, given that the reduced political attractiveness to foster client conflicts or to intervene on behalf of one party, for example in Africa, has declined. The opportunity for

regional or subregional conflict solution or war termination has already increased, as the case of the ECOWAS force in Liberia has shown.[7] Thus, the Secretary-General dropped the narrow definition of regional organizations, such as OAS, OAU and the Arab League. He does not formally elaborate the relationship between the United Nations and these bodies; instead, he recommends using their resources for the new United Nations peace agenda which should be governed by Chapter VIII, with the Security Council remaining the primary actor:

65. Regional arrangements and agencies have not in recent decades been considered in this light, even when originally designed in part for a role in maintaining or restoring peace within the regions of the world. Today a new sense exists that they have contributions to make. Consultations between the United Nations and the regional arrangements and agencies could do much to build international consensus on the nature of the problem and the measures required to address it. . . . Should the Security Council choose specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort. (S/24111, p. 18)

Should some of these recommendations be supported by the Member States and implemented at long last, the United Nations may be given a second chance to create a system of collective security. With the Helsinki decisions of the CSCE and the complementary offers by NATO and the WEU, as well as the proposals

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7.   As the United Nations Secretary-General noted: '62. [. . .] In Africa, three different regional groups – the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference – joined efforts with the United Nations regarding Somalia. In the Asian context, the Association of South-East Asian Nations and individual States from several regions were brought together with the parties to the Cambodian conflict at an international conference in Paris, to work with the United Nations. For El Salvador, a unique arrangement – 'The Friends of the Secretary-General' – contributed to agreements reached through the mediation of the Secretary-General. . . . Efforts undertaken by the European Community and its Member States, with the support of States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, have been of central importance in dealing with the crisis in the Balkans and neighbouring areas' (S/24111, pp. 17–18).

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of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the first steps have been taken for an incremental establishment of a regional collective security system for CSCE-Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

THE RESPONSE BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The initial reaction to these proposals of the Bush Administration (but also of France and the United Kingdom) was rather sceptical.[8] In September 1992, the Security Council set up a working group to study them. At the suggestion of the non-aligned movement and the Rio-Group states, the General Assembly debated the Secretary-General's proposals as well. On 29 October, the President of the Security Council declared that his body was closely co-ordinating its deliberations on the Secretary-General's report with those of the General Assembly (S/24728). It would discuss the report once a month and its conclusions would be considered by a special session of the Council in Spring 1993.

Initially, two recommendations were considered: (a) on the readiness of countries to make forces available on call for peace-keeping missions and (b) on the enlargement of the manpower and capacity of military officers and civilians available for peace-keeping operations in the United Nations Secretariat. The Security Council suggested that the Secretary-General establish a planning staff for peace-keeping and peace-enforcement measures and that Member States make available, on a limited time basis, experienced military and civilian personnel for these purposes (S/24872 and S/25036).

In 1992, Mr Boutros-Ghali repeatedly proposed a strengthening of regional organizations in crisis management by calling on the CSCE to strengthen its

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8. Paul Lewis (*New York Times*, 6 September 1992) commented: 'Of the five big powers with permanent Security Council seats, diplomats here say that China . . . seems the most hostile toward the Secretary-General's proposals. . . . Russia is the most enthusiastic. The United States is expected to oppose most of the Secretary-General's financial proposals. . . . Britain and France appear to support many of the Secretary-General's ideas in principle but are wary of anything that would weaken their own status as permanent Council members, which richer countries like Germany and Japan are increasingly contesting.'

structures and procedures for crisis avoidance, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes and for close consultations in those areas of common efforts and requesting a more active role of regional organizations in support of the United Nations and its Charter.[9]

On 28 January 1993, the President of the Security Council commented on paragraphs 63, 64 and 65 of *An Agenda for Peace*, in which the Secretary-General had called for a new division of labour between the United Nations and its regional arrangements and agencies (S/25184). The Security Council suggested that these regional bodies consider, within the framework of their specific regional conditions, measures of preventive diplomacy, fact-finding, confidence-building measures, good services and peace-building, as well as ways and means to further improve the co-ordination of co-operation with the United Nations. Its President recommended close consultations between the Secretary-General and the regional arrangements and agencies as well as a full exchange of information. The Security Council called on the Secretary-General to transmit these recommendations to all regional agencies and to report before the end of April 1993 on the response. It also suggested establishing a forum for co-operation between the United Nations and the regional agencies. On 26 February 1993, the President of the Security Council responded on paragraph 28 dealing with preventive deployment of forces as part of preventive diplomacy and in the framework of peace-making on the amelioration through assistance and on paragraphs 56 to 59 on post-conflict peace-building (S/25344). On 31 March 1993, he replied on paragraphs 66 to 68 dealing with the safety of United Nations personnel (S/25493). A month later, on 30 April 1993, his statement focused on paragraphs dealing with post-conflict peace-building (S/25696). On 28 May 1993, in his final statement, assessing the Agenda for Peace (S/25859), he requested the Secretary-General: to submit a follow-up report with specific recommendations on the strengthening of those units in the Secretariat dealing with peace-keeping and military tasks; to ask for notification from Member States on which troops and capabilities they would make available to the United Nations on a case-by-case basis; to maintain

9.   *UNO Woche*, Vol. 8, No. 29, 15 July 1992, pp. 6–7; No. 30, 22 July 1992, pp. 2–3; No. 37/38, 16 September 1992, pp. 2–4.

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reserve equipment for peace-keeping and humanitarian operations; to establish national training programmes for military and police personnel; to strengthen non-military peace-keeping operations. The President of the Security Council suggested expanding financial resources for peace-keeping operations. The Security Council specifically welcomed the role of regional arrangements and agencies. In the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council appealed to the regional arrangements and agencies to strengthen their contribution to the maintenance of peace and security. The Security Council indicated its readiness to support and facilitate peace-keeping operations in the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter. Furthermore, it looked forward to the report of the Secretary-General on co-operation between the United Nations and the regional agencies. On 15 June 1993, the Secretary-General submitted a report (A/47/1965-S/25944) on the implementation of the recommendations in his *An Agenda for Peace.*

In his annual report to the 48th session of the General Assembly in September 1993, Mr Boutros-Ghali (1993, pp. 95–179) discussed the United Nations efforts in 'expanding preventive diplomacy, humanitarian assistance and conflict resolution'. However, he did not specifically mention the relationship between the United Nations and its 'regional arrangements and agencies'. By 1994, a problem overload and a performance gap confronted the United Nations, which had initiated more peace-keeping operations since 1989 than during the previous thirty years. The United Nations lacked both the resources and the infrastructure to manage and solve an ever-increasing number of civil wars and ethno-religious conflicts.[10]

NEW SECURITY ORDER IN EUROPE: FROM VANCOUVER TO VLADIVOSTOK

Three basic terms require clarification: Europe, security and international organizations of relevance for such a regional collective security system.

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10.   J. Preston, *Guardian Weekly*, 7 February 1993, p. 17.

WHICH EUROPE ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?

Hettne (1991) distinguished four categories for world regions: (a) a geographic concept; (b) a historical formation; (c) an organizational perspective; and (d) an analytical concept. Here 'Europe' will be used both as an organizational perspective and as an analytical concept applied to the security area. At least six concepts of Europe can thus be distinguished:

1. Several geographically limited small Europes of European Community/European Union, EFTA or WEU.
2. NATO's transatlantic security and value community.
3. The Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok of the CSCE.
4. The Europe from Portugal to Poland of an enlarged European Community, without North America and the CIS.
5. The dated Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals of the CFE treaty.
6. The former Euro-Asian socialist Europe of WTO and Comecon.

While the Euro-Asian socialist Europe of the WTO and Comecon has disappeared, the Gaullist Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals will be obsolete with the implementation of the CFE and CFE IA treaties. At present the first three concepts comprise the European security system. By the year 2000, the third – the CSCE – and the fourth – an enlarged European Union – will be central.

WHICH SECURITY ARE WE AIMING AT?

Security as a social value and as a societal goal can be defined, in objective terms, as the absence of a danger or threat and, in subjective terms, as a feeling or certainty of protection against dangers. While national security in a narrow sense focused on problems of keeping the peace with military means (Buzan, 1983, 1987; Frei and Gaupp, 1978), since the 1970s and 1980s the concept has been extended to comprise non-military, that is, political, economic and ecological aspects[11] (Jahn et al., 1987; Krell, 1980). This chapter is limited to primarily 'military' and 'political security' tasks.

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11. According to Buzan et al., 1990, p. 4, the wider concept comprises at least five components: 'Military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive

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The term 'security architecture' will be used for the totality of institutional structures, procedures and processes that include both systems of collective self-defence (alliances) directed against an outside threat and collective security arrangements that deal with aggression originating from within. While the old Cold War security architecture relied both on the nation-state and on a bipolar alliance system aiming at military security in a competitive and often confrontational manner, the new post-Cold War security architecture should aim at a new European order of peace and security based on regional collective security arrangements in which co-operative interaction patterns and conflict solution mechanisms dominate. The old narrow and militarily dominated security policy should gradually be replaced by common efforts to secure the survival of humankind and the environment. However, it must also deal with new global security risks and challenges, for example water scarcity, population growth, migration and climate change (Möller, 1994).

None of the old competitive strategies can solve these new problems, either at the global or at the regional level. In the Northern hemisphere, new common or mutual security concepts are needed to deal with both new military and non-military challenges (Palme, 1982; Smoke and Kortunov, 1991). Conflict solution can only be conceptualized as non-zero sum games. With the departure of 'threat', military alliances have become obsolete. However, in a transition period, they provide the military infrastructure and means for regional institutions to counter aggression and violence in the framework and under the command of newly emerging regional collective security systems.

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and defensive capabilities of states and states' perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance, and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. It is well understood that these five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other, Each defines a focal point and a way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together in a strong web of linkages.' See also Waever et al., 1993.

GLOBAL CHANGE: DISARMAMENT SUCCESS AND NEW ARMS CONTROL TASKS

The optimist perspectives for the creation of a just and lasting European order of peace and security of 1990 (Senghaas, 1990, 1992), based on the Paris Charter for the New Europe, rapidly disappeared. The contextual change since 1989 has been instrumental in the signing of several significant arms control and real disarmament agreements, but it has also placed new issues on the arms control agenda: to contain horizontal and vertical proliferation and new sources of political instability.

Since 1990, several major nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements have been achieved between the United States of America and the former Soviet Union: the START I Treaty of 31 July 1991 and the START II Treaty of 3 January 1993 between the United States and the Russian Federation. In May 1991, the INF Treaty was fully implemented. On the multilateral level in Europe these disarmament and CSBM agreements have been signed:

The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of November 1990 among the then twenty-two members of NATO and the WTO, which was supplemented by a Final Protocol of the now twenty-nine parties to the treaty on 5 June 1992.

The Vienna Document of [November] 1990 on Confidence- and Security-building Measures of the then thirty-four CSCE states.

The Open Skies Treaty of 24 March 1992 of twenty-five CSCE states.

The Vienna Document of [March] 1992 on Confidence- and Security-building Measures of the then forty-eight CSCE states.

The Final Act on the Negotiations on Manpower Strength of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE IA Treaty) of 10 July 1992 of twenty-nine CSCE states.

In addition, the reciprocal unilateral announcements of President Bush on 27 September 1991 and Gorbachev's speech on 4 October 1991 to withdraw all land-based short-range nuclear missiles and artillery had been implemented by mid 1992. In his State of the Union speech of 27 January 1992, President Bush offered additional unilateral and reciprocal nuclear disarmament measures. A day later, Russian President Yeltsin replied by announcing unilateral and

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reciprocal nuclear disarmament measures of his own. Thus, elements of a gradualist strategy complemented traditional arms control by negotiations.

Without any treaty, all American chemical weapons were withdrawn from Germany by September 1990. According to a statement by the last Soviet Defence Minister Shaposhnikov in September 1991, all Soviet nuclear weapons had then been withdrawn from the former German Democratic Republic and Poland as well as from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. By the end of June 1992, all Soviet tactical nuclear weapons had also been transferred to the Russian Federation from the other CIS member states. Thus a nuclear disengagement or a nuclear weapon-free zone has been achieved in Europe from the Baltic through Central Europe to the Balkans.

Nevertheless, the weapons innovation process, at least in the West, continues unabated (Brauch et al., 1992). Since 1990, the public focus has shifted to horizontal proliferation issues, that is, ABC weapons, ballistic missiles and dual-use technologies, as well as to the 'brain drain' of weapons experts from the CIS to Third World countries. While the 'horizontal proliferation' of ABC weapons and missiles is addressed, the proliferation of conventional weapons continues without any major national constraints, at least for the major arms exporters. The new arms register adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1991 neither aims nor is able to curb these transfers.

THE NEW POLITICAL AGENDA IN EUROPE

With the end of the East–West conflict, the political agenda in Europe has fundamentally changed. Two opposite political trends presently confront Europe: a gradual peaceful integration in Western Europe and a rapid political and economic disintegration in Eastern Europe.

On 1 July 1990, with the implementation of the currency, economic and social union of Germany, the European community was de facto enlarged by 17 million consumers. Since then, Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway have applied for European Union membership; this was endorsed by the European Parliament in May 1994. In December 1991, association agreements between the European Community/European Union and Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) and Hungary were signed. The Maastricht

Treaty for a European Union laid the foundations for a currency union and for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). On 1 November 1993, the Maastricht Treaty entered into force. New subregional groups have also been established among the states of the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea and in Central Europe.

With the collapse of the 'Communist system', old subdued ethnic and religious conflicts have re-emerged. Violent ethnic strife erupted within and between several of these former Soviet republics, between Armenia and Azerbaijan and within the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan. The disintegration of former Yugoslavia into five states has resulted in the most violent and brutal conflict in Europe since 1945. The second democratic parliamentary election in the CSFR on 5–6 June 1992 initiated the break-up into two independent states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which was peacefully realized on 1 January 1993. Thus, since the signing of the Paris Charter for a New Europe the map of CSCE-Europe has been redrawn and its membership has increased from thirty-four in June 1991 to fifty-two in January 1993. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is still suspended and the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia has not yet been admitted, owing to Greek opposition.

These conflicting tendencies, integration in the West and disintegration in the East, require comprehensive Western financial and economic aid programmes to contain the causes of social unrest and of ethno-religious and nationalist strife before they explode into violence. None of these new military conflicts can be resolved by the old alliance system. The social consequences of the global contextual change necessitates major institutional adaptations and transformations of the relics of the old security architecture.

NEW CHALLENGES FOR EUROPE: A TEST FOR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The Second Gulf War (1990–91), the civil war in Yugoslavia (since July 1991) and the nationalist conflicts in the CIS between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, in the Republic of Moldova in the Dniester area, in Georgia and in Tajikistan have challenged all existing security organizations in Europe. All of these conflicts are outside the scope of NATO and WEU and do

not pose any direct military threat to its member states. In the 1990s, European security policy in a broader sense is confronted primarily with economic, ecological, political and societal challenges which may lead to military conflicts. The most likely politico-military challenges confronting Europe are:

1. Ethnic, religious and societal domestic conflicts (for example Yugoslavia, CIS).
2. Military consequences of the unhampered export of modern conventional weapons and dual-use technologies.
3. Military and societal conflicts at the periphery as a consequence of economic degradation: from North Africa to the Middle East and South Asia.
4. Migration movements of the poor from the South and the East to the European Community/European Union.
5. Economic and trade conflicts between the major centres of growth in the Northern hemisphere, between the United States, the European Union, the CIS states and Japan.

It appears unlikely that the so-called 'North–South' conflict will pose a fundamental challenge to European security and survival. Far more challenging and damaging are the economic rivalries and conflicts among the major growth centres in the Northern hemisphere, for example between the United States, the European Union and Japan. Furthermore, the new environmental challenges – air and water pollution, global warming, erosion of the ozone layer and climatic changes – require co-operative strategies in existing or new regimes and institutional frameworks. Which alternative models for a European security order exist that could prevent, de-escalate and suffocate ethno-religious and nationalist conflicts of this new type in former Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus and contribute to co-operative solutions to non-military challenges? How did the European security institutions react to the appeal of the Secretary-General supported by the Security Council to strengthen regional arrangements and agencies under Chapter VIII?

THE ADAPTATION OF EXISTING
SECURITY INSTITUTIONS FROM 1990 TO MAY 1994

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), five international organizations remain of relevance in dealing with 'military' and 'political security' tasks:

1. NATO with its geographical boundaries as defined in Article 6 of its treaty.
2. The WEU with its legally binding requirement under Article 5 to assist a partner against an aggressor.
3. The European Union with its emerging common foreign and security policy.
4. The CSCE process, which is still based on a legally non-binding political agreement.
5. The collective security system of the United Nations under Chapters VII and VIII.

Until 1990/91, the old security architecture was bipolar, with two rival military (NATO and WEU *v.* WTO) and economic (European Community and EFTA *v.* Comecon) institutional settings. In mid 1991, both the Warsaw Pact and Comecon were formally dissolved. After the transformation of twelve out of fifteen former republics of the USSR into a loose 'Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS), it is still uncertain whether the CIS will become a counterpart to the European Union or whether the disintegration process will continue in the new sovereign states. How has this old security architecture adapted to the changes since 1989? How have NATO, WEU, the European Union and the CSCE, as well as the United Nations, responded to these new opportunities and challenges?

NATO: from confrontation to partnership, 1990 to June 1994

As a consequence of the global structural change, NATO's visionary Harmel Plan of 1967 has become a reality: Germany is reunited and the division of Europe has been overcome. However, 'the ultimate political purpose of the Alliance ... to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees' has not yet been achieved. Since 1990,

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NATO's policy has been reactive and has lacked a longer-term grand design and the visionary element of the Harmel Report. However, irrespective of the global contextual change, Lord Ismay's comment on NATO's basic goal still applies: 'to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans fully integrated'. Since 1990, five stages in NATO's incremental adaptation can be distinguished:

1. The shift from SNF modernization (Brussels, 1989) to a downgrading of nuclear weapons as 'weapons of last resort' (London, 1990).
2. The approval of a new strategy and the establishment of a new consultative mechanism: the NACC (Rome, 1991).
3. The offer of aid for the peace-keeping missions of the United Nations and CSCE (Oslo, 1992).
4. The opposition to an eastward enlargement (Travemünde, 1993) and the offer of a partnership for peace (Brussels, 1994).
5. The offer of a special relationship with the Russian Federation (Brussels/Istanbul, 1994).

While in May 1989, on NATO's fortieth anniversary, the dispute on SNF modernization still prevailed, at its London Summit in July 1990 the heads of NATO states and governments downgraded nuclear weapons to 'weapons of last resort' and called for better relations with the Warsaw Pact members. In November 1991, at the Summit in Rome, NATO members adopted a new alliance strategy and future security structure. In the 'Rome Declaration', they also agreed that a network of interlinking institutions should respond to the new challenges whereby NATO, CSCE, WEU, the European Community and the Council of Europe should reinforce each other in a new security structure. NATO should remain the 'essential forum for consultation' among the allies. A strengthening of the WEU as a means of enhancing NATO's European pillar was supported and a North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) was established in which NATO's sixteen nations and the former members of the WTO, including the former republics of the USSR, but not the European neutral and non-aligned (N&N) states, would co-operate. Thus, a first institutional element of a new permanent pan-European security dialogue was formed to facilitate the implementation of the CFE treaty.

In December 1991, NATO's defence ministers called for a strengthening of

the CSCE institutions and mechanisms and offered their support in areas of its collective experience. In May 1992, at a joint Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and Defence Planning Committee (DPC) meeting, they offered the resources and experience of the alliance for the peace-keeping operations of the CSCE. In Oslo, in June 1992, NATO's foreign ministers agreed that the CSCE should become a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter and that NATO would be ready to offer the CSCE, on a case-by-case basis and in agreement with NATO procedures, resources and experience for peace-keeping operations under the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council or with its endorsement of the CSCE. On 23 October 1992, NATO's NPG meeting in Gleneagles (United Kingdom) focused on the war in the former Yugoslavia and on NATO's approach to peace-keeping.[12] At the same time, senior NATO officials expressed their disappointment that the CSCE had not lived up to expectations. On 11 December 1992, NATO's DPC decided to develop training measures, to supply infrastructure and to make the preparation for peace-keeping operations a major NATO mission for all members.[13] On 17 December 1992 NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) repeated its commitment to CSCE and United Nations peace-keeping missions and support on a case-by-case basis. The NAC supported a further strengthening of CSCE structures and an enlargement of its competence and operative activities in conflict prevention and adopted a document on its working relations with the WEU. NATO endorsed the CSCE efforts in conflict prevention and the strict implementation of United Nations sanctions, and offered its readiness to supply manpower and equipment to UNPROFOR II headquarters.[14]

These statements indicate that NATO could not act on its own under its Treaty and by international law and that it could only assist activities by the United Nations and the CSCE in response to new conflicts. In early 1993, NATO's search for a new identity and for new tasks continued while the gap between political declarations on crises in East-Central Europe widened. It was

12.   *US Policy, Information and Texts (USPIT)*, No. 130, 23 October 1992, pp. 27–36.
13.   *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)*, 12 December 1992
14.   *Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany*, No. 141, 29 December 1992, pp. 1305–9.

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stressed that NATO should remain an alliance for collective self-defence and not be transformed into a service organization for United Nations or CSCE missions.

On 25 and 26 May 1993, at the joint DPC and NPG meeting in Brussels, the defence ministers considered the political guidelines for national and collective defence planning in NATO up to the year 2000 and the implications of NATO's offer to contribute to United Nations and CSCE peace-keeping missions for its own defence planning.[15] At its meeting in Athens on 10 June 1993, the NAC supported the UNPROFOR mandate of the United Nations Security Council, the Vance–Owen plan, and indicated its readiness to contribute to its implementation under the authority of the United Nations Security Council in co-operation with the WEU. The ministers referred to their efforts to reach a common understanding with NACC members on conceptual issues of peace-keeping. The central question of an extension of NATO to the East remained controversial among its members.[16]

On 19 and 20 October 1993, at the joint DPC and NPG meeting in Trave-münde, the defence ministers discussed requests for membership by the Visegrad states.[17] The defence ministers agreed that NATO would only accept a United Nations mandate if it could act on its own responsibility and decide which military forces were to be used. Given the United States opposition to an extension of NATO to the East, NATO defence ministers endorsed as a first step Les Aspin's proposal to enter into bilateral 'Partnership for Peace' (PfP) treaties with members of the NACC for joint participation in peace-keeping missions.[18] The United States defence minister stressed that NATO would remain a mili-

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15. *Bulletin*, No. 46, 2 June 1993, pp. 501–3; *FAZ*, 25 May 1993; R. Cohen, *International Herald Tribune (IHT)*, 27 May 1993; J. Lancaster, *IHT*, 26 May 1993.

16. *Bulletin*, No. 55, 19 June 1993, pp. 577–9; *FAZ*, 9 June 1993; *FAZ*, 11 June 1993, p. 6; E. Hauser, *Frankfurter Rundschau (FR)*, 11 June 1993; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ)*, 14 June 1993; J. Kirkpatrick, *IHT*, 15 June 1993; J. Chace, *IHT*, 15 June 1993; S. Rosenfeld, *IHT*, 6 July 1993; M. Wörner, *IHT*, 6 August 1993; *FR*, 27 August 1993; R. D. Asmus, R. L. Kugler and F. S. Larrabee, *IHT*, 28–29 August 1993.

17. *FAZ*, 27 August 1993; *FR*, 27 August 1993; *FR*, 31 August 1993; W. Drozdiak, *IHT*, 2 September 1993; V. Havel, *IHT*, 20 October 1993.

18. *IHT*, 21 October 1993; K. Kinkel, *IHT*, 21 October 1993; *FAZ*, 8 September 1993.

tary and security alliance and would not become a political club.[19] However, the Presidents of Poland and of the Czech Republic, Walesa and Havel, warned against a fallback to the spirit of Yalta.[20]

The strong warning expressed by the Russian President Yeltsin against an eastward expansion of NATO in early October 1993 may have had an effect on NATO's reluctance to extend its membership. In the United States, the Clinton Administration's PfP was harshly critized by Zbigniew Brzezinski (echoes of Yalta), Henry A. Kissinger and Richard Perle (appeasement), who all supported an eastward extension of NATO to include the Visegrad states. James Baker even called, under certain conditions, for the admission of the Russian Federation into NATO.[21]

On 2 December 1993, the NAC approved the concept of a 'Partnership for Peace' with individual NACC members and on 9 December 1993 the joint NPG and DPC meeting stressed the dual function of NATO both for collective self-defence and in support of the collective security activities of the United Nations and CSCE.[22] NATO's Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner, commenting on the results of the Russian parliamentary election and on the support for Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky, stressed the two-track approach towards Russia: 'On the one hand, the will to establish real co-operation with the Russians; on the other, cohesion and vigilance.'[23]

On 10 and 11 January 1994, the NATO Summit in Brussels agreed

> to adapt the political and military structures of further alliances to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European security and defence identity, and endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces [CJTF];

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19. *FAZ,* 22 October 1993; *NZZ,* 22 October 1993; *FR,* 22 October 1993; *NZZ,* 23 October 1993; *FAZ,* 27 October 1993.
20. *FR,* 23 October 1993; *NZZ,* 25 October 1993.
21. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *IHT,* 2 December 1993; Henry Kissinger, *IHT,* 24 January 1994; *Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ),* 7 October 1993; Richard Perle, *IHT,* 12 January 1994.
22. See *Europa-Archiv (EA),* Vol. 49, No. 3, 10 February 1994, pp. D111–12, D116–19.
23. C. R. Whitney, *IHT,* 15 December 1993; W. Pfaff, *IHT,* 20 December 1993.

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to reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European
countries; to launch a major initiative through a 'Partnership for Peace', in
which we invite partners to join us in new political and military efforts to
work alongside the Alliance;
to intensify our efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery.[24]

The NAC repeated its 'conditioned' support for United Nations and CSCE
peace-keeping missions and that it would assist the 'participation of non-
NATO partners in joint peace-keeping operations and other contingencies as
envisaged under the Partnership for Peace'. The NAC stressed its commitment
to a strengthening of 'the operational capabilities of the CSCE for early warn-
ing, conflict prevention, and crisis management'. NATO's heads of state and
governments also approved the Framework Document of the PfP in which the
participating states stress that they would co-operate with NATO towards the
following goals:
1. To increase the transparency of national defence planning and budget
    procedures.
2. To realize democratic control of armed forces.
3. To maintain the capability and readiness for operations legitimized by the
    United Nations or CSCE.
4. To develop co-operative military relations with NATO with the goal of
    joint planning, training and exercises to strengthen its capability for tasks
    in the areas of peace-keeping, disaster relief and humanitarian operations
    and other tasks.
5. To develop armed forces that can co-operate more closely with NATO.
Those states signing a specific bilateral PfP treaty with NATO would partici-
pate in NATO exercises, finance their own participation in partnership activi-
ties and contribute to the overall burden, and would be able to send liaison
officers to a separate partnership co-ordinating cell at SHAPE in Mons.[25] By
adding new tasks or partially taking over those of the CSCE, NATO postponed

24. *USPIT*, No. 5, 10 January 1994, p. 15.
25. *EA*, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. D132–4.

the real tough question of its eastward extension and of security guarantees for the Visegrad and Baltic states. However, the NATO Summit rituals were over-shadowed by its failure to cope with the atrocities and violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Summit, while 'offering East Europeans too little an alliance role too late' (*Washington Post*, 12.1.1994), neither addressed the future role of Russia nor that of the CSCE in the post-Cold War architecture. If NATO has failed in the past to solve the conflicts among its members, for example between Greece and Turkey in Cyprus, will the PfP offer a better framework for the other United Nations peace-keeping operations between Vancouver and Vladivostok, in Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Tajikistan, or the pressing conflicts in Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan and Zaire, to which most members did not respond when the Secretary-General asked them to supply forces for peace-keeping operations?

While representatives of the Visegrad and the Baltic states called for a rapid eastward extension, President Yeltsin, Foreign Minister Kozyrev and the head of Russian Intelligence Primakov warned against such a step and called for a special relationship with NATO which would reflect Russia's great power status. In January 1994, Kozyrev suggested that the NACC become the organization for military co-operation in the CSCE to co-ordinate the efforts of NATO, the WEU and the CIS. In March 1994, Defence Minister Grachev announced that Russia would join the PfP if certain basic conditions were accepted: for example, if Russia was invited to join the G-7 as an equal member. In early May, Grachev backtracked and announced that he would bring his own plan to the meeting in Brussels on 24 May. At his meeting with NATO defence ministers, Grachev called for a 'full-blooded strategic relationship' of Russia within NATO. He repeated Kozyrev's proposal to co-ordinate the activities of NATO and of all other security structures in the NACC and to transform it into the security arm of the CSCE.[26]

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26. S. Erlanger, *IHT*, 26 November 1993; W. Drozdiak, *IHT*, 10 December 1993; S. Erlanger, *IHT*, 29 December 1993; C. Bohlen, *IHT*, 6 January 1994; A. Kosyrev, *FR*, 8 January 1994; F. Hiatt, *IHT*, 18 March 1994; *IHT*, 9 April 1994; *IHT*, 7 May 1994; J. Hoagland, *IHT*, 17 May 1994; W. Drozdiak and J. F. Harris, *IHT*, 26 May 1994; H. Schmidt, *Die Zeit*, 3 June 1994.

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At the joint DPC and NPG meeting on 24 May 1994, the defence ministers welcomed the progress in the areas of the PfP and the CJTF and on proliferation. They discussed the specific defence aspects of the implementation of the PfP. At the NAC meeting in Istanbul on 9 June 1994, NATO's foreign ministers approved six guidelines for NATO's future relationship with Russia based on the principle 'no vetoes, no surprises'. They rejected the Russian plan for a new consultative mechanism on all European security issues and they opposed the transformation of the NAC into an organ for military and political co-operation under the roof of the CSCE. They emphasized that NATO planned to implement a possible military mandate by the United Nations without Russian participation. Nevertheless NATO's Vice Secretary-General Balanzino acknowledged that a new European security order could not be built without or against Russia. Therefore NATO offered 'an extensive and far-reaching programme' of military co-operation with Russia without permitting a *droit de regard*. NATO's NAC welcomed the fact that twenty countries, among them the non-NAC members Finland, Sweden and Slovenia, had joined the PfP initiative. In their final communiqué, NATO foreign ministers welcomed the close co-operation and consultation with the WEU, with the United Nations Security Council and the CSCE, without however even mentioning the sensitive relationship with Russia.[27]

On 22 June 1994, on the 53rd anniversary of the German surprise attack on the former Soviet Union, Russia's Foreign Minister Kozyrev, in the presence of his American colleague Christopher, signed Russia's PfP Accord with NATO. In addition, NATO and Russia agreed in a separate document on an extended dialogue and co-operation which acknowledged Russia's geopolitical role and its geostrategic importance in Europe. Thus, for the first time, Russian diplomats will work closely on joint projects with their NATO counterparts in

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27. 'Kommunique der Ministertagung des Verteidigungsausschusses und der Nuklearen Planungsgruppe. Ministertagung am 24 Juni in Brüssel', *Bulletin*, No. 55, 8 June 1994, pp. 521–4; W. Drozdiak, 'NATO Ministers Unite behind Bosnia Peace Accord', *IHT*, 10 June 1994: 'We welcome arrangements that allow NATO to participate in the work of the CSCE and the CSCE to participate in certain NATO activities, and . . . look forward to further development of the interaction and co-operation between the two organizations.'

Brussels, as will Russian military officers with their colleagues at SACEUR in Mons. In a memorandum on the future security architecture, Russia emphasized its preference for a pan-European solution in the CSCE framework. In the Russian Duma, both the Communists and the Nationalists condemned the PfP 'as an instrument of American imperialism directed against Russia' and the signing of the PfP document as a 'capitulation of Russian diplomacy before NATO'.[28]

Russia's participation, as the twenty-first state in NATO's PfP programme, facilitates day-to-day co-operation on issues like peace-keeping, conversion and democratic control of the military between the former enemies. However, it neither solves the immediate security concerns of the Visegrad and Baltic states nor does it overcome the basic conflict of interests and perspectives on the longer-term issues of a just and lasting peace, order and security architecture among the CSCE members from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

North Atlantic Co-operation Council: toward a new security partnership

On 20 December 1991, NATO's sixteen foreign ministers, their colleagues from Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and Hungary, and the Ambassador of the dissolving USSR met in Brussels to establish the NACC on dialogue, partnership and co-operation. They agreed to strengthen the CSCE and to enter into an institutionalized process of consultation and co-operation on issues of security policy, especially defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, industrial conversion and democratic concepts for civilian–military relations.

On 10 March 1992, at their second meeting, all eleven CIS members joined the NACC, thus increasing the membership from twenty-five to thirty-five states. They adopted a comprehensive work plan for dialogue, partnership and co-operation on strategy, defensive orientation of the armed forces, force and command structure, military training methods, exercises and democratic

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28. 'Kozyrev to Sign Accord with NATO. Russia and Alliance to Define Hopes for Future Relations', *IHT,* 18 June 1994; D. Williams, 'Russian Signs on with NATO in Peace Alliance', *IHT,* 23 June 1994.

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planning concepts for defence in the framework of NATO's military, economic, scientific and environmental committees. On 1 April 1992, at the first meeting of the defence ministers of the then thirty-five NACC states, this co-operation programme was further specified.

On 5 June 1992, at their third meeting in Oslo, the foreign ministers of thirty-seven NACC member states – Georgia and Albania had become full members and Finland had become an observer – agreed to strengthen the operational and institutional capabilities of the CSCE for conflict prevention, crisis control and peaceful settlement of disputes, including peace-keeping. After the European CIS states had agreed on how to subdivide the five weapons categories of the CFE Treaty, the twenty-nine member states to this treaty signed a final protocol reflecting the political changes since the USSR had been dissolved.

On 12 December 1992, at their fourth meeting, the NACC members welcomed the decisions of the CSCE Council in Stockholm to enhance the operative and institutional capacities of the CSCE for conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes; they expressed their concern about the worsening situation in the former Yugoslavia and the ongoing hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh, welcomed the progress in the process of democratization in Georgia and the cease-fire in the Republic of Moldova, and requested an end to the unrest in Tajikistan. In addition, the thirty-seven NACC members (since 1 January 1993, after the separation of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the number has increased to thirty-eight) approved a new work plan on political and security-related issues, on defence planning, conversion, economic and scientific issues, on the challenges of modern society, on distribution of information, on consultations on political planning and on issues of air traffic control.[29] Even less than NATO, the NACC could not directly contribute to the solution of any of the new challenges to prevent violence and contain hostilities.

On 28 April 1993, the chiefs of staff of NATO and the former WTO countries discussed future co-operation in peace-keeping operations in Europe. At their meeting in Athens on 11 June 1993, the foreign ministers of the NACC

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29. *Bulletin*, No. 141, 29 December 1992, pp. 1309–14; *FAZ*, 19 December 1992; E. Hauser, *FR*, 21 December 1992.

called upon the conflict parties in Bosnia to stop fighting and they condemned ethnic cleansing. They adopted principles for future joint peace-keeping operations. Andrey Kozyrev requested a clearer mandate from the United Nations Security Council before Russia could commit forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The NACC members agreed on a peace-keeping co-operation programme which may eventually lead to joint military exercises.[30]

On 3 December 1993, the foreign ministers of the NACC approved the new work plan for dialogue, partnership and co-operation in 1994, a report of an ad hoc group on peace-keeping measures and a report on conversion. In this third work plan they agreed to extend their political consultations to regional security, conceptual approaches to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation; to continue their co-operation on defence planning and military matters; to exchange information among specialists on democratic and civilian control of defence policy and of the armed forces; to aim at arms control and disarmament agreements at the lowest achievable level; to move ahead with practical co-operation on conversion and security-relevant economic issues, including defence budgets; to enhance co-operation on scientific and environmental matters including ecological problems caused by past military activities; to consult on air defence and procurement matters; and to exchange information on civilian emergency planning and on relief in catastrophes on all levels.

In its second report, the NACC ad hoc group on peace-keeping operations, with the co-operation of Austria, Finland and Sweden, stressed the consultation on conceptual and political questions and the planning and development of technical preconditions, as well as education and training and modalities for joint exercises in 1994 in order to contribute to peace-keeping operations by the United Nations and the CSCE. The NACC emphasized its support for the CSCE, welcomed the decisions of its Council in Rome and promised to contribute to their full implementation. They also welcomed the progress achieved by the FSC in Vienna on crisis situations, conventional arms transfer, military contacts and defence planning issues. The NACC called for the full

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30. *NZZ,* 30 April 1993, p. 3; *Bulletin,* No. 55, 19 June 1993, pp. 580–2; *FR,* 12 June 1993; *NZZ,* 13/14 June 1993, p. 3; *IHT,* 12 June 1993; *FAZ,* 12 June 1993.

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implementation of both the multilateral (CSBM, CFE I, CFE IA, NPT, CBW, Open Sky) and bilateral (START I, START II) treaties and they promised to enhance the transparency of conventional arms exports.[31]

At their third meeting, on 25 May 1993 in Brussels, the defence ministers of the NACC countries confirmed that 'it is an important principle that peace-keeping is carried out only under the authority of the United Nations or the CSCE'. The NACC ad hoc group on co-operation in peace-keeping referred, inter alia, to efforts to help Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to establish a Baltic peace-keeping battalion. They welcomed the fact that the Netherlands and Poland would hold the first multinational peace-keeping field exercises in the autumn of 1994 as well as the first trilateral United Kingdom-German-Hungarian peace-keeping and the Danish-German-Polish mine-sweeping and land exercises. The NACC defence ministers stressed that the PfP 'will con-tribute . . . to the development of co-operative military relations through joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen the ability to undertake missions in such fields as peace-keeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations . . . ; and to create forces that are better able to operate together'. The NACC defence ministers concluded that 'co-operation in defense-related matters, including peace-keeping, constitutes one of the key contributions to the building of a genuine partnership, which will help us to achieve our common objective of strengthening international security and stability'.[32]

At the meeting of the NACC foreign ministers in Istanbul on 10 June 1994, the Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev repeated his proposals for a new Euro-pean security system – to make the CSCE the central point for military mat-ters – which had already been rejected by NATO. Kozyrev also announced that Russia would join the PfP though he still opposed an eastward extension of NATO.[33] Both agreed that a joint protocol between Russia and NATO would specify their planned co-operation. Russia would participate in the PfP pro-grammes without any special prerogatives. In addition, NATO would offer

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31. *EA*, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. D112–16; *SZ*, 4 December 1993; *FAZ*, 4 December 1993; *NZZ*, 5 December 1993.
32. *USPIT*, No. 54, 26 May 1994, pp. 5–6.
33. *FAZ*, 11 June 1994; *FR*, 11 June 1994.

Russia a broad security dialogue which would reflect its status as a big nuclear power. While co-operation in military matters increased, nevertheless, the basic architectural issues still remained unresolved between NATO and Russia.[34] While Russia and the United States opposed an eastward expansion of NATO, in May 1994 the WEU approved an eastward expansion for future members of the European Union.

Western European Union (WEU): European pillar of NATO and defence arm of the European Union

Prior to the European Community Summit in Maastricht in December 1991, the debate on the future role of the WEU was dominated by three proposals:

The proposal of March 1991 by the President of the Commission of the European Community, Jacques Delors, to put the WEU under the control of the European Council.

A British-Italian initiative of 4 October 1991 to keep the WEU independent and to charge it, complementary to NATO, with 'out of area' operations.

A Franco-German initiative of 14 October 1991 to create a joint corps in the WEU framework and to place the WEU under the control of the European Council.

After intensive negotiations, the WEU members of the European Community agreed at Maastricht, in an appendix to the Treaty on the European Union, that the WEU would be both the defence component of the European Union and a means of strengthening NATO.[35] In 1996, two years prior to its fiftieth anniversary, WEU members will review this new experience. Furthermore, they agreed to create a joint planning staff, to achieve closer co-operation in logistics, transport, training and strategic reconnaissance, to hold meetings of its chiefs of staff and to create forces assigned to the WEU. In a second declaration, they offered associate membership to the other European NATO states. At Maastricht a first step was approved for a gradual transition of the WEU from an

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34. *FR*, 13 June 1994; W. Drozdiak, *IHT*, 11 June 1994; *NZZ*, 13 June 1994; K. Feldmeyer, *FAZ*, 13 June 1994; *FAZ*, 13 June 1994.
35. *Bulletin*, No. 16, 12 February 1992, pp. 113–84.

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independent organization under Article 51 to an organ of a common defence policy of the European Community members.

On 19 June 1992, the foreign and defence ministers of the nine WEU states, in their 'Petersberg Declaration', supported the goal to offer both the CSCE and the United Nations Security Council its support for measures of conflict prevention and conflict control, including peace-keeping operations on a case-by-case basis and in conjunction with WEU procedures. This resolution was also endorsed by eight additional Central European states (Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary) and the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), whose foreign ministers were meeting with their WEU colleagues. They also agreed that they would concentrate in their future consultations on the new security architecture, future developments in the CSCE, arms control and disarmament, specifically the implementation of the CFE and the Open Sky treaties as well as on the Vienna Document of 1992.[36]

As a consequence of the Maastricht Treaty, Greece has already applied for WEU membership and other European NATO countries which are not WEU members have also been invited to apply. Among the potential future European Union members, Sweden's prime minister has already indicated an interest in joining the WEU. On 10 July 1992, after the end of the CSCE Summit in Helsinki, the WEU foreign ministers approved their first common military operation to send naval units to observe the implementation of the United Nations sanctions against Yugoslavia (Montenegro and Serbia). However, this decision excluded any enforcement of the embargo without specific authorization by the Security Council. Thus, both an enlargement and a deepening of the co-operation among European Union countries may be expected before 1996, when the WEU is most probably up for review.[37]

On 1 October 1992, the WEU established its planning unit in Brussels. At its ministerial meeting in Rome on 20 November 1992, Greece was welcomed as the tenth WEU member and Denmark and neutral Ireland were given observer

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36. *Bulletin*, No. 68, 23 June 1992, pp. 649–53; *Bulletin*, No. 68, 23 June 1992, pp. 654–5.
37. *Bulletin*, No. 79, 17 July 1992, p. 760; *Bulletin*, No. 16, 12 February 1992, pp. 182–4.

status, while Turkey, Norway and Iceland received the status of associated countries. In addition, the WEU Council and its secretariat were moved from London to Brussels. In a separate resolution on the war in the Balkans, the ministers stressed an increase in the contribution of the WEU for the efforts of the United Nations to restore peace in former Yugoslavia. The ministers emphasized further development of its operative capabilities in conjunction with its Maastricht and Petersberg declarations. They also approved that the functions of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) be transferred to the WEU to improve co-operation on armament issues and that a joint working group of the WEU and the Euro Group be formed.[38]

On 19 May 1993, the WEU Council of Ministers once again stressed the development of the role of the WEU as a defence component of the European Union and as a pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The ministers requested a detailed analysis of the role which the WEU could play in the implementation of the Vance–Owen peace plan in co-ordination with NATO.[39] On 20 May 1993, the WEU members, associate members and observers met as the consultative forum of the WEU in Rome together with the defence and foreign ministers of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. They stressed that intensified relations would be valuable to a stable and more peaceful order in Europe based on partnership and co-operation.[40]

At the summer session of the WEU Assembly, a dispute between the powerless Assembly and the powerful WEU Council erupted on the control of the budget and on the interpretation of the WEU Treaties of Brussels (1948) and Paris (1954), when the fifty-year duration ends in 1998 or in 2004. While the council stressed that the treaty is up for review in 1998, the assembly referred to 2004. The assembly was also critical of the transfer to the European Union of competence in the defence and security realm. A minority proposal to make the WEU a regional organization of the United Nations under Chapter VIII was also opposed.[41] With respect to security in the Mediterranean, the WEU Assembly proposed the

38. *Bulletin*, No. 126, 26 November 1992, pp. 1158–60; *NZZ*, 23 November 1992.
39. *Bulletin*, No. 46, pp. 497–9; E. Hauser, *FR*, 7 May 1993.
40. *Bulletin*, No. 46, pp. 499–500.
41. *FAZ*, 15 June 1993; *NZZ*, 17 June 1993; *FAZ*, 18 June 1993.

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setting up of close contacts with Egypt and the Maghreb countries. In a report the Portuguese member of parliament Pedro Roseta discussed the proposal for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM). In a draft recommendation the report suggested 'to establish a gradual and phased security dialogue with the Maghreb countries, starting with a restricted number of individual southern Mediterranean countries which, at a later stage, could be extended to include all the countries of the region and lead to true co-operation in security matters'.[42] On 17 June 1993 the Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU asked the Council to evaluate whether the WEU should declare itself a regional agency under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Several members of parliament proposed an observer status in the WEU for the Visegrad states. At its meeting in the autumn of 1993, the assembly recommended both a new Atlantic partnership and an expansion of its relationship with Central and East European countries.[43]

At its meeting in Luxembourg on 22 November 1993, the WEU Council welcomed the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and stressed the specific relevance of the implementation of the new foreign and security policy of the European Union for the WEU. They agreed to harmonize both the duration and the presidency with that of the European Union. The council welcomed the expansion of the working relations between the WEU and NATO. The ministers emphasized the need to develop further its operative capabilities. They agreed that the CSCE should play a special role in the future European security structure. They welcomed the progress made in building up the operative role of the WEU. The foreign and defence ministers of the WEU considered an associated membership for the future European Union candidates as a tool for developing a closer defence network.[44]

During its spring meeting in Luxembourg on 9 May 1994, the WEU Council approved, in its Kirchberg Declaration, the granting of associate

42. *FAZ,* 16 June 1993; Assembly of the Western European Union, *Proceedings, Thirty-ninth Ordinary Session, First Part,* June 1993, Vol. I: *Document 1371,* pp. 190–217.
43. *FAZ,* 18 June 1993; *FAZ,* 30 November 1993, *NZZ,* 1 December 1993; *FAZ,* 1 December 1993.
44. *EA,* Vol. 49, No. 3, 1994, pp. D106–11; *FR,* 24 November 1993.

membership without security guarantees to its nine consultation partners: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. The relations between the ten WEU members, its two observers (Denmark and Ireland) and its three associate members should be guided by the non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The nine new associate members may participate in its internal consultations on security issues but they cannot block decisions. They will be informed about the work of the task forces of the WEU Council. They can fully participate in humanitarian, peace-keeping and enforcement missions for crisis resolution and they may assign military forces for WEU tasks. Iceland, Norway and Turkey may nominate officers for the WEU planning cell and may also participate in the WEUCOM information network on meetings and activities.[45]

THE MAASTRICHT TREATY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The movement towards a joint foreign and security policy was long in the making. After the federalist approach to establish a European Defence Community and a European Political Community failed in the French National Assembly in 1954, it took another fifteen years until the Hague Summit (1969), when the European Political Co-operation (EPC) was established. At its Stuttgart Summit (1983), the European Council approved the inclusion of the political and economic aspects of security policy, and in the Single European Act (1986) the EPC was institutionalized and an EPC secretariat was established in the European Community Commission.

After the initial Franco-German irritation on unification, both Mitterrand and Kohl agreed in spring 1990 on two parallel government conferences to develop a European Political Union (EPU) and a European Economic and Currency Union (EECU). At the Maastricht Summit of the European Council (December 1991), a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was adopted. The goal is a closer harmonization on all important foreign and security questions and a representation of the common view in international organizations, for

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45. *Bulletin*, No. 46, 20 May 1994, pp. 405–9; T. Buerkle, *IHT*, 7–8 May 1994; *SZ*, 10 May 1994; *FAZ*, 10 May 1994; *NZZ*, 11 May 1994.

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example by France and the United Kingdom as permanent members of the Security Council. Under certain conditions a majority vote will be permitted. On defence issues, the European Community requests the WEU to prepare and implement those actions in accordance with the WEU organs. The European Council develops the principles and guidelines of the CFSP in close co-operation with the Commission and in consultation with the Parliament.

At the meeting of the European Council in Lisbon on 26 and 27 June 1992, the foreign ministers approved a report on the prospective CFSP to be implemented when, at that time, the Maastricht Treaty was expected to enter into force on 1 January 1993. Therein they agreed that the following security issues should be dealt with in the CFSP framework: 'CSCE, disarmament and arms control policy in Europe, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, economic aspects of security, particularly the control of the transfer of military technology to third countries and of weapons exports'.[46]

At its Summit in Edinburgh on 11 and 12 December 1992, the European Council announced that it was sending observers to Serbia in the framework of the CSCE and supported a United Nations presence in Kosovo to prevent the outbreak of violence against the Albanian majority.[47] The European Community nominated Lord Carrington and, subsequently, Lord Owen as co-president with Cyrus Vance and Harald Stoltenberg of the international conference on peace in the former Yugoslavia, to provide food and medicine to the victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen on 21 and 22 June 1993 focused especially on economic (growth, competitiveness, unemployment, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)) and foreign policy matters, such as enlargement, relations with Malta, Cyprus and Turkey and with Central and East European states, especially the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the former Yugoslavia and the Maghreb countries, and on issues relating to the joint foreign and security policy. The leaders called for an intensified partnership with individual Maghreb countries and for a rapid conclusion

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46. *Bulletin,* No. 71, 1 July 1992, pp. 679–82.
47. *Bulletin,* No. 140, 28 December 1992, pp. 1277–1304; J. Fitchett, *IHT,* 23 September 1992.

of the partnership agreement with Morocco.[48] On 26 October 1993 at a meeting of the foreign ministers in Luxembourg, a common foreign and security policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the Near East and former Yugoslavia was adopted and institutional European Union reforms were discussed with respect to the next expansion.[49]

At a special meeting of the European Council on 29 October 1993 in Brussels, the heads of governments and states agreed on the headquarters for several European institutions, while the foreign ministers approved an extension of winter aid to the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[50] Owing to the first Danish referendum, the postponement of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the British House of Commons and the appeal to the German Constitutional Court, the Maastricht Treaty did not enter into force until 1 November 1993.

In Paris on 26 May 1994, the French Government, with the support of the European Union, held a Conference on Stability in Europe to contribute to preventive diplomacy by encouraging bilateral treaties among potential European Union members on good neighbourhood and on minorities. Two regional round tables are to be set up: one on the presence of Russian troops in Latvia and Estonia and on the Russian-speaking population in all three Baltic states and the other on the large Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania. The Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev questioned the usefulness of these round tables, which duplicate the work of the CSCE. To enhance co-operation with the European Union, Prime Minister Balladur and Chancellor Kohl suggested inviting the leaders of the candidate countries to attend future European Union summits once a year to discuss matters of joint interest and co-operation.[51]

At the meeting of the heads of state and government in Corfu on 24 and 25 June 1994, a partnership and co-operation agreement with a ten-year duration was signed between Russia and the European Union to enhance co-operation on a wide range of economic, political, environmental and other

48. *Bulletin*, No. 60, 8 July 1993, pp. 629–40.
49. *FAZ*, 27 October 1993.
50. *FAZ*, 27 October 1993; *FAZ*, 30 October 1993, pp. 1–2; *FR*, 30 October 1993, p. 1.
51. *IHT*, 27 May 1994; *FAZ*, 27 May 1994; *FR*, 27 May 1994; H. H. Bremer, *FR*, 28 May 1994; *FAZ*, 28 May 1994; *NZZ*, 28 May 1994.

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functional issues. The treaty grants most favoured nation status to either side and, by 1998, it envisages a possible decision on the creation of a free trade zone between the enlarged European Union and the Russian Federation. The treaty foresees close consultations twice a year between the Russian President and the European Union presidency and the Chairman of the Commission as well as additional meetings at ministerial level.

Four days later, in a speech to graduates of Russian military academies, President Yeltsin called for a new comprehensive European security system that not only relies on military alliances but strengthens existing mechanisms for co-operation in Europe, such as the European Union and the CSCE.[52]

How has the CSCE, as the only comprehensive organization from Vancouver to Vladivostok, adapted to the global transformation since 1990?

THE CSCE: FROM THE 'PARIS CHARTER' TO THE 'HELSINKI DECISIONS'

In November 1990, at the CSCE Summit in Paris, as an appendix to the Charter for a New Europe, several initial CSCE institutions were set up.[53] At its first council meeting in Berlin on 19 and 20 June 1991, an extended mechanism for urgent situations ('Berlin Mechanism') was approved and the Conflict Prevention Centre was asked to create a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes. At the third human rights meeting in Moscow in September 1991, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania increased the CSCE membership to thirty-eight, and procedures for the implementation of human rights decisions were approved ('Moscow Mechanism').

At the second council meeting on 30 and 31 January 1992, the Prague Document on the future development of CSCE institutions and structures was

52. See, for example, T. Buerkie, 'Yeltsin Signs Treaty with European Union. A Truly Great Step', *IHT,* 25 June 1994.
53. The initial CSCE institutions were: (a) a Council of Foreign Ministers and a Committee of Senior Officials (CSO); (b) a CSCE Secretariat in Prague; (c) a Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) with a Consultative Committee (CC) in Vienna representing the heads of the CSBM delegations; (d) a Bureau on Free Elections in Warsaw; and (e) a Mechanism for Urgent Situations.

approved. The Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) was asked to intensify co-ordination and political consultations and to set up a CSCE communication network. Specific proposals were made on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, on economic co-operation, on the parliamentary assembly, on the relationship with non-governmental organizations, international organizations and with foreign states as well as on improved instruments for crisis management and prevention. The council requested that the CSCE Follow-up Conference in Helsinki review fact-finding and reporting missions, observer missions, good offices, advice, mediation and settlement of disputes. The possibility of CSCE peace-keeping measures or the role of such measures should be carefully evaluated and the functions of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) should be strengthened so that its consultative committee could serve as the forum for comprehensive and regular consultations on security issues concerning co-operation on conflict prevention, fact-finding and survey missions in the framework of the Paris Charter. The CPC would invite NATO, the WEU and relevant United Nations bodies to future seminars on security. In a declaration on non-proliferation and arms transfer, the now forty-eight CSCE member states – eleven Soviet successor states joined in Prague – agreed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to control missile technology and to establish a United Nations Register for conventional weapons.

On 24 March 1992, at the first meeting of the fourth CSCE Review Conference in Helsinki, the Open Sky Treaty and the Vienna Document 1992 on CSBMs were signed. Georgia, Croatia and Slovenia increased the CSCE membership to fifty-one states and Bosnia and Herzegovina became the fifty-second member state during the conference. Yugoslavia (Montenegro and Serbia) was excluded from the deliberations on the civil war in the Balkans and its membership was suspended for 100 days. At the summit of heads of state and governments on 9 and 10 July 1992, a 'Helsinki Summit Declaration' and twelve 'Helsinki Decisions' were adopted.[54]

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54. CSCE, Helsinki Summit Declaration, approved in Helsinki on 10 July 1992 (Washington, D.C., United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1992, p. 5): '20. To this end, we have further developed structures to ensure political management of crises and created new instruments of conflict prevention and crisis management. We have strengthened the Council and the CSO and devised means

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The 'Helsinki Summit Declaration' welcomed the adaptation of existing European and transatlantic institutions and the creation of new subregional bodies: the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Black Sea Economic Co-operation and the Central European Initiative. The summit approved an extension of its institutions, a comprehensive concept of security and a new definition as:

25. . . . a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. As such, it provides an important link between European and global security. The rights and responsibilities of the Security Council remain unaffected in their entirety. The CSCE will work together closely with the United Nations especially in preventing and settling conflicts.[55]

The CSCE members adopted decisions on strengthening CSCE institutions and structures[56] and procedural and institutional improvements on early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management (including fact-finding and rapporteur missions and CSCE peace-keeping) and peaceful settlement of disputes.[57]

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to assist them. The CSCE capacities in the field of early warning will be strengthened in particular by the activities of the newly established High Commissioner on National Minorities.

'We have provided for CSCE peace-keeping according to agreed modalities. CSCE peace-keeping activities may be undertaken in cases of conflict within or among participating States to help maintain peace and stability in support of an ongoing effort at a political solution. In this respect, we are also prepared to seek, on a case-by-case basis, the support of international institutions and organizations, such as the EC, NATO and WEU, as well as other institutions and mechanisms, including the peace-keeping mechanism of the CIS. We welcome their readiness to support CSCE peace-keeping activities, including by making available their resources. We are further developing our possibilities for peaceful settlement of disputes.'

55. CSCE, Helsinki Summit Declaration, op. cit., p. 6.
56. Ibid., pp. 1–4.
57. Ibid., p. 13. On 'CSCE peace-keeping', they agreed that such activities 'may be undertaken in cases within or among participating States to help maintain peace and stability in support of an ongoing effort at a political solution. . . . A CSCE peace-keeping operation . . . will involve civilian and/or military personnel, . . . may assume a variety of forms including observer and monitor missions and larger deployment of forces. . . . could be used . . . to supervise and help maintain cease-fires, to monitor troop withdrawals, to support the maintenance of law and order, to provide humanitarian aid and to assist refugees.'

The members promised that CSCE peace-keeping will 'at all times be carried out in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations; . . . take place in particular within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations'. The Security Council would be fully informed and in some cases the participating states may refer the matter to the Security Council.[58]

All CSCE states can take part in these operations and provide personnel. On the chain of command it was decided that the council will assign overall guidance to the Chairman-in-Office, who will chair an ad hoc group set up at the CPC that will offer operational support for the mission and monitor it. The Consultative Committee of the CPC will ensure continuous liaison with all states. The costs for these activities will be born by all CSCE states. The CSCE also reacted positively to various offers by international organizations during June and July 1992.[59] Such requests will be made by the CSCE on a case by-case basis after prior consultation with these organizations. However, these contributions 'will not affect the procedure for the establishment, conduct and command of CSCE peace-keeping operations'. The members set up a CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation with a strengthened CPC as an integral part of the CSCE to aim at 'security relations based upon co-operative and common approaches to security'. This forum was to be assisted by a special committee for negotiations on arms control, disarmament and confidence-building and for a dialogue on preparing negotiations on security enhancement and co-operation and the Consultative Committee in respect to existing and future

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58. CSCE, Helsinki Summit Declaration, op. cit., pp. 13–17: They specified as conditions that CSCE peace-keeping operations: 'will not entail enforcement action; . . . require the consent of the parties directly concerned; . . . will be conducted impartially; . . . cannot be considered as a substitute for a negotiated settlement and therefore must be limited in time'. The initiation of peace-keeping operations will be decided 'by consensus by the Council or the CSO' and, if these conditions have been fulfilled, 'establishment of an effective and durable cease-fire; agreement on the necessary Memoranda of Understanding with the parties concerned, and provision of guarantees for the safety at all times personnel involved'.

59. Ibid., pp. 16–17.

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tasks of the CPC. The tasks for both committees were specified in a Pro-
gramme for Immediate Action.

From 12 to 23 October 1992, with a mandate from the Helsinki Summit,
international lawyers of forty-two CSCE members negotiated a Convention on
Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE based on draft proposals by
Switzerland, France and Germany. At its Stockholm meeting of 14 and
15 December 1992, the council considered the recommendations by the CSCE
meeting on peaceful settlement of disputes and adopted measures 'to enhance the
Valletta provisions through modification of the procedure for selecting Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms'. The foreign ministers adopted this new Geneva
Convention and decided that the council or the CSO 'may direct any two
participating states to seek conciliation to assist them in resolving a dispute'.[60]

At their third council meeting, the foreign ministers expressed their com-
mitment 'to use the CSCE to consolidate human rights, democracy, the rule of
law and economic freedom as the foundation for peace, security and stability
and to prevent, manage and solve conflicts in the CSCE area'. They committed
'themselves to act to counter the growing manifestations of racism, anti-semitism
and all forms of intolerance in the CSCE area'. They also decided 'to increase
co-ordination with the United Nations' and they considered several important
aspects of CSCE strategy:[61]

Strengthening the CSCE's operational capabilities through structural reforms
and the appointment of a Secretary-General.

Emphasizing the CSCE's ability to provide early warning through the
appointment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities who will
enjoy the full political support of all participating states.

Active use of missions and representatives as part of preventive diplomacy to
promote dialogue, stability and provide for early warning.

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60. *FAZ*, 13 October 1992; *FR*, 26 October 1992; CSCE, Third Meeting of the
Council, Stockholm 1992, CSCE/3-C/Dec.1, Stockholm, 14 December 1992:
Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.

61. Third Meeting of the CSCE Council, Stockholm, 15 December 1992, *Summary of
Conclusions of the Stockholm Council Meeting. Shaping a New Europe – the Role of the CSCE*,
pp. 2–3.

Enhancing opportunities for the peaceful settlement of disputes through the approval of a comprehensive set of measures to this end. The ministers stressed their expectations that participating states will avail themselves increasingly of these mechanisms.

Effective use of missions and representatives in crisis areas as part of a strategy of consultation, negotiation and concerted action to limit conflicts before they become violent.

Co-operating, as appropriate, with international organizations and with individual participating states to ensure that the broad spectrum of CSCE mechanisms and procedures, including peace-keeping, can be applied.

Increased efforts at treating the root causes of conflicts by applying all aspects of the human dimension of the CSCE and by involving non-governmental organizations and individual citizens more directly in the work of the CSCE.

Making all governments accountable to each other for their behaviour toward their citizens and towards neighbouring states and holding individuals personally accountable for war crimes and acts in violation of international humanitarian law.

Greater use of the Forum for Security Co-operation as a place of negotiation and dialogue which can ensure continued progress in reducing the risks of military conflict and enhancing stability in Europe.

An active programme to help newly participating states to participate fully in the structures and work of the CSCE.

The Stockholm council meeting adopted decisions on: regional issues (former Yugoslavia, the Baltic states, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of Tajikistan dealt with by the conference); the CSCE as a community of values; the High Commissioner on National Minorities; the peaceful settlement of disputes; the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation and Non-Proliferation; preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping; the evolution of CSCE structures and institutions; improved co-operation and contacts with international organizations; the admission and integration of new states; the creation of a Secretary-General of the CSCE; and the management of resources. Four of these eleven decisions will be briefly reviewed.

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The ministers welcomed the activities of the new CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation[62] and the fact that those countries which are not yet parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 'pledged . . . to become Parties to that Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States'. They also concluded 'that the CSCE can play an especially important role in co-operation through mutually reinforcing European and transatlantic organizations by further developing relevant CSCE instruments in the field of preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping'.[63]

With respect to the evolution of CSCE structures and institutions, the ministers decided to enhance 'the operational capacity of the CSCE agreed in Paris and Helsinki'. They stressed 'flexibility', 'openness', and avoidance of 'the creation of a bureaucracy' based on CSCE's democratic rules. They 'tasked the CSO to conduct a wide-ranging review of CSCE structures and operations' and approved the creation of the post of a Secretary-General of the CSCE and an enhanced ability of the CSO to act as their agent. The secretariats in Prague and Vienna should establish a single organizational structure under the direction of the Secretary-General. The ministers requested the CPC 'to take rapid steps to strengthen its ability to provide operational support for CSCE preventive diplomacy missions and peace-keeping activities'.

The ministers requested the CSO 'to examine practical implications of the understanding, expressed in the Helsinki Document that the CSCE is a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. In its examination the CSO should also examine the proposal by the United Nations Secretary-General to the CSCE to seek observer status at the United Nations'. They called for close contacts between the Chairman-in-Office and the United Nations 'in order to promote regular exchanges of information, co-operation and co-ordination and avoid duplication of effort'. Furthermore, they

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62. They resolved 'to fully implement the Declaration of the CSCE Council on Non-Proliferation and Arms Transfers adopted at the Prague Council Meeting 30–31 January 1992 . . . the Ministers agreed as a first step that their States will become original signatories to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction'.
63. Third Meeting of the CSCE Council, Stockholm, 15 December 1992, Summary of Conclusions of the Stockholm Council Meeting.

suggested closer co-operation with the United Nations 'in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, management and resolution of conflicts as well as the promotion of democratic values and human rights'. They also decided 'that a representative of the United Nations Secretary-General will be invited to the meetings of the Council and the CSO of the CSCE' and that the Permanent Mission to the United Nations of that state holding the office of Chairman 'will serve as a focal point of the CSCE at the United Nations'.

These organizational developments since the Paris Charter reflect the experience the European Union countries made with the intergovernmental European Political Co-operation (EPC). At its Prague meeting on 2 and 4 February 1993, the CSO decided to establish a Sanction Co-ordinator to supervise the work of its four Sanctions Assistance Missions in four of Serbia's neighbours in Bulgaria, Hungary, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Romania, and to enhance the enforcement of its sanctions. They named the Italian Ambassador Antonio Napolitano for this post. On 30 April 1993, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was given observer status with the CSCE. From 6 to 9 July, the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly discussed the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the relations between the Russian Federation and the three Baltic states, the developments in Central and Eastern Europe, the situation of the Kurds in Turkey and migration issues. The CSCE mediation efforts in Georgia by Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati failed in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[64]

On 18 May 1993, the German diplomat Wilhelm Höynck was named the first Secretary-General of the CSCE. Subsequently, CSCE activities were gradually moved to Vienna, where the FSC dealing with arms control and disarmament issues, the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) focusing on the new local and ethnic conflicts and civil wars and the General Secretariat were located. During 1993, the FSC considered the following main points:

Harmonization of obligations concerning arms control, disarmament and confidence and security-building.

Global exchange of military information.

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64. *FAZ*, 5 February 1993; *NZZ*, 6 February 1993; D. Shorr, *BASIC*, No. 30, 21 July 1993, p. 3.

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Non-proliferation of weapons and arms transfer.

Information exchange on defence planning.

Code of conduct in matters related to military security.

Military contacts.[65]

Since the Stockholm meeting, the Vienna Group of the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) had been created to consider all issues when the CSO was not in session. It conducted weekly open-ended informal consultations, prepared decisions for the CSO and was responsible for their implementation. The CPC was tasked with the realization of the Vienna CSBM regime. It was assigned a role in the mechanism for consultation and co-operation with respect to unusual military activities and in supporting the Valletta Mechanism on dispute settlement. Thus it has become increasingly engaged in the CSCE efforts for crisis management.[66]

On 25 November 1993, the members of the CSCE Forum on Security Co-operation approved a programme of co-operation containing measures to enhance military contacts, co-operation by joint military exercises and education, visits to military installations and troop formations, observer visits, supply of experts, organization on co-operation in the military sector and exchange of information on military contacts and co-operation. With respect to defence planning, the CSCE members adopted measures on exchange of information, on defence policy and doctrine, on planning with respect to armed forces, on information on old expenditures and on budgets, as well as measures to enhance transparency by annual discussion meetings, study visits and additional information. The third programme focused on principles regulating the transfer of conventional weapons, while the fourth dealt with stabilizing measures for limited crisis situations, especially transparency measures and constraints and measures to foster confidence-building and to monitor compliance.[67]

At the fourth council meeting in Rome from 20 November to 1 December 1993, the foreign ministers in their final statement deplored the increasing threats to peace and stability and the increasing violations of human rights.

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65. *Focus on Vienna,* No. 29, April 1993, p. 2.

66. Ibid., pp. 5–9.

67. *FR,* 27 November 1993; *Bulletin,* No. 30, 8 April 1994, pp. 265–72.

However, they also noted progress in the field of human rights and democracy in several CSCE member states. The ministers adopted several resolutions on regional matters pertaining to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Tajikistan, on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states, on the extension of the capabilities of the CSCE for conflict prevention and crisis management, on the activities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities and on human and economic dimensions, as well as on co-operation and contacts with the United Nations and other European and transatlantic organizations and institutions and on the development of CSCE structures and operations.

With respect to the latter, the ministers set up a new Permanent Committee of the CSCE for ongoing political consultations and the day-to-day operative activities in Vienna. This committee will be responsible to the CSO, which will continue to make all important decisions. They abolished the Consultative Committee of the CPC and transferred its tasks to the Permanent Committee and to the FSC. The Permanent Committee will also hold meetings in the framework of the mechanism for unusual military activities, while the FSC will be responsible for the implementation of the CSBMs, hold meetings on military doctrine and annual meetings for monitoring compliance. The ministers moved the CSCE Secretariat to Vienna, keeping a bureau in Prague. The new expanded secretariat will comprise divisions on conference services, administration, budget and support services for the Acting Chairman as well as for the conflict prevention centre. The ministers emphasized the need for additional financial resources, for the supply of expertise from non-governmental sources and for the maintenance of lists of readily available candidates for CSCE missions. They welcomed the relations between the non-participating Mediterranean countries and the CSCE. One additional decision was adopted on the legal status, the privileges and immunities of the CSCE and its active personnel similar to that granted to international organizations and foreign governments.[68]

One controversial issue of the discussions among the foreign ministers dealt with Russia's peace-keeping missions in its 'near-abroad' and with the

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68.   *Bulletin*, No. 112, 15 December 1993, pp. 1233–44.

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protection of minority rights. The ministers failed to agree on the participation of Russia in such peace-keeping operations. Russia's Foreign Minister Kozyrev tried to obtain a CSCE mandate for its forces in the Caucasus, in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as financial support; this was vigorously rejected by Ukraine and other former Soviet republics. Kozyrev and United States Secretary of State Christopher criticized Ukraine for its delay in implementing its promises to give up the nuclear weapons on its soil.[69]

From 19 to 21 January 1994, the CSCE held a seminar on early warning and preventive diplomacy in Warsaw organized jointly by the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the CPC. This meeting discussed the performance of CSCE activities in the area of early warning, especially the (non-)functioning of CSCE mechanisms. From 23 to 25 February 1994, a CSCE seminar on promoting small and medium-sized business was held in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) and was attended by twenty-five states. From 15 to 17 March 1994, the second meeting of the Economic Forum was held in Prague with the participation of many international economic organizations focusing on Basket II issues. From 21 to 25 March 1994 a Human Dimension Seminar on Migrant Workers was held in Warsaw.[70]

Since the 1990 Paris Summit, the CSCE process has acquired many new functions but it still lacks the proper legal form as well as the resources and the power to deal with increasing challenges and growing commitments. At the Follow-up Meeting in Budapest from 10 October to 2 December 1994 and the CSCE Summit on 5 and 6 December 1994, the next opportunity will come to transform the conference into an Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

69. C. R. Whitney, *IHT,* 2 December 1993; *SZ,* 1 December 1993; *FAZ,* 1 December 1993; *FR,* 2 December 1993; *FAZ,* 2 December 1993; *NZZ,* 3 December 1993; C. Bertram, *Die Zeit,* No. 49, 3 December 1993.
70. Arie Bloed, 'CSCE Increasing Number of Meetings', *Helsinki Monitor,* Vol. 5, No. 2, 1994, pp. 89–98.

INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR NATO AND THE CSCE

Since the end of the East–West conflict many optimistic Kantian diagnoses and predictions for a new lasting peace order have been discredited. Furthermore, pessimist Hobbesian analyses can hardly explain the attractiveness and the survival of the European Union. From a Hobbesian perspective, the United States presence in Europe remains vital and priority is attributed to collective self-defence institutions: to both NATO and the WEU. From the Kantian perspective, neither collective defence, deterrence nor collective security guarantee international security and peace: only the internal constitution of states does this. In this neo-Wilsonian view, democratization is the preferred peace strategy. From a Grotian perspective, the role of the CSCE and its relationship to the United Nations as the two complementary sides of collective security are central:

The emphasis falls on functions at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, such as preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, the organization of arms control and disarmament, as well as peaceful conflict resolution. In the future, CSCE might be able to act effectively as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. This role is not possible as long as NATO is seen as a necessary means to maintain a balance of power vis-à-vis potential opponents and the latter are also members of CSCE. This builds a potential conflict into the system. According to the concept of interlocking, NATO and WEU could perform very well as organizations to carry out military operations under a CSCE mandate. For the eventual implementation of peace enforcement operations CSCE in turn would need a mandate of the United Nations Security Council. In this perspective the role of the Council of Europe is not unimportant as a network of international relations which mitigates the negative effects of the anarchical international system.[71]

Thus, liberal neo-institutionalist approaches in the pragmatic Grotian tradition may be better suited to explain recent institutional adaptations and to prescribe future options for a stable security architecture for a lasting and just peace order.

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71. See Everts and Van Staden, 1993, p. 17.

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This approach tries to combine enlightened national self-interest with an increasing role for international organizations. Two institutions are vital for a regional collective security system as the focal point of the new European security architecture: the CSCE and NATO, which provide both the legitimacy of and control over necessary resources.

Since 1990, the United Nations Security Council has been confronted with many new security challenges which could neither be deterred nor solved by the tools (alliances, nuclear weapons) and concepts (deterrence) of the old security architecture. As systems of collective self-defence, NATO and the WEU were neither legally permitted nor politically legitimized to stop violence by force. However, the global and regional systems of collective security which were legally entitled to act, the United Nations and the CSCE, have lacked financial, personnel and military resources and efficient decision-making rules and procedures to perform their functions. The United Nations Security Council is already confronted with a problem overload and the United Nations Secretariat with an undercommitment of its members with respect to their financial obligations and their readiness to supply forces for peace-keeping operations, especially in Africa (Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, Sudan). In CSCE territory, there was great hesitation by states other than the Russian Federation to supply peace-keeping forces for the many conflicts in the former USSR. At the same time there was great concern among many former Soviet republics and in the West that the CIS or Russian peace-keeping forces in the 'near abroad' reflect Russian interests to restore the lost empire. While the proposals by a few members of the WEU Assembly to transform the WEU into a 'regional arrangement and agency' under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter were rejected by the majority, similar Russian considerations to define the CIS accordingly were perceived with suspicion by most CSCE members. Beyond declaratory politics, no significant division of labour between the United Nations and the CSCE can so far be achieved because of the unwillingness of its members to supply the CSCE with the proper resources and institutional tools to perform its functions as a regional collective security system.

Since the Helsinki CSCE Summit in July 1992, no grand design for a European security architecture consistent with diplomatic rhetoric has evolved. Institutional self-interest, incremental activism and a policy of muddling through

has resulted in the creation of many overlapping political and security institutions with no clear delimitation with respect to functions and membership. For example, both the NACC and the FSC are tasked with defence planning, the CPC, the ODIHR and Balladur's stability pact to deal with preventive diplomacy in the area of national minorities.

Political, security and institutional self-interest made NATO and the NACC the focal points of transatlantic and pan-European security consultations. During 1994, NATO has repeatedly rejected the proposals by Yeltsin, Kozyrev and Grachev to make the NACC or NATO the security organ or organization of the CSCE. Instead the Clinton administration has pushed for its PfP programme, a network of bilateral treaties between NATO and about twenty former WTO states (Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia), Soviet republics (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine), neutral countries (Finland, Sweden) and Slovenia. While the United States opposed granting NATO membership to the Visegrad and Baltic states, the WEU offered associate membership to both and also to Bulgaria and Romania. This reflects the longer-term intention only to grant WEU membership to potential future European Union members. In my view, a threefold institutional transformation is needed:

The WEU should be transformed with the next European Union Treaty revision by 1996 from an independent alliance into a new instrument of a common defence policy of the European Union members, offering security guarantees to its present and prospective future members. Thus, the European Union itself would become a system of collective self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

The CSCE should be transformed from an institutionalized international process based on a legally non-binding political agreement into a regional organization or arrangement based on a binding treaty at the forthcoming CSCE Review Conference in Budapest in autumn 1994.

The NACC and the Partnership for Peace programme should be gradually enlarged to comprise all CSCE states and then be transformed into an instrument or organ of a CSCE organization. Thus it could merge with the Vienna-based Security Forum and Conflict Prevention Centre.

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The first position was implied in Delors' proposals of 1991, the second was unsuccessfully pursued by France at the CSCE Follow-up Conference in Helsinki in 1992 and the third has been held by both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. The latter proposal resulted temporarily in a polarization between Russia and NATO, while Russian opposition to an eastward expansion of NATO led to irritation between Russia and its former WTO allies and present CIS partners. The major political task remains to integrate Russia as a nuclear power and as a permanent member of the Security Council into a new regional collective security system.

Why have all three initiatives failed so far? The prevailing Hobbesian mindset of the Western security élite combined with the institutional self-interest of NATO bodies, the failure fully to recognize the 'new' global security challenges both from within as well as from the East and the South, and lack of both political vision and will to address those challenges have contributed to the prevailing policy and politics of muddling through. Since 1990, the political leaders have failed both to design and to construct a new global and European security architecture.

NATO IN THE YEAR 2000

With respect to NATO's future, at least ten options are foreseeable:
1. A strengthening of NATO as a system of collective self-defence.
2. Its maintenance in its present form as a system of collective self-defence.
3. An adaptation to new realities by adding collective security functions and legitimizing increasingly its existence with peace-keeping missions.
4. An eastward enlargement.
5. A Europeanization of defence by sharing and later transferring self-defence functions to the WEU.
6. NATO as a bridge to a pan-European security system.
7. Expansion of the NACC to include all CSCE states and transformation into an organ of a regional European security organization emerging from the CSCE.
8. Transformation of NATO from an alliance under Article 51 to a security organ of a regional collective security system under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

9. Transformation into an institution of close transatlantic policy consultation and solution of economic conflicts between the United States and the European Union.

10. Its dissolution.[72]

In mid 1994, NATO pursued Option 3 and indicated its readiness to move to Option 4. Options 7 and 8 have been suggested by Yeltsin, Kozyrev and Grachev and opposed by NATO. Thus, the future institutional debate and controversy will probably focus on Options 4 to 8. Depending on the outcome of the WEU Treaty review in 1996 and the evolution of the European Union and the WEU, the United States and the WEU may compromise on Option 5 and the Russian Federation and NATO on Option 6 or Option 7. From a longer-term perspective and based on optimist assumptions with respect to future development in Russia, NATO as an alliance may have lost its *raison d'être*. While both United States isolationists (Krauss) and European leftists (Smith) have called for a dissolution of NATO (Option 10), no single member has decided to leave NATO and several Visegrad and Baltic states have applied for NATO membership. Nor has any NATO member called for a transformation of NATO into a political club for close transatlantic security, political, economic and environmental consultations and problem-solving. Successive enlargements of the European Union may also raise the question of a parallel enlargement of NATO (Option 4). If an eastward expansion is not politically acceptable to both the United States and Russia, more of the collective self-defence functions may gradually shift to the WEU (Option 5).

However, if the process of an eastward expansion of NATO is pursued, for what reasons could democratic CSCE member states applying for membership be opposed? If Russia itself should fulfil the Baker criteria and apply for full membership in NATO, could it really be rejected? However, if most CSCE states were also admitted, NATO would automatically be transformed from an alliance directed against an outside threat to a regional collective security system directed inward (Option 8). More likely in the near future is an enlargement of the NACC from its present thirty-eight members to all fifty-two plus CSCE countries (Option 7). Three additional states – Finland (NACC

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72. These options have been extensively discussed in Brauch, 1992*a* and 1992*b*.

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observer), Slovenia and Sweden – have already signed the PfP programme. In this case, the NACC may become the major dialogue forum of both NATO and the CSCE and this may be seen as a first step to a transformation of the NACC into a security organ of the CSCE. In the longer term, especially if the WEU is transformed into the security organ of an enlarged EPU, NATO could become the security organ of the CSCE. In this case the parallelism between two military alliances and a regional collective security system would have disappeared and a regional collective security system would be responsible, in close co-operation with the United Nations, for conflict prevention, dispute resolution, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and peace-building in the Northern hemisphere.

INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR CSCE

There has been a huge gap between the rhetoric of leading members and official CSCE statements on the one hand, and the limited resources made available and the political support given by these members, as well as the unsatisfactory performance of the CSCE on the other. Everts and van Staden (1993, pp. 21–3) discussed several steps towards a further institutionalization: (a) to shift from decision-making by consensus to qualified majorities and weighted voting; (b) to make better use of the Troika; (c) to establish a directorate of major powers (European Security Council); (d) to base the CSCE process on a formal treaty like the United Nations Charter; (e) to reconsider the admission to membership of Central Asian but not all Mediterranean countries; (f) to establish the CSCE as a roof for other organizations and institutions; (g) to transform the CSCE into an organization which can carry out the functions of a true regional organization.

Beyond the initial steps towards an institutionalization of the CSCE process, which were approved at meetings in Paris (1990), Berlin (1991), Prague (1992), Helsinki and Stockholm (1992) and Rome (1993), a future regional organization emerging from the CSCE could be based on six institutional pillars under the roof of a pan-European regional organization:

The *political pillar* for arms control, confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-building, crisis prevention and peaceful conflict resolution (the CSCE with its Council, Troika, CSO, Secretariat in

Vienna, the Forum for Security Co-operation, the Conflict Prevention Centre, its Special and its Permanent Committees in Vienna and the CSCE Court of Arbitration in Geneva) already exists.

The *military pillar* for collective peace-keeping (under its own mandate) and peace-enforcement measures (under a mandate from the United Nations Security Council) under the guidance of a European Security Council and a regional General Staff Committee must still be established, possibly in Vienna or in Brussels at NATO Headquarters. The regional General Staff Committee could rely on NATO, WEU and CIS military capabilities and structures. NATO's Partnership for Peace programme could create both the technical (inter-operability) and educational (joint exercises) preconditions as well as the NACC programmes for military co-operation and the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation.

The *economic pillar* may be developed out of the CSCE Economic Forum and by taking over the activities of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in Geneva, a regional body of ECOSOC, and by integrating the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in London. Here economic aid and co-operation programmes for economic transformation could be co-ordinated. Close co-operation with the European Union in Brussels would be essential.

The *ecological pillar* may evolve out of the CSCE Charter and the decisions of Helsinki in close co-operation with the ECE, OECD, IAEA, UNEP and the regional regimes of the Oslo, Helsinki and Barcelona Conventions and may eventually result in a European Environment Protection Agency for the effective implementation of common obligations. Close co-operation with the Environmental Agency of the European Union in Copenhagen would be helpful.

The *pillar for democratic institutions and human rights* may develop out of the existing Office on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg, which may be enlarged by a separate chamber for the protection of minority rights, and the CSCE Court on Conciliation and Arbitration in Geneva.

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The *scientific and cultural pillar* may evolve out of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and comprise a multitude of existing and future functional organizations in close co-operation with UNESCO.

For the future pan-European security architecture, both the political and military pillars are essential. According to the first Helsinki decision (1992) the Council may establish ad hoc steering groups 'on a case-by-case basis in order to further assist the Chairman-in-Office, in particular in the field of conflict prevention, crisis management and dispute resolution. . . . In order to ensure efficiency, an ad hoc steering group will be composed of a restricted number of participating States which will include the Troika. Its composition and size will be decided taking into account the need for impartiality and efficiency'.[73]

This provision may offer the framework for a gradual transformation of such an ad hoc steering group on conflict prevention, crisis management and dispute resolution into a permanent European Security Council (ESC) which would consist of representatives of both foreign and defence ministries. If an enlarged NATO becomes the security institution or organ of the CSCE, the ESC could also take over some of the present functions of the North Atlantic Council and of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council.

The ESC could comprise fifteen of the fifty-two plus CSCE member states, of which five would be permanent members without a power of veto: the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France and Germany and ten additional states which would be elected for a two-year period to represent different regions and the members of the Troika. For the initiation of peace-keeping operations, a majority vote of 66 per cent and for peace-enforcement operations a 75 per cent majority could be required. The ESC should be advised by a regional Military Staff Committee envisaged in Article 47 of the United Nations Charter. It would plan and command under the responsibility of the ESC, and in close co-operation with the United Nations Security Council, all regional peace-keeping and peace-enforcement as well as post-conflict peace-building measures.

However, the institutionalization of the CSCE can hardly succeed if the CSCE Charter remains legally a non-binding political agreement. A regional collective security system can function effectively neither on the basis of a

73.   CSCE, Helsinki Summit Declaration, op. cit., pp. 2–3.

consensus nor on that of a veto power. These changes in the decision-making process are preconditions for a shift from the present collective self-defence to any future regional collective security system. Thus, it is suggested that, at the fifth CSCE Follow-up Conference in Budapest in autumn 1994, the CSCE be transformed from a legally non-binding political agreement to a legally binding treaty and from a political process to a regional organization, with its own secretariat, organs and a weighted decision-making process both reflecting the financial contributions of its members – for example, the suggested five permanent members of the ESC contribute 9 per cent each to the CSCE budget – but also protecting the interests of small states.

At the sixth CSCE Review Conference in 1996, that is after the next enlargement of the European Union is completed and parallel to the next revision of the European Union Treaty which may result in the WEU becoming the security organ of the EPU, NATO may transfer some of its infrastructure for collective self-defence operations to the WEU/EPU while taking over more CSCE tasks. After 1997, NATO or the NACC could become the major security organization or organ of the CSCE.

GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY

While systems of collective self-defence are directed outward against a common enemy, collective security systems are directed inward against violations in a subregion or a region or on the global level. Past experience, both with the League of Nations and during the first forty-five years of the United Nations, has been negative. Is this system bound to fail in the post-Cold War era?

So far enforcement actions under Chapter VII have not been fully implemented because the institutional requirements, for example the Military Staff Committee, are still lacking. Since the end of the East–West conflict during the Gulf War (1990/91), the global collective security system passed a first partial test. The cease-fire and the demilitarization resolutions entered new ground. The United Nations Special Commission was given a major political task.

On the regional level, a few international organizations qualified as 'regional arrangements' under Chapter VIII of the Charter: the OAS, the OAU

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and the Arab League. Nevertheless, owing to the impact of East–West competition on client conflicts, the influence and power for mediation of regional organizations has been limited. During the Gulf War, the Arab League was divided and the Gulf Co-operation Council was helpless to counter the aggression against one of its members.

On the subregional level a 'spillover' from economic co-operation and integration to conflict avoidance can be observed: war as an instrument for conflict resolution has become obsolete among European Union members. Thus the enlargement of the European Union may also have a positive impact on emerging or subdued conflicts in the new European democracies. In his report, Mr Boutros-Ghali specifically stressed the importance of these regional efforts for preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping. The more the regional efforts at mediation and conflict resolution succeed, the more the Security Council can focus on major wars which also require broad backing from major weapons suppliers.

My preferred conceptual option is to strengthen both regional and global efforts for conflict prevention, crisis control and resolution. This requires the gradual development of regional collective security systems. However, instead of setting up broad frameworks on paper without institutional backing, an incremental approach is preferred. In my view, the pragmatic functionalist approach implying that form follows function has been more realistic than the federalist approach implying that functions follow form. The CSCE as a legally non-binding political process has gradually emerged, following the functionalist path by first developing jointly agreed tasks and functions and by setting up institutions. As the only organization comprising NATO and former WTO and CIS countries, the CSCE should gradually evolve from a conference or process to a regional international organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter and NATO should gradually be transformed into the security organ of the CSCE.

There should be a hierarchy of conflict solution efforts: between the global (United Nations), the regional (CSCE) and the subregional level (NATO, European Union and WEU, CIS) the principle of subsidiarity may be introduced, that is, conflicts should be solved at the lowest level and should only be dealt with at the higher level if one party to the conflict doubts its impartiality and appeals to the higher level. Thus, as long as neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan

objects, the CIS could deal with the conflict on Nagorno-Karabakh, while the Cyprus issue could become a test case for NATO's new collective security tasks. The CSCE could deal with all those peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions (with a United Nations mandate) on its territory, thus relieving the United Nations Security Council. Only intra-regional conflicts which cannot be solved by the CSCE and conflicts involving outside parties would be considered and handled operatively by the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Secretariat. The peace-keeping forces of NATO, WEU and CIS and those units participating in the PfP programme could be made available for CSCE and United Nations missions. Thus the problem overload of the Security Council would be reduced. A functionalist institutional transformation strategy, as outlined in this paper, may contribute to this goal. Only if subregional efforts, for example by the European Community or CIS, fail should the CSCE become active and even then the Security Council should intervene only in conflicts which extend beyond the CSCE area.

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Abbreviations

ABC	Atomic, biological, chemical weapons
AFES-PRESS	Peace Research and European Studies
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand)
Bulletin	*Bulletin* of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany
CBW	Chemical, biological weapons
CC	Consultative Committee
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CFE I	Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe of 1990
CFE IA	The Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 1992
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
Comecon	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (in December 1994 title changed to Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE))

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CSCM	Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East
CSFR	Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
CSO	Committee of Senior Officials
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
EA	*Europa-Archiv*
ECE	Economic Commission for Europe
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EECU	European Economic and Currency Union
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EPC	European Political Co-operation
EPU	European Political Union
ESC	European Security Council
EuPRA	European Peace Research Association
FAZ	*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*
FR	*Frankfurter Rundschau*
FSC	Forum for Security Co-operation
G-7	Seven most industrialized Western states (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States)
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IA Treaty	Part of the CFE IA or IA Treaty
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IEPG	Independent European Programme Group
IHT	*International Herald Tribune*
INF Treaty	Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987/88
IPRA	International Peace Research Association
KSZE	CSCE in German
N&N	Neutral and Non-Aligned
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Co-operation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NYT	*New York Times*

NZZ	*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODIHR	Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PfP	Partnership for Peace
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SNF	Short Range Nuclear Forces in Europe
START I	Treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction Talks of 1991
START II	Treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction Talks of 1993
SZ	*Süddeutsche Zeitung*
UNCIO	United Nations Conference on International Organization
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNISCI	Research Unit on Security and International Co-operation, Complutense University, Madrid
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
USPIT	*US Policy, Information and Texts*
VU	Vrije Universiteit (Free University of Amsterdam)
WEU	Western European Union
WEUCOM	Western European Union Communication network
WP	*Washington Post*
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

Human rights in international security

*Michael Banton**

This essay discusses some recent developments in the multilateral protection of human rights, with particular reference to the six United Nations human rights treaty bodies: the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCRC), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Committee against Torture (CAT), and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). All these committees monitor the extent to which the states parties to the respective covenants or conventions fulfil the obligations they have undertaken on adherence, and report ultimately to the United Nations General Assembly on the examination of reports from the states. They have other functions in addition, the most important being the power of HRC, CERD and CAT to receive communications from individuals who believe that the state to whose jurisdiction they are subject has not protected their legal rights, provided that the state in question has recognized the competence of the committee to act in this capacity.

These protections are multilateral in that each derives from a treaty to which a significant number of states have acceded and which empowers the treaty body to act on behalf of the collectivity of states parties. They are to be distinguished from the protections deriving from bilateral diplomacy. Bilateral protections have also recently gained in importance with the decision of several states to make

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their economic and technical aid to less developed states conditional upon the recipients' improving their protection of their citizens' rights. When there is a military coup, or democratic processes are denied, then aid may be stopped. Membership of regional groupings may be subject to similar conditions. For example, the new Baltic states have been seeking membership of the Council of Europe but have had to satisfy the existing members that they respect the rights of minorities within their borders. European Community trade and co-operation agreements with these states include demanding human rights clauses. Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe and has applied to join the European Community; it is generally believed that acceptance of Turkey's application will depend upon its government's success in providing better protection for human rights. Furthermore, the World Bank has started to take into account the human rights situation in countries when deciding its economic policies.

An examination of the contribution of bilateral diplomacy to the improvement of protections would require knowledge of confidential representations made through diplomatic channels. Such an exercise cannot be attempted here.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The concept of human rights as such is of relatively recent origin, deriving from the discussions which led to the United Nations Charter in 1945. This lists among the new organization's purposes 'promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms'. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (a body composed of elected states) then prepared the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; it was not a binding instrument but an elaboration of the obligations intended by the Charter. It was given legal form in the two international covenants: the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These were supplemented by a series of conventions. Thus United Nations activity in the field of human rights falls into two divisions: obligations deriving from the Charter and binding upon all Member States, and other obligations accepted by those states which chose to accede to particular human rights treaties.

During the 1940s and 1950s the United Nations adopted conventions on genocide, traffic in prostitution, refugees, correction, the political rights of

women, slavery, statelessness and the nationality of married women. Its priorities started to alter with changes in the composition of the General Assembly. At the end of 1959 there were nine African Member States; another sixteen were admitted in the year 1960 alone and, as can be seen from Table 1, a further eighteen were admitted before the decade was over. One priority shared by all the African states, and for which there was much support elsewhere, was action against apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa. Revulsion from apartheid was the motive force behind the adoption in 1965 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and many of the decisions of the International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran in 1968. The Final Act of that conference contains resolutions on occupied territories, action against Nazism and racial intolerance, apartheid, racist regimes, non-discrimination in employment, action against racial discrimination, decolonization, women's rights and armed conflicts.

Table 1 is based on the 181 Member States of the United Nations at 9 April 1993 and records the period in which they became members. It may be noted that Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States are members of the 'West European' and 'Other' groups, and that Israel and South Africa are members of no regional grouping.

TABLE 1. Growth in United Nations membership, by region

Date	African	Asian	East European	Latin American	West European	Other
Original members						
(24 October 1945)	1	6	5	8	6	1
To 1949	2	7		12	8	2
1950–59	6	8	4		6	
1960–69	32	5		4	1	
1970–79	9	10		5	1	
1980–89	1	2		4		
1990–93	1	4	18		2	
TOTAL	52	42	27	33	24	3

THE TREATY BODIES

The Convention on Genocide provided that any contracting party might call upon the United Nations to act under its Charter to prevent acts of genocide, and for the punishment of offenders by national or international courts. It was used in 1993 in an action against Yugoslavia before the International Court of Justice. ICERD marked an important step beyond the Genocide Convention when, in 1965, it became the first human rights convention to include its own enforcement provision, even if not a very powerful one. It required states parties to report periodically on the judicial, administrative or other measures which they had adopted to give effect to the convention and established a committee to report annually to the General Assembly on its examination of the reports and of information received from states parties. As mentioned in this essay's opening paragraph, it also provided that states parties might recognize the competence of the committee to issue opinions on petitions from individuals claiming that the state to whose jurisdiction they were subject had failed to protect rights guaranteed to them under the convention. It further provided that a dispute between states parties as to the interpretation or application of the convention might be referred to the International Court of Justice (though many at this stage exempted themselves from adjudication by the International Court). These were significant steps by which contracting states surrendered some of their sovereignty to international oversight and adjudication. Some of ICERD's features were recapitulated in the drafting of other conventions.

The dates from which the treaty bodies started their work may be listed summarily: CERD, 1970; HRC, 1977; CEDAW, 1982; CESCR, 1987; CAT, 1988; CRC, 1992. The numbers of states which were parties to the related instruments at 7 September 1993 were: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 137; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 123; Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 126; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 125; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 77; Convention on the Rights of the Child, 147. When the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families has

obtained a sufficient number of accessions a further committee will come into being. It should also be noted that the United Nations has convened meetings of the persons chairing treaty bodies in 1984, 1988, 1990 and 1992. These meetings promote consistency in the activities of the various committees and enable them to speak collectively on matters of common concern. A further move in the promotion of a consistent human rights policy has been the decision to hold an annual debate in the General Assembly on 'effective implementation of international instruments on human rights'. Since the debate held in 1991, some delegations have pressed for better procedures for emergency humanitarian intervention in order to prevent human rights violations.

The year 1989 saw major political changes in Europe, popularly known as the ending of the Cold War but in the United Nations referred to more diplomatically as the ending of bipolarity in international relations. The reduction in the tension between East and West has been of great importance in enabling the treaty bodies to develop their work, but progress has in some cases been delayed by financial stringency. The United Nations was plunged into a budgetary crisis in late 1985 by the failure of the United States to pay all of its assessed contribution. CERD was hit hardest: over the years 1986–92 it was enabled to meet for only twenty-four weeks instead of the expected forty-two. The August session is always under pressure because of the priority which has to be given to the preparation of the annual report. When in 1991, for the first time in three years, it had the funds for a March session, then, in the words of an independent non-governmental organization, the International Service for Human Rights, 'it decided upon original and interesting initiatives. One can be happy to note that CERD . . . does not hesitate to demonstrate audacity and finds a second youth'.[1]

One of these innovations was the discovery of a procedure permissible within the constraints of the convention, whereby the committee could examine implementation of the convention within the territory of a state which had failed to submit its periodic report. Other initiatives entailed changes in the committee's working methods. It can be difficult to explain to someone unfamiliar with treaty bodies why it is difficult to secure changes of this kind, but

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1. *Human Rights Monitor*, Vol. 13, 1991, p. 13.

any attempted explanation has to start from the observation that it is the states parties that choose to adhere to a treaty and they will not do this if they suspect that it will cause them too much trouble. It is the states parties that elect the members of the committee, and from the beginning they have chosen to nominate people whom they can trust. As a result about two-thirds of the members of CERD have always been diplomats, or former diplomats, some of whom have been lawyers. On the HRC all the members are lawyers, but the other treaty bodies are like CERD in including many diplomats, persons in government service and others close to the governments. An observer from the International Service for Human Rights has commented that 'diplomats are used to acting with excessive care towards governmental representatives. Professors or judges contribute in a more effective way to the work of the committee, daring to direct more pertinent and thereby more embarrassing questions at the State delegations'.[2]

In the years 1991–92 other innovations went ahead. The meeting of persons chairing treaty bodies introduced modifications to the reporting arrangements to reduce overlap in reports to different committees. The finances of the two most vulnerable committees were improved and CEDAW was allowed increased meeting time. The committees are all following the example of the HRC in elaborating general comments on the implications of the various articles in their covenants or conventions. CERD, being the oldest body, has probably changed most. It now appoints country rapporteurs to open the consideration of state party reports; this has facilitated a better division of labour within the committee and has led to a closer scrutiny of state reports. Like some other committees, it now adopts 'concluding observations' which express a collective opinion upon a state report, whereas previously the committee's report had contained only expressions of the views of individual members. In the committee's early years there were members who maintained that, in accordance with a strict reading of the convention, the committee must base its examination of reports upon what the state in question chose to say. Information from the press and from non-governmental organizations could never be so reliable and should therefore not be utilized. In the circumstances of the time, when the committee was itself

2.   *Human Rights Monitor*, Vol. 21, 1993, pp. 15–20.

very much of an innovation and there were sharp political oppositions within it, caution may have been advisable, but attitudes have since changed and there is now much more use of information from sources independent of states. Members of the committee are now more inclined to balance their duty towards the victims of discrimination against their duties to the states who have elected them.

Other factors, too, have contributed to the change in attitudes. In some other cases there have been changes of government. Some new governments have come to the committee and said, in effect, that their predecessors' reports were insufficient or unreliable. It is therefore not surprising that all committee members now adopt a more critical stance towards state reports than in the early days.

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

The *United Nations 1993 Report on the World Social Situation* lists the major armed conflicts between 1947 and 1990 by region and state as follows:

Africa: Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda.

South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka.

Pacific Asia: Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Philippines.

Central and South America: Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru.

Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey.

Europe: United Kingdom.

Many of these conflicts were, or are, between groups distinguished by their ethnic origin. The casualties by death and displacement have been very high.

Since 1990 there has been an escalation of violent conflict, most notably in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in Yugoslavia. Many United Nations organs have responded. In January 1992 the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, presented to the Security Council his report, *An Agenda for Peace*, and the General Assembly adopted it on 20 September 1993. It outlines a four-stage approach to conflict regulation: preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building. The Secretary-General also identified a need to consider ways in which he and the expert human rights bodies might bring massive violations of human rights to

the attention of the Security Council, together with recommendations for action.

The treaty bodies are empowered to request special reports from states providing information additional to that contained in periodic reports. This can be more of a sanction than might appear. States dislike intensely any censure of their human rights records, either in a formal dialogue in Geneva or, more particularly, in a committee's published report. In 1992 the Chairman of the HRC (acting in consultation with committee members at a time when the committee was not in session) urgently requested such reports from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro – but note that there is a dispute about the correct name, on account of disagreement as to whether the present government is the legal successor to the former Yugo-slavia). The HRC maintained that, despite certain legal problems, the people in the territories of the former Yugoslavia were still entitled to the protections which had previously been guaranteed them. It considered three reports that year and adopted concluding observations on each. In the previous year the CESCR, concerned about circumstances in the Dominican Republic, had offered the services of some of its members as an advisory mission. In 1992 CRC started work on an urgent action procedure to address serious situations where there was a risk of further human rights violations which concerned the rights of the child.

One feature of the Yugoslav conflict, as of other armed conflicts, has been the violence perpetrated upon female non-combatants. CEDAW in 1992 adopted a general recommendation concerning the actions required if states parties were to discharge their obligations in this connection. It has exchanged letters on this subject with the Special Rapporteur on the former Yugoslavia appointed by the Commission on Human Rights. CERD in 1993 adopted a memorandum about the identification of serious, massive or persistent patterns of racial discrimination, on early warning procedures and possible advisory missions. It devoted substantial time to the consideration of special reports obtained from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Referring to the tensions between the federal government and the Albanian population of Kosovo, the representative of Yugoslavia explained why the mandate of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in

Europe monitors had not been renewed. Taking into account the need for a dialogue between the Albanians in Kosovo and the government, CERD offered its good offices in the form of a mission composed of three of its members. The mission would work for the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and help the parties arrive at such a solution. In late September the government agreed to receive a mission which might obtain a broader insight into the problems in that part of its territory. Accordingly, between 28 November and 4 December a mission of three members held discussions in Belgrade with federal and republican officials and in Pristina with local officials and representatives of Albanian organizations and political groups. This constitutes a major expansion of the committee's activities.

Because of its mandate, the increase in ethnic conflict has been of particular concern to CERD. The events in the former Yugoslavia have been particularly disquieting since that state was once regarded by many as a model of how ethnic tensions could be overcome by a constitution which took proper account of the differences within the population. The committee ought to have been able to detect the approaching dangers and warn the General Assembly, but it did not. Members have been conscious of their failure in this, and have been trying to learn lessons from the experience. Like others, they have to bear in mind two principles which do not sit easily together. On the one hand, international law recognizes the right of all peoples to self-determination. But on the other hand it also provides that nothing may be done which (to follow the protracted wording of the 1970 General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States) impairs 'the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind'. There is the danger that, if international bodies recognize a separatist claim based upon ethnic origin, this may have a 'domino effect' in encouraging dissident groups elsewhere to press for independence. The continued existence of many states would be threatened. So CERD has advised the international community against any legitimation of ethnic claims contrary to the philosophy of multi-national or multi-ethnic statehood.

THE VIENNA DECLARATION
AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION

In 1988 it was suggested in Geneva that the time was ripe for a second international conference to reinforce the framework for the protection of human rights.[3] So the World Conference on Human Rights was held in Vienna from 14 to 25 June 1993. It was a conference of states, with many non-governmental organizations represented by observers. These observers, and the representatives of the treaty bodies, were dissatisfied that the states did not allow them to play a more active part in the proceedings. This suggests that many states are sensitive to the pressure these organizations and bodies exert.

The central activity at conferences of this kind is the drafting of declarations and resolutions, which to some readers will appear mere words when action is needed. This betrays a failure to understand the importance of rhetoric in international relations. The drafting of resolutions on these occasions follows the principle of the ratchet, a kind of wheel which cannot ordinarily be turned backwards. A formulation that has been used in a previous resolution can be repeated; the parties are unlikely to object, even if the wording no longer reflects present circumstances, because they earlier accepted it and now have more pressing objectives to pursue. To accept a particular formulation is therefore to make a commitment. States may also attempt to strengthen formulations used on a previous occasion. An example of this steplike process

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3.   According to one commentator (*Human Rights Monitor,* Vol. 21, 1993, p. 2), those who proposed the conference were then distracted by the events of the following year, and paid little attention to the way in which one delegation, eager to improve the image of its regime following revelations about detention centres, took possession of the initiative. Whether or not this observation is justified the author does not know; nor can any publication of UNESCO be used to speculate about the motivations of one of its Member States. But the observation exemplifies one of the difficulties when writing about international events. Those who are close to these events usually have their own explanations of why others support or oppose particular proposals, but to voice them in public is to invite an altercation which holds up the proceedings and makes it less likely that an agreement can be reached. Thus many United Nations documents offer only a sanitized history of why things happened in the way they did.

can be seen in the sequence of United Nations resolutions which started as condemnations of racial discrimination and led to the 1975 General Assembly determination 'that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination'.[4] The condemnation was rhetorical, mere words, but became a powerful counter in moves (often Arab-inspired) against those who could be labelled Zionist. Having occasioned bitter resentment, it was rescinded in 1991. The rhetoric of human rights resolutions is important because it can be used as a basis for decisions which, if approved by the General Assembly, create obligations for all Member States, even if they are not of themselves legally enforceable. Declarations may later be used as a basis for the preparation of conventions which are legally binding upon those states which choose to accede to them.

In the preparations for the conference it began to look as if the ending of East–West bipolarity was being replaced by a North–South bipolarity, with the less developed states of the South objecting to the human rights priorities of the richer industrialized states. In particular, it was suggested that the Northerners were overemphasizing the importance of civil rights relative to economic rights, and that they had too individualistic a conception of civil rights.[5] Preparatory committee meetings in Geneva failed to agree the agenda for the conference.

Three regional groupings also held preparatory meetings. The African group, meeting in Tunis, reaffirmed the indivisibility and universality of human rights, but also declared that 'no ready-made model can be prescribed at the universal level since the historical and cultural realities of each nation and the

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4. Michael Banton, 'Racial Rhetoric at the United Nations', *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 5, 1991, pp. 5–18.
5. It is argued that an atmosphere of civil liberty promotes economic growth. On the other hand, the examples of Singapore, the Republic of Korea and south-east China can be used in support of a counter-argument that food must come before freedom and that authoritarian policies may be needed in order to see that the people are fed. An examination of the available statistics for the world's poorest countries in 1971 concluded that, on average, those countries which had better records on civil and political rights also enjoyed greater improvements in national income per head, life expectancy at birth and the infant survival rate. The one contrary finding was that these countries on average performed less well in improving literacy. See Partha Dasgupta, *An Inquiry into Well-being and Destitution*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993.

traditions, standards and values of each people cannot be disregarded'. The Latin American and Caribbean group, meeting in Costa Rica, agreed that no rights might be denied on the grounds that the full enjoyment of other rights had not yet been achieved. They called attention to many obstacles (some new) to such achievement, and expressed hesitations about the 'right of interference for humanitarian purposes'. The group of Asian states had difficulty agreeing its preparations for the meeting eventually held in Bangkok. Its declaration, which highlighted the right to development, was not as serious a challenge to the universality of rights as some had feared. It declared that the states would 'discourage any attempt to use human rights as a condition for extending development assistance'.[6]

The conference therefore opened in an apprehensive mood, overshadowed by reports of atrocities not far away in the former Yugoslavia which the west Europeans had failed to prevent. Though it did not realize all the original hopes, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action shows that the conference was successful in reinforcing the existing international framework for the protection of human rights, bringing within it a significant number of new states. The declaration strengthened international commitments on some new problems, as can be seen by comparing its thirty-nine operative paragraphs with the nineteen paragraphs of the Proclamation of Tehran twenty-five years earlier. The declaration included two paragraphs on the right to development 'as a universal and inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights',[7] and others on

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6. *Human Rights Monitor*, Vol. 21, 1993, pp. 15–20.
7. According to the classical theory only the rights of individuals can be human rights, so that the right to development belongs to a new class of collective rights, together with the rights to self-determination and peace, and the declaration in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights that 'all peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development'. Who is entitled to claim redress when a collective right is allegedly violated? Against whom can such a claim be made? It may be that what has been presented as a single right will have to be divided into two, one being a right of individuals and the other a right of states. The International Law Commission has made proposals along these lines. See Paul Sieghart, *The Lawful Rights of Mankind*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986, which can also be warmly recommended as a beginner's introduction to the law of human rights.

debt, poverty, terrorism, minorities, indigenous peoples, children, the disabled, the right to asylum, migrant workers, torture, non-governmental organizations and the mass media.

The accompanying Programme of Action adds specific recommendations. It calls on the Commission of Human Rights to take further steps in connection with the recent Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. It calls for completion of the draft declaration on the rights of indigenous people and recommends the proclamation of an international decade of the world's indigenous people to begin from January 1994. It calls for the adoption of the draft declaration on violence against women. It urges reconsideration of the reservations entered by many states when they acceded to the CEDAW Convention and the drafting of an additional protocol to permit individual petition under this convention. It stresses women's rights to health care and family planning services, and encourages the increased employment of women within the United Nations system. The Programme of Action urges reconsideration of reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child also, supporting proposals for a special study of the protection of children in armed conflicts and recognizing the important role played by non-governmental organizations in this field. It supports an optional protocol to the torture convention to establish a preventive system of regular visits to places of detention. It recalls the General Assembly's programme of action concerning disabled persons and calls upon it to adopt the draft standard rules on the equalization of opportunities for persons with disabilities.

CONCLUSIONS

Considering the persistent and massive violation of human rights in many countries today, most evident in armed conflicts such as those in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Tajikistan, and in the failure of the international community to intervene effectively, it can be argued that the human rights enterprise has been but a litany of failures. This is to compare achievements against an ideal. No one knows what other calamities might have occurred but for the effort to identify human rights and fundamental freedoms, to publicize them, and to make them subject to international oversight.

The central institution in the protection of human rights is the state. It is states which have to legislate and act so as to implement their international obligations. Some governments, perhaps because they have only a tenuous hold upon office, or rely upon repressive methods to retain office, do not discharge their obligations adequately, but there is at present no alternative to the state as the unit of international relations (it is conventional to speak as if these were relations between nations, but in political matters they are the relations between states, or governments).

Two of the treaty bodies (HRC and CERD) are empowered to make available their good offices should one state party complain that another is not fulfilling its obligations, but this possibility has not been invoked even in clear circumstances of inter-state dispute.[8] It can also be maintained that one of the weaknesses of the minorities treaties administered by the League of Nations was their reliance upon the readiness of states to inform the Council of an infraction or the danger of an infraction.[9] States were reluctant to take such action and the Minorities Committees established by the League were not strong enough to make the protections properly multilateral.[10] Though the treaty bodies can take no initiative in inter-state disputes, with the shift towards preventive diplomacy they can circumvent the reluctance of states to invoke the provisions for multilateral review.

Some states have engaged less actively than others in building the network of treaty obligations. This essay has focused on the two covenants and four conventions which presently form the heart of that network. Some states (including Saudi Arabia and South Africa) had, by 31 January 1993, acceded to none of them. Others had acceded to only one (including Myanmar and the United States of America) or two (including Indonesia, Thailand and Turkey). Does this matter? As far as the treaty bodies are concerned, the answer for the present must be that it does not. They have enough to do adapting their working

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8.   *The First Twenty Years: Progress Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,* paras. 133–42, United Nations, 1991. (HR/PUB/91/4.)

9.   Francesco Caportorti, *Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,* paras. 103–5, United Nations, 1991.

10.   Ibid., para. 122, pp. 130–3.

methods to the limited resources available, improving their dialogue with the states parties so as to make explicit the new standards, advising on how they may best be met, and encouraging better implementation (particularly through the provisions for individual petition). When other states eventually accede, they will find that they have to conform to norms in the elaboration of which they have not participated.

Barring some environmental catastrophe, they will eventually accede. Today it is not possible for anyone in an international gathering to deny that everyone has the right to life, that no one shall be held in slavery or subjected to torture. It is not possible to defend discrimination against women or on grounds of sex. Nor can anyone deny the rights of the child. A state representative cannot hope to persuade others that his or her state has good grounds for not acting to protect such rights. The reputation of a state in diplomatic circles depends to a significant extent upon its human rights record.

The arena of argument turns upon how one right is to be balanced against another, the circumstances (such as a state of emergency) in which a right may be suspended, and the possibility of exceptions to meet what the African states in Tunis called the 'historical and cultural realities of each nation and the traditions, standards and values of each people'. Some of these realities reflect, or are reflected in, differences of religion.[11] International law is also a reality, and arguments about the relevance of historical and cultural difference will have eventually to be expressed in legal form so the law can, if necessary, be modified to accommodate them. The treaty bodies have a special importance in this respect because, although they have been set up by states and their membership is elected by states, their members' overriding duty is to the fulfilment of the purposes of the treaty. Their dialogue with states helps clarify the application of international norms in varying circumstances and narrows any area of dispute. As the globalization process extends, all countries being drawn into an interdependent system of world trade, both the multilateral and the bilateral protections of human rights will be in the centre of future international relations.[12]

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11. It is sometimes maintained that the Koran offers a sufficient statement of human rights and the means of their enforcement.
12. Mr David Johnson kindly commented on an earlier draft of this essay.

Movements of people as a global challenge and the European dilemma

*Bimal Ghosh**

Events in Europe since the Second World War have revealed how movements of people can be a powerful instrument in the struggle for political change. They have also demonstrated how such movements can profoundly influence state policy and inter-state relations. Despite the severe restrictions imposed during the Cold War on individuals seeking to leave their countries, people from Eastern Europe moved to the West, defying the barriers. During the ten years following 1951 some 3.5 million people fled to the West, before the Berlin Wall was built on 13 August 1961.[1] In the years which followed, the same yearning for freedom led them to scale the wall or seek escape routes through barbed wire into the countries of the West, regardless of the risks to themselves and their families.

In mid 1989, as the fight for political reform was gathering pace in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia and the Communist regime was crumbling, tens of thousands of people from the German Democratic Republic

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1. Between 1948 and 1989 inclusive, 3.9 million people left the former German Democratic Republic. During the same period, a total of 6.1 million people from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania – representing 5 per cent of their population midway through the post-war period – moved to the West. See Jean-Claude Chesnais, *Migration from Eastern to Western Europe. Past (1946–1989) and Future (1990–2000),* p. 4, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1990. Official estimates place the number of people who have moved from the Soviet Union since the Second World War at 1.2 million.

travelled through Hungary and Czechoslovakia on their way to the Federal Republic of Germany. By November their numbers were approaching 200,000, when the government opened the border in the hope of stemming the mass exodus through Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

However, on 9 November 1989, within hours of the fall of the Berlin Wall, crowds of people, running into thousands, crossed directly into the Federal Republic, symbolizing the beginning of a new political era. With the migratory waves still rising, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic called for a full updated text of an article originally prepared in 1991 on the reunification of the two Germanys. The pressure of population movement proved to be a key element in accelerating the unification of the divided nation.

In 1989, a total of 1.3 million people moved from the Eastern part of Europe to the West – surpassing all previous outflows from the region in any single year since 1951. These trends continued in 1990–92, causing concern in the West.

This anxiety is heightened by a seemingly endless flow of Balkan refugees and the simmering ethno-political conflicts in many parts of the former Soviet Union. The concern of the West over Eastern migration needs to be seen in the context of other migratory flows, especially the South–North movements. A currently estimated total annual flow of 2 million people to North America and Europe from all sources may not be overwhelming but the build-up, as seen by many, of a huge potential of migratory waves from different parts of the developing world changes the scenario. As the economic and demographic imbalances which divide the South and the North remain, and as the South's migration potential is exacerbated by such powerful factors as flagrant violation of basic human freedoms, civil strife, famine and environmental degradation, the concern over South–North migration grows. This concern is particularly pronounced in Western Europe. Its direct exposure to migratory waves from two fronts – the East and the South – a sudden increase in the total inflow, far above the annual average of between 7 and 9 million since 1984–85, and including a record number of asylum-seekers, a rising migratory pressure in the southern Mediterranean countries and a high level of unemployment, alongside mounting social and racial tension, are not the only sources of anxiety for Western Europe. It also stems from the changes which, as will be outlined below, the Western European nations are themselves undergoing at the present

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time and the various painful dilemmas the process entails. The 221 findings of a recent survey (spring 1991)[2] are revealing: they indicate that nearly two-thirds of the public in the European Community would accept immigrants only with restrictions as to whether they were from the East or from the South.

THE DILEMMAS OF WESTERN EUROPE

Immigration is not new in Western Europe – at least in the sense of cross-country movements within Europe. The proportion of foreign or foreign-born persons to total population in several countries (for example, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and Switzerland) is higher than in the United States (8.3 per cent)[3] and yet most West European political leaders cling to the notion that theirs are non-immigration countries. Individual Western European nations are anxious to maintain their historical ties with former colonial countries to enhance their economic and political role and influence both within the European Community and in the international arena. Emotion plays a part. None the less, they are not, and have never been, too enthusiastic about large waves of non-European immigrants. In the 1960s, when they borrowed temporary labour from outside Europe, they were thinking of 'guest workers' – a flexible alien workforce. It was much later, in the 1970s, that they became aware of the significance of the aphorism of the Swiss author Max Frisch: 'We asked for workers, but we got human beings.'

The new immigration is also taking place at a time when nations in Western Europe are striving to forge a new collective identity to be asserted in the outside world. The process is a stressful one, as the search for a new collective identity tends to weaken, or is perceived to weaken, the distinctive traits and cultural moorings of each individual nation. Some could even see in it an impending threat to national sovereignty. The arrival of new waves of migrants makes the process even more complex and disquieting. It heightens Western Europe's

2. European Community, *Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the European Community* (Brussels), No. 35, June 1991, pp. 40–3.
3. OECD, *SOPEMI (Continuous Reporting System on Migration)*, Annex, Table 1, Paris, OECD, 1992.

worry. As recent East–West migration has so clearly demonstrated, movements of people can profoundly affect the whole society. There is thus an undercurrent of fear that large new inflows of immigrants, especially from the South, with vastly different racial, cultural or religious backgrounds, could upset the delicate balancing act in which Western European societies are currently engaged.

In a complex situation like this, even rational concern over massive and disruptive movements of people could turn into an undefined and generalized fear about immigration – the fear of being under siege. Any form of immigration could then be perceived as a negative force which could swamp the receiving society and defy effective control.[4]

IS MIGRATION MANAGEABLE? A DEEPENING CONCERN

A good part of Western Europe's concerns is also symbolic of the changing attitude of countries, especially that among the receiving industrial countries, towards international migration. Peoples' movements may be as old as mankind; the hopes and concerns which often surround them may not be new. However, there are growing indications that more and more nations throughout the world are becoming less and less enthusiastic about immigration. In 1976, only 6.4 per cent of countries in the world considered their immigration levels too high; in 1989 the proportion went up to 20.6 per cent. In the same year, nearly 39 per cent seemed in favour of putting brakes on further immigration.[5] This concern is particularly high among the governments of richer countries, as reflected in the fact that, in 1989, the proportion of governments anxious to reduce migration was more than twice as high among the industrialized countries (42 per cent) as that among the least developed countries (20 per cent).

Between 1976 and 1989 the percentage of governments perceiving the immigration level as significant increased from 24 to 39 per cent; the perception

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4.   For a more detailed discussion, see B. Ghosh, 'The Future of East–West Migration', in S. Ardittis (ed.), *The Politics of East–West Migration*, London, Macmillan (forthcoming).
5.   United Nations, *Trends in Population Policy*, pp. 1368–71, New York, United Nations, 1989. (Population Studies No. 114.)

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was shared by 46 per cent of the developed countries, compared to 37 per cent for the developing countries.[6]

Against this background a question is frequently asked: is international migration manageable?

INADEQUACIES OF EXISTING CONCEPTS, POLICIES AND APPROACHES

The anxiety that future migration may get out of control is a result, at least partly, of the inadequacies and weaknesses of the policies, procedures and approaches that are currently used to deal with them. The causes, context and nature of inter-country migration have significantly changed over the past twenty-five years, but the national and international rules and mechanisms to manage the flows have not – at least not in a commensurate manner. The available legal instruments and institutional mechanisms, however effective they may have been in the past, are proving inadequate to meet the exigencies of contemporary migration. Clearly they were not designed to cope with the myriad of new and emerging problems of inter-country migration, nor were they attuned to the complexity it entails.

Recent migration trends have, for example, clearly demonstrated that the conventional classification of countries into three neat categories – emigration, immigration and transit countries – is no longer valid. An increasing number of countries are already combining the characteristics of two or even all three categories at the same time. The national migration mechanisms which were narrowly designed in most countries to respond to one or another of these specific categories are not evolving fast enough. The southern countries of Europe, such as Italy, Greece and Spain, have long been both emigration and immigration countries and there is a continuing concern in the north of Europe that the southern states' immigration control system is still not sufficiently geared to the new realities created by the large inflows of people. It certainly contributed to some of the difficulties in the recent intra-EC negotiations on the dismantling of internal borders to ensure free circulation of people.

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6.   Ibid., p. 36.

In Japan, to take another example, a growing discordance between the changing labour market situation and the national immigration policy is among the main reasons for the recent increase in irregular migration. The demand for foreign workers in Japan has been unofficially estimated at between 600,000 and 1 million (the recent rise in unemployment may not have substantially changed this demand for foreign labour, which is highly skill- and sector-specific). Japan is yet to have a coherent legal framework governing the entry and status of semi-skilled and unskilled foreign workers. As the labour shortage in specific sectors challenges the present labour immigration policy, more and more foreign workers are finding employment in an irregular manner. The number of such irregular workers now perhaps exceeds 100,000, some unofficial estimates placing the figure as high as 300,000.

Likewise, the established classification of migration flows – such as labour migration, family reunification and asylum-seeking – is now increasingly challenged by the complexity of causes and mixed motivations of inter-country movements. Many among those who seek new economic opportunities in a foreign country are compelled to do so because of extreme economic and social deprivation or serious environmental disasters. In such cases, the conventional dichotomy between voluntary and non-voluntary migration loses much of its meaning. Millions of people flee from generalized violence or oppression but they do not fit into an established category of refugees. In many of these cases, the persons affected stray into a grey area, as they are not covered, and therefore cannot be easily accommodated, under existing international instruments dealing with specific, well-defined groups, such as labour migrants and refugees.

In a fast-moving world the migration realities can certainly change equally quickly. Austria has long served as a transit country for asylum-seekers from Eastern Europe and has taken pride in its liberal tradition, but neither the government nor the public expected the sudden influx of large numbers of migrants from Romania and Hungary in 1989–90, many of whom did not qualify as political refugees and had nowhere else to go. Similarly, the recent inflow of thousands of Albanians into Italy – mostly in a desperate search for better economic opportunities – took the receiving country by surprise. The Gulf crisis in 1991 led to the sudden forced repatriation of nearly 2 million migrant workers to their countries of origin. Situations such as these will

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continue to place national migration mechanisms and procedures under severe strain as well as generate internal political and social tension and threaten regional stability.

Admittedly such developments cannot always be anticipated. However, they underscore the fact that crisis management is no substitute for flexible, forward-looking and innovative approaches to international migration. They also reveal the need for examining the whole spectrum of migration, not just the immediate problems of entry in isolation but also other possibilities of migration management in a wider and long-term perspective. These include: policy initiatives to help reduce pressures for disorderly emigration in potential sending countries and areas; timely and well-planned assistance to deal with situations created by sudden mass movements of people; and viable programmes of return migration in the countries of origin or in third countries. National and bilateral action aside, sound international mechanisms, procedures and policy frameworks are essential for the strategy to be effective.

Such pro-active and forward-looking policies for handling immediate problems should not blur our vision about future trends and prospects. There is no reason, for example, why the current concern over massive movements from Eastern Europe should preclude careful analysis, appraisal and the monitoring of other, emerging and long-term trends affecting the whole region. A new pattern of West–East movements of transient professionals, managers and technicians is now already emerging. Barring unexpected developments stemming from, for example, the Balkan crisis or the ethno-political turbulence in the former Soviet Union, it is possible to envisage, between 1995 and 2000, a more stable, if still modest, flow of longer-term migrants from Western to Eastern Europe, in addition to purely transient migrants. Taking a view over the next fifteen to twenty years, one can also conceive of some Eastern European countries becoming involved in both emigration and immigration in a manner largely similar to that in southern Europe during the last twenty years.[7]

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7. B. Ghosh, *East–West Migration: The European Perspective. Current Trends and Prospects beyond 1993*, pp. 17–18, Geneva, International Organization for Migration (IOM), 1991.

POLICY-MAKERS AS PRISONERS OF PAST PRACTICES

Underlying the inadequacies of existing legal instruments, institutional mechanisms and operational approaches is a deeper problem: a certain lack of determination among policy-makers to re-examine the conventional concepts and policy objectives in the light of today's migration realities. In Europe, there is rising political and intellectual ferment surrounding the migration issue, as reflected, for example, in the multiplicity of meetings and discussions held in the context of the East–West migration of 1989–90. Real progress in reassessing conventional views and deeply entrenched ideas about international migration in a medium- to long-term perspective has been slow, and yet, without such a fresh and bold approach, it will be difficult to break new ground; governments in both sending and receiving countries will remain prisoners of past practices and outdated concepts and approaches. The more often this happens, the more difficult will it be to evolve sound policy and operational responses to the new challenges and opportunities of inter-country migration. This could create a vicious circle.

As established policies and structures are increasingly ignored and bypassed, and more and more migratory movements take place in defiance of established rules and procedures, governments might become less and less self-confident in dealing with future migration. If the trend persists, they could develop a feeling of being overwhelmed and an undefined fear of migration may take hold. Such an environment would make governments more self-defensive and would inhibit new initiatives or even an open policy debate on contemporary migration challenges.

THE ASYLUM SYSTEM REACHES A CRITICAL POINT

A major new migration challenge which is placing existing concepts, laws and practice under severe strain relates to asylum-seeking. The asylum system, as formalized by the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (and the Protocol of 1967), was essentially a response to the situation prevailing in Germany under the Nazi regime and the refugee flows during the Cold War years. For more than twenty-five years, it provided an effective protection for many of those who, haunted by the fear of persecution, sought

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freedom and human dignity outside their country. In the late 1970s, as the refugee situation in the developing countries could no longer be contained at the regional level and as new streams of migrants, propelled by a variety of powerful factors, were seeking asylum in the West, the system was already showing signs of strain in Western Europe and – though to a lesser extent – in the United States and Canada.

By the second half of the 1980s, it was heading towards a crisis. The number of asylum-seekers in Europe and North America shot up from 20,000 a year in the mid 1970s to nearly 550,000 in 1990[8] – or more than one-third of the total annual immigration of foreigners in industrial Europe. In 1992, the number (excluding the war refugees from ex-Yugoslavia) rose to more than 0.8 million, of which 168,000 were in Western Europe.[9] This rising number of applicants for asylum, their diverse national and cultural backgrounds, coupled with the fact that between 50 and 80 per cent arrive without adequate or genuine documents, has placed an exceedingly heavy burden on the admission authorities. To cover the cost of an asylum system, the receiving countries in Western Europe and North America spent US$1 billion in 1983; in 1990 the cost was hovering between US$6 and 7 billion – or more than one-tenth of the total development assistance budget of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The total cost has further shot up since then. Currently, Western Europe alone may be spending $7.5 million a year.

As reflected in the sharply declining rates of acceptance by the receiving countries, all the asylum-seekers are obviously not bona fide refugees as defined by the United Nations Convention. Many of them still have valid, and indeed compelling, reasons to seek a permanent or temporary safe haven outside their country of origin. Civil war, gross violation of human rights, mass expulsion, environmental disasters, natural calamities, famine and hunger are among these reasons. Few of these fugitives are, however, covered under existing asylum arrangements, including the regional conventions which are somewhat wider in

8.   Provisional figure: source UNHCR/Intergovernmental Consultations (IGC) Secretariat. See also J. Widgren, *Movements of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Recent Trends in a Comparative Perspective,* p. 6, Paris, OECD, 1991.
9.   Source: IGC/United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1993.

scope.[10] The fact that asylum-seeking in the West is becoming intertwined with pursuits of better economic opportunities has further complicated the situation. Some of the recent flows of Eastern European asylum-seekers – Albanians in Italy, Romanians, Poles and (former) Yugoslavians in Germany, for example – certainly contained strong economic undertones, though they were also linked to the political and ethnic turmoils in the countries of origin. Significantly enough, several of these countries – Yugoslavia (since before the internal conflict), Turkey and, until recently, Poland, which generated large streams of asylum-seekers in Europe – are labour-surplus countries, with a long tradition of economic migration.[11] In the absence of other avenues of entry, attempts at making use of the asylum procedure by these various groups of potential migrants have led to an unprecedented overcrowding of the system. This, in turn, has tended to clog the review procedure, harm the cause of genuine refugees and breed irregular migration.

Up to now the response of the receiving countries to this confused situation has been slow. On humanitarian grounds or in exceptional cases, individual governments have granted protection and assistance to many of the asylum-seekers who fail to qualify for formal refugee status. Original rules, often based on the narrow United Nations definition of refugees, have been bent or stretched to meet new situations or accommodate additional cases, although without widening the basic definition or evolving new approaches to meet changing realities. Over time these adjustments and exceptions have made national arrangements harder and harder to articulate and administer. More and more, the ad hoc

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10. The 1969 OAU Convention on refugee problems in Africa, for example, includes as refugees those persons who flee from 'external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order'. In Central America, a declaration adopted by the concerned governments at Cartagena agreed that the refugee concept in the region should include persons fleeing their countries because of generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights and other conditions seriously disturbing public order.

11. An analysis of specific characteristics such as age, structure, occupational skills and geographical origins of some of the recent groups of asylum-seekers from Eastern European countries also tends to confirm that the search for better economic opportunities was a factor underlying these movements. See Ghosh, *East–West Migration* . . ., op. cit., p. 5.

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incremental approach has demonstrated its conceptual inconsistency. The right to life, the right to the integrity of the person and the right to human dignity are deemed universal rights. Human rights laws are not discriminatory. In the changed conditions of the post-Cold War era, many are therefore asking whether the present system is fair and equitable. If refugees fleeing political persecution deserve protection, as they certainly do, why should other forced migrants who may be fleeing from an equally desperate situation be left out?

Given the escalation in asylum-seeking, other misgivings are growing. There is, for example, increasing concern that the asylum review procedure is being deliberately used by some receiving countries in a rigid manner as part of a restrictive immigration policy to curb xenophobic reactions, regardless of human rights or even humanitarian considerations which are supposed to guide and sustain the modern asylum system. Apart from some well-publicized cases of deportation, quite a few governments are now devising means of stopping the flow of asylum-seekers at the national frontiers, despite the provisions of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1967, which prohibit such action.[12] As the process continues, some are logically, if somewhat rhetorically, raising the question: should human rights stop at the frontiers of individual states?

The issue has been on the agenda of various regional and international forums for several years but, with decisions at the national level taking precedence over concerted action among countries, a major breakthrough on any of the substantive matters has so far proved elusive. In Europe, the exigencies of market unification within the European Community are leading member states to adopt a set of regulatory measures such as joint visa arrangements and carrier sanctions as part of the control of common external borders, together with

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12. Neither the concept nor the term 'asylum' appears in the 1951 United Nations Convention. The Declaration on Territorial Asylum, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1967, prohibits states from rejecting asylum-seekers at their frontiers and also the forcible return of asylum-seekers. Subsequent efforts to adopt a legally binding convention on the subject failed in 1977. At the time of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the proposal that the states should be required 'to grant asylum' or that anyone should have the right 'to receive asylum' was opposed.

arrangements which preclude multiple applications for asylum under different national systems. Even under the Maastricht Treaty, there has been little progress on various crucial and substantive matters, including harmonization of criteria for granting asylum, treatment of asylum-seekers and the status of rejected asylum-seekers.[13] Meanwhile the system of burden-sharing for refugees, as defined by the EC summit in Edinburgh (December 1992), by using the concept of 'safe country', seems set to hinge on keeping the fugitives as far away as possible from the national borders of the receiving EC member states.

Asylum-seeking continues to pose a twofold challenge which warrants bold and fresh thinking. First, how can the system be streamlined and, at the same time, be made more equitable and coherent by providing permanent or temporary protection to different categories of forced migrants proportionate to their genuine needs? Should there be a new or supplementary regime to protect these persons, alongside the refugee regime established by the 1951 Convention? Secondly, how can we ensure that the asylum institution stands firmly on its own merits, without losing sight of the fact that it cannot be isolated from overall migration policy?

THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT: POLICY AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Absence of conceptual clarity often hinders the development of sound and well-defined migration policies and regulations and inhibits effective management of migration flows through international co-operation. Indicative of this is the continuing confusion over the concept of freedom of movement – a concept which was frequently invoked in the context of the 1989–90 East–West movements but which still needs to be clearly defined.

Freedom of movement is an ideal deeply embedded in the liberal and humanistic tradition of Western democracies. For more than forty years, the West has pressed for freer emigration from the countries of Eastern Europe as a measure of their liberation policies. In the Cold War strategy, Eastern people were encouraged to 'vote with their feet' and outmigration from the East was

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13.   B. Ghosh, 'The Future of East–West Migration', op. cit.

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perceived as a flight for freedom. Hailed as an integral part of fundamental human rights, freedom of movement is enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and in several other international instruments.

Western Europe had not expected, and was certainly unprepared, for waves of outmigration from Eastern Europe, as was witnessed in 1989–90. It now faces a painful dilemma, as it fears further massive movements from the region. No wonder, then, that in Western Europe the concept of freedom of movement hinges more and more on the right to leave and the right to return. Among the nations in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, it arouses an expectation of welcome by the West, encompassing the right to relocate in search of better opportunities of life. Although these illusory earlier hopes in the East are now more tempered and subdued, an apparent conceptual conflict tends none the less to persist, inhibiting a fully co-ordinated policy and operational response to the East–West migratory flows. Is the conflict a real one? And to the extent that it is, how can it be harmonized, or at least accommodated, within a co-ordinated set of rules and principles?

Obviously there can be no real freedom of movement if people are forced to leave their homeland out of fear for life or liberty, or because of hunger and total despair. Free choice of movement – or the right to choose between moving and not moving – is clearly implicit in the concept of the freedom of movement. For sending countries, it thus creates obligations which extend beyond those directly associated with the individual's right to leave. Similarly, there can be no freedom of movement without the right to return to one's own country in conditions of safety and dignity. The present international system remains deficient in providing adequate protection and assistance to returnees under different circumstances. International refugee law does not at present protect persons inside their national territory, while the applicability of humanitarian law is basically limited to situations of armed conflict.

The question of the right to return has received attention in the United Nations resolutions dealing inter alia with refugees and exiles, for example refugees from Cambodia, Afghanistan and Chile, as well as Arab inhabitants expelled from Occupied Arab Territories. But these ad hoc decisions and arrangements, even if effective, do not cover all groups of returnees. Clearly, the

possibility of return to the home country 'without recrimination' and 'in conditions of safety and dignity' is important not only for refugees but also for numerous other groups of returnees, including the rejected asylum-seekers and those who are in a refugee-like situation.

There is also the important question of the right to enter. Neither customary nor general international law recognizes an unqualified right of entry of a foreign national. At the same time, freedom of movement becomes a meaningless concept if, to take an extreme example, all national borders remain permanently closed even for short visits and there is, therefore, nowhere to go. On the other hand, this cannot give a foreign national an unfettered right to enter and, far less, to emigrate into another country. The prerogative of national sovereignty – to which nation-states firmly cling – intercedes.[14]

Two other considerations deserve further reflection in this context. The first relates to mass exoduses and the second to large-scale outflows of vital human resources. Under the accepted norms of inter-state relations, no country should be a willing party to, or indulge in, acts which might disrupt the internal order and stability of another country. Since unplanned mass exoduses could have a seriously destabilizing effect on the receiving country, it can be argued that the sending country has an obligation to contain such disruptive migration.[15] How and to what extent should this be allowed to interfere with the individual's right to free movement?

The second complex issue relates to the individual's freedom of movement *vis-à-vis* the state's responsibility to the national community as a whole in

14. In 1988 at the United Nations Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Mr Mubanga-Chiboya, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of movement, urged that consideration be given to the right to enter other countries, since this would make the right to leave more meaningful, but the idea was rejected by others. See Roberta Cohen, *Introducing Refugee Issues in the United Nations Human Rights Agenda*, p. 23, Washington, D.C., Refugee Policy Group, January 1990.
15. Holding governments responsible for mass exoduses, including their payment of compensation to those forced to flee, was among the recommendations of the Group of Government Experts in 1986. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1987 welcomed the group's recommendation but no further concrete action was taken.

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situations of large-scale outflows of skilled manpower. It has been argued by some developing countries in the context of the 'brain drain' issue and, more recently, in the former Soviet Union during the debate on the new emigration law, that unrestricted migration could, in certain circumstances, lead to a serious depletion of scarce human resources which could then threaten national development. Can the obligation of the state to safeguard and promote the collective interest of the nation be invoked to oppose the individual's unrestricted right to leave? How and to what extent can these external and internal obligations of the state be balanced against the individual's right to leave, which it is supposed to protect?

A full discussion of all these issues is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that, if the concept of freedom of movement is to be translated into a coherent policy and operational framework for movements of people, it will inevitably call for a careful harmonization of the rights and obligations of the three parties concerned: the sending and the receiving countries and the migrants themselves.

MAKING MIGRATION MORE MANAGEABLE: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Policies, procedures and mechanisms, important as they are for migration management, cannot remain in a vacuum. They are a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to make migration more orderly and manageable when migratory pressures are too high. They need to be sustained by, and anchored in, action on a wide social, economic and political front covering the major causes or determinants of migration flows. The determining factors – glaring economic disparities, poverty and unemployment, political instability, suppression of human and minority rights, demographic explosion, environmental degradation and disasters and so on – are generally well known but it is the selection and designing of anticipatory measures necessary for containing massive or disruptive movements which poses problems. As already mentioned, it calls for, in particular, a forward-looking strategy, based on circumspection and a careful diagnostic analysis of the migratory trends and potential pressures in specific geographical contexts. Two of the major elements of such a

strategy – protection of minority rights and a new form of international economic co-operation, both of which need further attention as a matter of high priority – are discussed here.

PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS AND MANAGEMENT OF MIGRATION

Recognition of brutalities committed against European minorities was among the principal factors which motivated international action for refugee settlement in the period immediately following the Second World War but, until recently, tensions and conflicts involving ethnic and national minorities have received very little systematic attention as part of anticipatory measures for migration management. These tensions are however emerging as one of the most powerful forces of massive movements of people. Much of the cross-border migration in post-war Africa, for example, has its origin in ethnic conflicts or has ethnic undertones. Ethnic groupings were often used as a divisive force by colonial regimes. The drawing up of the national borders of African countries in an arbitrary and artificial manner, often cutting across strong and deeply rooted ethnic alignments and solidarity, made matters worse. Independence hardly changed the situation. As the ethnic groups now spill over states, the majority group in one state becomes a minority in one or several adjacent states. Recent events have revealed how the chain reaction of inter-ethnic conflicts can thus easily lead to cross-border movements.

The same phenomenon can be observed in Eastern Europe. Almost all countries in the region, including the former Soviet Union, have ethnically diversified societies. Even the relatively homogeneous Poland and Hungary have several ethnic groups living in their territories. Ethnic minorities, if grouped together, constitute a large proportion of the national population in most of these states: in the two extreme cases of former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union it comprised 64 and 48 per cent, respectively. Nearly 65 million citizens – 25 million Russians and 40 million belonging to non-Russian ethnic groups – lived outside their ethnic territories of the former Soviet Union.

Claims of sovereignty or autonomy by Tartars, Baskirs and other ethnic groups within the Russian Federation and by Abkhaz and south Ossetians

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within Georgia are typical of the frictions which could seriously destabilize many of the states which were formerly part of the Soviet Union. In the Baltic states, too, concern grows over minority rights, as reflected in the mounting tension over the rights of Polish and Russian minorities in Lithuania.

Three large, traditionally mobile minority populations in the region – ethnic Germans, Jews and the Armenians – may not be the only ones to add to Eastern emigration in the future. Several other minority groups – 2.5 to 4 million gypsies scattered over the region, 2 million Hungarians in Romania, 600,000 to 700,000 Turks in Bulgaria and 250,000 to 400,000 Greeks in Albania – feel vulnerable to real and perceived ethnic discrimination and conflicts. If the situation worsens, they may be induced or compelled to migrate in large numbers.[16]

Ethnic sentiments and nationalist forces often derive support from each other. When ethnic groups are only minorities inside the territorial boundaries of individual republics and provinces and ethnic links cut across them, the two, instead of converging, could clash. Conflicts among the groups could lead to large-scale displacements – as reflected in the uprooting of people following the violent clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the former Soviet Union since 1988. Already by mid 1992, the number of such displaced persons in the former Soviet Union, including, in particular, those in the former Central Asian republics, could reach, according to some unofficial estimates, more than 2 million. Such internal displacements, even if contained within the country in the first instance, often propel external migration.

The fact that many of the minorities in Eastern Europe have close ethnic links across countries – Albanians, Greeks, Bulgarians and others in former Yugoslavia, Romanians in Moldavia, Macedonian Greeks and Turks in Bulgaria, Greeks in Albania and so on – makes the situation highly explosive. The 1989–90 East–West movements may have been spurred by, and closely linked to, the dramatic political changes which swept the region. Ethnic ties were all too powerful in influencing the actual movements and their directions – the Germans in the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia moving to the Federal Republic of Germany, Bulgarian Turks

16. The figures refer to the pre-1989 situation.

to Turkey, ethnic Hungarians in Romania to Hungary and the Serbs in Romania to Serbia in Yugoslavia.

In such a setting, ethnic conflicts and rekindled irredentism can lead to challenges to existing frontiers and unleash instability and massive and disorderly movements of people,[17] as demonstrated by the ghastly conflict in former Yugoslavia, which generated up to late March 1993 a total of 4.6 million displaced persons, of whom 800,000 moved outside the ex-Yugoslav territory.

Much of the attention so far given at the regional or international level to the protection of ethnic and national minorities has tended to focus on the rights of individuals rather than on the collective rights of the groups. Obviously, individual rights, when viewed in the context of fundamental human freedoms, have easier, or at least less contentious, acceptance. Collective rights, on the other hand, often raise more delicate political questions, as they tend to underline and perpetuate divisions between national groups. Large-scale political upheavals and mass exoduses are, however, often generated by the repression of a whole minority group which unleashes a general feeling of insecurity. The recognition of the collective rights of the ethnic and national minorities therefore assumes special importance in the context of migration management.

The international community has so far been reluctant to recognize the repression of minorities as a possible direct threat to international security. It seems less reluctant, however, to accept that such repression could lead to mass migration and cross-border incursions and that these could constitute a threat to international security. As the United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (1991) concerning Iraq put it: 'the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in areas populated by Kurds, . . . *led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions which threaten international peace and security* in the region' (italics added).

The reasons for this caution on the part of the Security Council against linking directly the repression of a minority to the threat to international security are not difficult to understand. As already indicated, many ethnic and national

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17.   B. Ghosh, 'Trends in World Migration: The European Perspective', *The Courier* (Brussels), September–October 1991.

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minorities in Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia and the Middle East spill over inter-state borders and may even constitute the majority populations in powerful ad-jacent states. In such situations the repression of a minority in one state can easily be a direct cause of mass migration or international instability, or both.

In Europe, the cautious attitude seems to be undergoing a slight change following the impact of the Yugoslav crisis. At the Paris summit in November 1990, the Conference on European Security and Co-operation (CSCE) decided 'to hold a thorough discussion on the issue of national minorities and of the rights of persons belonging to them'. The subsequent CSCE meeting of experts held in Geneva in July 1991 did not, however, go very far into the question of the rights of the minorities – not of their individual members but as groups. The meeting none the less recognized that the rights of minorities are a matter of justified international importance and not just an internal affair of individual countries. Only a few weeks later, when, under the shadow of the deepening crisis in Yugoslavia, the European Community foreign ministers had to grapple with some of the same issues, they sought to formulate two significant principles: that altering internal or international borders by force is not acceptable, and that ethnic minority rights must be guaranteed within territories seeking independent status. The latter is an important, if still tentative, move towards international recognition and protection of collective rights of minorities inside nation-states.

One point is becoming increasingly clear. If changing internal or international borders of nation-states is politically risky and if large-scale population transfer is a painful and costly undertaking, more attention must be given to the protection of minority rights. As one analyst recently put it, they must feel at home where they live, so that they may not feel the need to move either themselves or the inter-state borders.[18] Unfortunately, conflicting interests and perceptions of its powerful members have prevented the EC articulating

18. Edward Mortimer, 'When Nation into State Won't Go', *Financial Times* (London), 6–7 July 1991. For a succinct discussion of the right of international interference to protect minority rights, see B. Ghosh, 'Quand les états pourront-ils se mêler des affaires des autres? [When Can the States Meddle in the Affairs of Others?]', *Journal de Genève* (Geneva), No. 16, 16 July 1991, p. 1.

further the principles enunciated by its foreign ministers and enforcing them in the Balkan situation as part of a common defence and foreign policy. In the event, the action of the EC foreign ministers has proved to be 'too little and too late' in the context of the Yugoslav crisis. Even so, if the modest principles formulated by them could be further refined, widened and formalized – and effectively enforced – through the United Nations and the regional organizations concerned, including the CSCE, they will have important implications, as much for human and minority rights and international peace as for international migration and its management.

Unfortunately, the progress so far has been slow and faltering. This is exemplified by the lack of any real initiative at the June 1993 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna and the non-adoption (consideration was postponed) of the proposed additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights dealing specifically with the rights of national minorities at the first ever summit meeting (Vienna, October 1993) of the Council of Europe, the organization which drew up the original convention and has played in the past a most active role in defending human rights.

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Lack of economic development is generally recognized as an important cause of contemporary economic migration, but relatively little is known about the complex interlinkages between development and migration. Not surprisingly, policy formulation based on the use of migration as an instrument of migration management is thus plagued by considerable conceptual ambiguity and weaknesses in the operational approach.

Clearly, even an accelerated rate of economic development of the migrant-producing countries cannot be expected to remove in the foreseeable future the enormous disparities in income which now divide the world – $19,200 per head in the OECD countries compared with $290 in sub-Saharan Africa and $320 in south Asia (1989 figures). The wage differential between Western and Eastern Europe is roughly 8:1 and that between the United States and Mexico 10:1. Such important economic imbalances will continue to encourage some inter-

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country movements, especially those motivated by the search for better economic opportunities. By raising expectations and increasing the capacity of certain groups of people to move outside the home country, economic development itself might encourage new migratory movements over the short to medium terms. At the same time, however, economic development can reduce some of the current potential migration flows, especially those caused by poverty and unemployment. From a migration management perspective, it is thus extremely important to know more about the likely changes in the nature of the flows and the net balance of migration as a result of economic development. If rapid and broad-based economic development can assure even a minimum level of economic relief to those who might otherwise feel compelled to move owing to poverty, unemployment and economic despair, it will have a significant effect on reducing the pressure of disorderly mass migration, which is precisely the kind of movement considered generally more disruptive and more difficult to manage.

Further, as the experience of newly industrialized countries of Asia has revealed, when such broad-based development is pursued in a dynamic context with a focus on technological upgrading of the economy and systematic improvement of labour productivity, new opportunities are created for better jobs and higher incomes at home. The process, in turn, can ignite new hopes about the future of the home country economy among potential migrants and reduce the pressure for outmigration, whether it be driven by poverty and unemployment or motivated by the search for better economic opportunities.

There is enough evidence that, even in countries at a relatively advanced stage of development, hopes about future economic prospects weigh heavily on an individual's decision-making about migration. The European experience, for example, seems to suggest that, within certain limits, it is the rate of economic expansion of the home country economy and the perception of its future performance – rather than existing income and employment differentials between countries – which critically influence the final decision to migrate or not. It may not just be an accident that, between 1971 and 1985, some 650,000 Greeks repatriated themselves to the home country from all over the globe, including Western Europe. The Greek economy was then picking up fast, although wages and incomes were lagging far behind those in Western Europe. The slowing

down of Italian emigration to the EC countries from 1967/68 (at the exact moment when free access of its nationals to the Community became effective) and from Spain and Portugal since the mid 1980s are other examples. Surveys conducted in Poland in the late 1980s also seem to confirm that the pessimistic perception of the home country economy could be an important factor in large-scale emigration.[19]

If economic development is to be effectively used as an instrument of migration management, it is essential to take fully into account the migration effects and objectives not only in determining macro-economic policies but also in sectoral and micro-level programming. A capital-short, labour-surplus country which intends to reduce pressure for mass emigration must foster conditions conducive to employment creation, so that people will not feel obliged to look for job opportunities abroad. If, however, its fiscal, monetary and pricing policies are used to promote capital-intensive production which discourages the use of labour, the effects will run counter to migration objectives.

In the past, many migrant-sending countries encouraged the concentration of scarce capital in the modern sector in an inward-looking economy, involving the use of capital-intensive methods and the neglect of the export sector. Whatever its other merits may be, it has also meant much less employment in the organized sector and low labour productivity and earnings in the agricultural and informal sectors. This, in turn, has encouraged both internal and external migration.

The contrasting experience of Spain (use of the comparative advantage of low-cost labour in an outward-looking economy) and Turkey (export of labour, alongside import substitution) during the 1960s and 1970s illustrates the migration implications of alternative policies. Spain depended more on the integration of its economy into the international division of labour. Until the early 1980s, Turkey followed a more inward-looking policy and relied more on the export of workers to relieve unemployment at home.

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19. Marek Okoloski, *Migratory Movements from Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,* pp. 21, 27, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1990.

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A NEW FORM
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION:
TRADE, AID AND INVESTMENT

Obviously, national strategies for reducing emigration pressure by making a dynamic use of the comparative advantage of low-cost labour in an outward-looking economy will not make much headway without access to external markets.

Despite repeated policy declarations of the leaders of the Group of 7, underlining the importance of trade liberalization in enhancing global trade and prosperity, progress has been slow and difficult. Labour-intensive industries – textiles, farm produce, footwear and leather goods, selected machinery – are among the economic activities which many industrial countries are struggling to protect, paradoxically, by using immigrant labour.[20]

Trade, aid and foreign investment work differently from migration but they can be used to enhance a more efficient allocation of global resources based on the factor cost equalization process, thereby substituting, at least in part, the pressure for cross-border movements of people. Aid and foreign investment, if properly used, can enhance the competitiveness of the economy, and trade opens up market possibilities for additional goods and services, thus increasing labour demand. The creation of additional and better-paid job opportunities and more positive economic prospects can reduce pressure for emigration in a labour-surplus country.

Unfortunately, as with trade, the increase in the flows of foreign investment to the migrant-producing countries has been far from encouraging. Although foreign direct investment is of critical importance to Eastern Europe, as it brings capital and technology and helps expand trade, very little of it currently flows to these countries. Although the number of joint ventures and wholly owned foreign firms registered in the region doubled between the beginning of 1991 and January 1992, foreign equity commitments amounted to only $9 billion

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20. See, in this connection, B. Ghosh, *Migration, Trade and International Economic Co-operation: Do the Inter-linkages Work?*, Geneva, IOM, 1992. (Paper submitted to the Tenth IOM Seminar on Migration, Geneva, September 1992.)

and the amounts actually invested were much smaller. The share of developing countries in the average annual flow of foreign direct investment steadily declined from 26 per cent in 1981–85 to 17 per cent in 1986–90,[21] although the proportion rose to 25 per cent in 1991. The trade liberalization undertaken by developing countries may have helped to some extent the inflow of foreign investment there. The trade preferences enjoyed by the developing countries have been insufficient to counterbalance the advantages of foreign production in a vast, unified market with actual or anticipated trade barriers such as the EC's single market or the free trade zone of North America.

There are now increasing calls from regional and international organizations, such as the OECD, the Council of Europe, the European Community and the International Organization for Migration, for a new economic co-operation policy based on increased aid, trade and foreign investment flows to reduce the pressure for disorderly migration from labour-surplus countries.

Could such a policy run parallel to an orderly and limited flow of migration from the labour-surplus countries?[22] Doubts have been expressed on the grounds that, in such a setting, young and more enterprising people will opt for emigration rather than wait for improvement of wages and incomes through economic development at home. If some workers do migrate in an orderly manner and under mutually agreed arrangements between the sending and receiving countries, there is no reason why this should jeopardize the effectiveness of the economic co-operation policy or defeat its basic objective of reducing pressure for massive and disruptive migration.

As already indicated, trade, aid and foreign direct investment can be woven into a coherent economic co-operation policy which can reduce – but not completely eliminate, at least in the short term – the pressure for outmigration. In such a situation, orderly and limited migration can serve as an outlet for residual migratory pressure. Admittedly, such a dual approach –

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21.   United Nations, *World Investment Report 1991: The Triad in Foreign Investment,* New York, United Nations, July 1991; also *World Investment Report: Transnational Corporations as Engines of Growth,* June 1992.

22.   B. Ghosh, *Migration–Development Linkages,* Geneva, IOM, 1992. (Paper submitted to the Tenth IOM Seminar on Migration, Geneva, September 1992.)

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limited immigration alongside economic co-operation – could add to the administrative burden of immigration control because of a possible excess demand for entry. The problem is not an insurmountable one and cannot, in any case, be avoided even under a highly restrictive immigration policy. Over time, the increasing success of the co-operation policy could be expected to make migration management less difficult. Indeed, as a general principle, the greater the economic coherence already achieved between the potential labour-sending and labour-receiving countries, the easier it is to open borders for movements of people. The EC experience provides an example. The exchanges envisaged under the new economic co-operation policy should not, as the 1991 OECD conference in Rome rightly emphasized, leave out, or be regarded as an alternative to, inter-country migration.

What needs to be underlined is that, as in the past, the call for new economic co-operation will remain public rhetoric unless it is firmly embedded in congruent domestic and external policies of both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. To be effective, the policy should be a part of and supported by an international agreement providing a coherent and transparent framework for concerted action by all sending and receiving countries. The agreement should contain specific guidelines dealing, inter alia, with:

(a) suitable domestic strategies for rapid and broad-based development, with emphasis on job creation, demographic change and promotion of human resources, along with stable macro-economic policies in labour-surplus countries;

(b) appropriate changes in trade, aid, debt relief, industrial restructuring and anticipatory adjustment assistance policies in capital-rich countries; and

(c) outlets for orderly migration and arrangements for temporary and fixed-term labour employment, including project-tied work, and trade and investment-related labour mobility as part of an equitable international exchange of skills, while avoiding, as far as possible, any permanent loss of human capital for the labour-surplus countries.

MIGRATION AS A GLOBAL
AND MULTIDIMENSIONAL CHALLENGE

International migration is not a unidimensional phenomenon: it intersects with issues of demography and the labour market, trade, aid and development, human rights and democratic values, environment and foreign policy. Its multidimensional character is gradually receiving some recognition but the process so far has been extremely slow. In designing policies and mechanisms for migration, it is still regarded primarily as an internal law and order issue. When this happens, the whole range of other related issues tends to be left out or given only scant attention at the time when national migration policies and procedures are formulated.

This might also explain why, with the possible exception of the external security aspect, the international dimensions of cross-border movements have received less emphasis than they warrant. The international aspects of migration – in addition to being germane in the very nature of inter-state movements – stem, as we have already seen, from their close interrelationships with trade, aid and investment, and the growing global concern with regard to environment and human rights. This tends to be overshadowed by domestic concern about law, order and security. It is significant that, even as the European Community makes strides towards closer economic and, if more haltingly, political unity, member states have been averse to transferring (with the exception of the visa question and measures to cope with an emergency situation created by sudden inflows from a third country) the responsibility for external aspects of migration to the community level.

AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM
IS STILL LACKING

Clearly, internal law and order and external security aspects of international migration will continue to have importance in a system based on, and dominated by, nation-states. Overemphasis on these aspects, especially if conceived in a narrow, domestic context, could be self-defeating. In a world which is becoming increasingly close and yet exceedingly complex, they will make the management

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of international migration even more difficult than it needs to be. For example, an effective early warning system to anticipate mass movements, speedy mobiliz-ation of adequate support to the transit or first asylum countries, targeted econ-omic co-operation in the form of aid, trade and investment – these and similar measures cannot be successful or sustained in the absence of a strong international commitment and well-defined international policies and mechanisms.

Regrettably, there is at present no international authority, inside or outside the United Nations system, which can serve as a permanent mechanism, or even as an effective focal point, in dealing with different migratory flows such as labour migration, refugee movements, family reunification, movements of irregular migrants and various programmes of in-migration integration and return migration. In times of emergency, such as the Gulf crisis, the international organizations concerned have shown remarkable responsiveness and a spirit of co-ordination in dealing with the immediate problems of population movements. However, there is no institutional framework to extend and orchestrate such co-operation on a continuing basis and in the context of migration-related substantive issues – political, economic, social and environmental. True, the various forms and flows of migration entail different sets of problems and, admittedly, different international entities can bring their specialized knowledge and experience to bear on them. These flows and the issues associated with them are so closely interwoven that, without an overall view of, and a concerted approach to, the whole spectrum of movements of people, it will be increasingly difficult to ensure their orderliness and effective management. Also, in the absence of an appropriate international mechanism, migration issues will continue to fail to receive enough systematic attention when related aspects of international trade, aid, investment, environment or population are discussed in other international forums.

ORDERLY MIGRATION:
CALL FOR A REGULATED OPENNESS

Uncontrolled and unexpected mass exoduses can well be a disruptive economic and social force; they can pose threats to national security and international stability but they need not be viewed only from this negative perspective, which

tends to overshadow the manifold positive contributions that international migration can make for the benefit of human society. This will also mean a disavowal of the part it has played over the centuries in strengthening national economies, promoting flourishing cultures and enriching the common civilization of mankind. For migration to play such an overall creative role or to serve as an equilibrating economic and social force in a fast-changing world, it must be orderly and manageable. It must follow certain internationally agreed rules and objectives, reflecting a commonalty of interests. One of the most challenging tasks before the world community today is to ensure conditions which guarantee a regulated openness and make international migration more orderly, manageable and productive.

The concept of economic security

László Lang*

Economic security is one of the numerous concepts which are being widely used in social science without a proper understanding of or a consensus on the substance. It is politicians rather than economists who prefer to talk of the 'economic security' of their respective nation-states or that of a group of states, or, heaven forbid, that of the international system. Indeed, the term of 'security' is a recent transplant from military and political vocabularies to economics. Security, in the usual sense of the word, concerns the preservation of the well-being of individuals. Certainly, 'well-being', in this interpretation, implies more than merely physical health and material wealth; economic and political liberties also form a constituent part. Security in military terminology means the lack of external threats or the capability to prevent external actors staging an effective threat to one's group, country, etc., and/or to defend that social unit from an actual attack. Politicians tend to use the term 'security' as a camouflage for the persistence of the regime they rule or are a party to. Regime security is a concept which has little to do with either the common or the military interpretations of security: political regimes might enhance their survival by exploiting external threats, by an acquiescence in external rule or, more importantly, by the limitation of individual political and economic liberties.

Therefore problems of definition will not be solved by simply adorning the term 'security' with the 'economic' attribute. After all, individual, military or

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political security, with their different interpretations, all have an economic dimension. Moreover, 'pure' economics has no security concept of its own; economics, in its classical sense, defies the easy conceptualization of security. In traditional military security issues it is hardly a problem to identify the threat or the opponent. Opponents and threats are intrinsic to the notion of security. However, in economic, trade or financial linkages there are forces which drive two countries together and others which set them apart. Nor do 'economic threats' permit easy definition. Foreign competition, fair or unfair, may be a threat to certain producer groups, while it provides windfall benefits to consumers or suppliers of related services.

The lack of conceptual clarity is all but a new phenomenon in political economy. Writing in 1827, Thomas Malthus complained that the tendency of different writers to attribute different meanings to the same term had given rise to 'differences of opinion among political economists'.[1] As a panacea, Malthus proposed to go along with the common usage, or the one raised by 'the most celebrated writers' in the field and/or with the imperative of higher utility which provided that any new definition should be consistent with those which are allowed to remain.

This article examines the concept of 'economic security' without, however, offering empirical observations on whether the 'economic security' of individuals, nations, groups of nations or the international system is increasing or decreasing today. Various conceptual approaches will be reviewed with special emphasis on, or rather bias to, 'economic security' as interpreted and accomplished by small- and medium-sized powers. This bias is due not only to the eminently sensitive and vulnerable position of these countries in the international economic system but also to the recent historical changes in Europe. The countries of former Eastern Europe are preoccupied with national self-definition and self-determination. Autonomy is a high priority for all of them and so is security. At the same time, they have a deficient understanding of costs: these countries need, in my opinion, to develop a higher degree of cost awareness, so that they can reconcile their legitimate security and sovereignty

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1.   T. R. Malthus, quoted by David A. Baldwin, 'Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis', *International Organization*, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1980, p. 473.

needs with their re-engagement in a wide range of collaborative international economic arrangements, and with what goes with it: constraints on their national autonomy.

INTERNATIONAL VERSUS NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

Economic security, or rather the economic dimension of security, can be approached from two perspectives. One sets out from the assumption that *international economic structures are connected to the use of force*: that is, specifically, that some kinds of world economic systems are more war-prone than others. It is thus argued, resting on the old proposition developed by Adam Smith, and subsequently by Paine and Cobden, that a liberal international economic system discourages the use of force among states, while a mercantilist system stimulates it.[2] Advocates seek to define world economic structures, institutions and regimes which conform with international interdependence and are likely to promote peace. The other, the 'bottom-up', perspective examines the economic ways and means by which nation-states can enhance their own security. This concerns less international peace than the expansion of the power resources of the nation-state through economic growth and adjustment to, and a positive interaction with, its external economic environment.

It would probably be wrong to propose that these two approaches are, by definition, contradictory or that one provides an enlightened twentieth-century concept whilst the other is still stuck in some nineteenth-century notions of sovereign states competing with each other under the circumstances of systemic anarchy. After all, international regulation means simply that nation-states accept a degree of extra-national control over their domestic activities because they find it in their best national interest to do so. That is, the acceptance of constraints is an integral part of the national adjustment strategies which states follow: to forgo these constraints would be too costly. Moreover, and paradoxically, nation-states attempt, at the same time, to counter the domestic

2.   For a detailed analysis and an eloquent critic, see Barry Buzan, 'Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case', *International Organization*, Vol. 38, No. 4, 1984, pp. 597–624.

effects of international rules and regulations and interdependence in general by enhanced interventionism. Consequently, the international and national aspects of 'economic security' are intimately interlinked. However, analytical clarity may justify separate treatment.

ECONOMIC SECURITY: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The economic dimension of international security

The functioning of the world economy has major consequences for international security and vice versa. The world economy can affect international security both positively and detrimentally. In the first place, the international economy affects the distribution of international economic and military power. It is a fundamental tenet of classical economics that individuals or nation-states will fail to enter into a transaction unless both or all parties to it gain on the deal. However, more often than not, one party to a transaction gains more than the other, although both gain in absolute terms and it is these relative gains which matter from the viewpoint of security. Nation-states, even in an interdependent world economy, closely monitor how much the others gain in relative terms and in mutual transactions, since relative economic and financial gains translate into enlarged power resources.

Secondly, the world economy and the interdependencies to which it gives rise 'impinge directly, and at times, significantly on [the nation-states'] political autonomy, traditional values and social structures. Thus, the world economy challenges what is most precious to any society's definition of national security, namely its political autonomy and cultural values. [There is] an inherent conflict between the requirements of maintaining a well-functioning international economy and the desire of individual societies to maintain their national independence.'[3]

Thirdly, the much lauded interdependence of the world economy implies, for any national economy, the asymmetry of dependencies not only on some vague organism of international economy but also on easily identifiable agents of

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3.   Robert Gilpin, 'The Economic Dimension of International Security', pp. 3–4, Princeton, 1988. (Manuscript.)

that world economy and, in the first place, on other nation-states. Dependencies create national sensitivities and threat perceptions which directly impinge upon international security. An asymmetrically dependent nation-state either turns into a 'security ally' of the larger power on which it depends, thereby threatening others in geopolitical terms, or it desperately revolts against its dependency, thus creating a 'security menace' for the external masters of its economic fate.

It is often argued that the liberal world economic order, modelled on the post-war world economic system, makes the most conducive contribution to the maintenance of international security. Indeed, the argument which suggests that, if markets and resources are freely and competitively available, the use of force to expand power resources loses its attraction does make sense. Moreover, if nation-states are enmeshed in a complex network of interdependencies, the use of force may become counterproductive as it entails self-damaging implications. Therefore, nation-states develop a propensity to adhere to international norms and rules rather than to national unilateralism in promoting their goals. Certainly such international regimes of governance may more easily develop in the field of economics than in that of security; however, spillover effects may be widespread. As linkages among policy areas such as trade, finance and invest-ment become increasingly intimate, co-operation in areas other than economy may also be involved.

However, this argument, appealing and lulling though it may be, suffers from some major flaws. One is that a liberal world economic order such as that from 1945–47 until the early 1970s is not sustainable without a strong hegem-onic actor which also provides, in its own self-interest, incentives for others to participate in and share the values of this order. As Kindleberger argues, this liberal system needs an underwriter to 'provide a market for distress goods, a steady if not counter cyclical flow of capital, and a rediscount mechanism for providing liquidity' and to 'manage in some degree, the structure of foreign exchange rates, and provide a degree of co-ordination of domestic monetary policies'.[4] Without an undisputed hegemonic leader possessing such capabili-ties, the interests and security fears of competitive nation-states cannot be

4. Charles Kindleberger, 'Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2/3, 1981, p. 247.

contained, even if their enlightened understanding of mutual economic dependencies were to speak for multilateral (security) policy co-ordination. To have such a leader presupposes a certain disposition towards international power. Therefore the liberal economic order, and the leadership without which it cannot function, are derivatives of an a priori international security arrangement and vice versa.

Furthermore, since hegemony implies, by definition, the superiority of the hegemony's power (economic, political and military) over others, there are no built-in guarantees that this superior power cannot be abused. The abuse of hegemony, the fundamental precondition of a liberal world economic order, is a potential security threat to the lesser nation-states of the international system.

Even if, however, the system's underwriter for some reason behaves benevolently, it cannot sustain its position indefinitely. Hegemonic powers, whether malevolent or benevolent, are doomed to failure owing to either the costs which the hegemony's economy endures relative to the economies in its orbit (over-extension) or controversial domestic political dynamics, or both. In the wake of the inevitable demise of the hegemonic power, the possible disruption of the liberal economic system might adversely affect international security. Nation-states which were forced to co-operate through carrots and sticks under the hegemony's rule may be slow or reluctant to acknowledge that co-operation beyond hegemony – to quote the title of Robert Keohane's powerful book – would be possible or desirable. As a consequence, not only does the liberal economic order falter but its decline adversely affects international security. Interdependence, as Barry Buzan argues, 'has an addictive quality for those actors caught up in it. While such a quality is useful as a support for the stability of the liberal system [guaranteed and sustained by the system's hegemony], it increases hardship when the system breaks down.'[5]

On these grounds, one can conclude that, though a liberal world economic order sustained by a hegemonic leader and the international regimes it accepts and fosters may be the best of all possible economic worlds, it has 'neither a

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5.   Buzan, op. cit., p. 620.

strong nor an unconditional constraining effect on the use of force'.[6] Further-more, there is no hard evidence for the superior impact of economic structure on international security. A world economic order may only be a subordinate to a given international security arrangement, that is, the security dimension of the world economy may be a more relevant subject of study than the economic dimension of world security.

The security dimension of the world economy

The post-war benevolence of the hegemony and the relative success of the lib-eral economic order it maintained was partly due to the fact that the partici-pants in this order, its hegemony as well as its lesser powers, had been sharing a common threat, namely that posed by the Soviet bloc. One could even argue that they had been allies, thus renouncing the use of force against one another well before their liberal economic order was established. Their shared security goals enforced economic co-operation rather than vice versa and it was less some prior economic co-ordination, based on the principles and requirements of liberalism and interdependence, which resulted in the diminished rationale for the use of force.

The post-war international economic order was all but universal. Countries in what was called the Third and the Second Worlds were the outcasts of this system for reasons resting as much on their own anti-market domestic regimes as on their peripheral economic status. Calls for a 'new international economic order' from many Third World quarters during the 1970s and the early 1980s, supported reluctantly and deceitfully by the erstwhile 'socialist' countries, were triggered by the somewhat naive self-confidence of the periphery (based on the use of the 'oil weapon' and/or the proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons) as well as by the false perception that structural handicaps could simply be redressed by a worldwide redistribution of incomes.

Naturally a supportive security framework and, therefore, non-univer-salism appear to have been necessary conditions for the proper functioning of the 'global' market. The security coherence of the First World alliance had been an overriding goal of the United States, the leader of the First World's economic

6.   Ibid., p. 623.

order, a goal that deserved the subordination of its short-term, parochial economic interests to the good of the whole.

The immediate political antecedents and rationales of the post-war economic order notwithstanding, the fundamental problem of international economic co-operation is, as Robert Gilpin contends, 'the absence of common purposes'.[7] However, the difficulty is not, as it is often argued, the lack of an agreement among nation-states on economic philosophies which could be accomplished. The pursuit of 'common purposes' implies, by definition, joint action and, therefore, trimmed national autonomy. Nation-states, however, are reluctant to subordinate their decision-making autonomy to some larger entity, that is, they are not very likely to share such common purposes unless their acquiescence is justified by a desire to contain an even larger danger to national autonomy. A collective external security threat is such a danger and this might be the glue to economic co-operation which otherwise might be stranded in the collision of competitive and no doubt short-sighted national interests.

Many students in the field of political science consider security a matter of 'high' politics as against the 'low' or 'soft' politics of economy. Others challenge this view, suggesting that, with the demise of bipolarity, and the clear-cut and simple threat perceptions implied, economics is bound to rank higher on the international policy agendas. There is much truth to this argument. The glue of common threat which played a large part in keeping together the major actors of the international economic order during the past several decades has clearly dispersed. The United States, the economic hegemony of those decades, has undoubtedly weakened. Its decline is certainly not terminal, however; it suffices to undermine some major pillars of that order. Economic differences among the major industrial powers are already on the rise, even if the persistence of international institutions of the past era (such as NATO) still helps to subdue tensions. No doubt a new global security equation is emerging, whose effects on the international economy will have to be multifarious and penetrating.

For the moment, regionalization seems to be the prospective answer to the challenges posed by the collapse of the old global security regime as well as to the

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7.   Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation,* p. 43, New York, Basic Books, 1975.

functional disturbances of the international economic order. Regional integrations centred around the major regional powers in the Americas, Europe and the Pacific will inevitably develop in the long run their respective regional security arrangements. These, in turn, will shape and reshape the nature, scale and scope of the new regional economic regimes. The European Community's agonizing over 'deepening versus broadening' reflects the fact that the smaller the number of actors involved, the more efficient their co-operation, though there are also uncertainties related to the desirable defence and security profile of the Community. Therefore it would be extremely premature to conclude that, with the demise of security bipolarity, economics have taken over security considerations on international agendas. Rather, there will be a somewhat more balanced and, in addition, more intimate interlinkage between the two in the non-hegemonic liberal bloc system which is likely to emerge.

Be that as it may, economic factors will not be the dominant determinants of the world system. In an international context, military and non-economic factors will continue to play their decisive role in shaping relations among nation-states and the blocs of nation-states. The emerging world economic structures will neither significantly discourage nor encourage the use of force. World 'economic security' will therefore continue to be enmeshed in and interact with conventionally interpreted global security.

ECONOMIC SECURITY: THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

Economic security versus security economics

The early debates on the economic dimension of national security addressed the issue of choice between 'power' and 'plenty'. More recent discussions have portrayed the dilemma as the choice between 'guns' and 'butter'. Until recently American literature had further simplified the issue to the interlinkage between the level of military expenditures and the general health of the economy. In domestic policy, the heart of the matter was the necessary minimum of resources devoted to sustaining or enhancing, in relative terms, defence capabilities. On occasion, the issue was boggled by the introduction of the Keynesian demand-stimulating functions of the military sector; when demand-side stimulation was found imperative, budgetary constraints on military procurements diminished,

irrespective of the actual or perceived defence needs. In international policy, this perspective with regard to defence economics reflected on burden-sharing in military alliances and on what was inherently plaguing any military alliance, the problem of free-riding. Technology-intensive exports and the constraints on their unwanted proliferation have also come under the heading of 'economic security' debates.

Until the late 1960s, Americans had both guns and butter; therefore trade-offs and relative preferences were hardly considered. From the 1970s onwards, however, it increasingly appeared to become an 'either/or' policy issue, with undisputed priority given to military security. Subsequently, from the mid 1980s the foundations of United States national security changed significantly. The military was sufficiently strengthened during the Reagan administration while, at the same time, divergent economic changes (the country's skyrocketing trade deficit, its expanded foreign borrowing and the massive FDI inflows) raised new questions about the economic dimensions of United States national security. Clearly, 'economic security', an issue which is much broader than the conventional guns and/or butter dilemma, has made a powerful headway in the American policy agenda.

For the former Soviet Union, economic security, either in its simplified guns and/or butter form or in any broader interpretation, was a non-issue until recently. An almost waterproof economic and social autarky unequivocally prioritized 'power' against 'plenty'. In a society where economics was/is about monolithic power rather than pluralist welfare, trade-offs between the two did not need be considered. In recent times this situation has changed dramatically: Russian power, both domestic and international, has been eroded substantially without any chance of a quick restoration. The Russian Federation would now have neither security nor wealth if it were unable to play the nuclear card, that is the persistent image of global Russian power. By playing this card, however, the Russian Federation can try to transform power into wealth by pleading that the continuation of *perestroika* needs economic incentives from the outside.

Consequently, from the viewpoint of conceptualization, the American and, above all, the Russian cases are of limited help. The Americans only recently awoke to the fact that power and prestige were strictly related to economics, while the Russians are only now learning the basics. Other lesser powers have

centuries-long experience with the economic dimensions of security, that is, the domestic and external economic factors which may affect their 'power' to survive as autonomous national entities. Nevertheless, their painful historical experiences have not led to any clear conceptual evidence. Most of the current authorities in the field contend that there is a reciprocal and dynamic interaction in international relations between the pursuit of wealth and of power. Certainly this can hardly be disputed; the maxim of the Medici back in the fifteenth century was not very different: 'Money to acquire power. Power to keep the money.' One can have no power without wealth and vice versa. Apparently, political economic thinking, in general terms, has not developed very much since the age of the Medici.

Nevertheless national governments, when taking decisions, have to prioritize one value against the other – national welfare against national security, the latter, from this perspective, being clearly a defensive notion: a nation-state wants to 'protect autonomy, maximize latitude of choice in policy-making, reduce constraints emanating from abroad, and maintain domestic political legitimacy and authority'. National welfare, in turn, is conceived as economic opportunities available at home or abroad 'to increase the overall wealth within the economy'.[8] But, although these aims may be complementary in the long run, governments live in the short term. As a consequence, they rank 'plenty', that is economic welfare, high on their agenda only when external security threats and constraints are negligible. Since, for small or medium powers in an interdependent world political economy, this is rarely the case, 'power' concerns, that is those of national and/or regime survival, are almost always prized more than wealth and welfare.[9]

This hierarchy of values may of course change over time. Countries which are in a delicate security situation, or which are weak as opposed to a powerful neighbour or a hegemony and have to discard the military option for all practical purposes, or which value the autonomy of their political community inordinately, will be compelled to skew their economic relations with the outside world

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8.   K. J. Holsti, 'Politics in Command: Foreign Trade as National Security Policy', *International Organization*, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1986, pp. 645–6.
9.   Ibid., pp. 646, 669.

and, not infrequently, also their domestic economic regimes so as to reflect the overall security context in which they find themselves. In such cases, security and foreign policy dimensions of economics matter most, rather than 'economic security'. Finland provides a fair example for this kind of behaviour and constraints in its post-war economic history.

Conversely, if a secondary power finds itself in a more relaxed security position partly and mainly because of membership in an alliance which guarantees its fundamental security interests and, in addition, absolves it from taking a proportionate part in the costs of regime maintenance, it will be more at ease in pursuing its individual welfare goals. The Federal Republic of Germany had, until recently, been in such a position, even though its Ostpolitik had taken its toll also in economic terms. The new democracies of Central Europe now wish to follow suit, quite hopelessly though, by seeking some kind of security association with the European Union, NATO or the Western European Union, so as to release resources for the purposes of their pro-market economic transitions and economic development.

Welfare goals figure high on national economic agendas; yet security, as interpreted in the most conventional foreign policy and military meaning of the term, plays an intrinsic part in accomplishing these goals. As I have argued, 'security economics' is a limited concept because it addresses only a marginal part of the problem. However, 'economic security' may not be much more helpful, as it pretends that a nation-state's welfare goals can be secured by economic means only, irrespective of the military security context in which it is placed.

Interdependence versus national economic security

The economic interdependence of nation-states in a modern world economy implies, by definition, constraints on national choices, meaning limited national autonomy. As such, interdependence poses a security dilemma. Nation-states of all sizes want, naturally or rather instinctively, as much room for manoeuvre as possible in the pursuit of their macro-economic policies and in fashioning their security postures. The mercantilist instincts of states are deeply rooted, and are unrelated to the given historical epochs of 'acknowledged mercantilism'. In the instinctive interpretation of nation-states, national independence and sovereignty are antagonistically opposed to the operation of a liberal world economic

'order' unless, as has already been stated, a hegemonic power provides sufficient incentives to collaborate in the maintenance of the system. 'Economic security', in this interpretation, can be regarded as an endeavour which is aimed at achieving the highest possible degree of national sovereignty at the lowest possible cost when forgoing the constraints set by interdependence. The smaller the number of national actors involved, the easier it is to achieve this delicate harmonization. Hence the tendency for regionalism and regional integration.

Notwithstanding, the 'economic security' of a nation-state in an interdependent, international economic system implies the prevention or limitation of any external influence which could either threaten to degrade, over a brief span of time, the quality of life of the inhabitants of a state or significantly narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to the major private, corporate actors within that state.[10] This being so, the question is what abilities a nation-state can develop in order to prevent or restrain the negative feedbacks of international interdependence, that is, external events that are beyond its control. The higher the level of such national capabilities, the higher the degree of 'economic security' of the respective nation-state.

International literature differentiates between 'sensitivity' and 'vulnerability' interdependence.[11] Sensitivity reflects how quickly economic changes and policy decisions in one country affect another, and what costs the latter has to support before mitigating policy measures can be taken. Vulnerability means that a country's economy suffers owing to external events, even if it takes appropriate policy steps to diminish adverse effects. Exchange rate movements and their impact on a country's monetary policies provide a clear case of sensitivity interdependence, whilst the way that increased international interest rates may affect heavily indebted countries illustrates vulnerability. The mitigation of the implications of both sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence implies active national adjustment policies. Therefore, the concept of 'economic security' needs to incorporate a range of political, institutional and structural

10. See Richard N. Ullman, 'Redefining Security', *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1983, p. 130.
11. See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, pp. 8–9, Cambridge, Ballinger, 1977.

characteristics of a given national economy, since these characteristics will, inter alia, determine the quality and efficacy of the adjustment policies it pursues in response to interdependence. This contention runs against the conventional, 'internationalist' and institutionalist interpretations of 'economic security'; a country's 'economic security' depends less on the international economic context (the rules and regulations of that respective system) than on how flexible, adaptive and efficient a political economic system that country has.

Input management as a way of economic security planning

A nation-state can lessen the adverse effects of interdependence sensitivity and vulnerability partly through sensible input management:

A nation-state can adopt an autarkic approach to security planning. Of course this need not be absolute: decreased reliance on sensitive commodity imports through the development of indigenous resources, such as, for example, those the United States and much of Eastern Europe pressed for after both the 1973 and 1981 oil price hikes, or forgoing reliance on external financing as, most notoriously, did Ceausescu's Romania in the second half of the 1980s, comes under the heading of an autarkic policy preference. A total closure of a national economy, as in Pol Pot's Cambodia, is unlikely and above all unaccomplishable in a modern, civilized world economy. Nevertheless, nation-states still widely display defensive reactions of an autarkic nature to lessen the sensitivity of their economy to external events.

Preventive strategic interventions by a nation-state can help to reduce its vulnerability to interdependence-induced damages. Stockpiling of strategic raw materials and money-market interventions by central banks both fall into this category.

Diversification of foreign inputs is a third thrust of economic security planning. By such 'portfolio management', the risks associated with the varying availability of one input (be it technology, financing or raw materials) may be prevented from affecting adversely the overall supply of that input. That is, portfolio management can help to minimize the variations in one economic factor caused by disruptions or disturbances in the supply of that foreign input.

Economic security planning conceived as the external input management of an economy through autarky, prevention and/or diversification is a narrowed-down concept; none the less it still leads to several conclusions.

In the first place, enhancing the 'economic security' of a nation-state is a costly exercise. The costs of autarky are so evident that they need not be explained here. Prevention is no less costly, particularly if allowance is made for the associated difficulties of forecasting: what kind of contingencies are to be reckoned with? With strategic stockpiling, for instance, one can speculate on either a fall or a rise in the availability, and the terms of availability, of a strategic commodity. However, one cannot speculate on both. Conventional military security thinking focuses mostly on sequential, bilateral and predictable threats. In contrast, economic security planning is supposed to counter a multitude of risks which are to be defined and foreseen at a much larger margin of error. Preventive economic policy measures which, at the end of the day, prove superfluous or misdirected add severely to the total costs of this specific form of economic security planning. Finally, supply diversification can entail even higher costs, especially in the case of small countries. Diversification, for instance, in the supply sources of weapon systems, makes undoubtedly eminent sense in both political and security terms for any country. However, a small nation-state can hardly afford the operation and the maintenance and servicing of a weapon system of varied standards and origins.

Secondly, 'economic security' which can be achieved through these instruments of input management can only be relative. There is no economic security in the sense that all the critical external dimensions of national economic development are predictable, transparent or even identifiable. Such a state of affairs would inevitably mean an end to market and market-based interactions, resulting, eventually, in an increase of anarchy in the respective system. Soviet-type economies have provided ample evidence of the intimate coexistence of anarchy and central planning in the recent decades.

Moreover, economic security cannot be 'increased' infinitely. If, on a vertical axis, one measured the degree of economic security (in terms of lessened sensitivity and vulnerability risks) and, horizontally, the necessary costs, a parabola line would be arrived at. The curve's minimum point, that is where the degree of economic security is the highest (the security risks are the lowest), will

fall somewhere to the right on the cost axis, that is in the higher costs ranges. Furthermore, the curve beyond this point will flatten out, meaning that increased outlays will not lead to enhanced security. The position of this point on the horizontal axis must be country-specific, the minimum level of sensitivity and vulnerability risks (at maximum investment to counter them) being, in the short and medium term, probably a given parameter for either nation-state.

Thirdly, to improve economic security through input management implies extensive state intervention. Autarky, even in relative terms, is simply the 'over-fulfilment' of state-led mercantilism. Nor can preventive strategies be left exclusively to private economic actors, not only because of their inevitable costs but also because they are motivated, in part, by non-economic considerations. Input diversification is again only partially a task which can be met by individual economic agents; it involves both economic and political transactions costs that must be borne by the state. Little wonder that whenever, in the past two decades, the upgrading of national economic security figured high on the economic policy agenda of the former Soviet bloc countries (as in the aftermath of both oil crises of the 1970s), pro-market reforms had suffered a severe setback. Under given circumstances, the endeavours towards 'more' economic security can be a disguise for attempts by declining regimes to preserve regime security: the then socialist countries pressed for some institutionalized and formalized international 'economic security' in the United Nations forums back in 1987–88. Needless to say, one of the most ardent advocates of this foreign policy drive was Honecker's German Democratic Republic.

Output management as a way of security planning

Output management, to use an admittedly vague term, is a neglected perspective in providing for national 'economic security'. A nation-state's economic security will increase if it is successful in enlarging its external space for economic manoeuvre. Increased exports and improved access to foreign markets or to external funding will definitely upgrade a country's economic security by promoting the pursuit of its welfare goals.

Co-operative attitudes to the outside world may be one way of securing such goals. However, the broadening of the external manoeuvring space of a country can also be achieved through conflictual strategies. In the case of a

major power, this is quite evident: the history of colonization and the additional resources of economic growth it provided set clear though morally refutable examples. Nevertheless, the rationale of an external conflictual strategy may prove right also in the case of lesser powers: the take-off strategy of the East Asian NICs could be taken as an example.

However, co-operative and conflictual strategies cannot be sharply differentiated. After all, co-operation is the continuation of conflict through other means. There is no co-operation without prior conflict (since if interests automatically coincide, co-operation is superfluous) and co-operation gives rise to further conflicts (if only because it intensifies interactions between self-interested actors). One-sided conflictual national strategies, however, face a major problem in an interdependent system: reciprocity is intense, therefore conflicts triggered by one nation-state infect others, and this infection is localized with difficulty.

The 'output-oriented' strategies of a nation-state's economic security planning may take various forms. One is unilateralism, the imposition of one's will on others. If a nation-state is powerful enough to enforce others to buy its products or to 'voluntarily' restrict their exports, etc., then this strategy is clearly an efficient way of enhancing national economic security. Nevertheless, there is no individual power in today's world which could pursue economic unilateralism to its limits. Unilateralism strikes back; any nation-state, large or small, must accept a minimum number of international norms so as not to confine inadmissibly its own manoeuvrability. After all, extreme economic unilateralism translates into severe security fears on the part of 'the others', thus transferring the issue into the realm of 'high politics'.

Bilateralism might provide for a way-between. Bilateralism, as a part of economic security planning, is not necessarily deviant behaviour; it can address various sensitivities and can be a tool of: (a) sensible structural policies (by securing market access for infant industries through bilateral subcontracting, 'industrial co-operation', etc.); and (b) the mitigation of the lack of foreign exchange, and the vulnerability this creates (by a network of barter and clearing deals, and the protection of a technological edge over others, as the proliferation of market-sharing agreements between hi-tech companies in recent years has attested).

Regionalism, as already pointed out, is a powerful emerging strategy of national economic security planning. Unlike multilateralism, it responds to interdependence and the national sensitivities and vulnerabilities to which it gives rise by regionally limited collective management. Unilateralism as well as bilateralism, if applied as economic strategies, are most likely to create friction among states, which easily translates into political antagonism and aggressive nationalism. Needless to say, geographical closeness and the historical intimacy of relationships between neighbours tend to intensify such conflicts. Regionalism, that is economic bloc-building, addresses this problem of alternative strategies by defining and striving to maintain a minimum of common regional interests and the permissible maximum of constraints on national autonomy.

Regionalism is an offensive strategy for expanding a nation-state's power resources by integration and policy co-ordination. Furthermore, regionalism is also an attractive strategic option because it involves, by definition, a small number of actors. This may permit blocs of small and medium-sized states to establish a non-hegemonic liberal economic system internally, while not denouncing the potential yields of the alternative strategies of unilateralism and bilateralism which they may collectively exercise towards external actors.

In the case of small and medium-sized nation-states, multilateralism as a further option of economic security planning is, more often than not, limited to abiding to the norms and rules of a given international economic system. Norm-creation is largely beyond their capacity. This does not mean, however, that they should denounce the multilateral options of economic security planning. First, small and medium-sized powers are well-placed to take the initiative (though not the final decision) as far as changes in the regimes governing the international economic system are concerned. This is partly because they recognize the malfunctioning of existing international regimes earlier than large powers, which, after all, are less exposed to the feedbacks of these regimes. Secondly, multilateralism can address issues which obviously exceed the potentials of regionalism: the Cairns Group of small agricultural exporters, which helped to shape and influence the Uruguay Round's policy agenda, is an evident case in point.

CONCLUSIONS

The concept of 'economic security' apparently does not yield to easy definitions. Having approached this political economic notion from various angles, one is left with the impression that the thrust of the concept lies in the quality of the national adjustment policies which states follow. Therefore the 'economic security' of a given nation-state, that is, the welfare of its individuals and the smooth, uninterrupted operation of its economy, relies to a large extent on the skills deployed by the nation-state in response to external events and challenges.

Certainly, even with the best domestic adjustment policies, a state may find its opportunities to expand and enhance its power resources circumscribed by external events beyond its control. If so, a range of input- or output-oriented, co-operative and competitive strategies may be adopted, so as to minimize negative feedbacks and lessen sensitivities and vulnerabilities. However, national economic security cannot be increased indefinitely. For one thing, the respective strategies entail costs and, for another, a certain degree of sensitivity and vulnerability is inherent in any open national economy.

Global interdependence poses security dilemmas for all nation-states. No state, quality or order of the world economic system exists which could automatically provide for the economic security of its participant actors. Moreover, most world economic orders appear to have been subordinated to a given structure of international military security. Economics cannot overrule conventional security considerations even in the wake of the recent demise of security bipolarity. Rather, there will be a somewhat more balanced and, in addition, a more intimate interlinkage between the two in the non-hegemonic, liberal bloc system which is likely to emerge.

Clearly, the supposed primacy of economics over security is a grave misinterpretation of the concept of 'economic security'. Traditional 'power' concerns, such as those of national and/or regime survival, continue to be prized more than wealth and welfare in most cases.

Ecological security in a new world order: some linkages between ecology, peace and global security

*Patricia M. Mische**

This article examines some of the linkages (and also some antagonisms and contradictions) between ecological, economic and military security. It argues that ecological security is at the core of true national and global security, integrally related to economic well-being, conflict resolution and peace and world order. It further argues that ecological security requires a fundamental change in concepts of security and sovereignty, in the theory and practice of international relations and in global structures and systems. It points to 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, as an opportune time to advance global structures of ecological security.

LESSONS FROM THE PAST

There is a tendency to romanticize the ecological relationships of earlier human societies and to associate environmental damage only with the modern era. Such romanticizing obscures the real lessons to be learned from the past. Not all early societies understood or consistently lived in environmentally sustainable ways. No doubt, even the most ecologically sensitive societies

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struggled through periods of trial and error in their relationships with nature. They had to learn and then teach succeeding generations how to balance the demands of their physical and economic existence with the limits and demands of the larger community of life upon which their own lives depended. It took long and continuing effort to develop and maintain cultures of ecological responsibility.

It is impossible for human communities to survive without in some way affecting the environments in which they live. Some environmental harm is unavoidable. A challenge for all human societies in all times is how to live within the upper and lower limits posed by the life system; how to conserve the functioning integrity and self-healing, self-renewing capacity of ecosystems while advancing and sustaining human communities. This is not only a scientific or technological problem. It is more primarily a cultural, ethical and political problem: how to advance understandings and relationships of ecological responsibility; how to advance and sustain systems of thought and patterns of human behaviour which are conducive to ecological well-being as an integral aspect of human well-being.

ECOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM

Many early groups did learn to bring their lives into harmony with the limits of the nature systems within which they dwelt, and there are important lessons to learn from these societies. The lessons are in the continual struggle for balance more than in particular skills or particular types of culture. These varied in different regions and time periods and in different ecological and economic systems. Despite great cultural variations, successful societies, that is those which sustained themselves within the limits of their life systems over a significant period of time, shared at least two features in common, features that are relevant to our present challenge:[1]

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1.   See Patricia Mische, 'Towards a Pedagogy of Ecological Responsibility', *Convergence: The Journal of the International Council for Adult Education,* Vol. XXV, No. 2, 1992, pp. 9–25; also Patricia Mische, *Ethics and the Environment in an Interdependent World,* Tokyo, Institute for Studies in Social Justice, Sophia University (forthcoming).

1. They learned to balance the individual good and the common good. Too
    much repression of individual needs and expression endangered a group's
    chances for long-term success by stifling the creativity, initiative and
    adaptability required for changing circumstances. But the lack of a com-
    mitment to the good of the whole community on the part of too many of
    its individual members could undermine the very foundations of a so-
    ciety's existence and, hence, also the security and survival of its individual
    members. In ecologically successful communities this sense of common
    good extended beyond the human good to include the total community of
    beings comprising the life system.
2. They learned to balance their attentions and priorities between four
    spheres affecting their security and well-being:
    (a) the *biosphere* – the sphere of life or the nature system, including air,
         water, soil and living beings in these environments;
    (b) the *technosphere* – the structures made by humans and set in the space of
         the biosphere, such as human settlements or cities, communication sys-
         tems, farmlands, irrigation systems, aqueducts, sewage systems, roads,
         vehicles, industries, etc., which are partially controlled by, but also
         have unintended consequences on, the biosphere;
    (c) the *sociosphere* – the political, economic and cultural institutions or sys-
         tems humans develop to manage their relations with each other and
         with the other two spheres; and
    (d) the *sphere of mind and spirit.*

Societies which lost this equilibrium for any length of time (for example, by fail-
ing to develop environmental norms strong enough to offset the strains on the
nature system from the introduction of new technologies or economic activities)
risked the degradation of their environment (and with it their physical and
economic means of survival, which are ultimately rooted in the nature system)
and/or their social or spiritual disintegration (also affected deeply by relation-
ships with the nature system).

Learning to balance sometimes conflicting aspects of the common good
was a continuous challenge. Neither nature systems nor human systems are
static. They are dynamic, open and evolving. Once a society learned how to
live within the limits of its nature systems it continually had to reassess and

revise its understandings and behaviour in the light of new and ever-changing conditions. Each new technological revolution catalysed change in human groups and in ecological systems. New technologies brought economic and other benefits for human groups, but also disequilibrium and strain on existing systems, including ecosystems. For example, improvements in hunting weapons increased human success in felling larger animals and increased their food supplies, but it also led to the extinction of some species which could not reproduce themselves as fast as they were now being killed. The plough and irrigation systems revolutionized agriculture, again enhancing human food supplies, but they also led to soil depletion and erosion. Bronze and iron technologies provided improved tools and living conditions, but also led to deforestation.[2] More recently, the industrial and scientific revolutions contributed to a higher standard of living and longer lives for more people than ever before in history, but also led to more environmental damage in the span of a century than in all of previous history.

Crises of growth

There is a vulnerable period in any technological revolution between its first heady advances and the time it takes to assess its impact on environmental, economic, cultural and political systems and develop safeguards to prevent harm. Communities must not destroy themselves or their life systems once they have developed the technological means to do so.

Ethical, moral and legal restraints are means societies have developed to prevent this from happening. But in periods of rapid economic and technological change, the cultural, political, religious, educational and other systems through which normative behaviour is defined and governed may lag far behind. This lag or disequilibrium constitutes a crisis of growth. It is the oft-repeated story of new wine in old wineskins: old systems and norms may not be strong enough to contain the strains introduced by new economic or technological developments or by a rapid increase in demands. This may be

2.   A good summary of this research can be found in Andrew Goudie, 'The Changing Human Impact', in Laurie Friday and Ronald Laskie (eds.), *The Fragile Environment*, pp. 1–21, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.

particularly true where strains and threats to the environment are concerned. Harm to ecosystems may not be immediately visible and, even when visible, societies which lack a deep sense of how their own identity, well-being and security are integrally related to the larger life community may allow short-term economic gains to supersede, or even undermine, long-term ecological security.

Many societies before now have made this mistake. Geophysical and archaeological evidence abounds of environmental damage by earlier human groups who failed to balance their technological and economic development with commensurate environmental safeguards. The damage was not specific to one time, place or economic system but was caused by diverse groups with diverse economic systems in different world regions and time periods. Among those who exceeded the limits of their ecosystems were early hunting and gathering societies in Africa, Asia, Europe, the British Isles, South America, the Pacific islands and Australia. Later agricultural and cattle-keeping societies in Upper Egypt, Nubia, Mesopotamia, Europe, China and India also left evidence of extensive damage. So did metal workers in the Bronze and Iron Ages in northwest Iran, northern China, Britain and many parts of Africa. The types of environmental damage inflicted by these societies have been described in some depth by Andrew Goudie[3] and include:

1. Deforestation – burning or in other ways clearing woods and forests to enhance hunting, cattle-grazing and agriculture.
2. The eradication of some animal and plant species through over-hunting, over-grazing of animal herds, deforestation, or the introduction of new agricultural technologies such as ploughs and irrigation systems.
3. Soil disturbances such as erosion, salinization, acidification and desertification caused by deforestation and poor agricultural practices.
4. Ecological damage from mineral exploitation – the mining of ores and smelting of metals. Metal-working required enormous amounts of wood and charcoal and led to wholesale clearing of trees and great erosional scars in some world regions.

These and other types of environmental degradation often had devastating effects on human communities. Some societies did not survive the

3.   Ibid.

desertification, flooding, starvation, or other physical effects of the environmental damage they caused. Some survived physically but experienced serious economic, social and cultural disintegration. Others survived by migrating to new territories. Human history is full of stories of mass migrations – refugees fleeing changing environmental conditions which were the consequence of either their own or nature's making or some combination of human and natural causes. In the days when human populations were small and new frontiers abundant, migration was a viable solution. But, as human populations grew, so did competition for environmentally favourable territories, and this solution became less viable and often led to inter-group conflict and warfare. More will be said on this below.

TODAY'S CRISIS OF GROWTH

However, the crisis of growth in this century and its effects on the Earth and human communities exceed anything in past history. In the twentieth century, between the years 1900 and 1990, human populations multiplied three times, the global economy multiplied twenty times, the consumption of fossil fuels multiplied thirty times and industrial production multiplied fifty times.[4] Four-fifths of this growth occurred after 1950 and much of that in the last two decades.

Economic imbalances

From an overall economic view, these trends seem at first glance to represent tremendous human success. In the last nine decades more people have been fed, clothed, sheltered, educated and lived longer and healthier lives than ever before. But a closer look shows tremendous inequities in the distribution of this growth. Most of the population growth was in the poorer countries of the South. Most of the proceeds of economic growth went to the industrialized countries of the North. Of the $20 trillion increase in world GDP between 1972 and 1992, only 15 per cent accrued to developing countries; more than 70 per cent went to

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4.   Jim MacNeill, Pieter Winsemius and Taizo Yakushiji, *Beyond Interdependence: The Meshing of the World's Economy and the Earth's Ecology*, p. 3, New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991.

the richer, industrialized countries of the North.[5] Consumption and waste in these countries was so disproportionate that today every child born in the developed world consumes twenty to thirty times more resources of the planet than a Third World child.[6]

From a Third World viewpoint, these inequities became increasingly intolerable, especially in the 1980s, when foreign debt, mounting interest rates and adverse terms of international trade led to the net transfer of hundreds of billions of dollars from poor to rich countries.[7] By 1986, the foreign debt of LDCs surpassed $1 trillion, with interest payments mounting to $70 billion a year. In 1988 and again in 1989, poor countries transferred over $50 billion a year to the richer countries, and this includes only what is counted by the World Bank.[8] Much of the transfer involved ecological capital, further depleting or degrading the forests, soil, water, mineral and other resources of the poorest countries.

Ecological imbalances

From an environmental viewpoint, much of this growth was unsustainable and placed enormous burdens on the Earth's life systems. Up until this century human impacts on the environment had been on a relatively small, primarily local scale. Now they were of a new, global order of magnitude and complexity. These environmental costs are only now beginning to be assessed and have seldom been internalized in the prices and accounts of producers, corporations, national governments, or international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund to reflect the true costs of production and economic growth. The following are only a few environmental costs of this growth.

Forests are disappearing at an accelerating rate. Since 1850, the Earth's forest cover has been reduced by one-third, most of that in the last two decades.

5. Maurice Strong, *Statement at Opening of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 June 1992*, p. 4.
6. Ibid.
7. MacNeill et al., op. cit.; also World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*, Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 1987.
8. World Bank, *World Debt Tables, 1989–90, External Debt of Developing Countries*, Vol. 1, p. 78, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1989.

According to United Nations data, half the deforestation caused by human activities has occurred within the last twenty years.[9]

Air, water and soil are being polluted at alarming rates, threatening the health of present and future generations. Today, 1.2 billion people, almost one-fourth the world's population, lack safe drinking water. Four million children a year die of related diseases. Every year 6 to 7 million hectares of agricultural land are lost to erosion and another 1.5 million to water-logging, salinization and alkalinization. Topsoil is being lost at the rate of 25 billion tons a year.[10]

Land and water degradation have already resulted in more than 10 million environmental refugees.[11] This is two-thirds of the world total, putting environmental ahead of political causes of refugee flows. In fact, environmental factors sometimes trigger the political causes of refugee flights. People fleeing the hunger and deprivation which result from destroyed ecosystems crowd into urban centres or cross borders, causing rapid demographic and geopolitical shifts which strain existing political and economic systems and become a factor in civil strife and political upheavals.

The practice of ecological apartheid is an especially troubling aspect of toxic waste disposal. The uneven development of standards of environmental protection among different countries leave those with weaker standards more vulnerable to ecological exploitation. Increasingly, people in the poorer countries have found their waters and lands used as garbage dumps for the toxic wastes of the richer, industrialized countries. With tougher environmental standards and higher costs for toxic waste disposal at home, some companies have either moved the most polluting aspects of their production abroad or exported the waste to countries with lower standards or where they may bribe local officials to look the other way. Conscious or unconscious racism is almost certainly involved. Those exporting toxic waste would be loathe to dump it in their own neighbourhoods,

9. United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), *Earth Summit Issues in Brief*, New York, 1992. (DPI/1227–9528.)
10. MacNeill et al., op. cit.
11. Jodi Jacobson, 'Abandoning Homelands', *State of the World*, Washington, D.C., World Watch Institute, 1989.

affecting their own children, but have fewer qualms about putting African, Asian and Latin American children at risk. Within the richer countries, racial and ethnic minorities and poorer sectors often face the same problem.

But to damage one area of the Earth is to affect the whole. The planet is a single living system and we are so interdependent that the toxic exports to one area of the world can never remain isolated but find their way back again in the foods, air, water and health of peoples who cross our borders.

The loss of plant and animal species is also accelerating. In the 300 years between 1600 and 1900, humans accounted for the loss of one species in every four years. From 1900 the average rate began increasing to one per year and by 1979, to one a day.[12] Now, according to 1992 estimates, the losses average a staggering three an hour, seventy-four a day and 27,000 a year.[13] With the rapid destruction of tropical rain forests (the habitat for between 70 to 90 per cent of species), the Earth may lose as many as half of all remaining species in the coming decades. 'This mass extinction will far surpass the 'great dying' of the dinosaurs and associated species 65 million years ago,' says Myers. Eventually evolutionary processes may generate new species but this will take a long time. 'Our descendants will look out on a biologically impoverished world for possibly 200,000 generations – ten times longer than since humanity first came into existence'.[14]

Global warming and depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer which protects the Earth from excessive solar ultra-violet radiation are among the gravest environmental threats. Ozone depletion has been linked to damage to crops and to increasing incidence of skin cancers, cataracts and diseases of the human immunity system, such as AIDS.[15] Global warming could cause sea levels to rise, flooding low-lying islands and coastal regions. It will increase desertification and

12. Norman Myers, *The Sinking Ark: A New Look at the Problems of Disappearing Species,* Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1979.
13. Norman Myers, speech presented at *Eco-Ed,* an international conference on environment and development in Toronto, October 1992.
14. Norman Myers, *The Gaia Atlas of Future Worlds,* p. 34, New York, Anchor Books/Doubleday, 1990.
15. United Nations Department of Public Information, op. cit.

crop failure and disrupt weather patterns, leading to unpredictable rainfall alternating between drought and flooding.[16]

One of the most insidious aspects of our failure to keep our economic growth in equilibrium with the limits of ecological systems is the cost to future generations. Much of the environmental harm being done today will not affect those of us living now, but will do unprecedented harm to future generations. It is not just that future generations may live in gravely damaged environments; their own bodies may bear the ravages of environmentally induced diseases and genetic damage.[17] Children are more vulnerable than adults to pollutants and unborn children are the most vulnerable of all, especially in the embryonic stage when organs begin to form. We are stealing the future from our children and grandchildren. This may be one of the worst possible forms of criminal behaviour but national governments and the international community have not yet identified it as a crime or developed the ethical and criminal codes necessary to protect the rights of future generations to a healthy environment.

For the first time in history, humanity is capable of universal harm to the planet and to the human gene pool. We, who are creatures of the Earth and who have evolved out of the Earth's creative processes, are now capable of intervening in those processes in ways which will change the future course of planetary evolution and undermine the chances for our own species to survive. The question is not whether the Earth will survive. As it always has through its billions of years, the Earth will adapt to crises and changing conditions and continue in its long evolution. The question is whether humans will be able to adapt fast enough to survive the changes the Earth makes in response to human assaults.

A narrow margin of time

Some of the ecological harm which has been done is irreversible, but additional harm can be avoided if the world community acts quickly and effectively. Most of today's crises have been caused by human activities. Human volition was

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16. United Nations Department of Public Information, op. cit.
17. Lloyd Timberlake and Laura Thomas, *When the Bough Breaks: Our Children, Our Environment,* London, Earthscan Publications, 1990.

involved and human volition can be asserted to change the situation. There is still a narrow margin of time to overcome the present ethical and systemic lag and find creative resolutions to our present crises. But that margin diminishes daily. Once today's environmental crises with their interactive and compounding effects go beyond a certain point, they will take on a life of their own and be beyond the range of human volition to remedy.

INADEQUACY OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

Role of Second World War and Cold War perceptions

Existing international systems have not been effective in redressing the transboundary aspects of this global ecological and economic disequilibrium. The United Nations and its Specialized Agencies evolved in the shadows of the Second World War and the Cold War. A generation of world leaders were guided by perceptions of security which were tied to their memories of that war and to the exigencies of the bipolar world order which evolved with the Cold War. For more than four decades international relations were dominated by these perceptions of security. These were the very decades in which today's crisis of growth was mounting, with attendant population pressures, economic inequities and environmental crises. Many environmental crises might have been dealt with sooner, had they not been subordinated and obscured, consciously and unconsciously, by narrow Second World War and Cold War perceptions of national and global security.

The Second World War had been the most devastating war in history. While the war was still being waged and in the months immediately following its end, Allied leaders were planning a new world order with two major concerns on their mind. One was how to prevent another world war. The other was how to reconstruct devastated economies and international monetary relations in such a way that they enhanced the prospects for international peace and economic security. Thus, as the United Nations Charter was being drafted, environmental issues – either as a cause of war or as a security issue in themselves – were not much in any government's consciousness. Nor were they yet visible to most of the public. Needless to say, ecological aspects of peace and security were not included in the United Nations Charter.

Interestingly, nuclear weapons, with their potentially devastating effects on the environment as well as human populations, were not included either. Research and development of the atom bomb had been so top secret in the United States that not even Vice-President Harry Truman knew of it until after President Roosevelt had died and he was sworn in as president. The United Nations Charter was signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945. It would be another six weeks before the world would awaken to the startling news that a new kind of bomb existed and had been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and it would be still longer before most of the world outside these cities understood the effects of these new weapons and their implications for international relations and an emerging new world order.

Nor did drafters of the United Nations Charter anticipate the Cold War and the nuclear arms race which would ensue between the United States and the Soviet Union, or the effects the Cold War would have in obstructing the effectiveness of the United Nations, especially the Security Council. Instead of a world order based on collective security, what emerged de facto was a bipolar world order driven by the military competition and balance of power struggles between the two superpowers and their allies. All international relations were viewed by the major powers through this framework – including their relations with colonized peoples struggling for political autonomy and economic development.

This bipolar world order was also reflected in the economic and monetary institutions established after the Second World War to deal with increasing economic interdependencies, such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. Soviet bloc countries were excluded from these structures, and poorer, non-industrialized countries of the South largely marginalized, dependent on decisions made in the industrialized North.

It is not surprising, then, that, over the next forty years in this world order, two trends accelerated at an alarming rate: (1) increasing environmental degradation, and (2) increasing inequities between the rich and poor countries.

Gradually the international community did begin to address ecological crises and the great economic inequities between the rich and poor countries. At first economic development and environmental concerns were treated along

separate tracks, in separate international forums. Then in 1992 the two agendas were brought together in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). Not surprisingly, it was not until the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar world system that most people really began to look at the severity of these ecological and economic crises and the inadequacy of existing global agreements and institutions to deal with them. Meanwhile, within the narrow, Cold War framework of security, ecological destruction had been compounding in communist and capitalist, rich and poor countries alike.

Even now, with all the evidence of ecological harm spread before us, many national leaders still persist in denial. In the major powers, a whole generation of national security and international relations specialists who were schooled in this narrow Cold War view of the world and of security still fill the corridors of power and diplomacy and academia. They are ill-prepared even to know how to think about, much less effectively respond to, global ecological threats. Thus they still tend to subordinate the requirements for ecological security to military and economic objectives. There is little understanding of how peace and long-range economic security is linked to ecological security. The true security and well-being of the human community now requires that these linkages be understood.

ECOLOGICAL FACTORS AS A CAUSE OF CONFLICT AND WAR

Environmental factors have often been a direct or underlying cause of conflicts and wars. Of course, nature does not 'cause' a war in any true sense. The 'causes' of war lie in the sphere of human interactions and the ways societies choose to deal with the environmental and other conditions in which they find themselves. The role of environmental factors in conflict cannot be viewed in isolation but needs to be seen as interactive with cultural, religious, psychological, political, economic and other factors. Not all groups go to war in the face of adverse conditions, whether those conditions are environmental, economic or social. Faced by crises, some groups may choose to co-operate in a search for creative solutions or they may choose from a wide spectrum of other behaviours short of violence or warfare. Even if a crisis sparks conflict, it need not lead to war. The dynamics of conflict vary within and between different societies in different

times and circumstances. Conflict is often helpful to constructive social change, in that it forces groups to examine and deal with a crisis or problem which would otherwise be denied or submerged.

But it is clear from history that environmental crises have sometimes been a significant factor in violence and warfare. If this was true in the past, it will be even more true in the future, as increasing population and economic pressures lead to increasing strains on ecological systems.

Environmental factors in past wars have included:

1. Competition for natural resources.
2. The overuse and depletion of shared resources by one or more groups in a bio-region, affecting others who also depend on the resources (often exacerbated by class, ethnic, national or other divisions).
3. Environmental degradation (e.g. pollution, soil erosion, deforestation, loss of biodiversity) that impoverishes the living space and undermines a society's physical, economic, social and spiritual quality of life.

Although these environmental factors have been listed here separately for reasons of discussion, in fact they often overlap or are different dimensions of a single ecological problem.

Competition for resources as a cause of war

Among these and other possible environmental factors in wars, the most obvious up to now has been competition for natural resources. The natural resources at stake in past wars have included both living and non-living, renewable and non-renewable resources, and have ranged from mineral and other raw materials to energy and water supplies, to food and timber sources, to sea or land passages, to land rich in topsoil and to waters rich with fish. Even when groups or countries do not acknowledge such resources as the 'cause' for which they are fighting (resource wars have often been 'justified' on other grounds), they may be an underlying factor in the conflict.[18]

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18.   Arthur Westing, 'An Expanded Concept of International Security', in Arthur Westing (ed.), *Global Resources and International Conflict*, p. 183, Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 1986.

Scarcity and/or maldistribution are often factors in conflict over a key resource. Natural resources tend to be distributed unevenly around the world, with some regions and countries in short supply or totally lacking one or more resources they perceive as vital to their well-being.[19] The scarcity and maldistribution may also run along class or ethnic lines, increasing the potential for conflict.

Judith Rees[20] delineates four types of resource scarcity which may contribute to conflict:

1. Physical scarcity (the resource is only available in a finite amount).
2. Geopolitical scarcity (the resource is distributed unevenly around the world, so that some regions are dependent on others for access or deliveries).
3. Socio-economic scarcity (unequal distribution of property rights or purchasing power to obtain resources within or between societies).
4. Environmental scarcity (a previously abundant and naturally renewable resource is made scarce by environmental degradation, that is, the failure of groups to manage the use of the resource in sustainable ways).

The type of scarcity affects the contours, issues, parties and dynamics of a conflict and thus also the requirements for resolving it. Also, more than one type of scarcity may be involved, compounding the complexity of the conflict configurations.[21]

But not all conflicts over natural resources involve scarcity. Even the discovery of resources not used in the past, or new sources of vital resources providing an increased supply, can be a source of conflict, especially when agreements on access rights have not yet been worked out between potential users. In such cases nations may fight to gain control of, or to prevent other nations from controlling, access to the new resources.[22] A 'cause' of conflict here is not scarcity but a lag in inter-group or international agreements or laws.

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19. MacNeill et al., op. cit.
20. As cited in ENCOP Switzerland et al., *How to Cope with 'Environmental Conflicts':
Problem Outline and a Research Framework*, p. 18, Zurich, Environment and Conflicts Project, 1992.
21. Ibid.
22. MacNeill et al., op. cit., p. 54.

The desire to gain or control natural resources has been a major factor in expansionism and colonialism from ancient times to the present, including the Greek and Roman empires, Russian expansionism, European colonization of parts of Africa, Asia and North and South America, the American colonization of the Philippines and Japanese and German expansionism earlier in this century, to name only a few examples. The process of annexing and/or colonizing other territories may or may not have involved the physical violence associated with warfare, but it inevitably involved structural violence: the domination and exploitation of peoples and their environments, including the wholesale looting of natural resources. Perhaps, just as inevitably, colonized peoples ultimately revolted against this structural violence and exploitation. Many wars of independence in this and previous centuries had as a goal not only political self-determination, but also sovereignty over natural resources.

Westing[23] outlines inter-state, colonial and civil wars and skirmishes in this century in which natural resources played a significant role. Among others, he includes the following:

The First World War of 1914–18. Natural resource aspects included population pressures in Central Europe; territorial rivalries, for example over the iron-rich Lorraine area; Germany's goal of getting access to oil; and conflicts over colonies in resource-rich areas of Africa, Asia, Pacific islands, etc.

The Chaco War of 1932–35. Paraguay and Bolivia fought for control of the Gran Chaco wilderness area. They thought, incorrectly, that it contained oil.

The Second World War of 1939–45. Natural resource aspects included population density in Germany – a justification given by Germany. Germany annexed the iron-rich Lorraine area of France, the agriculturally and iron-rich Ukraine in the Soviet Union and the nickel-rich Petsamo (now Pechenga) region of Finland. Germany pillaged Poland's timber resources and Japan's expansionism was motivated largely by an indigenous scarcity of key resources.

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23. Westing, op. cit., pp. 204–10.

The Algerian War of Independence of 1954–62. A colonial war in which France fought, in part, to continue its hold on Algerian oil deposits.

The Congo Civil War of 1960–64. A civil war in large part fomented by Belgian and other foreign interests so as to protect their investments in copper and other minerals.

The Third Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Israel conquered parts of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, gaining much-needed water and oil.

The Nigerian Civil War of 1967–70. Attempts by Eastern region (Biafra) to secede were thwarted by the government. At stake: rich deposits of oil.

The Anglo-Icelandic Clash of 1972–73. Icelandic gunboats drove away British trawlers which refused to recognize Iceland's unilateral extension of its coastal fishing rights from 22 to 93 kilometres from its shores.

The Falkland/Malvinas Conflict of 1982. Argentina and the United Kingdom both claimed ownership of the islands, which are attractive for the surrounding fishery resources and potential offshore oil deposits.

No doubt Westing would now add to his list the 1991 war with Iraq. At stake were the oilfields of Kuwait. The Westing study focused on violent conflict in which natural resources had a significant role. Population density was included because of its impact on resource supply and demand. In itself population growth does not cause wars. Some countries, such as the Netherlands, have successfully and peacefully managed the strains of high-density population over a long period of time. The strengths of their social, political and economic systems and of their relationships with other countries are greater than the strains of high populations. When nations with high-density populations do erupt in war, there are usually other contributing factors, like rapid population growth accompanied by a rapid depletion of one or more essential resources and political and economic systems too ineffective to manage the strains of unmet human needs and economic demands.

*Environmental degradation
and resource depletion as causes of war*

Although less research is available on the role played by environmental degradation and resource depletion, they have also been factors in civil strife and warfare. In cases where one group depletes or pollutes a shared resource, such as a

river or aquifer, the cause of the resulting conflict is obvious. But the role of environmental degradation, such as soil erosion, deforestation and desertification, is not always so apparent. Contending parties may not always be aware themselves of the environmental factors in their hostilities, pointing instead to the economic and social effects of the degradation, such as hunger, deprivation and impoverishment.

Recent examples where environmental degradation and resource depletion contributed, along with other factors, to social upheaval and conflict include Ethiopia, Haiti, El Salvador, Somalia and the Philippines, to name only a few.

According to the Ethiopian Relief Commission, the primary cause of the 1975 famine in Ethiopia and the resulting social upheavals and mass migrations of people was not the long drought, but the 'accumulated effects, over decades, of resource degradation, on the one hand and increasing human and animal populations on the other'.[24] In Haiti, which was one of the most impoverished and politically corrupt countries in the world, more than a million 'boat people' – approximately one-sixth of the population – fled the country. Environmental factors such as soil erosion and resource depletion have been underlying factors in the hunger and economic crises leading to this mass exodus. Haiti has one of the most severe cases of soil erosion in the world. In many parts of the country it is down to bedrock.[25] It is not surprising that Haiti has also been rife with civil strife.

El Salvador, with one of the worst cases of environmental degradation in Central America, experienced years of international and internal strife. So many Salvadorans seeking a better life crossed the border to neighbouring Honduras that by 1969, when Honduras began expelling them, illegal Salvadorans comprised 12 per cent of the Honduran population. In reaction to the expulsions, El Salvador invaded Honduras, demanding (successfully) that Honduras allow existing Salvadorans to stay and trying (unsuccessfully) to force Honduras to accept future immigrants.[26] El Salvador has also suffered through many years of insurgency warfare, with thousands of its citizens killed in the violent conflict

24.   MacNeill et al., op. cit., p. 55.
25.   US AID, as cited in MacNeill et al., op. cit.
26.   Westing, op. cit., p. 207.

between rebel and government forces. This civil strife has been attributed as much to environmental as to political and ideological factors. Forests, soil and water had been depleted to such an extent that the land was unable to support increasing populations.[27]

As is evident in the above and many similar cases, rapid population growth, political corruption and gross inequities in the distribution of wealth, power and resources are often interactive with environmental degradation in conflict build-up.

Gross inequities in a country, including in the distribution of the economic gains and misery resulting from environmental degradation, increases the likelihood of conflict and strife. When the deprivation and suffering are shared more or less evenly among a population, people are less likely to revolt. This is because perceptions of social injustice are a volatile force, eroding a people's sense of the legitimacy of a social system and hence their willingness to co-operate in maintaining it. If all the members of a society are suffering more or less equally, they may be miserable but they may not see the system itself as unjust or illegitimate. But if there are great inequities, so that some gain most of the economic benefits, while others suffer most of the burden of the misery resulting from environmental degradation, and, especially, if these groups are defined by class, race, ethnic or national differences, the perceptions of injustice and illegitimacy and the likelihood of revolt will be much higher.[28]

Global economic forces have often exacerbated environmental degradation and resource depletion and also inequities in distribution. For example, when oil prices began climbing in the 1970s, many oil-importing countries were faced with mounting balance-of-payments deficits, undermining their currencies and economies. To offset such economic threats, they increased exports of natural resources, accelerating the loss of their ecological capital. Their own populations were left to absorb the long-term costs of environmental degradation and

27. US AID, as cited in MacNeill et al., op. cit., p. 55.
28. See Kenneth Boulding, *Stable Peace*, Austin, Tex., University of Texas Press, 1978; also Patricia Mische, 'Perceptions of Social Justice as a Variable Affecting Conflict or Co-operation, War or Peace in a Social System: The 1986 People's Revolt in the Philippines as a Case Study' (dissertation), New York, Columbia University Teachers College, 1991.

resource depletion and to face shortages and rising prices for food and other basic needs. Western models of development and the conditionalities and terms of multilateral and bilateral foreign aid also caused many poorer countries to export precious natural resources, further depleting and degrading the environment and exacerbating problems of maldistribution.

The Philippines provided an example of how environmental degradation, rapid population growth, political corruption, maldistribution and global economic forces may all interact and contribute to conflict and civil strife.[29]

Forest and land-tenure issues are major factors in the conflict configurations which have plagued the Philippines through much of this century. Before they were settled thousands of years ago, the 7,000 islands which comprise the Philippine archipelago were almost totally covered by forests. Even fifty years ago, the forest cover was about 75 per cent. Then, in the late 1940s, forest resources began to be used as a source of foreign exchange to finance development programmes. In 1949, forest products were only 1.5 per cent of total exports. By 1955 they grew to 11 per cent and, by 1969, they surged to 33 per cent. By 1960, 5.5 million hectares of forest were under logging concessions; by 1971 the amount almost doubled to 10.6 million hectares. Successive waves of oil shocks accelerated the loss of forests and other natural resources. The Philippines imports virtually all its oil and, when its economy was repeatedly hit by the increasing cost of oil imports, the government leaned heavily on timber and other commodity exports to try to rectify imbalances in trade and payments.

Political corruption further exacerbated the problem. The big industrial loggers used their huge profits to buy politicians, elections and forest officials; and politicians used timber-licence agreements as political spoils. This was

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29. My observations on the Philippines here are a summary of research conducted between 1979 and 1992 and developed in greater detail in Patricia Mische, 'Perceptions of Social Justice . . .', op. cit., and also in 'Ecological Security and Its Relationship to Peace and International Co-operation in the Eastern Asian Region: Case Studies of the Philippines, Japan and Malaysia', a report to the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation on a research project undertaken from 1 January 1990 to 31 December 1991.

especially pronounced during the twenty years of rule by President Ferdinand Marcos, who liberally dispensed logging concessions to his cronies.

Population growth, mass poverty and the failure of land reform also took their toll on the forests. Between 1963 and 1989 the population more than doubled, jumping from 30 million to 61 million. Population density in the Philippines is now double that in China. In 1986, when Marcos was forced from power, more than 80 per cent of the people were on or below the poverty line. Although the Philippines was one of the major food producers in the world, its people had the second lowest calorie intake in Asia. Seventy-nine per cent of schoolchildren suffered from malnutrition.

Land distribution issues have been a cause of conflict in the Philippines from colonial times and, in this century, were a major factor in several peasant uprisings and in guerrilla warfare. Despite promises of agrarian reform by successive political leaders, the feudal land-tenure system inherited from more than 300 years of Spanish colonial rule was never effectively reformed – neither by the Americans who succeeded the Spanish nor by the ruling élite after Philippine independence. Those half-hearted measures which were legislated were never fully implemented. They were also full of loopholes for those close to the centres of power and the large plantations which produced sugar and other key export crops. In effect, the exemptions for export-commodity production encouraged and rewarded mono-cropping, soil depletion, deforestation (to clear land for more agricultural exports) and other ecologically damaging practices.

The failure in land redistribution, combined with rapid population growth, led successive waves of landless peasants to encroach into upland forests where they practised slash-and-burn farming. There they came into conflict with tribal forest dwellers. All too often the government either looked the other way or openly encouraged and even assisted this encroachment into forest lands to gain a temporary reprieve from growing population and land pressures in the lowlands and to open new lands for production of export crops.

All this contributed to the massive devastation of Philippine forests in just a few decades. The Forestry Development Center (FDC) of the University of the Philippines College of Forestry has predicted that, if present trends continue, all present commercial old growth forests in the Philippines will be gone by the year 2000. The existing destruction has already contributed to floods, diminishing

water tables, soil erosion, hills washing down on rice paddies and other environmental disasters.

It also led to increasing conflict between illegal logging interests and defenders of the forests. The latter have been comprised at various times and places by forest tribes, farmers (whose farms were being devastated by the flooding and other effects of deforestation), church leaders in solidarity with the tribal and farming groups and environmental activists. Various non-violent tactics have been used by these groups to try to stop the illegal logging, including people using their own bodies as a blockade against logging trucks. In reaction, illegal loggers have become both more clandestine and more violent, using armed gunmen (who are sometimes members of the military) to serve as private armies. Military involvement has ranged from looking the other way to direct involvement in aiding and abetting the illegal logging. Often the military and illegal loggers also have ties to politicians. In an interesting twist, the New People's Army (NPA – the military arm of the Communist Party in the Philippines) alleged, in 1992, that four generals of the Armed Forces of the Philippines were involved in illegal logging activity in the Cagayan Valley, where logging is a 2.8 billion peso industry. The areas targeted by the Armed Forces to wipe out insurgents became 'places where illegal logging grew rampant', the NPA said. Similar allegations have been made by priests, nuns and non-governmental organizations in the area. People have been killed trying to stop illegal logging and others threatened, harassed or detained by the military on trumped-up charges of subversive activity.

Under the Aquino government, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources tried to curb deforestation by drastically cutting the number of logging concessions, banning the export of raw timber and fostering tree-planting and other forest-conservation programmes. But like many poor countries and those with a large foreign debt, it lacked sufficient moneys for effective forest management. There are too few forest rangers to patrol and enforce the drive against illegal logging. Recently the Philippines has benefited marginally from a debt-for-nature swap and from some foreign aid packages with environmental protection and afforestation components. But these measures are still far from what is needed effectively to reverse these trends and offset future disasters and conflicts.

Similar conflict dynamics with overt or underlying environmental factors can be found in many other poorer countries around the world.

EFFECTS OF WAR ON THE ENVIRONMENT

If environmental factors have contributed to social upheavals, civil strife and warfare, the converse is also true: warfare has been increasingly damaging to the environment.

Perhaps nowhere was this so manifest as the 1991 Gulf War, when a key resource was not only a cause for war but also a weapon and a target. Millions of barrels of oil were deliberately poured into the sea and the oilfields of Kuwait set ablaze by Iraqi forces, with enormous ecological damage in sea, land and air environments. Added to this was the 'collateral' environmental damage inflicted by both allied and Iraqi forces through massive bombing, the mining of sea and land areas and the deployment of many thousands of troops and military equipment in fragile desert ecosystems.

By the end of the Gulf War, about 760 km of coastline had suffered massive damage from oil spills and burning oil wells. The impact on marine life was extensive. Flora and fauna vital to the survival of the shallow Gulf ecosystem were killed. Coral reefs, mangroves and sea-grass beds were destroyed. Between 500 to 700 burning oil wells caused severe atmospheric pollution, resulting in acid rain, chemical smog, reduced solar radiation and a drop in temperature, disruption of agriculture from the lower temperature and lack of sunlight and soil contamination. According to the World Meteorological Organization, at the end of the war oil fires were emitting some 40,000 tonnes of sulphuric dioxide into the air every day. Hundreds of other gases and chemicals were also released in blankets of soot which spread as far as the Himalayas and beyond. Land pollution was equally devastating. Over 100,000 tonnes of bombs were dropped on Iraq and Kuwait in a few weeks, more than were dropped in all of the Second World War. Targets included chemical and nuclear reactor facilities. Vegetation and topsoil were destroyed. Huge quantities of refuse, toxic materials and between 170 and 204 million litres of sewage were left in sand-pits by coalition forces. With severe damage to the civilian infrastructure in Baghdad, raw sewage overflowed in the streets or was dumped directly into rivers in which

children bathed and played. Drinking water was contaminated and almost the entire population of Iraq was exposed to water-borne diseases.[30]

The Gulf War was a severe case, but hardly the only time war has been environmentally destructive. Protracted warfare in Viet Nam turned one-third of the country into wasteland, pock-marking farmland with two-and-a-half million bomb craters and defoliating forests with 50 million litres of agent orange. Between 1945 and 1982, Viet Nam lost over 80 per cent of its original forest cover.[31] In the Afghanistan War, centuries-old irrigation systems were destroyed and thousands of mines left in fields and mountain passes. In counter-insurgency offensives in Central America and the Philippines, government forces employed 'scorched earth' policies, destroying crops and razing forests in pursuit of rebels.[32]

The environment has been a casualty of war from ancient times, with environmental destruction sometimes deliberately inflicted as part of both offensive and defensive military strategies. But, in the latter half of the twentieth century, war and preparations for war have become ever more environmentally destructive. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons poses tremendous environmental threats. One of the most serious effects of a nuclear war, more grave even than the immediate explosive damage, would be the ecological damage: the resulting 'nuclear winter' with its related climate changes and the radioactive damage to soil, air, water, food and ultimately to the DNA and human gene pool.

Even if such weapons are never used in a war, their very production, testing and stockpiling causes ecological damage. According to United Nations data, by 1980 the nuclear powers had conducted some 1,233 nuclear tests globally, destroying desert ecosystems, vaporizing some Pacific islands and rendering others uninhabitable and contaminating oceans, marine life and human populations.[33] Untold numbers of people have suffered cancers, birth defects and other

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30.   Science for Peace, *Taking Stock: The Impact of Militarism on the Environment* (preliminary report), Vancouver, 1992.

31.   Ibid., p. 2.

32.   Ibid.

33.   Rosalie Bertell, 'Early War Victims of World War III' [Testimony at 1983 Nuremberg Tribunal], *Breakthrough*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1983; and, by the same author, 'The Health of the Oceans', *Breakthrough*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1984.

ill-effects. In some cases whole family lines have died out from the effects of radiation exposure from nuclear testing.[34] The Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands was a target for United States intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) aimed from Vandenberg Air Force base in California. Although not carrying nuclear warheads, the missiles came crashing in at 8,000 miles per hour, destroying coral reefs and lagoons. Fish which had been the main staple of the people now carried toxins that poisoned those who ate them.[35] None of the nuclear powers factored such damage to environmental and human health in the costs of national security.

The end of the Cold War has not ended the nuclear weapons threat. Thousands of nuclear weapons are still stockpiled by the nuclear powers, primarily in the United States and the Russian Federation, but also now some newly autonomous countries of the former USSR. Political uncertainties in the latter feed uncertainty about the fate of these nuclear arsenals, including fears that fissionable materials will come into the hands of terrorists or renegade states. Increasingly, the nuclear powers are not the only countries to worry about. Currently some thirty countries have operating nuclear-power reactors and twenty-four countries, most in the Third World, have or are developing long-range rockets that can be used as ballistic missiles armed with nuclear or chemical warheads.[36] Eight of these presently have, or are on the threshold of having, nuclear-weapons capability.[37]

Even 'conventional' weapons and military activities are becoming increasingly destructive to the environment and human populations. Worldwide, the military consumes inordinate amounts of non-renewable natural resources, far beyond the proportion used in the civilian sector. In the United States the Pentagon is the single largest consumer of oil and possibly also the largest worldwide. In 1989 alone, the United States Department of Defense purchased

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34.   Rosalie Bertell, 'An Appeal for the Marshall Islands', *Breakthrough*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1986.
35.   Bertell, 'The Health of the Oceans', op. cit.
36.   Joseph Nye, Jr., 'A Cloud that Lingers', *World Monitor*, February 1993, p. 30.
37.   The eight are Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

200 billion barrels of oil for military use. This could have run all of the United States public transport systems for twenty-two years.[38] An F-16 fighter jet consumes almost twice as much gas in one hour as the average United States motorist uses in a year. Global statistics on military consumption are just as disproportionate. One-fourth of the world's jet fuel (42 million tons a year) and 9 per cent of global iron and steel are consumed by the military and, worldwide, the military consumes more aluminium, copper, nickel and platinum than the entire Third World.[39]

The military also controls increasing amounts of land, water and air space around the world, making less available for use by growing populations and also inflicting serious damage on ecosystems. This increasing military encroachment is due in part to the increasing size of armed forces around the world and also to new weapons technologies. Globally, the military now controls between 750,000 and 1.5 million square kilometres of land (not including areas used by arms-producing companies). In the United States alone the military controls land areas equivalent to the entire state of Virginia. Additionally, the United States military controls more than 8,000 square kilometres outside its borders. Lands used for military training usually undergo severe damage, including destruction of vegetation and wildlife habitats, soil compacting and erosion and water and soil contaminated with lead and other toxic materials.[40]

There are similar impacts on air and water environments controlled or affected by the military. According to Science for Peace,[41] in the United States as much as 70 per cent of all airspace is used for military purposes. Of some 90,000 training sorties a year, one-fifth are at very low levels, which is particularly damaging to human health and to nature systems. Canada also devotes extensive airspace to military use, much at low levels. In the former Federal Republic of Germany, almost the entire airspace was open to military jets and two-thirds to low-level flights.

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38. Science for Peace, op. cit.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.

The effects of militarization on the Earth's atmosphere and climate have only begun to be calculated. Data are incomplete, but some rough estimates of atmospheric pollution have been made by German environmentalist Gunar Seitz, who calculates that 6 to 10 per cent of global air pollution comes from military activities.[42] The World Watch Institute estimates that military activities may be responsible for as much as 10 per cent of the carbon dioxide emissions which threaten the planet with global warming. The military also is responsible for a large share of the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other gases which are depleting the ozone layer. According to Science for Peace, the United States military alone 'is responsible for half of the world-wide use of CFC-113' and is a major user of Halon 1211, both of which contribute to ozone depletion.[43] Worldwide, the military share of CFC-113 use has been estimated to be more than two-thirds the total. The military also uses other ozone-depleting substances, including some with no civilian counterpart.

Hazardous wastes have also been produced in disproportionate amounts by the military. Besides the radioactive wastes from nuclear-weapons production and testing, there are pesticides, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), cyanides, phenols, acids, alkalies, metals, fuels and explosives. Many threaten human health with increased risks of cancer, birth defects, genetic damage and other ill-effects.[44]

Many countries are adopting stronger environmental protection laws. But too often the military are not held to the same standards as the civilian population. In the United States, for example, there are some 15,000 suspected hazardous waste sites on active and former Department of Defense (DOD) properties. But according to the Center for Defense Information (CDI), 'the majority of US military facilities do not meet federal and state hazardous waste control requirements'. Recent disclosures have exposed environmental contamination at seventeen nuclear-warhead factories in twelve states. 'Hundreds of billions of gallons of extremely toxic radioactive, chemical and mixed wastes have been discharged into the soil and air in violation of federal hazardous waste

42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., pp. 11–12.
44. Ibid.

disposal laws.' Furthermore, the 'total cost of bringing US military facilities into compliance with environmental laws and mending the damage they have caused could easily exceed $150 billion'. The CDI report continues: 'future generations of Americans will be paying the bills far into the 21st century'.[45]

If the armed forces of many countries are not bound by national environmental laws, then they are also not bound by international agreements which inevitably rely on national means of enforcement. This represents a major weakness in an already very weak body of international environmental law.

Add to these effects of global militarization the co-option for military uses of incredible financial, scientific and technological resources which could be better applied to advance ecological sustainability and economic well-being. According to the Brundtland Commission, half a million scientists around the world are engaged in weapons research, using about half of available research and development moneys. This exceeds the total combined spending on research and development for new energy sources, improved health, increased agricultural production and pollution control.[46]

It is evident that the whole war system has become inimical to ecological security. Therefore the advancement of world peace is essential to ecological security. Yet the danger is that, in the face of increasing environmental, population and economic pressures, many countries will be tempted to maintain and use military force to assure their access to diminishing resources. Thus the converse is also true: ecological sustainability is essential to world peace. In short, ecological security is a prerequisite for peace; and peace is a prerequisite for ecological security.

RECENT TRENDS

What then are the prospects for the future? The end of the Cold War is not the end of warfare or militarism. International conflicts are diminishing but intranational wars and hostilities persist in many regions of the world. Nevertheless, the end of

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45.   Center for Defense Information (CDI), 'Defending the Environment: The Record of the US Military', *The Defense Monitor*, Vol. XVIII, No. 6, 1989.

46.   World Commission on Environment and Development, op. cit., p. 8.

the Cold War does open a window of opportunity for redressing threats to ecological security. The military powers which were faced off against each other in the Cold War – the United States and the former USSR – were not only the major producers of nuclear and chemical weapons and other military threats to the environment, they were also the biggest producers of greenhouse and ozone-depleting gases and major obstacles to global ecological security. The end of hostilities between them permits countries involved in the Cold War and the international community at large to reorder national and global priorities.

The end of the Cold War has already contributed to cuts in military spending in the United States and the former USSR. It has spurred progress in negotiations and agreements on phased dismantling of some nuclear, chemical and other weapons systems. It has opened the way to initial dialogue on conversion of some industries from military to civilian production and there are beginning steps in applying some military technologies and personnel to environmental protection. What meaning and effect, if any, will such trends have on attaining greater ecological security? Nothing is automatic and major challenges still lie ahead.

Cuts in military spending, for example, may not translate into environmental dividends unless politicians, the public and industry all co-operate to go in this direction. Theoretically it is true that moneys previously allocated for military purposes could be transferred to human needs and environmental protection, but past spending on the arms race left both superpowers with serious economic problems and hard budgetary choices. Unless there is widespread understanding of how ecological security is vital to national and global security and also concrete policies and allocations pursuant to these understandings, ecological security may be sacrificed to economic goals. It is possible to have both ecological and economic gains, both increased jobs and increased ecological security, but only through careful planning to pursue both in tandem.

Conversion of industries from military production to new technologies and products for environmental protection is one step which could benefit both ecology and the economy. Financial, material and intellectual resources which were once applied to military contracts can be redirected to environmentally related research and development but, in the initial stages of conversion, industries and consumers will often need the help of government subsidies or other incentives. A Russian plan for conversion of military production until 1995

underscores this point. Of thirteen official recommendations in the plan, one is for production of equipment needed for environmental protection. According to an expert study by Belousov, Panov and Uborsky,[47] while the twelve other recommendations have a commercial character requiring no public expenditure, the path promoting environmental goals needs assistance from the public sector. 'In a market economy, enterprises will produce only what is economically advantageous. Consequently, we need to create a system of incentives both for buyers and producers,' they write.[48] For centuries governments have subsidized or provided incentives related to production for military security. Should not the same consideration be given to ecological security?

Another proposal is to use some of the cuts in military spending to retrain some military to work with environmental protection programmes at local and district levels where there might not otherwise be funding for this purpose. Funds would be allocated through environmental rather than conversion programmes in this case, to avoid misapplication for a wrong activity.[49]

This recommendation is comparable to the United States Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), which provided jobs for United States workers during the great depression in the 1930s. The CCC involved many workers in forest and other environmental programmes. Something similar could be instituted in the United States again to help meet today's needs for both jobs and environmental conservation and clean-up.

Similar recommendations have been made by Renner[50] and Cronberg.[51] The United States military could redirect some of its budget for the clean-up of environmental damage from its past military activities. The military have

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47.   Valeryi K. Belousov, Albert N. Panov and Andrei V. Uborsky, 'Economic Aspects of Environmental Problems Related to Conversion of Weapons and Military Industry', in Nils P. Gleditsch (ed.), *Conversion and the Environment*, pp. 81–90, Oslo, International Peace Research Institute, 1992. (Proceedings of a seminar in Perm, Russia, 24–27 November 1991.)
48.   Ibid.
49.   Ibid.
50.   Michael Renner, 'War on Nature', *World Watch*, Vol. 4, May–June 1991.
51.   Tarja Cronberg, 'The Social Reconstruction of Military Technology: With Special Reference to the Environment', in Gleditsch (ed.), op. cit.

greater knowledge of the causes of the damage at military sites and the types of technology needed in the clean-up. Any new technologies developed for the military clean-up could also have civilian applications.

In some countries the military is already involved in environmental clean-up and conservation. In a study of new uses of the armed forces, Michael Harbottle[52] found that almost every one of the twenty-two countries responding to his survey had taken some steps to involve the armed forces in environmental conservation. The Indian Army, for example, has established 'environmental cells' to co-ordinate conservation projects at mega, macro and micro levels. Activities so far have included tree-planting, conservation education for members of the military and their families and the development and use of renewable sources of energy, such as solar energy for cooking. The Indian Navy is helping to monitor pollution in waters around the coast and inland waterways and the Indian Air Force has introduced a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) requiring pilots and aircrews to report on deforestation and soil degradation observed on domestic flights over remote areas. This information provides early warning of possible avalanches and floods. The aircrews also report on the movement of wildlife in these areas, with a special eye on endangered species.

Environmental initiatives by the military in other countries in the Harbottle study include afforestation and reafforestation projects, like 'soldiers' forests' (Bulgaria) and tree-planting (Austria, Cuba, Finland, Jordan, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United Kingdom and Venezuela); combating ocean and waterway pollution, oil spills and waste emissions (Belgium, Denmark, France, Egypt, Ireland, Netherlands, Venezuela); programmes for the protection of wildlife and flora (by most of the countries in the survey, some more extensive than others); meteorology, hydrology and seismology, such as the use of military equipment and personnel to obtain data on high-altitude pollution (Bulgaria) and soil and rock modifications (Italy); training and education of military personnel to be more environmentally responsible (most of the

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52.   Michael Harbottle, *What is Proper Soldiering? A Study of New Perspectives for the Future Uses of the Armed Forces in the 1990s,* Chipping Norton, Centre for International Peacebuilding, 1991/92.

countries in the survey); and military co-operation with civilian environmental agencies (just beginning in some of the countries in the survey).

In the United States, Senator Sam Nunn, Vice-President Al Gore and some other political leaders have advocated using some United States military technology in environmental protection. With some of the most advanced satellite monitoring, computer and other information systems in the world, the United States military could help gather, store and share important data related to the Earth's atmosphere, climate, deep seas, forests and other natural systems.[53] Some environmental applications of these military technologies are already in process.

So, with political will, it is possible to redirect moneys, minds and materials from military to environmental needs, but the above examples represent only small steps in redressing many decades of environmental damage from the arms race. Major challenges still remain.

Among them is the disarmament process itself. The end of the Cold War has brought welcome progress in disarmament negotiations, but dismantling some systems, such as nuclear and chemical weapons, presents difficult problems. To destroy such weapons by means of explosion would create severe, long-term environmental damage. To continue to store nuclear and chemical weapons also threatens the environment and the health of present and future generations but, up to now, no means have been developed for safely disposing of the toxic, radioactive and other environmentally harmful materials in these weapons.

Chemical weapons are a case in point. Chemical warfare agents were used in the First World War. Seventy years after that war, Germany is still having problems destroying the chemical agents and contaminated soil.[54] And the United States, the most technologically advanced country in the world, has not yet found a way to destroy safely some of its chemical weapons. After spending nine years and more than $400 million dollars, the United States

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53. Cronberg, op. cit.; Harbottle, op. cit.; and Renat Perelet, 'Environmentally Sound Conversion: International Experience', in Gleditsch (ed.), op. cit.
54. Peter Lock, 'International Co-operation and Conversion: Overcoming the Inherited Environmental Hazards of the Arms Race', in Gleditsch (ed.), op. cit.

decontamination plant at Johnston Atoll in the South Pacific is still beset with problems. In the former Soviet Union the problems are even more daunting. The only facility for this purpose, with a capacity to handle only 250–500 tons per year, was closed after public protests over questions of citizen safety. Yet existing disarmament agreements call for the USSR to destroy 35,000 tons of chemical weapons agents by the year 2002.[55]

The dismantling of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons presents other types of difficulties.[56] Resolving these environmental threats from the arms race is clearly in the national and global interest and a matter of great national and global security. Otherwise, even if war is abolished tomorrow and peace reigns on Earth, we and our grandchildren will go on paying the environmental costs of the Cold War and its related arms race far into the twenty-first century.

A NEW WORLD ORDER?
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Although the partial dismantling of weapons of mass destruction and the conversion from military to peacetime production by the major powers are important steps, in themselves they are not guarantors of peace, economic well-being or ecological security. Steps must also be taken to build global structures of peace and economic and ecological security. We still need to overcome the disequilibrium and ethical and systemic lag left in the wake of the old world order. The end of the Cold War provides new openings to develop the global public policies, systems of governance and new modes of international relations we need to meet the real security requirements we face as we go into the twenty-first century.

This is a major challenge. Ecological security requires a whole new way of thinking about security. It cannot be achieved through conventional approaches to national security. Unlike military or economic threats, environmental threats cannot be defined ideologically. Nor can they be resolved

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55. Lock, op. cit.
56. Alexander S. Ousadchenko, 'Implementing the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms: Environment Problems', in Gleditsch (ed.), op. cit.

through conventional competition for power and supremacy. A more powerful state or arsenal is no added advantage. Domination will not bring salvation. In contrast to these long-standing ways of seeking military security, global ecological security can only be achieved through global co-operation; for that matter, achieving sustainable world peace and economic well-being also requires global co-operation in and common approaches to security.

Reconceptualizing sovereignty

Ecological security also requires a reconceptualization of sovereignty. Sovereignty, as we know it, deals with the question of who has ultimate authority. The question has been answered differently in different time periods and societies with different philosophies and world-views. For modern societies, the ultimate authority in internal relations has variously been the monarchy, the people (popular sovereignty), the constitution, the law, parliament, parliamentary and judicial institutions or shifting pluralist groups. In external (inter-state) relations, each state generally has upheld its right to be the final arbiter of decisions and rules affecting its territories.

When it comes to ecological security, all these philosophies are limited by their homocentrism and by their narrow political definitions of territory. Ecological security requires a vision of sovereignty with a larger frame of reference than humans alone or their political boundaries.

We need to re-examine our concepts of sovereignty in light of new understandings of the Earth as a total, living system with interactive bio-regions. Current concepts of national sovereignty evolved at a time when many people still believed the Earth was flat and finished, functioning like a machine with predetermined, separable parts. If the world were flat and its parts separable, it might be possible to prevent environmental threats from penetrating one's political territory, but the world is round; it curves back on itself and rotates and revolves. It is an open, living, evolving system comprised of interactive subsystems, interactive species and complex, dynamic and interactive processes.

The Earth does not recognize sovereignty as we now know it. The Earth has its own sovereignty and is governed by its own laws. Even the sovereignty of the Earth is not absolute but is subject to larger cosmic laws and forces. Humans are only now beginning to understand these laws which we did not make but

which govern all human as well as non-human existence and to which all human sovereignties owe allegiance. The Earth is like a single cell in the universe, and we are not over this system but part of it. We will live or die as this single cell lives or dies.

Unlike human sovereignties, which are politically divisible, the sovereignty of the Earth is indivisible. None of the Earth's bio-regions are totally self-sustaining or sovereign. We all – past, present and future generations – breathe from one air system and drink from one water system. Like air and water, birds and animals cross political boundaries. Fish respect no exclusive economic zones or sovereign fishing rights. What then does national sovereignty mean relative to ecological security? Who owns the rain forests? Who owns the ozone layer? Who has authority over climate? Who speaks for Earth?

No modern philosophy of sovereignty provides an adequate answer to such questions. National sovereignty, a postulate as old as the nation-state, was enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the international agreements and structures which have evolved since. The banner of national sovereignty may well be unfurled to delegitimize military aggression of one state against another and to thwart some environmental threats such as unwanted toxic dumping in one's political territory, but claims of national sovereignty offer little immunity or protection against other transboundary threats such as ozone depletion, global warming or acid rain, which originate from policies and activities in other countries.

One way of reconceptualizing sovereignty is to see it as shared responsibility for the state of the Earth and its human communities. This does not mean a total abandonment of the principle of national sovereignty as we now know it. Rather it involves some sharing or pooling of sovereignty in international structures, so that we can be more effective in resolving transboundary issues. The nation-state may remain the major structure through which to resolve some issues, but the nation-state is too big for some problems that can better be resolved locally and it is too small for other problems that are beyond the ability of a single nation-state to resolve.

In an increasingly interdependent world, with increasing global-scale problems, the question is not whether we need some form of governance at the global level but, rather, how much? How much authority to deal with ecological and other threats should be retained in the private sector and how much delegated to

the public sector? Among public sectors, how much authority should be delegated to local, national and regional levels and how much to the global level?

In answering these questions, my own preference is to be guided by the principle of subsidiarity. Simply stated, whatever can be managed at the local level should be. Only when a problem exceeds the competence of local structures should it be taken to larger ones. However, effective polities and legal and institutional systems must be in place at all the appropriate levels where decisions and action may need to be taken.

This is the precise point of weakness in the existing international system. While local and national polities are comparatively well developed, regional and global systems are still at an early, immature stage of development and, with some modest exceptions, are not yet sufficiently effective in dealing with the transboundary aspects of many crises, including ecological crises.

The end of the Cold War provides a window of opportunity to reconceptualize security and sovereignty and to overcome this global structural lag. Ideological face-offs in the Cold War obstructed serious international discussion of practical questions related to the development of more effective global systems. Such constraints are now greatly diminished. Questions of regional and global governance are now moving higher on political agendas than at any time since the founding of the United Nations at the end of the Second World War.

An emerging global public policy

There has been some progress in this direction. In the last half century, there have been beginnings in global-level policy development on a wide spectrum of issues. They include common-use areas such as Antarctica, oceans, outer space and climate; economic issues such as agricultural development, capital flows, economic development, energy, industrialization, trade, transnational corporations and transportation; and issues of the environment and natural resources (elaborated on below). They also include information and knowledge issues such as communications, information sharing, intellectual property, mass media, science and technology; political issues such as decolonization, disarmament and arms control, peaceful settlement of disputes, territorial integrity and political autonomy; and social issues such as ageing, children, crime prevention, consumer protection, disaster relief and prevention, education, employment,

food, health, housing and human settlements, human rights, migration, population, refugees and women.[57]

However, there is still a long way to go in the development of effective global policy and institutions. An evaluation of progress and limitations in the area of environment and natural resources provides some insight into the overall lag in global policy and institutional development. Currently, there are about 150 multilateral treaties on the environment and natural resources.[58] All but three were negotiated after 1945 and the majority in the last twenty-five years, showing a trend of increasing attention to environmental issues in international relations. Nevertheless, in the same time period, despite progress in some countries, worldwide environmental conditions have worsened.

A closer look at existing international environmental treaties shows why. Most are inadequate. They have been too little, too late. They have been reactive rather than preventive, covering toxics and pollutants only after extensive damage had already been done, or they are full of loopholes, or are ratified by only a few countries, and not necessarily those who have greatest responsibility for the harm. Dangerous substances banned in some countries are still produced or used by other countries not parties to the agreement and find their way around the world in air, water and food. Even when ratified by significant numbers of countries, most treaties are very weak or totally lacking in compliance measures. There are no effective means to prevent transboundary harm, or to hold violators accountable to the world community.

Attachment to national sovereignty has been a major obstacle in negotiating more effective international agreements and systems. Although many national governments now recognize the need for global co-operation and systems (or they wouldn't be at international negotiating tables), they have been reluctant to delegate sufficient sovereignty to the international systems to make them effective. The result has been continual frustration and international

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57. Robert Manley, *Forty-eight Global Level Issue Areas: A Survey of Policy Development, 1945–1977,* pp. 20–56, New York, Global Education Associates, 1979. (The Whole Earth Papers, No. 12.)
58. United Nations Environment Programme. See also the list of the treaties in *Breakthrough,* Summer/Fall, 1989, pp. 18–19. (A publication of Global Education Associates, New York.)

agreements and systems so compromised and ambivalent that they lack the authority and means to protect the very sovereignty nations profess to possess.

UNCED: gained and missed opportunities

This syndrome was operative at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. Held twenty years after the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972), UNCED was aimed at overcoming some of the deficiencies in international environmental protection. In his opening address, Maurice Strong (Secretary-General for both UNCED and the Stockholm meeting) reported that 'despite significant progress made since 1972 in many areas, the hopes ignited at Stockholm remain largely unfulfilled', and that many environmental problems have become even more 'immediate and acute'.[59]

UNCED was the first world conference in the post-Cold War era and the most universal conference in history. Representatives of 178 governments participated in negotiations and 118 heads of government or state participated in the related Earth Summit. More than 7,000 representatives of media and press covered the proceedings, more than at any past world conference, and an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 representatives of independent and non-governmental organizations participated in parallel conferences and/or were official observers at the inter-governmental proceedings, more than for any previous world conference.[60]

UNCED, and the processes leading up to it, did accomplish some things. Prior to it and the efforts of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), the agendas for economic development and the environment had been pursued along two separate and often conflicting paths. UNCED dared to bring them together, addressing a central question of our times: how can economic growth or alternative models, on the scale needed to meet the basic needs of present and future generations, be advanced in ways which are both environmentally sustainable and economically more equitable. Although not everyone accepts the answers proffered by governments in Rio, many more

59. Strong, op. cit.
60. Ibid.; also United Nations Department of Public Information, UNCED Briefings, June 1992.

people now understand that ecological sustainability and economic well-being are interlocked.

Five international agreements were negotiated in the UNCED process: the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Statement on Forest Principles, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity and Agenda 21, a comprehensive plan of action for the twenty-first century covering 115 programme areas related to environment and development. All were steps forward but most were substantially watered down in the negotiating process and fell far short of what is needed.

Again, states were reluctant to delegate or share sovereignty. Also behind the watering-down were contentious issues over which agreement could not be reached except by compromise, if at all. During the Cold War, negotiating divisions had fallen primarily along an East–West axis, with the non-aligned, Group 77, or 'Third World' countries caught between. In Rio, with the Cold War over, they fell primarily along a North–South axis. There was finger-pointing in both directions.

However, on a number of issues there were subtle and not-so-subtle power struggles and shifting alliances which did not fall along easy North–South divisions. Some oil-producing countries aligned with the United States to water down measures to limit CO_2 emissions. Low-lying island countries fought for stronger curbs on greenhouse gases than many other members of the G77. Sometimes one environmental issue was used as a bargaining chip against another. Some African negotiators, who felt miffed that desertification in their countries was given short shrift at UNCED, threatened European negotiators that they would not sign a forest agreement unless they got a pledge of support for a special world conference on desertification. Some indigenous groups aligned with the United States in opposing measures in the biodiversity convention related to state sovereignty over patent rights and biotechnology produced from materials found in the tropical rain forests. Both indigenous groups and the United States argued against state sovereignty but parted ways on where the locus of sovereignty should be. Indigenous forest-dwellers argued that intellectual property rights should accrue to the local communities. The United States argued for the rights of scientists and companies which did the biotechnological research and development of new applications.

And so it went. In the pursuit of narrow, national and sectoral interests, negotiators often pitted one part of the planet against another, one environmental issue against another and environmental and economic issues against each other. As a result, there were many missed opportunities in Rio. What was to have been a legally binding convention on sustainable management of forests became instead a non-binding statement on forest principles and even that barely made it through the negotiations. What some originally hoped would be a legally binding Earth Charter was diluted instead to a non-binding Rio Declaration. The result of protracted and difficult negotiations which almost didn't make it through the fourth session of the UNCED Preparatory Committee, the Rio Declaration is a compromise between industrialized countries, which wanted a reaffirmation of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and emphasis on environmental concerns, and the Group 77 (now grown to 128) developing countries which wanted, among other things, more emphasis on their sovereign right to development and on the need for new financing and technology transfers which would enable them to take a more ecologically sustainable route to development. The conventions on climate change and biodiversity, though legally binding, were also greatly compromised and weakened.

Also troubling was the failure of governments in Rio to deal adequately with the effects of militarism on ecological and economic security. The militarily powerful countries effectively blocked any but the most bland references to the negative impact of militarism, arguing that UNCED was not an appropriate forum. Clearly more effort is needed to show the integral relationships between ecological and economic security and world peace and disarmament. Thus there is still a long way to go on the road from Rio toward global ecological security. It is still too soon to tell how effective the new Commission on Sustainable Development which came out of UNCED will be. It appears to be a modest step forward, but far from adequate to redress major ecological threats.

The fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations: 1995 toward 2045

The fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations in 1995 provides an opportunity and focal point for subsequent strategies and steps to safeguard the Earth and future generations. Many conferences and events will be held around the world.

It will be a time to look back and assess the past fifty years in the evolution of the United Nations system, but it can also be an occasion to look forward to the next fifty years. It can be a time to face up to the transboundary nature of today's crisis of growth and the ethical and systemic lag which has left us without adequate means to advance a peaceful, economically just and ecologically sustainable future. It can be the occasion for worldwide discussion on ways to strengthen international systems better to serve the Earth and humanity in the next century. Among other things, the United Nations Charter should be reviewed with an eye to correcting existing inadequacies.

The fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations would also be an opportune time to push again for negotiation and adoption of an Earth Charter. This was proposed by Maurice Strong at UNCED and endorsed by several heads of government. An Earth Charter could build on the Stockholm and Rio Declarations but should go beyond them. It should be legally binding and of comparable stature to the United Nations Charter. It could stand on its own as a complement to the existing United Nations Charter or be absorbed as a section within an amended United Nations Charter.

Progress in the areas of peace (including strengthened systems of peace-building, peace-making and peace-keeping) and more just and equitable global economic and monetary systems (including reforms in GATT, the IMF and the World Bank) must be sought in parallel with ecological gains. The three areas – peace, economic well-being and ecological balance – need to proceed in tandem as inseparable parts of a global security triad.

This is not a time to lose hope or surrender to lethargy. Despite set-backs and limited results from past efforts, significant progress has been made in delineating the nature of the crises before us and our mutual self-interest in finding creative solutions. For better or worse, the environment will be an increasing force in international relations, affecting conflict or co-operation, war or peace and the demise or sustainability of human communities. We owe it to ourselves, to future generations and to the Earth to rise to the historic challenges before us and to forge a truly new world order, one in which the human community learns to live as responsible members of the larger community of life.

Environmental security

*Keith D. Suter**

INTRODUCTION

The concept of environmental security is becoming increasingly important during the 1990s. This article deals with the broadening of the concept of security to include environmental considerations.

The evolution of the concept of environmental security can be viewed, from the present vantage point, as proceeding along two complementary tracks. One track has been the scholarship associated with redefining the concept of national security. The second part of this article traces the broadening of this concept, which originated at the end of the Second World War, from purely military considerations to include economic considerations and now to include environmental considerations. The third part deals with the other complementary track: the relationship between the environment and armed conflict – from how the environment can be a victim of armed conflict to how it can benefit from peace. The fourth part deals with how this new definition of security can be implemented at the national level by the introduction of a new government department: a Ministry for Peace.

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TRADITIONAL 'NATIONAL SECURITY'

The national security state

Concern about 'national security' is as old as the nation-state. But in the contemporary United States context, in particular, it goes back to the closing stages of the Second World War:

Acheson spoke about the 'United States getting itself together'. By this, he meant that the country had to become organized for perpetual confrontation and for war. The unified pattern of attitudes, policies, and institutions by which this task was to be effected comprises what I call America's 'national security state'. It became, in fact, a 'state within a state'. The attitudes were derived from the two commanding ideas of American post-war foreign policy – anti-communism and a new doctrine of national security. The policies included containment, confrontation and intervention, the methods by which US leaders have sought to make the world safe for America. The institutions include those government bureaucracies and private organizations that serve in permanent war preparedness. These developments have helped to increase dramatically the power of the executive branch of the US Government, particularly the presidency. For the national security state required, as Charles Bohlen put it in 1948, 'a confidence in the Executive where you give human nature in effect a very large blank check'.

   And so the Second World War was succeeded not by the peace that Yalta had promised, but by a new conflict, the Cold War, an armed truce, precarious and dangerous – and still today, the central and defining fact of international life.[1]

In 1977, Daniel Yergin, in his book *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, gave details of two contrasting theories about the Soviet Union which struggled for control of United States policy. The first he called the 'Riga axioms', named after the Baltic port and capital of Latvia, where United States officials gathered information on the early Soviet Union and concluded that the Soviet Union was a menace to world peace. What broke this group's influence temporarily was the German invasion of the Soviet Union in

1.   Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, pp. 5–6, London, Penguin, 1977.

June 1941, following which the United Kingdom and the United States assisted in fighting the common enemy. The 'Yalta axioms' underpinned United States–USSR relations between 1941 and 1945, and assumed that the Soviet Union was a great power which behaved in a traditional fashion motivated not so much by ideology as by self-interest. The 'Riga axioms' school held sway for most of the post-1945 period:

American leaders who accepted the Riga axioms misinterpreted both the range and degree of the Soviet challenge and the character of Soviet objectives and so downplayed the possibilities for diplomacy and accommodation. It was the new doctrine of 'national security' that led them to believe that the USSR presented an immediate military threat to the United States. The doctrine, an expansive interpretation of American security needs, represented a major redefinition of America's relation to the rest of the world.

If American interests were in jeopardy everywhere in the world, the exercise of Soviet power anywhere outside Russian borders appeared ominous. Any form of compromise was therefore regarded as appeasement, already once tried and once failed.

The doctrine of national security also permitted America's post-war leaders to harmonize the conflicting demands of Wilsonianism and realpolitik – to be democratic idealists and pragmatic realists at the same time. So emboldened, American leaders pursued a global, often crusading, foreign policy, convinced that it was made urgent by something more earthy than the missionary impulse of Woodrow Wilson.[2]

Given United States predominance over much of the globe following the Second World War, its use of the concept of national security set the pattern for many other nations. The concept was one of the most durable themes of post-war international politics. It has meant that national security has been largely perceived in military terms.

Limitations to this approach

This approach to 'national security' had five main weaknesses. First, the United States had no way of securing itself against a Soviet attack on the United States

2. Ibid., pp. 12–13.

mainland. It could destroy the Soviet Union in retaliation and it could hope that the threat of retaliation would deter the Soviet Union from launching the attack in the first place, but it could not destroy the incoming missiles. This was the first time in world history that this paradox had arisen – owing to the explosive capacity and virtual invulnerability of nuclear missiles. By contrast, for instance, Hitler's Operation Sea-lion (the 1940 invasion of the United Kingdom) was stopped by the British RAF in the Battle of Britain, in which it had to shoot down only 10 per cent of the German aircraft to deny the Germans air superiority. During the Second World War, an estimated total of 3 million tons of TNT was used (including the two atomic bombs). The United States and Soviet Union had 176,000 million tons of TNT in their nuclear weapons – the equivalent of 4,000 Second World Wars. Each United States Trident submarine alone carried the equivalent of 5,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs in its nuclear missiles.[3] This new era of the nuclear explosive meant that traditional notions of 'national security' no longer applied.

Second, the United States (like all other nations) was vulnerable to low-intensity nuclear warfare. Clyde Burleson has recorded cases of stolen United States uranium, attempted assaults on nuclear power plants and various nuclear accidents.[4] Guerrilla groups may be able to obtain nuclear devices in the future. Additionally, they may be able to gain access to chemical or biological weapons. Indeed, the list seems almost endless. As nations become more economically advanced so they become more vulnerable to disruption. A modern city has, for example, centralized water, electricity and gas delivery systems. A century or so ago each householder was more self-sufficient. Nowadays an individual or a small group can disrupt an entire city by poisoning the water supply or cutting off electricity or gas supplies.

Third, in a military sense, national security is not part of the solution, it is part of the problem. The central arms race was governed partly by an action-reaction phenomenon, with each superpower responding to the other. But,

3.   Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures: 1983*, p. 18, Washington, D.C., World Priorities, 1983.
4.   Clyde W. Burleson, *The Day the Bomb Fell: True Stories of the Nuclear Age*, London, Sphere, 1980.

given the lead time in producing weapon systems, each superpower estimated where it thought the other would be in a future fixed period and developed its own weapons to match the anticipated weapons of the other superpower. Those officials wanting to acquire more weapons assumed the worst possible figure of the other superpower so as to ensure the maximum number for their own side. This phenomenon may be seen, for example, in the 1960 'missile gap' allegations. Former United States Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recalled early in 1982 the following conversation:

Scheer: 'One of the arguments that is made by the [Reagan] Administration is that the Soviets are engaged in – I forget the exact words – the most unrelenting, massive military build-up, in both conventional and strategic weapons, and that we now have to counter that.'

McNamara: 'I don't want to get in an argument with the Administration; I just want to state what I believe is a fact, which is that we overstate the Soviets' force and we understate ours, and we therefore greatly overstate the imbalance. This is not something that is new, it has been going on for years.'

Scheer: 'Did it go on while you were Secretary of Defense?'

McNamara: 'Of course it did. I tried to correct it; I frequently made statements correcting it, but because it appears to serve the interests of some to consciously or unconsciously overstate the Soviet strength and understate ours, that frequently occurs.'

Scheer: 'Who are the "some"?'

McNamara: 'Well, particular elements of our society that feel their programmes are benefited by that. The missile gap of 1960 was a function of forces within the Defense Department that, perhaps unconsciously, were trying to support their particular programme, in that case, and expansion of US missile production, by overstating the Soviet force. I don't want to state that they were consciously mis-stating the facts, but there is an unconscious bias in all of us. In any case, it was a total misreading of the information, and by early 1961 all who had examined the evidence concluded that there was no missile gap, despite the fact that in the latter part of 1960 it was a rather common belief.'[5]

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5.   Robert Scheer, *With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War*, pp. 214–15, New York, Random House, 1982.

The 'missile gap' controversy is important not only as the most famous of such 'gaps' but also because 1961 could have been a time of delaying the arms race, rather than accelerating it:

In early 1961 some of the White House people like Science Adviser Jerome Wiesner and Carl Kaysen of the National Security Council were trying to slow down the arms race, or at least were in favour of a good deal more talking with the Soviets before speeding ahead. At that point the United States had 450 missiles; McNamara was asking for 950, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asking for 3,000. The White House people had quietly checked around and found that in effectiveness, in sheer military terms, the 450 were the same as McNamara's 950. Thus a rare moment existed, a chance to make a new start, if not turn around the arms race, at least to give it a temporary freeze.

'What about it, Bob?' Kennedy asked.

'Well, they're right,' McNamara answered.

'Well, then, why the nine hundred and fifty, Bob?' Kennedy asked.

'Because that's the smallest number we can take up on the [Capitol] Hill [the United States Congress] without getting murdered,' he answered.

Perhaps, thought one of the White House aides, by holding back we might have slowed the cycle rather than accelerated it. But in 1961 the advocates of disarmament encountered an Administration which considered the issue a little peripheral, not something that could be taken up immediately, something that would have to wait.[6]

Fourth, the fixation with a military definition of 'national security' turns attention from the non-military threats to 'national security'. Two examples will illustrate this. There are implications for national security arising out of Third World debts. Ironically, the debts total an amount equal to about one year's total world military expenditure. Nevertheless, considerable attention is paid to the debts and far less to military expenditure. The international financial system, whose main centre is in the United States, could be in severe trouble if there were a 'debtors' OPEC' which refused to pay:

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6.   David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*, p. 91, London, Pan, 1973.

Even more probable and certainly more imminent is the threat of a nervous breakdown in the fatefully inter-connected world economy. Whatever it is triggered by (just now a cascade of defaulting debtors, perhaps induced by some sort of 'debtors OPEC', seems a likely trigger), the scenario is all too readily imaginable: financial panic . . . the ungluing of alliances in the face of epidemic global inflation and unemployment . . . a hardening North–South confrontation . . . and a paralysis of will immobilizing the world's centres of affluence.[7]

There are also the implications for all nations arising out of the world's growing economic interdependence. The United States is now part of that interdependence:

Co-operative development and approach are essential for collective global economic and social betterment because of the way in which total human interests and endeavours are now intricately and irrevocably enmeshed. Economies and individuals are now hopelessly dependent upon one another. 'No man is an Island,' Donne said. Similarly no country can any longer claim to be an island.

    The United States used to be one of the most self-sufficient countries. This situation is now very different. About 20 per cent of industrial US output is now exported. So is 40 per cent of its farm products. Some 30 per cent of all its exports by value have the developing countries as their final destination. About 28 per cent of all US imports come from developing countries. A significant proportion of US energy needs is now imported. US commercial banks have accumulated billions of dollars in claims upon debtors in developing industrial as well as oil-exporting countries. Direct US investments have created jobs and wealth in Europe, Asia, Canada and Latin America, so economic performance outside of the United States now has a direct and major impact in the economy of that country.[8]

Fifth, the narrow definition of national security meant that the United States had a narrow perception of world affairs. This is illustrated by the following

7.   Harlan Cleveland, 'Defining Security: A Sober Threat Analysis', *The Interdependent* (New York), November 1983, p. 7.
8.   S. Siawatibu, *The Prospects for Co-operative Development*, p. 11, Canberra, AIIA, 1983. (Paper given at the 50th Anniversary Conference of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.)

incident in June 1969 involving Henry Kissinger (President Nixon's National Security Adviser) and the Chilean Foreign Minister of that time:

Valdes recalls his impromptu talk as 'the most difficult time in my life'. He had come to the White House with the other Latin American officials knowing that the State Department had lobbied against his visit. At one point in his Oval Office talk, Valdes says, he told Nixon that Latin America was sending back 3.8 dollars for every dollar in American aid. When Nixon interrupted to challenge the statistic, Valdes retorted that the number had come from a study prepared by a major American Bank. 'As I delivered my speech', Valdes says, 'Kissinger was looking at me as if I were a strange animal'. The next afternoon Kissinger asked for a private lunch with Valdes in the Chilean Embassy. The meeting was unpleasant. As Valdes describes it, Kissinger began by declaring, 'Mr Minister, you made a strange speech. You come here speaking of Latin America, but this is not important. Nothing important can come from the South. History has never been produced in the South. The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo. What happens in the South is of no importance. You're wasting your time'.

   'I said', Valdes recalls, 'Mr Kissinger, you know nothing of the South'. 'No', Kissinger answered, 'and I don't care'.[9]

Kissinger's perception of the world meant that he was unprepared for crises in which the Soviet Union had no direct involvement, such as the 1973 OPEC oil price increase and the 1974–75 debate over a new international economic order. He also overestimated the role the USSR could play in ending the Viet Nam War.

   From as early as the 1960s, this narrow definition of national security was under criticism. This trend began, ironically, back in 1961 with a speech by one of the most distinguished former soldiers in United States history: Dwight Eisenhower.

Redefining national security

The military-based concept of national security has been subject to various criticisms. There is space here for only three: President Eisenhower's warnings about the military-industrial complex, the United Nations inquiries into the

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9.   Seymour M. Hersh, *Kissinger: The Price of Power*, p. 263, London, Faber, 1983.

economic and social costs of the arms race and disarmament, and non-governmental suggestions for a broader definition of national security.

The military-industrial complex

At the end of the Second World War in 1945, demobilization took place, though not necessarily back to pre-war levels. The enemies changed; Japan and most of Germany became allies of the United States. The tensions remained; fears of war remained. Equally significantly, the military establishment did not disappear.

The growth of the military since the Second World War poses a fundamental dilemma for democratic government. On the one hand, the weaponry of modern warfare can be employed with such awesome efficiency that no nation can defend itself from a surprise attack without a substantial armed force at the ready. Consequently, governments have been obliged to devote massive amounts of manpower, treasure, and scientific research to military defence. On the other hand, devoting so many resources to the armed forces inevitably increases the danger that the military elite, not the people or their representatives, will ultimately determine the choices made in crucial areas of public policy.[10]

President Eisenhower (1953–61) had seen at first hand the revolution in warfare by which, in only a few decades, the United States Army had grown from being smaller than that of pre-war Greece to becoming the most powerful in the world. He was obviously not opposed to defence forces but he did question the continued high level of military preparedness.

On 17 January 1961, in his farewell address, President Eisenhower cautioned his fellow Americans to beware of the danger to freedom from the 'military-industrial complex':

. . . this conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

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10.   Michael Margolis, *Viable Democracy*, p. 134, London, Penguin, 1979.

In the councils of Government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defence with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.[11]

The speech received a favourable press reaction. Speaking the next day at his final presidential press conference, he replied to questions about how to deal with the military-industrial complex:

Eisenhower said every citizen should keep well informed, because 'it is only a citizenry, an alert and informed citizenry which can keep these abuses from coming about'. He added that the potential abuses of power and influence by the arms makers could come about 'unwittingly, but just by the very nature of the thing'. Every magazine you picked up had an advertisement of a Titan missile or an Atlas or what have you, which represented 'almost an insidious penetration of our own minds that the only thing this country is engaged in is weaponry and missiles. And, I'll tell you we just can't afford to do that'.[12]

It is worth emphasizing that the United States had no monopoly over this type of 'complex'. In examining the inefficient use of military expenditure, Senator William Proxmire noted:

If I may digress a moment, the military tends to act alike the world over. The activity of generals is not without its wry humour. When the Soviet defense budget was reduced in 1965, the Soviet military leaders, like their counterparts in this country, conducted what was, in effect, a lobbying campaign against the cut. They lacked the profusion of mass media, the imaginative use of advertising that is a feature of our own lobbying campaigns, and the vast network of public relations

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11. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 'Liberty is at Stake: Farewell Address', reprinted in Jacob K. Javits et al., *The Defence Sector and the American Economy*, pp. 93–100, New York, University Press, 1968.
12. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, pp. 613–14, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1984.

specialists found in the Pentagon. Consequently, they confined themselves to the columns of *Red Star,* the official journal of the Soviet armed forces. But the burden of their argument had a familiar ring. The military budget could not be cut. The country should err only on the side of more defense. Change the typeface and the reports of their remarks could be substituted for testimony before the Armed Services Committees or an editorial in one of the American military journals.[13]

United Nations research

The United Nations has for several years claimed that military expenditure overall was harmful to an economy and that there are economic arguments in favour of disarmament. Not all economists, however, have shared that view and the approach of the United Nations has, by implication, been criticized by economists of various political persuasions. However, in recent years, the point of view of the United Nations has gained additional support.[14]

The United Nations General Assembly decided in 1960 (Resolution 1516 (XV)) to establish a group of experts to study the economic and social consequences of disarmament. *The Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament* (United Nations Sales Publication No. 62 IX. 1) was published in 1961. Its authors were, in effect, representatives drawn from each of the three major economic and political systems of the time: USSR, Sudan, United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Poland, United States, Venezuela, France and Czechoslovakia. The study began by examining the resources devoted to military purposes: 85 per cent of the total outlays arose from seven nations: Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, China, USSR, United Kingdom and the United States. The great bulk of the resources released by disarmament would, therefore, be concentrated in a very few nations.

On the peaceful use of resources released by disarmament, it did not provide a shopping list of where the resources could be used or an alternative programme. It tried to highlight generally some areas where the resources could be

13. William Proxmire, *Report from the Wasteland: America's Military-Industrial Complex,* p. 190, New York, Praeger, 1970.
14. This is examined in more detail in Keith Suter, *Peacemaking: The United Nations and Disarmament,* Sydney, United Nations Association, 1985.

used, such as: raising standards of personal consumption of goods and services; expanding or modernizing productive capacity through investment in new plant and equipment; promoting housing construction, urban renewal (including slum clearance) and rural development; improving and expanding facilities for education, health, welfare, social security, cultural development and scientific research.

Subsequently there was an examination of the impact of disarmament on national production and employment. The problem of conversion of military resources to civilian uses in 1962 would result in a smaller programme than that required after the Second World War. Consequently, the study dealt with that conversion programme and noted its consequences, all the more so since, at that time, military expenditure and force levels were four times higher than at the beginning of the 1960s.

In the context of the structural problems of conversion, the study did not underestimate the extent of the problems involved but stated that these could be resolved by appropriate government planning, especially in respect to the adaptation of skills to peacetime requirements, the provision of assistance to particular enterprises which had catered previously for military programmes and the reorientation of research and development programmes. On the impact of disarmament on international economic relations, it concluded that disarmament was bound to have favourable effects on such relations, such as the relaxation of political tensions reducing the political obstacles to international trade, as well as providing increased foreign aid, which would then be spent on importing more goods and services. Since some nations regard certain domestic industries as important for national security, they have assisted them through discriminatory and protectionist policies. If there were a relaxation in political tensions, there would then be less incentive to have such policies.

As regards the efforts of disarmament on the volume and framework of aid for economic development, the study recorded the potential assistance (both in aid and personnel) which could become available as a result of disarmament. It recalled, however, that foreign aid can play only a supplementary role in economic development and so, in effect, foreign aid is not a panacea. The study did not state how a mechanism could be developed to ensure that cuts in military expenditure are translated partly into foreign aid.

In regard to some of the social consequences of disarmament, reduced military expenditure could give rise to increased social welfare benefits. People would no longer be haunted by the threat of war. A reduction in political tensions could facilitate international co-operation in scientific research, the arts and cultural contacts. The study's last paragraph (para. 195) concluded:

The Consultative Group is unanimously of the opinion that all the problems and difficulties of transition connected with disarmament could be met by appropriate national and international measures. There should thus be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries and lead to the improvement of world economic and social conditions. The achievement of general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing to all mankind.

The report was examined by the 1962 United Nations General Assembly, which endorsed the unanimous conclusion of the consultative group of experts that the implementation of general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing for all mankind (Resolution 1837 (XVII)).

On 22 May 1970, United Nations Secretary-General U Thant, in a statement entitled 'Politics of Disarmament', proposed that a study be undertaken of the economic and social consequences of the arms race. He hoped that such a study would help publicize the extent of military expenditures and the effects such expenditures were having in diverting resources away from peaceful purposes, and would help to create a fuller understanding of the needs and the possibilities for reordering world priorities during the 1970s.[15]

The 1970s, as far as the United Nations agenda was concerned, were characterized as the decade of 'mega-conferences', starting with Stockholm in 1972 on the human environment, going through food (1974), population (1974), unemployment (1974), women (1975) and science and technology (1979). There was also a revival of using United Nations General Assembly Special Sessions in the mid 1970s for the new international economic order. Although in 1970 U Thant could not foresee all the diplomatic gatherings

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15. *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures*, pp. v–vi, New York, United Nations, 1972.

planned for the decade, he was well aware that disarmament did not figure on the list of new priorities in the limelight. Like most economists, governments regarded the arms race as a fixed fact of international life and so directed their attention to what were seen as more alterable features of international life. U Thant hoped to place the arms race higher on the international political agenda by examining what a waste of money it was.

The 1970 United Nations General Assembly considered his proposal and it requested him to appoint a group of experts to report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures (Resolution 2667 (XXV)). Fifteen experts were appointed, representing all the world's main political and economic systems. Their report, entitled 'Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures', was adopted unanimously. It was then considered by the 1971 United Nations General Assembly, which 'welcomes [it] with satisfaction' (Resolution 2831 (XXVI)). On the qualitative aspects of the arms race, it said that 'while the cost of the arms race in terms of the resources which it consumes is highly alarming, the mounting sophistication and destructiveness of the weapons which result from it are even more so' (para. 22).

In terms of resources, military expenditures were then running at two-and-a-half times what governments were spending on education and thirty times more than the total of all official foreign aid. Military expenditure equalled the combined GNP of developing countries in South Asia, the Far East and Africa (with a population of 1,300 million) (para. 24). Eighty per cent of military expenditure came from six nations (out of the then total of 120): United States, USSR, China, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany (para. 30).

As to the dynamics of military research and development, the arms race should be seen as a technological race, with the achievements of one side spurring on the other to improve the technological advances which it might have made itself (para. 43). Before a new weapon is completed, the military designer is already designing a more effective model, for obsolescence had also become a characteristic of the arms race (para. 44). Since the military want to employ the best scientists, their bidding for them can have an inflationary effect in the scientific market (para. 47). The arms race 'is incompatible with normal economic and social development' (para. 52).

On the national consequences of the arms race, military expenditure means that that sum of money cannot be spent on health, education or welfare programmes (para. 56). Military expenditure hinders economic growth because that money is not being spent on capital assets (paras. 59–64). Developing countries which do not have domestic weapon manufacturers divert potential investment capital into buying weapons from overseas (para. 65). Private consumption is in direct competition with military expenditure and so money which could be used to increase standards of living is going into military expenditure (para. 72). The report endorsed the findings of the 1962 report that no major economic and social instability need result from disarmament (para. 77).

As for the international consequences of the arms race, in terms of the foreign aid goals set by the United Nations General Assembly (Resolution 2626 (XXV)), it would take only a 5 per cent shift of military expenditure to development to meet those goals (paras. 106–9).

The report concluded unanimously: (a) a substantial reduction in the military expenditures of all nations should be brought about as soon as possible; (b) regardless of their size or their stage of development, all nations share the responsibility of taking steps to achieve this goal; (c) a halt in the arms race would help the economic and social development of all nations; (d) in order to draw the attention of governments and public opinion to the direction the arms race is taking, the United Nations Secretary-General should keep the facts under periodic review (para. 120).

An air of unreality surrounds this report. First, groups of experts are appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General in consultation with governments. The experts (at least from Western nations) tend to serve in their personal capacities, but it is rare for any expert to be appointed if he or she is opposed to the government's thinking on the matter under investigation. This is why the experts are selected to represent a wide range of political and economic systems. No individual can represent a political and economic system but individuals can be representative of governmental thinking on an issue, and therefore the United Nations Secretary-General ensures that, in effect, all the main United Nations Member States are invited to suggest names of possible people. Consequently, the report was prepared on the basis of at least some

general indications of what governments would find acceptable for their experts to state. The experts recalled the 1962 United Nations report and went on to identify themselves with the urgency of the topic:

We have been asked to approach the same general problem from the point of view of the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures. We do so with a sense of urgency, in the recognition that until a halt is put to the race, there can be no assurance of international peace and the threat of war, and particularly of nuclear war, will continue to plague the world.

But nothing done by most governments would indicate that they subsequently heeded the words of their experts.

Second, the 1972 report was clear about the economic advantages to flow from cutting back on the arms race. And yet this inducement to accelerate the disarmament negotiations was ignored. One explanation for this air of unreality is simply that governments were wedded to the belief that they had to possess defence forces irrespective of the costs. Consequently, while acknowledging the economic disadvantages of the arms race, they felt obliged to disregard the views of their own experts since national security had to come first. Second, defence establishments are seen as a fixed part of political life. The United Nations report, like its other related reports, then sank without trace into a mire of governmental apathy.

A third explanation is 'incrementalism', a term political scientists use to describe decision-making.[16] Decisions are made on the basis of one increment being added to others and so proceeding slowly. This precludes major changes of policy (short of a national emergency, like the Second World War). The United Nations report would have required too many changes; politicians and civil servants are not in that business.

To sum up, the United Nations largely pioneered post-1945 concern about the economic and social consequences of the arms race, but its work was a voice in the wilderness. Even most of the economics profession took little interest in this subject.

16. For example, Charles E. Lindblom and David Braybrooke, *Strategies of Decision*, New York, Free Press, 1963.

Another decade led to another United Nations report: the 1981 United Nations Secretary-General's report on disarmament and development (often called the Thorsson Report, after Mrs Inga Thorsson, the group's chairperson).[17]

'Development' is said to relate not only to Third World aspirations (the focus of the previous United Nations development–disarmament reports) but also to the range of relationships between the prospects for balanced and sustainable global economic and social development, on the one hand, and disarmament on the other, through the reallocation of real resources. The relationship is a complex and multidimensional one and the group's analysis aims to improve understanding of it as a basis for the formulation of practical aims (para. 21). One old problem remains: a lack of 'data for most countries, including some which have very significant military expenditures . . . ' (para. 26).

On the framework and scope of the relationship between disarmament and development, the group warns: 'Mankind is at present facing the greatest challenge of the century. The level and speed of the arms race are bound to increase the danger of war. The outbreak of a nuclear war would jeopardize the very existence of all mankind. During this decade peoples will be confronted with new technological, economic and social challenges that will be made far more complex if the arms race continues unabated' (para. 31). Meanwhile, despite the previous United Nations studies on disarmament and development, little progress has been made in reordering global priorities. 'One can only conclude, therefore, that, regrettably, this broadly moral and logical argument for encouraging disarmament for the sake of development has not in itself been sufficiently compelling to outweigh the concern with military security, that is concern about the use or threat of use of force in disregard of the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations' (para. 40).

The report then goes on to develop two important points. First, if 'security' is so important to nations, the starting area for the examination has therefore to be a move away from the standard linear disarmament–development relationship to the triangular disarmament–development–security one. However, 'security' is a wider concept than that of military security alone; it has

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17. *Development and International Economic Co-operation: Study on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.* (United Nations Doc. A/36/356, 5 October 1981.)

economic and social dimensions (para. 43). Thus, it is necessary for governments to recognize the extent of non-military challenges to security, such as energy, food, ecological stresses, the large and widening gap in material standards of living (paras. 60–75).

Second, there has to be a new approach to contemporary international economic, social and political problems: 'the co-operative management of interdependence' (para. 90). In presenting her report to the 1981 General Assembly, Mrs Thorsson commented:

The appalling poverty, the destruction of the environment, the accelerating arms race and the resulting global economic malaise are largely problems of our own making. Yet the Group was convinced that it is well within our collective capabilities, and within the Earth's capacity, to provide the basic needs for the world's entire population, and to make progress towards a more equitable economic order, at a pace politically acceptable to all. In this respect the arms race is incompatible with the objectives of a new international economic order. Of course, economic growth is possible even with a continuing arms race, but it would be relatively slow and very unevenly distributed both among and within regions of the world. Co-operative interdependent management can be in the economic and security interests of all states. But it is quite improbable if the arms race continues.[18]

The fifth chapter of the report deals with conversion and redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development purposes. Conversion is probably the most important word in the 1981 United Nations report. It represents one of the main stumbling blocks on the way to disarmament, since many people continue to believe that the arms race is necessary to help the economy and to keep people employed.

I would like to make four points in this context. First, conversion of military facilities to civilian uses is not the only form of conversion. Conversion is taking place every day throughout every national economy as, for example, a mine is closed, a factory is opened or a farm is closed. It could be argued, of course, that

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18.   Inga Thorsson, 'The Arms Race and Development: A Competitive Relationship', *Development* (Rome), No. 1, 1982, p. 13.

even civilian conversion is not handled very well, such as the introduction of microprocessor technology. However, there is nothing intrinsically different about the conversion of military facilities to civilian uses: a comparative process already goes on in civilian economic life on a daily basis, with some economic activities finishing and others beginning. Indeed, military conversion should probably be easier because it will be centrally controlled, whereas so many economic activities are those of private concerns.

Second, many military facilities can be made available immediately for civilian uses. To quote the example of United States military expenditure, only about 20 per cent is spent specifically on nuclear weapons, the remaining 80 per cent goes on the conventional forces in the army, air force and navy. Of that 80 per cent, the majority is spent on the 'tail' rather than the 'teeth' (that is, the persons who actually do the fighting). The tail components comprise doctors, teachers, administration, etc. The Pentagon is one of the biggest landlords and providers of medical services and food in the United States. Many of these facilities could be converted immediately to civilian use. Naturally, the persons concerned would have to submit to a number of changes, such as a revision of salary or not having to wear uniforms but, intrinsically, there is no difference between being a doctor on a United States base or in a Chicago slum, or between building homes on a United States military base as opposed to rebuilding the slums in New York, or undertaking engineering projects in the Third World.

Third, extensive conversion took place after the Second World War. Conversion continues to take place within defence establishments as old technology is replaced by new, such as the cavalry relying on motorized vehicles instead of horses. These experiences indicate that the military establishment can, in fact, absorb conversion.

Finally, even though there would be some military equipment for which no direct individual use for civilians exists, other uses can be found for some of the equipment. For example, none of us would have any direct need for the United States and Soviet spy satellites, but together with their related stations they could be of use to an international disarmament organization to ensure that all nations were following their disarmament obligations. Additionally, spy satellites could identify from the air new areas of potential resources, vessels in distress, bush fires, etc.

In short, there are no major obstacles to prevent the conversion of military facilities and personnel to civilian uses. Indeed, it is noteworthy that, as the report points out, in recent years there has been no official governmental study on conversion or on the response of the defence industry to military cutbacks.

The World Watch Institute
The World Watch Institute, based in Washington, D.C., has been among the non-governmental pioneers advocating a broader definition of national security. According to its director, Lester Brown:

Underlying this definition is the assumption that principal security threats come from other countries. Yet, the threats to security may now arise less from the relationship of nation to nation and more from the relationship of humanity to nature. For many countries, desert encroachment or soil erosion may do more to undermine national survival than invading armies could.

Even though rapid population growth can destroy a country's ecological system and social structure more effectively than a foreign adversary ever could, national government expenditures on population education and family planning fail to reflect this fact. Countries spend large sums on tanks and planes to defend their territorial sovereignty, but little or nothing to protect the topsoil on which their livelihood depends. National defence establishments are useless against these new threats. Neither bloated military budgets nor highly sophisticated weapons systems can halt the deforestation or solve the firewood crises now affecting so many Third World countries.

The erosion of soils, the deterioration of the earth's basic biological systems, and the depletion of oil reserves now threaten the security of countries everywhere. Ecological stresses and resource scarcities have already given rise to economic stresses – inflation, unemployment, capital scarcity, and monetary instability. Ultimately, these economic stresses will translate into social unrest and political instability.

Regrettably, non-military threats to a nation's security are much less clearly defined than military ones. Because the processes that ultimately lead to the collapse of biological systems are gradual and cumulative, they are too seldom given much thought until they pass a critical threshold and disaster strikes. For this reason, it is easier for government councils of developing countries to justify

expenditures for the latest model jet fighters than for family planning, which could alleviate the population pressures that are leading to the deterioration of their croplands.[19]

In short, 'national security' should not be defined simply in terms of percentages of GNP going on defence, and armed forces alone cannot be seen as the sole guarantors of national security, since the threats to national security go beyond military ones. Brown provided a lesson from history. The Mayan people developed and expanded steadily over seventeen centuries in the lowlands of Guatemala in Central America. Doubling on the average every 408 years, the population had reached 5 million by A.D. 900, with a density comparable to that of the most agriculturally intensive societies of today. At this point of the highest level of Mayan civilization, agriculturally, culturally and architecturally, their world suddenly collapsed. Within decades the population fell to less than one-tenth of what it had been because of soil erosion. The Mayan people probably never grasped why their civilization collapsed. However armed the Mayans may have been, their downfall could never have been stopped by armies or accumulation of weapons.[20]

To sum up, the concept of national security was created at the end of the Second World War at a time of different international political tensions from today. It is now out of date, too narrow and too based on military considerations. A broader definition is now required.

THE ENVIRONMENT AND ARMED CONFLICT

Introduction

A new concept of 'environmental security' has also emerged from the relationship between the environment and armed conflict. This relationship has existed for thousands of years, but only recently has the relationship become acute enough to demand a fresh consideration of the two matters.

There are five aspects to this relationship. The first and second have roots going back millennia: the environment as a victim of armed conflict and as a

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19. Lester R. Brown, *Building a Sustainable Society*, p. 362, New York, Norton, 1981.
20. Ibid., pp. 3–4.

cause of armed conflict. A third and more recent development is the way in which environmental destruction may in itself become a cause of armed conflict. Another recent development has been the attempt to provide some international legal protection for the environment, both to prevent tampering with the environment for military gain and to protect it during an armed conflict. Finally, the environment would benefit from an outbreak of peace.

The environment as a victim of conflict

All armed conflicts have been fought between human beings, with human beings and the local environment as victims of the conflict. There is nothing new here, except that the application of modern technology to warfare has made the potential for actual destruction far greater than in previous centuries.

The environment becomes a victim in three ways. First, there is the preparation for armed conflict, such as the erection of fortifications and nuclear weapons testing. Ironically, as various European monuments attest, some fortifications have lasted longer than the rulers who erected them. Designed to withstand attack, they have been difficult to demolish, as is the case of France's Maginot Line. The contribution of nuclear testing, especially prior to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, was to scatter radioactive debris over an area well beyond the testing ground itself, especially via the atmosphere.

Second, virtually every armed conflict in history has resulted in environmental damage, such as the destruction of food stocks and the poisoning of water supplies. 'Scorched earth' policies are nothing new: classical Greek writers reported them over 2,000 years ago. The threat today comes from the increased possibilities for destroying the environment, especially via nuclear weapons in a Third World War.

Finally, there is the problem of cleaning up after a conflict. Battlefields themselves have remarkable regenerative capabilities, as is evident from France to the Urals, in their recovery from the First and Second World Wars. However, unexploded ordnance remains a danger well after any conflict. Some Second World War ordnance may yet explode. For example, USS *Montgomery,* an ammunition ship which ran ashore in 1944, lies in the mouth of the River Thames, United Kingdom. The authorities decided to leave the ammunition on board to rot but no one is willing to go on board to check. In September 1988,

Australian newspapers carried a story about the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific being still bedevilled by Second World War mines. Australian soldiers are now on a five-year mission to train local police on how to dispose of Second World War weapons and ammunition. Furthermore, the Afghanistan conflict has left many 'booby traps' scattered around the countryside. The environmental consequences of the Iraq conflict in January 1991 are difficult to assess but will be considerable.

Modern technology has made this problem even more complex. For example, some mines are made of plastic and cannot be tracked down by metal detectors, which, in any case, cannot distinguish a bomb or mine which failed to explode from the metal shreds of one that did. While discussing this problem in Viet Nam in 1974, I was also informed about the problem caused by chemical defoliants dropped to uncover combatants. They tended to kill the weaker vegetation while allowing the stronger species to proliferate as they were no longer in competition for nutrients. However, heavy vegetation has made detection of unexploded ordnance even more difficult. One way to dispose of unexploded ordnance was to set the vegetation ablaze, since intense heat sometimes triggered the devices thus, in order to save the environment, it was necessary first to destroy it.[21]

Now that progress is being made in disarmament, there is a problem concerning the disposal of weapons of mass destruction outlawed by the new agreements. For example, toxic chemical agents cannot simply be dumped at sea; they need to be incinerated at high temperatures, but the process itself is controversial (for example, where will the incinerators be located and how will the agents be transported to the incineration sites).

The environment as a cause of conflict

The environment has also long been a cause of conflict. Thousands of years ago, tribes invaded the territory of other tribes to settle on their land. The era of European imperialism has ended, but its consequences remain. For example, colonialists often used rivers as boundaries between national claims, even

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21.   Keith Suter, 'Living on a Minefield', *New Accent* (Canberra), 28 September 1974, p. 23.

though the original inhabitants regarded them as highways running through their settlements; consequently tribes were suddenly divided between various European nations. The boundaries were often imprecise and, although tolerable as approximate imperial boundaries, are nevertheless inadequate today for nation-state boundaries. Almost forty major boundary disputes remain around the world.[22]

In a resource-hungry world, environmental disputes are likely to increase. For example, there is the problem of water in the Middle East. In 1986, this was considered by the Annual Conference of the American Society of International Law. In opening the discussion, Professor Joseph Dellapenna noted:

Few issues are more central to life in the Middle East than the provision of adequate supplies of water. Few issues have been more neglected in discussions of the Middle East situation than water. The longest running active hostilities in the region are ostensibly over control of a river – although one may doubt whether this is the true cause of the Iran–Iraq war. And while little has been said about water by the recurrent combatants in the Jordan Valley, more than one observer has concluded that Israel's military and political policies are dictated by a 'hydraulic imperative'.[23]

Professor Thomas Naff dealt with the case-study of Jordan and Israel over the Jordan river system, in which there are two basic factors:

One is technical, and the other is political. The Jordan system has a very complex hydrological structure in terms of its water balance, its outflows and run-offs, its sources and springs and so on, which is shared by all the riparians. Second, those four riparians – Israel, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon – are hostile toward one another and have been for about two generations. Complicating efforts to reach an agreement on the co-operative utilization of the Jordan system is the overarching

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22. Keith Suter, *Alternative to War; Conflict Resolution and the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes*, pp. 42–4, Sydney, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1986.
23. Joseph W. Dellapenna, 'Water Resources in the Middle East: Impact on Economics and Politics', in *Proceedings of the 1986 Conference of the American Society of International Law*, p. 249, Washington, D.C., 1987.

Israeli–Palestinian problem. Taken together, these factors have so far made conflict over the Jordan intractable. Since 1948 there have been no less than 14 schemes put forward by the United States, by Jordan, by Israel, by the United Nations, by the World Zionist Organization and the Arab League for sharing and developing the waters of the Jordan. None of these schemes, regardless of how workable or how sensible, has ever been adopted.

About 200 river basins worldwide are shared by two or more nations. The Middle East problems are, then, perhaps the most acute of what may well become an even more important cause of conflict.

Environmental destruction as a cause of armed conflict

A third facet of the relationship between the environment and armed conflict is the way in which environmental destruction itself can contribute to armed conflict. The distinction between this facet and the one mentioned above is not necessarily clear-cut, for both involve people moving from one territory into another. The difference is more one of motivation: instead of a small number of colonialists setting out for a new life, the third facet concerns a whole group having to move because its present location is too damaged to sustain life. It does not necessarily want to move but is forced to do so because of the decline in its local environment.

One example is Ethiopia. By the early 1970s, the nation's traditional highland farming area was suffering from soil erosion which led to food shortages in the cities. The ensuing disorders helped precipitate the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. Environmental problems were not the whole story: several other factors contributed, notably economic incompetence, institutional rigidities, social inequities and political repression. Rising food prices were the final factor triggering the crisis for Selassie's rule, and these, in turn, reflected long-gathering but little–recognized factors of environmental decline. Subsequently, the new regime under Haile Mariam Mengistu did not move fast enough to restore agriculture. As a result, throngs of impoverished peasants began streaming into the country's lowlands, including the Ogaden zone straddling the border with Somalia, an area of long-standing dispute between the two countries. Hostilities broke out in 1977. Again the environmental factor

was far from being the sole contributor to Mengistu's woes. Rather, it worked to compound the adverse repercussions of political and military struggles within his regime as well as his preoccupation with the Tigre and Eritrea provinces, not to mention general political instability. A combination of all these elements moved the Somalis to invade Ethiopia to stop the peasant migration into their territory.[24] Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe in May 1991. The new government now has to address the environmental problems or else the conflicts will continue.

A second example comes from the speculation over climate changes due to the 'greenhouse effect'. Assuming that the planet is becoming warmer, the sea will expand and even the Arctic and Antarctic ice may melt. Rising sea levels will lead to the migration of low-level shore-based communities to higher ground, possibly the territory of other people. 'Environmental refugees' see their migration as only temporary and not as an act of colonization, for in due course they hope to return to their homeland. Their hosts may have some sympathy for them at first, but this may turn to hostility once it becomes clear that the refugees cannot return to their own territory.

International legal protection for the environment

A fourth facet in the relationship between the environment and armed conflict is the role of international law in protecting the environment from damage arising out of an armed conflict. Given that the Cold War prevailed during most of the period since 1945, little progress was made in disarmament and arms control until the late 1980s, and therefore environmental protection received little attention.

The main treaty addressing this issue is the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), which seeks to ban military or hostile uses of techniques which modify the environment with long-lasting or severe effects. Among the techniques envisaged is the deliberate manipulation of the earth's structure, its sea area and its atmosphere, which does not, however, exclude their use for peaceful purposes. The convention provides for a consultative committee of

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24. Norman Myers, 'Linking Environment and Security', *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (Chicago), June 1987, p. 46.

experts to examine and report upon any problems arising over its objectives and application. It also provides that any state party may lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council if it believes the convention is being broken.

ENMOD was opened for signature in May 1977 and came into force in October 1978. While no nation is able yet to manipulate the environment for warlike purposes, the convention is intended to pre-empt new military developments and thereby contribute to international security. It is a useful addition to other existing multilateral arms control and disarmament treaties.

Mention should also be made of Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the four Geneva Conventions of August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. These conventions, along with the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, form much of the basis for regulating armed conflicts. They were updated in 1977. Additional Protocol I has two provisions relating to environmental protection. According to Article 35 (3): 'It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.' This prohibition is confirmed by Article 55, which considers this general prohibition in greater detail.

The environment as a beneficiary of peace

Finally, it is evident that the environment could benefit from an absence of armed conflict. A reduction in military expenditure, for example, could be spent on soil conservation, reforestation and protecting coastal nations from flood.

During August 1988 much of Bangladesh was flooded. The World Bank recommended a $25 billion programme to stop these inundations. The problem of coastal flooding has long been identified but the prohibitive cost of relevant engineering projects has blocked action. The World Bank has said that managing water flow from the melting snow of the Himalayas, the world's highest mountains, and preventing annual floods each year in the lowlands of India and Bangladesh would necessarily involve Nepal and possibly China in what would be one of the world's largest engineering complexes. The United States Army Corps of Engineers is one of the world's largest and oldest engineering companies. If peace were to break out, if there were less need for military engineering activities, then this corps could be involved in the Bangladesh

flood plan. A similar point can be made about irrigation systems in Africa, where there are frequent droughts which are not so much due to the shortage of water as to the lack of adequate irrigation systems. Military engineers could also be deployed to create such systems. Additionally, a climate of peace would enhance international co-operation for the protection of the environment. Returning to the 1986 Conference of the American Society of International Law and the Middle East issue of water, Professor Dellapenna went on to comment:

Disputes over water in the Middle East are essentially settled the way most disputes between Israel and its neighbours are settled, by the law of vendetta: you do it to me, it will be done back to you. The remarkable thing is that, in a sense, this law of vendetta has worked. There is already a high level of tacit co-operation over water. With rare exceptions, there has been de facto agreement that water facilities are not proper targets. Airplanes are blown up, bus stations are bombed, airports are machine-gunned. When have you heard about water facilities being attacked? The other countries are too vulnerable themselves to Israeli counter-strikes against their water facilities to tolerate attacks by anybody against Israeli water facilities, and they do not imagine for a minute that it would not lead to retaliation. In fact, it did lead to retaliation the one time it happened. When the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was first starting its terrorist campaign around 1969–70, it began by attacking water facilities. The Israelis responded by bombing the East Ghor Canal and the Maqarin Dam. This led rather directly to what is still remembered in the Middle East as Black September. Jordan put an end to these attacks by expelling the PLO.
So there is a law, if you will, that protects water facilities, but it is not a legal system that anyone should feel comfortable about. What is necessary is an initiative by someone, probably from outside the region, to get the states in the region back to talking constructively about water, because they all are going to face disaster in the near future. If you take water away, you are not just changing a boundary, you are destroying a culture. They have got to start doing something together, unless one of them thinks that it can meet its own needs by literally destroying the others.[25]

25.   Dellapenna, op. cit.

FROM NATIONAL SECURITY
TO ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

Institutionalizing environmental security

There are, then, two interlinking strands which form a redefinition of 'national security' and a fresh assessment of the relationship between the environment and armed conflict.

The problem to be addressed in this section is how to build upon these two developments in terms of government institutions. The planet is in an unprecedented situation. We are trying to solve new problems with old techniques. They will not work. This was stated in 1961 by the late Norman Cousins, who spoke of 'common security' two decades before the Palme Commission made this term current:[26]

The best chance – perhaps its only chance – for meeting these needs is through the development of a common security. The people who settled frontier territory found that the only workable answer to lawlessness was the adequate machinery of law. A single individual, no matter how well armed, was unable to defend himself and his family. Only as enough individuals, acting together to create a consensus, also created specific machinery to deal with the anarchy, did the anarchy subside. It is substantially the same in the world today. Only as the world's peoples see beyond the limitations of absolute sovereignty will they be able to deal with the volatile actions of the nations in the world arena.

A common security requires machinery. It requires new rules of the game. It requires new conditioning, new habits, new outlooks, new prospects, new allegiances. The new allegiances need not eliminate the old. They need only take into account the oldest fact in the world; namely, that man has the obligation to create a sane society for himself and to safeguard the essential conditions of his well-being.[27]

There is then no longer any 'national' security, only a 'common security'. Bangladesh cannot solve its problem of coastal flooding on its own; it needs the

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26. Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (Palme Commission), *Common Security,* London, Pan, 1982.
27. Norman Cousins, *In Place of Folly,* p. 98, New York, Harper, 1961.

co-operation of Nepal and China, and all three would benefit from the partici-
pation of the United States Army Corps of Engineers.

Today's challenge is to institutionalize the new perception of environmen-
tal security at the international and national levels. At the national level, all
government deliberations involve financial considerations as well as those
concerning social welfare, usually favouring an extension of the government's
mantle of care over its citizens. However, environmental security is not often
taken into consideration. Each nation needs a government department respon-
sible for this matter.

Ministry for Peace

A new type of government ministry is required, which I have elsewhere called a
Ministry for Peace.[28] This new ministry could have three main tasks handling
the new assessment of national security, disarmament and peace-building.

National security is more than the armed forces which are the prime
concern of defence departments. It is more than diplomacy and the
maintenance of healthy international political relations, which are the prime
concern of ministries of foreign affairs. The new perception of national security
cannot come from existing governments, for they each define national security
according to their own national perspectives. A Ministry for Peace should
co-ordinate the various perspectives to form an overall National Security
Assessment (NSA). This ministry could urgently prepare an annual report on
the government's official view on NSA, covering such matters as defence,
disarmament, energy, environment, international organizations such as the
United Nations, assistance to developing countries (including financial aid,
terms of trade and training of foreign personnel) and the international
protection of human rights. The central questions it could address each year are:
What is the state of national security?
How does this assessment compare with that of the previous year?
Has the international security situation improved or deteriorated?

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28.   Keith Suter, *Ministry for Peace*, Sydney, United Nations Association of Australia,
      1984.

What should be done to meet the challenges posed by the international security situation?

The NSA could be tabled for consideration by a parliamentary committee. The committee's deliberations could be open to the general public and the media, non-governmental organizations being invited to make submissions. The NSA could also be the subject of parliamentary debate. In short, it would be an educational tool to help people to become accustomed to a new form of 'security'.

Second, a Ministry for Peace could absorb disarmament negotiations. Its disarmament branch could provide a unified approach to disarmament, including defence and treasury considerations, and outside ministries for foreign affairs.

If a disarmament branch is part of a ministry for foreign affairs, then all disarmament considerations are viewed within the context of wider foreign policy issues. Instead of disarmament being seen as an important objective in itself, it is subservient to other considerations, some of which are actually accelerating the arms race. This is obviously unsatisfactory, since reducing the threat of a world war remains urgent.

Among its work in this context, the new ministry could co-ordinate work on the conversion of military establishments to civilian purposes. Some people fear that, through disarmament, they will lose defence-related employment, as there is a popular belief that the arms race is good for the economy. In fact the United Nations has produced various studies which show that the arms race does not make economic sense, and that more people, for the same expenditure, could be employed in environmental protection, health, education, welfare or public transport than in defence. Conversion of military personnel and facilities to civilian use was successful following both world wars. The current relaxation in international political tensions is to be welcomed, but more planning is needed to reduce defence forces and subsequently permit their redeployment on, for example, projects to protect the environment.

The third and final task of a Ministry for Peace could be peace-building, which is an economic and social task aimed at removing the deep-seated causes of conflict. Peace-makers can negotiate settlements which keep combatants apart but, as long as Third World suffering and international inequalities exist,

there will be a need for peace-building to be carried out in the framework of such bodies as UNESCO, the World Bank, WHO and FAO.

The challenge of peace-building must be tackled at two levels. The more obvious task would comprise various programmes of overseas assistance, such as the provision of financial aid, the relaxation of trade barriers against Third World nations and help for refugees, including resettlement. All these tasks could be co-ordinated by a Ministry for Peace. Second, there is the management of global interdependence. The era of nation-states, which has characterized world politics for the past three centuries, is now becoming outmoded. Governments find increasing difficulty in solving their problems since there are so many factors outside national control. The ministry's starting-point could be based on the National Security Assessment, from which it could draw up a programme on global interdependence.

To conclude, there needs to be a redefinition of 'security' to include environmental considerations by moving away from a 'national' outlook to looking at the world as a global whole. This challenge has been set out in the Brundtland Report, *Our Common Future*:

The Earth is one but the world is not. We all depend on one biosphere for sustaining our lives. Yet each community, each country, strives for survival and prosperity with little regard for its impact on others. Some consume the Earth's resources at a rate that would leave little for future generations. Others, many more in number, consume far too little and live with the prospect of hunger, squalor, disease and early death.[29]

The evolution of environmental security is therefore part of an important process in the assistance to the Earth's economic, social and environmental development.

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29. World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*, p. 27, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987.

Social and cultural origins of violence: non-military aspects of international security

*Håkan Wiberg**

The concept of violence has been broadened in recent decades, in part thanks to UNESCO, and now includes structural and cultural violence besides physical and military violence. Yet it belongs to what philosophers consider as 'essentially contested concepts': the disparities between the many definitions proposed derive from analytical, political and ethical differences. This is also true for the concepts which are the contrary of those concerning violence, that is peace and security. The most limited meaning of 'peace' is tantamount to 'absence of armed conflict'; since this is a definition by the absence of something, it is sometimes referred to as 'negative peace'. 'Positive peace' then refers to the *presence* of something, such as integration, mutually beneficial co-operation, equity or justice, liberty and identity. Different peace concepts vary somewhat in this respect and, for that matter, some of them could equally be defined as absence of, for example, structural or cultural violence. Whereas 'security' was thought of as the absence of military threats two or three decades ago, it is now conceptualized at different levels (sub- and supernational, in addition to national), many dimensions having been added to the military concept, such as political, economical, ecological, cultural and societal security (Wæver et al., 1993).

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A recent UNESCO symposium in Copenhagen[1] treated the social and cultural origins of violence; the papers presented there have served as raw material for the present chapter, which is, however, structured analytically rather than as a series of summaries of individual papers. The first section discusses various conceptualizations of violence and general methodological problems in assessing its causes; the second section covers various research approaches and reviews findings and theories. The third section points at some avenues for the future.

THE MOST LIMITED CONCEPT: INDIVIDUAL PHYSICAL VIOLENCE

The most limited sense of 'violence' can be defined as the intentional infliction of bodily harm or death, in a manner contrary to prevalent norms. The term 'intentionally' reflects a widespread, but far from universal, inclination to tie moral or legal judgements on actions to the intentions of the agent. 'Bodily harm' reflects a traditional delimitation; cultures and subcultures vary as to what types and degrees of bodily harm amount to 'violence'. 'Contrary to prevalent norms' reminds us that decisions taken by courts, such as corporal or capital punishment, are sometimes not considered as 'violence'.

Other conceptualizations reject one or more of these semantic restrictions. *Lex talionis,* in its Babylonian origin, did not tie culpability and punishment to intentions: if a house collapsed and killed a child, one of the builder's children

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1.   The Advisory Working Group on the Follow-up to the International Congress on Peace in the Minds of Men held its first symposium at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen on 8 and 9 February 1992, and discussed the Yamoussoukro Declaration and the further contributions UNESCO might make concerning social and cultural origins of violence. This meeting was organized by the Centre with financial assistance from UNESCO. The Advisory Working Group consists of David Adams (United States of America), Bernard Dadiè (Côte d'Ivoire), Ali Hilal Dessouki (Egypt), Ryuhei Hatsuse (Japan), Jadwiga Koralewicz (Poland), Felipe MacGregor (Peru), K. P. Misra (India), Norbert Ropers (Germany), Valentina Uzunova (Russia, represented in Copenhagen by Valentin F. Vydrin) and Håkan Wiberg (Denmark, convenor).

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had to be killed. Some present conceptualizations also avoid linking the concept to the intentions of their actors. If many people were to survive longer or escape being crippled by infantile malnutrition through a societal distribution of goods and services other than that existing already, the latter constitutes 'structural violence', whether or not these effects were intended by any identified actor (Galtung, 1969). Other conceptualizations go beyond 'bodily harm' to include various forms of mental harm in the term 'violence' or by adding loss of freedom and of identity (cultural violence, cf. Galtung, 1990) to loss of physical health. Everyday language sometimes counts the destruction of property or various disturbances of the established social order as 'acts of violence'. To define a general concept whose meaning is not closely tied to prevailing norms in various countries, we must also omit the qualification 'contrary to prevailing norms'. One of the founding fathers of peace research, Lewis Fry Richardson (1960b), declined to categorize in legal or moral terms the wars he had studied .

Here there is a problem of compatibility. On the one hand, when selecting any definition of 'violence' to be used – for example, in the formulation of an action programme where moral, political or legal considerations are involved – the categories of actions are condemned or condoned by attaching (or not attaching) the label 'violence' to them, because in fact no 'neutral' or 'value-free' definition of violence exists. On the other hand, from a scholarly point of view, the desirable virtues of a concept comprise its *reasonably* precise definition, its linkage (at least indirectly) to some form of observation or measurement, its theoretical fruitfulness and the homogeneous etiology of the category of phenomena it covers. These desiderata tend to draw empirical researchers towards highly limited concepts of violence, which is in itself scientifically questionable, but there is no reason to expect a dovetailing of moral and scientific distinctions, for a categorization which is relevant for a given value system may be unwieldy or useless for a researcher, and vice versa.

Subsequently, we shall only deal with causes of individual violence inasmuch as some evidence has been presented that they are also relevant for the study of collective violence. We therefore have no reason to go through the vast literature on causes of individual violence, where many disciplines have contributed various kinds of lenses, but none of them *the* lens (if we wish to avoid tautologies). A short summary of this literature demonstrates that all simple

causal formulae in terms of instincts, physiology, territory, frustration, cues, etc., needed heavy modification when confronted with systematic empirical research, with the addition of reservations, conditions, contexts, interpretations. Situational factors, social relations, cultural norms, personal history, genetic factors, etc., influence to some degree dispositions or inhibitions regarding aggression. The reservations which we must add to simple formulae primarily concern social and cultural factors. Cultural values and social norms strongly affect targets of violent behaviour, experiences of frustration in certain situations, responses to the perception of the legitimate or illegitimate and the identification of legitimate targets of such responses.

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN THE LIMITED SENSE: RIOTS AND WAR

The tautology that collective violence, in the final analysis, comprises individual acts of violence helps our understanding as little as chemical reactions ultimately consisting of the behaviour of quarks helps that of the chemist. We have to look in other directions than studies of individual minds to find the most important causal factors behind collective violence. One important debate was initiated by Milgram's (1975) experiments. Do authority and related social norms legitimatize the expression of violent tendencies otherwise suppressed by 'society' or 'the super-ego', the removal of socially induced inhibitions releasing a 'natural' tendency to aggression? Or do, as he argued on the basis of his experiments, precise authority and patterns of obedience force individuals to commit acts of violence which they do not want and would avoid if they could?

There are even both theoretical and empirical grounds for perceiving 'collective violence', in the limited sense of physical violence, as too broad a category to be analytically fruitful. Some studies of collective violence have identified different main types with little or no simple relationship to each other: war among states, war between organized parties within a state ('revolution', 'rebellion', 'civil war' or 'anarchy' in an analytical sense and 'turbulence', 'riots' or 'anarchy' in an everyday sense). The bi-variable correlations between these three types of phenomena have repeatedly been found to lie close to zero (Tanter, 1966; Finsterbusch, 1974), even if the introduction of third variables

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may disclose some partial patterns (Wilkenfeld, 1973). Their causes must thus in certain important respects be distinct; if they had the same causes, we could expect strong correlations between them.

BROADER CONCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

There are two main arguments for including broader concepts of 'violence' which transcend the very narrow one indicated in the first section. One is essentially normative and is based on effects: any avoidable cause of harm to human beings, whether intended or not, can be counted as 'violence'. The other argument is in terms of causes, deprivation by 'structural violence' being an important cause of 'intentional violence'. Eliminating the causes of this latter form must involve *reducing the former by means of social transformation which would provide a more just distribution of nutrition, education, medical care, etc.* There has been little quantitative research relating the different types of violence to each other (Wallensteen, 1973); results have been so mixed that we stand on uncertain ground. The same regions tend to be worst off in terms of either kind of violence, but this does not prove causality. Also, relative deprivation seems to have stronger effects than absolute deprivation (Gurr, 1970).

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
IN ASSESSING CAUSALITY

The identification of 'origins' or 'causes' of war has posed several problems: the units are few and vary on many dimensions; controlled experiments are obviously impossible. Statistical bases for drawing firm causal inferences thus tend to be weak. One major research project preferred to call itself more modestly The Correlates of War Project (Singer, 1979, 1980). Among the plethora of theories about causes of collective violence, few can claim to be confirmed. If we use rigorous methodological standards: (1) there must be variations in both the explaining variable and the explained variable (here: violence) – a variation cannot be explained by a constant; (2) there must be a significant correlation between the two variables in the predicted direction; (3) this correlation must be shown as not being simply due to both variables being caused by a third.

Condition 1 is satisfied for many explanatory candidates but excludes, for example, general references to 'human nature', as this is assumed to be constant. Condition 2 is also satisfied by many empirical studies, though very few of them find strong correlations. Condition 3 is illustrated by the correlation between childbirth and storks in German municipalities (rural areas have better stork habitats and a more traditional pattern of big families); it is rarely satisfied, as we can seldom be certain whether an observed correlation is due to direct or indirect causality (from the first factor via others) or is spurious, as in the stork case.

Very few, if any, theories about the origins of collective violence have been 'proven beyond reasonable doubt'. This means that they are not confirmed by rigorous empirical studies and therefore cannot claim to be established 'from a scientific point of view'. However, this does not mean they are false; most must just be regarded as not being proved by these rigorous criteria.

These criteria are, however, not necessarily those to use when seeking premises for action and where they depend on the logic of the situation. In some cases strict criteria are needed: purveyors of medicines must prove beyond reasonable doubt that they are effective and, more important, have no harmful side-effects. Equally, for a verdict of 'guilty', many courts demand equally strong evidence. In both cases, one error – sentencing an innocent person – is deemed worse than acquitting a guilty person. However, where there is no such asymmetry, such strict criteria do not make sense. For many decisions, the question is primarily whether available evidence indicates the hypothesis as being more or less likely. For instance, it can be claimed 'proven beyond reasonable doubt' neither that high military expenditures harm the economy of a country and increase the risk of war nor that exposure to violent movies on television increases violent behaviour. Nevertheless, in both cases the total evidence collected clearly indicates that it is more likely than not. These hypotheses therefore have a good claim to be included among the premises for decision-making, unless, for example, specific evidence for a given country points in the opposite direction.

In many other domains – armaments, ozone layers, global warming, etc. – the definition of the burden of proof is crucial. Here, too, 'more likely than not' may be a sufficient premise for decisions, when it makes no sense to delay action until evidence has been obtained 'beyond reasonable doubt'.

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There is another methodological issue. Gunnar Myrdal repeatedly stated that: 'There are no economical problems, there are no social problems, there are no political problems – there are problems!' Reality is too complex for facile pigeonholing by academic discipline: the understanding of a phenomenon is often doomed to failure if multidisciplinarity is not used.

One example is given by relative deprivation being more closely related to collective violence than absolute deprivation. Absolute deprivation is easier to measure by, for example, economic indicators. Yet human actions tend to be less motivated by these simply measurable circumstances than by how people see their position in comparison to that of others (neighbours, fellow-workers, etc.). Who 'the others' are and how people make comparisons depends much on how they have learnt to do so, that is to say on which cultural factors have been taken into account. The global communications system thus plays an important role: the reference groups to which one compares oneself have become wider. People living in poverty, under despotic rule or extreme inequality are now less inclined to see these matters as being inescapable 'laws of nature'. Through observing that things are different elsewhere, they are less willing to accept the conditions under which they live and are more prone to demand social change. If these requests are frustrated, the likelihood of structural violence leading to physical violence is greater than before the television age. To understand links between deprivation and violence we therefore need a broad interdisciplinary approach.

Another example is the end of the Cold War, which has not produced greater peace in the world, for we have seen an upsurge of nationalist conflicts. In order to understand them, analyses of 'rational decision-making' are of limited help, the basic issues being sociocultural rather than politico-military (even if presented differently by the actors). Hence we must regard social and cultural factors as playing an important role in conflicts on identity formation and social cohesion (Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1964). When one enemy image disappears, others often appear: other states, other ideologies or 'internal enemies' (Harle, 1991). To find more harmless ways of defining collective identities and to reduce misconceptions, we must draw deeply on *How Nations See Each Other* (to use the title of a 1953 UNESCO study by Buchanan and Cantril). We shall always have conflicts, many having constructive effects, but there is no evidence that they must always engender violence and wars. Finding

constructive ways of acting out conflicts and more creative ways of conflict resolution demands an approach which does not take into account traditional academic boundaries and which does not assume that any particular culture has a privileged claim on truth.

THE MICRO LEVEL: OUR BIOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT

Several theories and much research relate our biological equipment, whether normal or abnormal (XYY genes, etc.), to violent behaviour. The simplest explanation is that the instruments for violence are built into us and can be stimulated electrically or otherwise, though there is no solid evidence of normal persons using these methods (Mark and Ervin, 1970).

Owing to the absence of solid evidence that biological variations are related to the amount and frequency of collective violence, we have no reason to dwell further on this research here, the essential content of the *Seville Statement on Violence* (UNESCO, 1986) stating that:

1. It is scientifically incorrect to say that war cannot be ended because animals make war and because people are like animals. First, it is not true because animals do not make war. Second, it is not true because, unlike animals, people have culture and the ability to change their culture. A culture that makes war in one century may change and live in peace with its neighbours in another century.
2. It is scientifically incorrect to say that war cannot be ended because it is part of human nature. Arguments about human nature cannot prove anything because human culture gives people the ability to shape and change their nature from one generation to another.
3. It is scientifically incorrect to say that violence cannot be ended because people and animals who are violent are able to live better and reproduce more than others. Actually, the evidence shows that people and animals do best when they learn how to work well with each other.
4. It is scientifically incorrect to say that people must be violent because of their brain. The brain is like other parts of the body. They can all be used for co-operation as well as for violence. All depends on the purpose of their use.

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5.   It is scientifically incorrect to say that war is caused by 'instinct'. Most
     scientists do not use the word 'instinct' any more because behaviour is not
     determined to the point that it cannot be changed by learning. Of course,
     everybody has emotions but, in modern war, decisions and actions are not
     necessarily emotional.

THE ROLE OF EARLY SOCIALIZATION

There is broad agreement that family patterns and child-rearing are of great
importance for typical behaviour within groups of human beings, from subcul-
tures to nations or civilizations. Exactly how important depends on whether pri-
mary socialization determines later behaviour very strongly or can be much
modified by various forms of secondary socialization; opinions are divided on
this issue. There is much literature on how the family experiences of children
affect their later attitudes to violence: essentially children who are brought up by
means of violent sanctions, whatever euphemistic terms are used for them, will
see the use of violence as legitimate in more contexts and situations than those
who are not (Miller, 1980; Brock-Utne, 1989).

   When we look for social and cultural origins of war, another question
becomes crucial: to what extent do patterns of child-rearing determine the
behaviour of collectivities, for example war? There is considerable research to
the effect that cultures with frustrating patterns of childhood discipline show
more internal conflict as well as stronger tendencies to engage in external war
(Eckhardt, 1975).

   The family being a very intimate sphere makes it difficult for states to
have much influence on child-rearing patterns. The possibility does exist,
however: a number of states have followed the example of Sweden, making
parental use of violence against children illegal. In other respects, non-govern-
mental actors, such as women's organizations or teachers' associations, may be
more apt to play a role in the peaceful upbringing of children than govern-
mental actors.

EDUCATION AS A SOCIALIZING AGENT

The most influential agents of secondary socialization are the mass media, peer groups and formal education. Education is important in several respects. First, it generally attempts to inculcate the predominant values of its society; depending on what these values are, children may thus be affected in a more pacific or bellicose direction (Brock-Utne, 1989). Second, one important content of education is how the children are taught to see their own society, other societies and relations between them. Is their society considered to be just one among many others, with particular achievements to be proud of and on which is based a part of their personal identity and weaknesses? Or is it considered inherently superior to all others, a 'chosen nation' with a right to dominate others or even with a missionary vocation? Are other societies presented as such but with some features which children will find difficult to understand? Or are they perceived as being inherently inferior or aggressive?

Another important aspect of education has to do with what, if anything, the children are able to learn about living with and handling conflicts, about methods of non-violent conflict resolution and co-operation in interpersonal relationships, and about the dynamics and possible resolution of conflicts on a societal or international level.

There have been several encouraging developments in these respects. UNESCO, the Nordic Council and other international bodies have inspired certain Member States to establish bilateral forums for discussion of, for example, history textbooks; this has led to revisions, thus reducing national stereotypes. Many states have exchange programmes for students, professionals, etc., which contribute toward international understanding. Educational programmes for the development of conflict resolution skills have also been created and in some cases have been effective.

MASS MEDIA AS A SOCIALIZING AGENT

The main competitors for how children and adults spend their time are family members, school, work (formal or informal), peer groups and the mass media. Their relative success on the aggregate level depends on gender and age, on

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which society we observe and, in particular, on how compatible or incompatible these ways of spending time are. In certain modern societies, the amount of time teenagers spend before a television screen equals that which they spend in school. What patterns of thinking and behaviour do they learn from it?

The simplest, perhaps even simplistic, way of raising this question concerns the number and extent of violent programmes they see and the effect on their own tendencies to violent behaviour. If the question is put in this way, the net balance of a great number of partly contradictory results is that there is a clear relation both on the micro and macro level (Brock-Utne, 1989). Children who are exposed to television violence are more prone to behave violently themselves and the greater the amount of violence shown on television in a country the more young people there engage in violence.

Mere correlations do not necessarily tell us much about the mechanisms engaged or the reservations made, unless they are carefully designed to do so. Among suggested mechanisms we have imitation (for example of techniques of violence), legitimation (in particular if the hero of the film exerts violence against criminals) and other forms of role-taking. Violence is gradually perceived as being harmless or normal – a parallel to this can be found in the clinically neutral or even positively playful way in which military language often describes killing, destruction and their instruments (Chilton, 1985). Watching violent films often tends to make the viewer regard the surrounding world as dangerous and threatening, where one needs to be armed and prepared to fight; this then increases the chances of actually becoming engaged in violence and may contribute to explaining a more general finding from the United States: the more people watch television, the more likely they are to carry firearms. Violent fiction is not the only culprit, however: the news media also tend to 'over-report' violence. A Swedish study showed that the inhabitants of Stockholm overestimated twenty to fifty times the number of violent assaults in the city.

In conclusion, whereas a tendentious relationship between media consumption and violent behaviour does exist, it is a complex rather than a stimulus-response reaction. This raises the issue as to what can be done on a societal level. Censorship is often suggested, whether at the source (practised to varying degrees in many countries) or by parental control in the home. Given

the different degrees to which different societies accept intervention in their mass media, this is difficult to regulate by international agreements, as sometimes proposed. Many states, however, have restrictive legislation aiming at protecting children against exposure to violent films. How well this succeeds, however, is a different matter; the fact that they are forbidden may actually make these films more attractive. Research on this problem seems to indicate that parental presence is crucial, because it gives the children a chance to receive explanations, a normative orientation and a possibility of working on traumatic aspects.

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Societies exhibit great variety in terms of how equally or unequally wealth, power and prestige are distributed, through which institutions they are granted, the extent to which they are allotted according to gender, age, religion, mother tongue, socially defined race, caste, estate, clan or family or to achievements in education, work and other social activities. Do these social structures make for particularly high or low internal or external violent conflicts?

The most general answer must be that it is difficult to find great differences between different types of societies in terms of pacific or bellicose behaviour (Haas, 1974). Among the hundreds of variables which have been correlated with war, very few have a clear relationship: being a great power, having many boundaries and being overarmed. The typical result of correlating a societal variable with participation in war is that there is very little direct relationship. Structural variables, such as the distribution of income or land, have weak statistical relations to war, even if historical case-studies may demonstrate stronger links in specific cases. As mentioned above, relative deprivation tends to count more than absolute deprivation, the very same distribution perhaps giving rise to different patterns of relative deprivation in different societies. Repeated studies have shown little relationship between forms of democratic societies and how often they engage in war, with one very important exception: democracies do not go to war against each other (*Journal of Peace Research*, 1992). Wherever we find a security community, that is a group of countries with relations ruling out war as a means of settling conflict, all its

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members are democracies. This is an established fact, though certain explanations proffered may differ. Transparency and mutual predictability may increase mutual confidence and decrease the risk of escalated crises.

STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AS A COMPONENT AND AS A CAUSE

The term 'structural violence' was coined by Johan Galtung (1969), who also indicated a way to operationalize it, at least in principle (Galtung and Hoivik, 1971). It is defined in terms of 'avoidable' harm to human beings and is related to such phenomena as political dominance and economic exploitation; while centrally linked to economic inequality (access to basic physical needs), it may also be related to, for example, access to education on different levels and to cultural services, as well as to systems of public distribution.

Since then, many interpretations of 'structural violence' have been made as well as empirical assessments being attempted. Some calculations on 'structural violence' in specific countries or in the world as a whole, using life expectancy or infant mortality, conclude that far more people are killed by 'structural violence' than by 'intentional violence': the former has a global magnitude of 10 million people per year, the latter around 1 million (Hoivik, 1971, 1977; Alcock and Köhler, 1979; Köhler and Alcock, 1976). There have also been attempts to assess structural violence in a wider sense than these demographic indicators, for example in a major study of Peru (MacGregor et al., 1990) which illustrates that creating peace in the extended sense, that is the absence of military and structural violence, is a far more encompassing task than (sometimes) terminating military violence in a given area at a given time. Extended peace necessarily calls for a wide social transformation, summarized as 'development' or 'justice', etc., and these terms, in turn, must be further conceptualized in order to serve as satisfactory research instruments. The social and cultural origins of structural violence, which then contributes to military violence, are studied far less often than those pertaining to military violence itself.

THE MILITARY AND PEACE

The social structure of modern societies, with very few exceptions, includes the presence of armed forces. Four main types of dangers from armaments have been suggested (Wiberg, 1989*b*): (1) they increase the risk of war by making their possessors more belligerent, more reckless or more likely targets of pre-emptive wars, or by making 'war by accident' more probable; (2) they are wasteful by reducing societal or global resources available for constructive purposes and are therefore inimical to welfare and development; (3) highly armed states can use their military power as leverage in forcing other states to make concessions detrimental to their sovereignty, security and welfare; (4) heavily armed states become 'militarized' in many ways, through the economy and political system and through the national culture.

All these assumptions are controversial: empirically, theoretically or normatively. They also relate to issues of violence in different ways. Number 3 falls outside the scope of this chapter; 4 will be taken up in the next section. Number 1 lies only in part within this scope and we shall limit ourselves to a condensed summary of research results (cf. Wiberg, 1989*b*). As for armaments levels of individual states, Vasquez (1976, p. 203), following a great amount of quantitative studies, concludes that 'there appears to be no strong relationship between violence among nations and the military power or status of nations'; this must imply some (weak) relationship, since he cites it under 'promising findings'. Other authors, such as Rummel (1972), Van der Dennen (1981) and Zinnes (1980), basing themselves on systematic quantitative studies, largely concur. Some researchers (Haas, 1974; Wallace, 1973; Choucri and North, 1975) shed further light on patterns of causality by testing more complex causal models with military indicators 'in the middle' of the model. They found that other factors behind war, such as rank disequilibrium or population pressure, operate via the arms build-up, which in addition has some (modest) effects of its own. Whatever the causal pattern, military expenditures serve as an early warning indicator.

Results on the state level, while usually weak, all point in the same direction: the extent to which armaments have an influence on peace is negative and these relatively weak results may be due to looking at the wrong level:

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studies of pairs of nations give somewhat more conclusive results. The risk of a confrontation escalating into war increases with the level of military preparedness in a pair: it increases from low-low pairs through low-high pairs to high-high pairs (Singer, 1981), and there is particular danger when two opponents have equal capability (Weede, 1976; Garnham, 1976; Houweling and Siccama, 1988). In addition to these static analyses, there are also dynamic results on arms races (Wiberg, 1989a), going back to Richardson (1960a). Smith (1980), studying the period 1860–1977, shows that different types of arms races all are more likely to end in war than situations without an arms race. Wallace concurrently finds the risk of a dispute ending in war to be higher if preceded by an arms race and concludes that 'it is those who would seek "peace through preparedness", who have misread the historical record and, as a consequence, are advocating a dangerously unrealistic course' (Wallace, 1981, p. 95). Houweling and Siccama (1981) and Diehl (1983, 1985), with refinements and reservations, find weaker relationships but arrive at essentially the same conclusion: there is no support for the *para bellum* hypothesis. Finally, the puzzle of systemic causes of war is still largely unresolved (Zinnes, 1980) and there are no solid studies directly relating belligerence in a system to the arms expenditures there.

Number 2 is most closely linked to issues on structural violence via questions about how military expenditures affect the development of societies and the distribution of resources within them. The first question originally produced varying theories and results, but research results during the last decade have been more convergent, ranging between military expenditures having little influence on national development and their having a decidedly negative effect (Cappelen et al., 1984; Rasler and Thompson, 1988). Health, education and welfare are the budget sectors which primarily suffer when military budgets expand.

THE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL VALUES

A culture which attaches a positive value to the use of violence will see more violence than one which strongly condemns it (Eckhardt, 1975). While this may be seen as 'obvious' (which is always dangerous in social science), we should also look for cultural traits which are not obviously linked to collective violence.

One way is to start by peaceful societies and ask what they have in common. Only a handful of cultures exists which have never seen internal or external war (Fabbro, 1978; Smoker, 1981). Their populations are small and most of them are on a low level of technical economic development; they vary in other respects and, in any case, the group is too small to permit generalizations. A larger set of peaceful societies was collected by Melko (1973) and was criticized for containing too many cases of *Pax Romana,* which are only peaceful in the sense that the unipolar distribution of power deters open conflict.

Another procedure is to start from important cultural dimensions of societies, and ask how they are related to different forms of war. In their secondary analyses of the data presented by Wright (1964), Broch and Galtung (1966) found two dimensions having an especially strong effect on the presence of political or economic warfare: the lower the economic development of a culture, the less it engaged in war for political or economic gains, agricultural societies being more warlike than pre-agricultural ones; and cultures with little contact with their neighbours are less engaged in war with them than those which have more contacts. In both cases, it can be argued that few opportunities make for less war. However, neither of these findings is of much help in looking for cultural keys to peace in modern societies, where the organizational ability to wage war is always present and total isolation is a rare phenomenon.

One of the classic authors on peace research, Pitirim A. Sorokin (1937), emphasized cultural dimensions in his studies, which spanned some 2,500 years. His main dimension was that between 'sensate' cultures, which are this-worldly, empiricist, fact-oriented and materialistic (e.g. the Hellenistic period or Renaissance Europe), and 'ideational' cultures, which are other-worldly, metaphysical, rationalist and idealistic (e.g. medieval Europe). These two types of cultures differed little with regard to war; there was more of it than normal in periods of *transition* from one to the other. The dangers of transition are seen in studies of other factors, such as social or political organization, economic systems and positions in the international system.

Militarization has sometimes been seen as a cultural factor making for more war. Unless this is a tautology, it deserves careful consideration. Whether to perceive militarization as positive or negative depends, of course, on ethical and political positions. Conservatives tend to embrace traditional military values more

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than liberals and socialists (Eckhardt, 1969, 1980; Skjelsbaek, 1979), though 'red militarism' has also been identified (Albrecht, 1980; Holloway, 1980). Eckhardt (1975) demonstrates a positive relationship between the importance of military values in a culture and its tendency to be involved in collective violence.

One crucial cultural variable is defined by the perceived relationship between state and nation. For present purposes, we assume the term 'state' to be sufficiently well-defined, as at present some two hundred exist. The term 'nation' is more tricky, as it is used for two very different concepts as well as various combinations of them. The French Revolution created a largely political concept, identifying nationality with citizenship or desired citizenship, willingness to die for the state and to adopt its majority language, culture, etc. This concept essentially makes the coincidence between state and nation a tautology.

German Romanticism, on the other hand, created a concept of nation essentially based on language and culture and not linked to existing states. If we were to maintain such 'objective' criteria as language or religion, there would be some 2,000 nations; state and nation coincide in very few cases, such as Iceland or Japan. Most states are bi- or multinational and run a higher risk of domestic violence than homogeneous states. Very many nations are divided by state boundaries, which often contribute to international conflict.

'Objective' criteria are not good enough, however. They may or may not coincide with how the group in question sees itself, which is more crucial. If political criteria predominate, the bi- or multinationality of a state creates no internal problems, unless some groups suffer from discrimination and, even then, conflicts may be defined in terms of, for example, either class or region rather than being ethno-national. Nor do divided language groups create much of an international problem in this case, when, for example, different speakers of German primarily define themselves as 'Austrians', 'Swiss' and 'Germans'.

If, on the other hand, cultural criteria predominate, then multinationality carries a higher risk for domestic conflict and divided nations a higher risk for international conflict. Attempts from the state to force people to use political rather than cultural criteria may only make things worse. 'Nation-building' in this sense is a difficult matter, usually taking a long time to achieve. Furthermore, definitions may sometimes change rapidly, identities often being forged by conflicts, rather than causing them. Societal security may clash with politico-

military security (Wæver et al., 1993) and a difficult balance may have to be struck between autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination.

Political culture is another and partly related factor affecting collective violence. How are relations between the state, the nation and the individual perceived? How are identities and loyalties divided between family, class, neighbourhood, voluntary associations, ethno-national groups and the state? What forms of acting out political conflicts are seen as legitimate? When are transitions from one political and economic system to another relatively painless and when are they fraught with major problems?

Developments in former 'socialist' states seem to indicate that form may triumph over content, in the sense that there are also strong authoritarian tendencies in the parties which have replaced the former dominant ideology with another. Furthermore, the price paid for former suppression of national identities is that they now often take on extreme forms. One factor affecting this is how the transition came about. If it was mainly created by a peaceful 'revolution from below', as for instance in Poland, less spill-over from the old form can be expected than if it came through 'reforms from above', as for instance in Russia.

If old patterns of obedience to authority create problems for democratization, the opposite also occurs: ingrained tendencies to regard any government with suspicion and offer it no more support than necessary may make it difficult for a democratic regime to build up legitimacy.

To what extent can findings about the relationship between cultures and forms of conflict resolution aid us in finding avenues to a more peaceful world? A first caveat is that, with rare exceptions, cultural change takes generations or centuries, rather than months or years. Strategies therefore have to be particularly far-sighted and this must be borne in mind when trying to identify relevant actors and strategies to be employed.

One crucial issue concerns whether to look for 'a culture of peace' or for 'cultures of peace' (cf. Boulding, 1992). The notion of a global culture of peace may have an element of self-contradiction, since 'global' implies a claim to universality (and is, at its worst, just a synonym for 'Westernization'), whereas 'culture' denotes at least an element of particularity. The very diversity of cultures in our global society is in itself a precious asset, which UNESCO must protect. Whereas conflict is a common feature of societies, with important posi-

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tive functions for parties and for the system to which they belong, all cultures have some traits promoting the peaceful resolution of conflicts (those which did not are presumably extinct) and some others which increase the risk of conflicts escalating into organized violence. Attempts to strengthen the former at the expense of the latter have a greater chance of succeeding if considered in terms of intracultural transformation rather than as the diffusion of a single culture seeking global predominance. In the latter case, transitions would be more drastic and, in themselves, might cause more war rather than less.

The pair, rather than the unit, might be the sources of collective violence, as in the case of cultures. The differences between two cultures which are, by themselves, relatively peaceful might create the risk of the development of violent conflicts. In such cases, the prime issue would seem to be increasing mutual understanding and reducing prejudices rather than changing either of the cultures.

If there is conflict in all cultures (one without conflicts would probably soon disintegrate through total stagnation), the crucial question is whether there exist any immutable social or cultural factors making it inescapable that conflict occasionally takes on a violent form. The existence of completely peaceful cultures seems to entail a negative answer, but the specific character of these cultures implies that the question may still be raised validly in the case of, for example, industrial cultures, even if nobody seems to have presented convincing reasons why occasional collective violence is an inherent trait therein.

RELIGION AS A PROBLEM AND A SOLUTION

The first question raised about religion and peace is: what do the doctrines of different religions say about war and peace? In his comparative study, Ferguson (1977) shows that all major religions or ethical systems contain different currents of interpretation in this respect. Each contains pacifist currents distancing themselves from any use of violence, as well as other currents condoning such a use in various contexts. Some even have explicit doctrines on just wars (cf. Walzer, 1977).

Another question is historical: what role have religious institutions played in relation to wars, conflict resolution and peace? What church or religious

institution has encouraged or legitimated war, spoken against war and tried to prevent or stop it or has adopted functions of conflict resolution, such as good offices, conciliation, mediation or arbitration? There is little systematic research on this, though a long list of instances could be quoted.

Religious institutions have, in many cases, encouraged or condoned wars and violence. The Old Testament describes several, some of which still inspire extremist groups. The history of the crusades provides more material. While Western understanding of *jihad* takes it to mean 'holy war', it has also repeatedly covered the blessing of wars. Religious leaders in Sri Lanka and Hindus in Ayodha have incited Muslims to acts of violence. Twentieth-century Europe contains examples of Protestant, Catholic or Orthodox religious dignitaries acting similarly, without being publicly criticized, demoted or excommunicated by their churches.

On the other hand, entire Christian denominations have suffered severe persecutions for refusing to carry arms. Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish and Muslim leaders have chosen martyrdom rather than the use of violence. Among the main currents of the peace movement described by Nigel Young (1987), the current based on religious convictions is important. History contains examples of ulemas resolving conflicts by a *fatwa*; of the Pope arbitrating in conflicts between states and, more recently in 1978, between Argentine and Chile; of Quakers bringing conflicting parties together to discuss patiently their conflicts, etc.

When do religious organizations play one role or the other, or even no role at all? Richardson (1960*b*) wrote an early empirical study on this subject, his statistical conclusions on wars in the period 1820–1949 being crudely summarized in five points: (1) religious differences appear as a cause of about every sixth war in this period and, in addition, in the background of about every third war; (2) Christians fight each other more often than expected from their number, but this is not enough to prove that Christianity has incited wars between its adherents; (3) Muslims fight each other less often than could be expected from their number, but this does not prove that Islam has prevented wars among its adherents; (4) the Confucian-Taoist-Buddhist culture seems to be pacifying, inasmuch as that part of the world has seen significantly fewer wars than expected from the magnitude of its population; and (5) there were decidedly more wars between Christians and Muslims than could be expected

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on the basis of populations. Religious differences, or some associated factor, thus seem to increase the risk of war.

Methodically more sophisticated replications have raised questions, *inter alia,* on Richardson's notion of 'causes'. A closer analysis may reduce conclusion 1 to stating that the combating parties belonged to different creeds, causality, if any, being less related to theological disagreements than to one group discriminating against the other with regards to either, for example, language or 'race', thus triggering off violence as a means of oppression, resistance or both. Conclusions 2 and 3 suffer from his treating Christianity and Islam as single religions. Many wars have been identified as being between Catholics and Protestants, or between Catholic and Orthodox Christianity, Northern Ireland and former Yugoslavia being the most recent examples. The distribution between Shi'ite and Sunnite Islam being much more uneven, we should expect fewer wars there than among the three main Christian denominations. As for conclusion 4, the average state in the Confucian-Taoist-Buddhist area is bigger than those in the Christian area. Differences may therefore be due to how living in the same state or in different states affects the likelihood of fighting. Finally, conclusion 5 may not be applied beyond the period 1820–1949 with its European imperialist expansion in the (largely) Muslim world. Again, it may, as indicated by the many civil wars in states where there are sizeable groups of both Muslims and Christians. The net balance is that there is no solid reason to see members of any major religion as more peaceful or bellicose than others.

Let us add some general reflections on what roles may be played by religion, considered as a social phenomenon. In most societies during most of the history of humankind, religion has played a central cultural role, being the main vehicle for reproducing patterns of fundamental beliefs on the nature of human beings, society and nature, as well as on fundamental value orientations. The authoritative scriptures of a given religion, together with their received interpretations, have thus 'defined reality' in a given society, within which people have worked, raised families, co-operated and fought. Which kinds of defined realities are more conducive to peaceful coexistence and which are more likely to lead to human actions that culminate in armed struggle (Galtung, 1981)?

In most societies throughout the history of humankind, religions have also had a central social function, 'defining morality' in their societies: ideals about a

good world, a good life and good human beings; which acts are wrong, right or are duties. Their moral philosophies differ, sometimes fundamentally, as do their categorizations of acts. What are the consequences of human collectivities following the precepts of a given religion? Under what circumstances have actions of the kind defined as 'right' or 'prescribed' led to consequences, whether foreseeable or unforeseeable, which make outbreaks of violence more likely?

In many countries, the main problem is peaceful coexistence between different creeds. Richardson's conclusions do not deny that Christians and Muslims have coexisted peacefully in various historical circumstances when one religion was often clearly predominant, the other adapting to this fact. Where there is a large minority which, in fact, already constitutes a local majority or tends to become a majority, the record is less encouraging as, for example, in the Philippines, Lebanon, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Cyprus and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Which historical circumstances have given rise to this situation? History is replete with bloodshed between Protestants and Catholics, when the difference in religion was seen as significant by the combatants. Yet today Northern Ireland is a rare exception, and there is no apparent reason to predict any new wave of conflicts between Protestants and Catholics elsewhere. History also shows that the old and deep East/West conflict in Europe has Catholic/Orthodox boundaries. The Serbo-Croatian clashes today have strong religious overtones and here there is less ground for optimism: the Croats have won the war of propaganda in the Catholic world and the Serbs in the Orthodox (and the Muslims in the Islamic world). This East/West cleavage may quickly become as deep as before, unless this danger is recognized and counteracted.

Great caution is called for when describing and explaining inter-group violence in terms of religious differences. There is no implication that theology as such has made peoples of different creeds slaughter each other. Historians have often discovered quite different motives, such as the strife for political power or economic advantages, behind so-called religious wars. The important point is that they were often fought under religious banners, religion being used in mobilizing people to fight, whether religious leaders condoned this or not. The crucial question is therefore: which features of which religions make them amenable to being used under such banners?

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This has to do with how people define themselves and under which circumstances religious categorizations take precedence over, say, citizenship, language, socially defined race, class, etc. Among a great number of combinations, it appears that 'ethnic' categorizations tend to dominate, provided they are already manifest and the situation forces people to choose between them.

Religion and language are prime candidates for defining ethnic categorizations, both being powerful forces in defining reality and group boundaries (cf. Judges 12: 56 on shibboleths). They will thus often be the categories in which people define their most fundamental identities, one reason being that they are difficult or impossible to dissimulate; as Chesterton's Father Brown put it, a Buddhist will reveal himself as such even in his way of denying that he is one. One must be bilingual from childhood or a language genius to pass as a 'native speaker'. Especially in times of conflict and crisis, human beings will seek security among others sharing their defined and thus clearly identifiable reality. Since this tends to make for deeper dividing lines and more discrimination between religions or languages, a vicious circle of conflict may be created.

Religion may be a part of the solution as well as a part of the problem. How are religious institutions able to act as countervailing forces when societal violence has broken out or threatens to do so? All major religions contain a version of the commandment: 'Thou shalt not kill'; yet main currents in all of them also admit exceptions which legitimate, under certain circumstances, capital punishment and participation in war. Most of them limit the commandment to human beings, and some have many believers seeing themselves as the 'chosen people', to whom followers of other religions do not really qualify as human.

All religions also have many believers understanding the commandment as an absolute norm, at least for the interaction between different groups of people and the handling of conflicts among them. Several religious leaders have promoted non-violent struggle. On the one hand, they have rejected any use of violence as a means of struggle and, on the other, they have indeed struggled against injustice and war. We find them in several religions: the Muslim Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the Christian Martin Luther King, the syncretistic Hindu Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and the Vietnamese Buddhists are merely a few examples.

The aspect of religion as a shared reality may also promote peace: as acknowledged authorities on this reality, religious leaders can contribute to resolving or mitigating conflicts, through means of communication not always available to others. In some multicultural societies, this has been officially recognized: in the former Turkish millet system, Muslim and Christian leaders of various denominations were entrusted with arbitrating conflicts among their co-religionists. The influence of religious groups and leaders is not necessarily limited to their own religious communities; they may be able to achieve confidence and trust among other parties and be able to provide good offices or engage in mediation or reconciliation between conflicting parties. In this case, trust and confidence are primarily in the person or organization, but the religious context may be important: it is an asset to have a strict ethical code, provided it is known to be followed rigorously.

Another way lies in promoting dialogue, as exists already through the World Council of Churches, as well as forums for Jewish/Christian, Christian/Muslim and other bilateral inter-faith dialogues, where it may be discovered that the faiths have more in common than originally believed. Disagreement is not necessarily negative: it may show that the parties at least address the same questions and, on this basis, further understanding and mutual tolerance may emerge. There is a clear need for a Hindu/Muslim/Sikh dialogue on the Indian subcontinent; a Christian/Muslim/Jewish one in the Middle East and a Catholic/Orthodox/Muslim dialogue in former Yugoslavia.

Some dialogues are far from easy, since religion (whether profound or superficial) tends to be an important part of a national identity. On the one hand, religious leaders may speak with particular authority when distancing themselves from acts of violence by their co-religionists and, on the other, their own followers expect them to speak on behalf of their own group. Religious leaders involved in dialogue tend to be under considerable pressure and require great courage and wisdom to cope.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ORIGINS OF PEACE

The social and cultural origins of violence are many and complex and no simple formula can sum them up. Nobody has presented convincing evidence that col-

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lective violence is inescapable within or among human societies, but there is no simple formula for peace either. In addition to possible elements of peace sugges-ted above, we should add a few general reflections.

First, Gandhi: 'There is no road to peace. Peace is the road.' His concept of peace was broad, far beyond the absence of war, and his essential point was that stable peace cannot be achieved by means that are not peaceful. It should be underlined that this was not merely an expression of high-minded idealism, but was a strategy that Gandhi used in a keen understanding of political realities that tended to be greater than the 'realism' his opponents took pride in (Sharp, 1979). Several of the findings reported above point in the same direction. The most brittle foundation on which peace can be built is mutual deterrence; the development of common interests goes much further, as demonstrated by existing security communities. For peace to have long-term prospects, we need profound cultural changes in the understanding of relations between nature, human beings and societies, learning from peaceful cultures, from feminist theories, etc. (Galtung, 1993).

Second, the actors for peace will belong to a much richer variety of categories than governments, diplomats and United Nations peace-keeping forces. Individuals, popular movements, churches, peace organizations, professional associations (including 'Generals for Peace') and other non-governmental actors have a role to play in creating peaceful social structures (Diamond and McDonald, 1991). What they could do may be obvious, though sometimes it calls for careful analysis. For example, state and international diplomacy is indispensable for arriving at international agreements and treaties, but these sometimes merely change conflicts from being manifest to being latent, ready to erupt again. United Nations peace-keeping forces have a good record in preventing fighting across the lines they are monitoring, but they are not designed for conflict resolution, even if talented officers have repeatedly contributed in this domain at a local level by using their own initiative and creativity. The development of mechanisms for conflict resolution, especially between nations (as distinct from between states) and at the local or regional level, thus seems to be a major challenge to those non-governmental actors that have relevant expertise or experience.

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